from whence cometh the phrase Le Diable Marche Avec Nous.

yeah, the trouble with that is whilst Keyes and some others do look at such plans, some even offer to command them, it's never really government policy... which is perhaps a lesson for future events, as twitter & other social media increase the spread of rumours, it can be very difficult to work out what is really being offered and to base your strategy of that... Saying this though, I still firmly believe that things would have been very different if the Alert had been sent out by Radio. Thanks for the comment.

@@DrAlexClarke An alert on May 8th would definitely have made a LOT of difference, definitely. There where fortifications, minefields that could be raised and torpedo batteries similar to that in the Oslo fjord several other places. But without orders or a firm policy, they simply did not have the resolve to fire. I would merely point out that Ruge was also a fighter, even if he did not have the resources to attack. And while the plans of attacking Trondheim where rumors and wishes among the British officers, they where apparently presented to Ruge, the guy holding the front and coordinating the defense, as if they where the actual operational plan. What he was told, and figured could have been successful, is pretty much what you suggested.

My first comment: Dr. Clarke, by quote "things would have been very different if the Alert had been sent out by Radio". Indeed, it would inherently mean General mobilization - a completely different mode (alerts through all available means), hopefully executed in a higher tempo and larger scale of mobilization than Silent (and partial) mobilization, sent by postal service... The Nygaardsvold government was given the main responsibility for the silent mobilization by the Commission of Inquiry of 1945 (Undersøkelseskommitéen av 1945). Together with the fact that the military leaders were not summoned to the government meeting early in the morning, this has been presented as the direct cause of the mobilization chaos in Norway. My second comment: Elling Polden, about (quote) "when he took command" and "his forces had no way to respond". Note that Otto Ruge performed a very active role in reducing the armament of this losing game - for more than a decade before 1940. It is no secret that Norway's main problem was the political "trend", two political parties in particular, leading up to 1940. Some sources believe that the demilitarizing road to perdition started as early as 1917 (the Russian Revolution, different interpretations of its causes and consequences, e.g. "the inherent danger of keeping a national army, which (hypothetically) can be turned towards the people", and similar ideas). To support my expression "active role", here are just a few quotes from an article (source: after quote): (Quote) "Ruge's radical and unsentimental views on defense policy made him a highly controversial figure in conservative military and pro-defense circles in the 1930s. ... Ruge had a great influence on the defense reforms in the interwar years ... By virtue of his positions in the General Staff, he was on several occasions engaged in investigative work, first by the Defense Commission of 1920. Since then he worked with Forsvarsordningen av 1927, og -1933 [the defense schemes of 1927 and 1933. Both Colonel Laake and Colonel Ruge were active parts in defining the schemes, led by Laake]. ... Especially on the latter, he [Ruge] had a great influence. ... The defense scheme of 1933 entailed a reduction of all personnel categories. Permanent salaried officers decreased from 147 to 126 man-years, permanent non-commissioned officers from 238 to 159 and enlisted/quartermasters from 353 to 300. The defense system of 1933 also reduced the number of aircraft in the Navy Air Force from 96 to 64..." (End quote) The source of the above is simply a mainstream subject matter article about Otto Ruge in the Norwegian Biographical Encyclopaedia (as translated from the original Norwegian article into English). It is part of SNL, Store norske leksikon (Great Norwegian Encyclopaedia), which today is curated by the history departments of the eight largest Norwegian universities, thus considered an established authority on WW2 history. nbl.snl.no/Otto_Ruge Two first-hand accounts to read, for insight of the response to Operation Weserübung-Nord during the 62 days of Norwegian military defense, and aftermath: (1) Oberst (Colonel) Odd Lindbäck-Larsen, book title "6. divisjon", 1946. Electronic copy available at the National Library of Norway, www.nb.no/items/a50b806dad94d5b6ebecc0cf537dcb6d (2) General Fleischer, book title "Efterlatte papirer" (papers he left behind were published, by permission from his widow, after her death), 1949. Electronic copy available at the National Library of Norway, www.nb.no/items/8c55434b7a9e07d00644944389ea47e6 (3) Reprint of President of Parliament C. J. Hambro's review of Fleischer's book, published in the newspaper "Tønsberg blad" on 6, 8 and 9 December 1947, Electronic copy available at the National Library of Norway, www.nb.no/items/62ab091411f1f09ed89b648566a0b43c It is still possible to find first edition of both books, used but in good condition. From what I have read about our WW2 history, in Norwegian literature, I have to agree with Dr. Clarke: in Norwegian military history of WW2, no general or admiral could measure up to Major General Carl Gustav Fleischer as genuine man of war (not only by education, training and experience, but even more: by personal characteristics and pure talent). Fleischer's second in command, oberst Odd Lindbäck-Larsen, describes Fleischer in memoriam on the first pages of his 1947 book: (here, translated from Norwegian) "We will always be proud to have fought under his command. I have put these words of remembrance at the forefront of my account, so that readers can see our chief as we saw him: the knight, with his old-fashioned courtesy and common sense, cold wrath and deep laughter". I want to end with pieces of Major General Fleischer's sad fate: the political game over his head (or behind his back), him speaking his strong mind, consequences, gradual reduction of duties in London, Scotland then Canada, humiliation, his tragic suicide, his widow's demise few years later, and the official epilogue (or shameful lack of). It was undeserved, and the early death of our general was a great loss for the Kingdom of Norway.