If taking a random number between 0 and 1 is defined, then from 0 to inf is also defined, given the mapping f(x) = x/(1-x) which sends [0,1] to [0,inf)

@@LeviFinkelstein I specified linear distribution though. If you graph x/(x-1) you'll see it's not linear. Also, if you do the mapping and pick random numbers between 0 and 1 you'll get 75% of numbers being less or equal to 0.75. Which maps to 3. So than taking random numbers from a linear distribution between 0 and infinity would result in a number less that 3 (3=0.75/(1-0.75)) which is not what's expected right. Numbers less than 3 should occupy and infinitely small space of the resulting distribution

aha, okay. Well if linear means that intervals of same size contain the same probability mass, then [0,inf) would contain infinite intervals of some constant non-zero probability, which would diverge.@@Oskar1000

The odds on theism that lemons would be yellow = the odds on atheism. The arguments aren't analogous because conditional on theism one would expect harmony while no one would expect any specific pairing between colors and fruits.

@@deliberationunderidealcond5105 Well, you just have to postulate a god who values psychophysical... eh, I mean color-fruit haromony

@@kamilgregorThe prior probability of a God who wants red apples is no greater than of a God who wants yellow or blue apples, so that theory gets a ludicrously low prior.

@@deliberationunderidealcond5105 The prior probability of a god who wants the actual psychophysical laws is no greater than the prior probability of a god who wants any other set of psychophysical laws. This is because if you are consistent about keeping the physical states constatnt across possible worlds with different psychophysical laws so that only mental states change, then what "harmonious" means just collapses into being synonymous with "actual" and the argument from psychophysical harmony just becomes an argument from actual-world chauvinism.

@@deliberationunderidealcond5105 The prior probability of a god who prefers the actual psychophysical laws is no greater than the prior probability of a god who prefers any other set of psychophysical laws. This is because if one is consistent about keeping everything other than mental states constant in cross-world comparisons, the term "harmonious" just collapses into being synonymous with the term "actual" and the argument from psychophysical harmony just turns into an argument from actual-world chauvinism. If the difference in mental states between two worlds literally doesn't matter at all when it comes to anything else (because we're holding everything else constant), then there's no truth about which would has the "harmonious" psychophysical laws. Any inclination to call the laws in our world "harmonious" is then just down to us being used to them (because they are the actual ones) and the laws in the other world are just odd but not "disharmonious" in any meaningful way. So there's no reason to posit that a god would prefer the actual laws over the laws in the other world.

Of course a theodicy can work. Soul building might say real psychological anguish is valuable, skeptical theism can explain it, genuinely helping avert pain may strengthen relationships, and the HI theodicy also explains it benthams.substack.com/p/a-theistic-theory-of-everything

@rationunderidealcond5105 Saying that "real psychological anguish" is valuable is just my point no. 2. If you think we experience it bc there's a god who values it even though it's not instrumental for anything is just another way of saying you believe in the Mad Sultan Yoth-Shogoth. Theodicies that postulate that pain is instrumental don't apply because we are holding everything other than the presence of pain across the two worlds as constant. E.g., in both worlds, souls get built up just as much but in one world, they do without any painful mental states. One can of course say that god is so grossly incompetent that the only souls they can manage to create are souls than can only be built up by painful mental states AND that this god also cares about whether a very few souls actually get buit up or not (most people go through they entire life without any painful sensation at all, given that most pregnancies end in miscarridge). But that's just adhocness squared. Ditto for similar theodicies.

​@@kamilgregorthe demon sultan is Azathoth, not Yog-Sothoth. ("Yoth-Shogoth" is not anything--you may be conflating with shoggoths, a species created by the Elder Things.)

@kamilgregor Value often emerges from contrast. Pleasure gains significance when contrasted with pain. Without pain, would pleasure lose its meaning? Perhaps psychophysical harmony requires this balance. However, without contrast, pleasure becomes mundane. Imagine a symphony playing only one note-it lacks richness. Pain, as the contrasting note, enhances the symphony of experience. You mention that souls can be built up without painful mental states. But perhaps pain plays a unique role in shaping souls. It could be akin to the chisel that sculpts a masterpiece.

​@ith-bq6nf Let's use a specific example: Imagine a possible world which is exactly the same as the actual world except for one difference - the phenomenal experience of pain is "swapped" with a different phenomenal experience, compared to the actual world. And for the sake of simplicity, let's imagine it's "swapped" with a phenomenal experience that nobody gets to experience in the actual world. Let's say that it's the phenomenal experience of what it's like to taste a well-done, juice tyrannosaurus stake. In that possible world, literally everything is the same as it is in the actual world, except when someone, for example, puts their hand into fire, they have the phenomenal experience of tasting a tyrannosaurus stake instead of the phenomenal experience of pain, but they still say "Au!", learn to avoid touching fire in the future, teach their kids not to touch fire, etc. In that possible world, all the "work" that pain is doing in the actual work is done by the phenomenal experience of tasting a tyrannosaurus stake. For example, in that possible world, it's the phenomenal experience of tasting a tyrannosaurus stake that makes people appreciate pleasure and prevents pleasure from becoming mundane. In that hypothetical, there is no truth of the matter about which of the two worlds (the actual world or the imagined possible world) is more "harmonious" than the other. The possible world is just different. People might have the intuition that surely, the possible world must be "disharmonious" but that intuition is misguided by the fact that in the actual world, us not experiencing pain would have adverse consequences. But as long as we stipulate that whether pain is "swapped" or not across the two worlds doesn't make any difference for anything, the intuition loses its force. The imagined possible world just seems odd to us (because we don't live in it) but it's perfectly normal for people living there - they don't go around saying "oh no, what a disharmonious world we live in!" (because everything except for the phenomenal experience of pain is kept the same, including what people believe, say, how they behave, etc.) Us calling that possible world "disharmonious" and ours "harmonious" is just actual-world chauvinism. And more importantly - a perfectly loving god would OF COURSE chose to create that world instead of the actual world. Postulating that they wouldn't is tantamount to believing in a Lovecraftian cosmic monster. My epistemic credence that this is true is much higher than, for example, my epistemic credence that the statement "torturing babies for fun is immoral" is true and astronomically higher than that the following statement is true: "The actual psychophysical laws are the case and no gods exist."