Relay brilliant to see Yogi talk about the recent paper on naturalising relevance realisation. I’ve yet to sit down and properly read the paper, so this was a really nice and well integrated summary.

Terribly interesting discussion on an entire 23 volumes of philosophical relevance today and topics in the philo of science. Absolutely 1000% agree on reductionist view using computationalism as what explains higher order complexity enigmata such as, the universe as a quantum computer (this really should only be considered as allegory IMO), or consciousness. I also agree that the figures who currently think they sit at the proverbial 'right hand of God', believing not only that they can, but also should be able to manipulate virtually anything they want, whether that means building a some biological super intelligence (I also don't understand why anyone legitimately would want to create something like this but out of sheer vanity - which is the world we live in today). I have further Q's, but one just floats to the top of my neural lipids. How does the notion that metamodern science addresses the problem with postmodern critique apply to current scientific inquiry? I get that postmodern critique is designed to err on the skeptical in the sciences (yet that's not enough for irreproducible science to be published - and there's A LOT of it!), and can certainly is a deconstructive process. This is arguably by design however. I look at scientific inquiry as the moment one forms an educated opinion on a set of observation, one in which they would probably want to be 'right', and then takes that hyothesis, balls it up into a little paper ball, throws it to the ocean, and take rifle shots at it (metaphorically, theoretical or experimental tests). If the idea continues to stay afloat, there might be something to it. Never definitively, but perhaps elevated with a level of evidential support that the idea would not have otherwise had. So then, from the interpretation by the ideal observer - an unbiased skeptic (who hardly exists), what truly makes the deconstructive nature of postmodern critique, within the realm of scientific inquiry, a negative? And how would reconstruction in postmodern critique in the sciences be implemented? Appreciate your patience on the length of this post.