Todd May even contributed material to Michael Schur's The Good Place!

The guy participates in the idea of Foucault

Hahaha I had that same feeling!

Not that there's anything wrong with that

"What's the deal with substantialist metaphysics?"

Word

The difference is just that there is no need for affirmative action in Taoism, since acting with purpose goes against the very thing that is acted upon, by inscribing identity into it, this is why one should act as though not acting (wu-wei).

Interesting because Deleuze & Guattari discuss the Tao in A Thousand Plateaus on the “How To Make Yourself A Body Without Organs” chapter (or plateau as they’d call it)

@@cheers6043 Aha. Thank you for the reference, I will have to look into it.

so so glad I am not the only one. my current conclusion is that the Dao is this 'creator' of difference.

This Is Fractopia the whole point is that if you say that what returns is a “template” or “structure” you’re negating difference in advance and confining it to pre-established categories. Deleuze was a post-structuralist.

Probably more accurately transcendentalism can be described as things that express the possibility of experience. Though it’s kind of an odd way of putting it, Kant believed the a priori were the conditions for experience and Deleuze probably though the same for difference in itself

the "difference" here has a different meaning for Deleuze, not the one understood as something between two identities.

@@firebolt6306 It doesn't work though, it's not a move that can be made. If the domain of Deleuzean difference can be assigned temporary identities via thought it presupposes that difference has a structure, and structure already presupposes identity. To use the wanky term, identity is always already present in the notion of difference. If conceptualisation is the act of imposing identities on difference, the only way there could be a criterion as to whether they were correctly imposed is if the thing on which it is imposed already has a structure, and then we're back at the fact that structure presupposes identity. He appears to have conflated specific conceptualisation with Identity as an abstract absolute, as if to say that if current conceptualisation is shown to be inadequate by new experience it must be the fact that Identity in itself is a construct. But there's no need to go that far, the only step required is to say that certain 'identities', or concepts are inadequate. Seems to me that Deleuze thinks he's gotten to the noumena with the move to call it difference, and that phenomena are accounted for by identities, but really by trying to instantiate this realm of difference it was necessary to pressupose identity in it, which really comes back to the Kantian observation that the only way to conceive of the relation between thoughts and an external world is to accept that all accounts of an external world presuppose certain base concepts, and that's the limit of thought.

@@lukeskirenkoBrother, no. Any identity you apprehend in difference is an ontic claim that comes from the already-constituted subjectivity; that you can talk about identity in difference as (non)-being doesn’t say anything about (non)-being itself, as if words alone could conjure things into existence.

@@o.s.h.4613 This raises the question, what concepts are pressuposed by the claim that there is a 'constituted subjectivity'? Can the claim be made merely with reference to metaphysics, or can it only be made be going beyond metaphysics and into science?

By being bald and wearing glasses?

@@reeseriley225 @@reeseriley225 what nonsense you let slip from your fingers! It appears 'your' breathtaking arrogance can't apprehend a joke. 'I' love Foucault, 'I' love Todd, why 'I' even love 'you'! Reread that last comment of 'yours'-can't you see how it reeks of priggish negativity, cold hate? On the other hand, love loves to love love.

I think we are supposed to notice this-as a Repetition. And then we’re supposed to look for the Difference.

He’s presenting the Dogmatic Image of Post-Structuralism.

And it isn’t easy!

establishing difference in itself, without involving any sorts of identities, is difference in itself. It does feel a bit elusive, because establishing difference as X, difference as Y, cannot escape X and Y as identities. We can only try to establish difference as something like X (as kind of like a myth, through copies, or Simulacrums), and I think that is precisely what he seems to be doing as difference in itself. I'm not Deleuze expert, take my word with a grain of salt.

I think he sorts of defines it as intensity. He sort of uses Kant's idea of intensity (as opposition to rationalist theories about extension) "The expression 'difference of intensity' is a tautology. Intensity is the form of difference in so far as this is the reason of the sensible." An example of an intensity would be temperature. No two things can ever be exactly the same temperature because there is infinite room for error. However something like quantity would be an extensity because you can have definite amounts. Because there is infinite room for difference within intensity, Deleuze thinks of them as the same thing. Difference is sort of the thing that drives sensation.

Just because it is reactive. It is all in "Nietzsche and philosophy", his rather readable book. I can't put it all here, but it comes down to dialectics being the final form of nihilism. Edit: deeper reason that can be put in a comment - according to him, Max Stirner is right on dialectical grounds

because a reactive dialectic relies entirely on negation rather than affirmation, and negation means identities precede difference, while deleuze wants to make a thought which affirms difference by making difference primary instead of identity, if you watch the lecture before this he says all this in the last hour or so

@@tobincharles8651 thanks :)

@@tomio8072 no problem, even if it's a comment a year old I'll take the chance to btfo hegel.

@@counterr6750 love this comment “the dialectic is the final form of nihilism” I am totally stealing that sometime