It has its critics

@@jamesmhango2619 yes that's true, and I've heard them, but honestly, what doesn't have critics? I still thinks it holds up to them, and that's what matters :)

What unconvinced you?

I think you bring up a good point, although I think you are missing one thing. Although it is true that we assume others around us have minds, that is only because we cannot observe the inner working of their brains. We can, however, observe the inner workings of a computer, thus making its appearance of consciousness irrelevant. Also I find it strange that you are mentioning emergent properties as the basis of conciousness, as that's something Searle practically invented. Yet you and Searle seem to differ radically when it comes to AI, why is that?

@@eurobeatenthusiast2157 I find we have as much access to the inner workings of the brains of others as we do to the inner workings of a computer. The major difference is that, to a large extent, we understand what's happening in the computer better because we built them intentionally to make sense to us. Even there, though, we don't understand _everything_ about the systems we use. In networking there are bits of code and other processes that were created using genetic algorithms. They work really well, but we don't know why. As for why Searle and I differ on consciousness, I'm not sure. It could be that I cannot see any meaningful distinction between something that 'is' conscious and something that 'seems' conscious. Unless we've developed some form of test for generic consciousness (other than the Turing test), I cannot see how we can possibly justify there being any distinction that matters.

@@robindude8187 The level of difference in our understanding of computers versus our brains is really miles apart, not on par as you suggest. We can explain and recreate every single element of a computer, as is implied by the fact we created them, can you say the same for the human brain? From what I understand of genetic algorithms, they are merely just a way of problem-solving based off of trial and error. How are exactly are they implemented into networking in such a way that we cannot understand them? Finally, while I do agree that there isn't really a meaningful test of consciousness, the distinction is still important. In a world where computers are being trusted with more important tasks than ever, the understanding that they are not truly conscious is an important one. Societies relationship with computers has already gone far past that of a simple tool, the delusion that our computers are conscious would make that relationship even more skewed in an unfavourable way. This is what I believe Searle is truly trying to tell us with the Chinese Room argument. While computers are powerful tools and are very likely going to gain functional equivalence to humans in a relatively short period of time, we still must understand that consciousness cannot arise from a system designed in such a way as a computer, and with this understanding we must continue looking for consciousness in avenues that will be more fruitful.

@@eurobeatenthusiast2157 *The level of difference in our understanding of computers versus our brains is really miles apart, not on par as you suggest.* I didn't suggest they were on par. In fact I said we know computers better because we build them. What I was trying to say is that we can observe the functioning of a brain, much as we can observe the functioning of a computer. *From what I understand of genetic algorithms, they are merely just a way of problem-solving based off of trial and error.* So is evolution, but that doesn't mean we 'understand' why the answers work, just that they do. Genetic algorithms recombine code in various ways and trying them. What you end up with is a set of codes that work send signals and process them. We understand each small piece of code (much like we understand the firing of neurons in the brain), but we can't say why that combination in that order functions as well as it does (just as we can't understand why the firing of neurons produces our thoughts). Part of the reason we _use_ genetic algorithms to produce these codes is that the answers they come up with are better than any we can develop by intentionally combining those codes. *Societies relationship with computers has already gone far past that of a simple tool, the delusion that our computers are conscious would make that relationship even more skewed in an unfavourable way.* For right now it _would_ be a delusion to say that a computer is conscious. I do not accept that any current computer has reached that point. I also don't accept that amoebas are conscious, despite the fact they're made of the same sorts of things we are. Pretty sure plants aren't. Have my doubts about ants or worms. If, however, that changes it would seem detrimental to us to deny that consciousness. *This is what I believe Searle is truly trying to tell us with the Chinese Room argument.* I rather doubt his arguments are about how we should treat computer intelligence, or respond to it. _Especially_ since he has stated that it's not impossible for computers (or machines) to be conscious, just that consciousness cannot come about via the methods we currently employ for active programming, that is using deliberate logical coding. I suspect that if computer consciousness is to arise, it will be via genetic algorithms combining code in ways we don't predict, perhaps with a 'community' of such things interacting to drive them on. At the end we'll have a program that reacts like the conscious minds of people, and will have no better understanding of _why_ those codes in that order generate a conscious mind than we do why a bunch of neurons firing in the patterns they fire in generate our _own_ consciousness.

I think you don't even need to look at how the mechanism of understanding is, in order to refute the chinese room. searle assumes that the room can talk like a native speaker (that means semantics is implemented) while asserts that the room can't do semantics.

Pleasure, thanks for watching, best of luck in the assignment.

Thank you

The thought experiment isn't about the book with the inputs and outputs, its about the person in the room. The person who wrote the book understood Chinese, and wrote the book so well that someone who doesn't understand Chinese can use it and seem fluent. The person in the room however still doesn't understand Chinese at all

A pleasure, thank you for watching.

Functionalists argue that the understanding happens in the notebooks, not in the operator. This might sound weird, but that's because the thought experiment massively understates the amount of information that needs to be handled in order to answer a simple question. You wouldn't be looking up the answer, but you would be running a mathematical model with trillions of calculations, similar in magnitude as simulating what happens in a human brain.

@@user232349 Still tough to see how we can get semantically valuable meaning from that though

Thank you for watching :)

Neurology has nothing to say on the question of the mind except that there is currently no physical evidence that the mind is the product of the brain