Thank you for the kind words! Glad you found it useful.

You are most welcome

Hi Vince. Thanks for the excellent comments. I hesitated over the word "constitutive," insofar as not just ANY (material) thing could be an idol. So, there has to be something "in" the material too, not just in the case. However, if forced to answer "True or False," I would say "True" to that claim. On the subjectivism point, I wonder about that. Marion seems to imply a Heideggerian sense of the force of "Schicksal" or fate in determining the gaze. In other words, there is more than just an individual psychology involved but a cultural "horizon" as well. In fact, the latter seems more important. (Note what he says about the "twilight" of the idol, and how the Greeks had a possibility of seeing the divine in statutes that are mere art for us, since "the gods have fled" (as Holderlin and Heidegger would say). But this is under the influence of Lacan and Sartre as well, so there is a subjectivism here too. The phenomenology of the icon might be compared to the encounter with a transformative human influence: it can make you into something that, antecedent to the encounter, you never could have imagined. However, I imagine that whether you find that possibility convincing depends on your own experience of it (or lack thereof). I agree that the idol and icon are not two distinct entities, but perhaps a better analogy than "two sides of the same coin" would be: "two gestalts of the same figure." In the idol, visibility completely fulfills the gaze, and the invisible is absolutely invisible. But in the icon, invisibility comes to visibility (in the manner of the Levinasian "face.") P.S. Certainly, you have discharged your duty with this fine commentary, but I hope that, in the service of the class and your overall pursuit of philosophical "paideia" or "Bilding" you will engage with other (esp. grad) student comments as well. One advantage of this format is we can keep several discussions going on in parallel for the next three weeks, which might yield interesting cross-pollination. So, please check back here this weekend to see what others have said, in case something inspires a response.

In response to your inquiry about "subjectivism," Vince, I think a more rigorous phenomenological account of "the gaze" is required. In the other assigned chapter by Marion ("The Icon or the Endless Hermeneutic"), we receive a passing reference to Husserl's notion of "adumbrations" associated with perceptual experience of the life-world. To be brief, the adumbrations arise from expectations implicit within our intentional aims (e.g., the act of perceiving): when I perceive the front side of a tree, I expect the backside to, for the most part, present a similar kind of tapestry (e.g., bark-like substance and texture as opposed to a human face). In turn, my previous conscious experience with tree-like entities informs, fills out, and unravels the intentional content of the perceptual act. I say "fill out" because we can never view the object from all sides; rather, we are limited in our perception of the intentional object by our finite spatiotemporal location. To be clear, though, it is not only my consciousness that carries these presuppositions about "perceiving a tree"; rather, others also share them to some extent. I am curious if a similar analysis can be performed with "the gaze" as described by Marion, especially in the context of idols which are fundamentally constituted by the gaze. In short, what sort of adumbration(s), apperception, and intentional implication(s) are necessary to "fill out" and "complete" the intentional aim of the gaze, and, more importantly for Vince's question, are they intersubjective? In a religious context, I would assume that a common background in upbringing and education (i.e., Heideggerian "thrownness") would be necessary. In an aesthetic context, I would assume the same, specifically at historical moments when aesthetic education was more tightly-controlled, monitored, and standardized (e.g., the 19th and early 20th centuries). We might worry, however, that such a phenomenological analysis presents insurmountable challenges as secularization and globalization continue to traverse cultural boundaries, a phenomenon welcomed by Vattimo.

Vince, if you would care to respond to Jason, that would be great. I will hang back and observe and mull this over a bit for now...

​@@jasonbarton6091 I believe that, in short, the answer is that we cannot analyze "gaze" in the same way that Husserl analyzes "adumbrations" or apperception more generally. The reason is that for Husserl there is deeper commitment to the notion of a noema which is objective (in the full metaphysical sense of the word). In contrast, (and now I'm stealing some of what the professor says in the next video with respect to Derrida) Marion doesn't appear to want such a notion, in agreement with Derrida. There is only noetic content, not a noema. And that would be the reason why I asked the question to begin with. It seems at first glance that Marion does not want an objective standard for idols/icons. Only a subjective one. There is also the concern of intersubjectivity raised by both Jason and the professor. What determines idols/icons is an intersubjective nexus of norms, handed down to us by culture. Having read Heidegger, I understand this answer, but I am nevertheless critical of it. Who decides what constitutes the nexus of norms? A group of people over time, of course. To my mind that leads us straight back to the issue at hand; whether we have a standard which is objective or subjective. I suppose that at root my question boils down to "If we want to decide whether an entity is an icon or idol, how do we choose?". I think that Marion has to say that the answer is subjective unless he wants to throw in with Husserl (and Frege) and commit to a larger metaphysical picture.

Thank you for your feedback! Let me know your future thoughts on the matter, so I can improve future presentations of this material.

I think this is open for interpretation, but the way I was thinking of it, "transpierce" refers to the way, when we see things in everyday life, we are always already looking "through" them towards another thing. In this way, we navigate and organize our life-world. We don't contemplate things for their own sake, but only in order to "string" them together with other things in ur environment. Perhaps you might use the analogy of how a threaded needle "pierces" pieces of fabric to fasten them together. By contrast, the gaze is "frozen" and "fixed" upon the idol.

@@BrentKalar I see, that is way more helpful. I see it with the analogy of the 'threaded needle.' thanks!

Hi Robert! How does the artist "zone in" on the idol in the material? I'm glad you asked! That is partly what the readings for next week deal with. So stay tuned. No doubt, you will want to raise this again in connection with next week's vids.

The icon seems to me to be quite different from the idol, though both are tangible objects. The difference between them is that our aim arrives at the object through our gaze, in the case of the object being an idol and is arrested there. The icon, similarly, is merely an object, but in this case, the gaze is invited to go past its aims, or more closely approach its aims, by contacting some manner of the invisible or the divine.

Hey Arlene! Good to hear from you. Good points. It does seem that the power of the idol comes from the gaze, but the gaze is something mysterious that we don't have the ability to "turn on and off" at will.I am not clear though why and how the idol that could no longer satisfy the gaze would become and icon. I might, but it might also just become "neutral," a "dead" thing. I don't think we become objectified by the icon, so much as "subjectified" "to" it. It reveals our identity as subjects to us, or calls us to a (usually "higher") way of being, thinking, and acting.

Hi Kate! Certainly, the icon can call one to ponder what is beyond. But I think it also renders the invisible visible literally, the the way the face does. That is, when one feels that IT sees YOU, rather than the reverse. That reversal of intention, or "counter-intentionality" as it is called, is the essence of that type of phenomenon. Of course, it may not happen to you personally; but in that case, the icon doesn't appear -- at least as an icon. That is my understanding.

@@BrentKalar That makes sense! Thank you

I thought the icon does call forth the infinite. I think the reference to the icon painted on wood is confusing, even confused, in the way it raises and then almost negates the material aspect. I have little familiarity with Levinas, but a static representation would be subject to the gaze and so, I think, not an icon.

Hi Jason. Great questions. It has been a long time since I have read "Reality and its Shadow" (although I believe I read it about fifteen years ago in a continental aesthetics reading group), so I am not prepared to immediately comment on that. Can you say more about why Levinas would see the icon as duplicitous and concealing more than it reveals? That is interesting.

Hi Dawson! Good to hear from you. I think we need to read that in context. The point is that there is no "icon of the visible," but only of the invisible." Christ exemplifies this: he is the "view" of the Father, who is essentially invisible. He serves this function through gradual "saturation," whereby, in an infinite process, the Father is revealed more and more in him.

Hi Ryan! Good to hear from you. You make some points that are interesting to think about. Bataille seems to view "inner" experience as something closer to the traditional "mystic" notion of a union/ merging of the self into the whole of being. So, it would be a more violent and radical experience than of either the idol or icon. The Lacan connection is also intriguing, but I'm not sure I am seeing what you are getting at there. Perhaps you can develop those ideas further.

Another important notion here is the "aim", which is essential to the gaze. Where we look is determined by our aim; e.g. in Ancient Greece the statue of Athena is an idol only because of our predisposition to look for a statue of Athena, we need an aim in order to fix our gaze upon something. In that sense, I can understand why a concept could be an idol. The intellect's "aim" (perhaps its intuition?) sets out what we would like to cognize, and the concept gives us an entity to gaze at. Is that helpful?

Hi Hank! Does the intellect have a gaze? Well, perhaps a form of "in-sight." The phenomenological intention is already at least quasi-conceptual, insofar as it serves as a kind of schematic anticipation of the intuition that would fulfill it in perception. The idol is supposed to be a complete "filling up" of an intention. So, we might ask: what is the analogue of a complete filling of an intention in the case of a concept?

I also thought that it was interesting that a concept can be an idol. Marion suggests on p. 16 that the idol corresponds to metaphysical concepts, even Christian metaphysical conceptions of God. The way that Marion is describing metaphysics seems to connect back to the theme of continuity v. discontinuity in the course with the idol representing continuity and the icon, discontinuity. Following Vattimo’s explication of Gadamer’s criticism of aesthetic consciousness in “Truth", you could say that in the idol, the gaze “never really encounters anything other than itself." If Marion is emphasizing above all the continuous character of metaphysics, then this might be a slightly different take on what constitutes a metaphysical concept.

@@louiseblanco8254 Hi Louise! Interesting-- it had not occurred to me to make that connection. Vattimo on discontinuity and Marion on saturated phenomenon would be a comparison worth exploring in detail. In both cases, they are trying to explicate a way to encounter "the given" beyond metaphysical constructions of "being." The concept of "event" is the obvious place to begin a comparison.

Good point. One might challenge Marion for assimilating the face and icon too closely. I think, however, that Marion does want to attribute a KIND of animation to the phenomenal experience of the icon. In this respect, it is similar to Heidegger ascribing a "battle" of earth and world to the work of art.