A couple points here to consider in this discussion. The Imperial Japanese Navy have been running all around constantly from combat zone to combat zone from November, 1941 until June, 1942. The Japanese carrier strike force had fought at Pearl Harbor, Malaya, Dutch East Indies, attacked British Navy targets at Ceylon and elsewhere with raids on many Pacific islands including the Philippines. The Japanese also struck in the south Pacific around the Solomons, New Guinea and raided Darwin, Australia. Some experts will add more but the point here is the six main Japanese carriers had already seen constant combat before the battle of the Coral Sea. All these combat operations had resulted in a certain level of attrition and aircraft losses for the Japanese naval air corps. Heavy aircraft, pilot and aircrew losses at the Coral Sea meant the Japanese only had four carriers for the Midway operation in June, 1942. These naval aviation losses at the Coral Sea were a critical factor in the loss of the battle of Midway. But I think the sum total of all the losses incurred by the Japanese across the Pacific took their toll on combat efficiency by the time Midway rolled around. Japanese naval aviators, their aircrews, sailors, officers and aviation technical support, mechanics, bomb loaders, fuelers and the like were likely very tired, perhaps even exhausted from non-stop naval combat operations. So my argument is to NEvER overlook the fatigue factor from overwork. Many of these Japanese naval aviators had been heavily involved with training for Pearl Harbor and ramping up for the war for a period of about a year. However, the Japanese lacked adequate replacement pilots and aircrew. Many of these Japanese aircrew were veterans of the China war making them irreplaceable. So the loss of those four carriers really hurt Japanese naval aviation efficiency. It is amazing in some respects, bordering on recklessness, that Admiral Yamamoto would order his carrier crews into combat at Midway almost immediately after the Coral Sea operation. The real turning point of the Pacific war was the battles around Guadalcanal with the prolonged meatgrinder losses of naval warships, warplanes and troops that really stopped the Japanese offensive aspirations permanently. America had to lock Japan into a headlock and grind up Japanese forces in a sausage grinder type of campaign. Midway was an important battle but the battles around Guadalcanal were almost as important. Guadalcanal went poorly for the American Navy and Marine Corps for the first two months. The Marines on land held but the US Navy really did poorly against the Japanese cruisers and destroyers in night surface warfare actions. American nava losses due to our inferior torpedoes, the lack of knowledge about how to use radar, and our inadequate night fighting training really caused sever losses in several night actions around Guadalcanal. The US Navy got better for sure but only at heavy cost in men and ships. We lost many carriers too due to Japanese air or submarine attacks. So It is really important to understand in my estimation that the United States didn't really get its act together in terms of naval warfare until about mid-1943. The Mark XIV torpedo story is almost criminal negligence. But our fighter planes, like the Wildcat and Army P-40 were barely adequate against the Zero and Oscar. We didn't really start turning the tide in the Pacific until the P-38 fighter, the Hellcat and more heavy bombers made their way into the Pacific. The Gato class submarine was also extemely important from mid-1943 in turning the tide against the Japanese sinking tankers and the rest of the enemy merchant fleet with torpedoes that actualy worked. We got a little bit lucky at Midway to stop Japanese advance. But it took three long years of vicious grinding war on the air, land and sea against an implacable foe that fought to the death in most cases to win the Pacific War.

You can’t count on luck but luck counts.

The only problem for me with these types of seminars are they are aimed at people who only have limited or no knowledge of the battle. I would love to see a conference with a number of historians well versed on the Battle of Midway to ask more obscure questions about some of the nuances of the lead up to, the actual event, and the aftermath of the battle. At minimum, I would like to have this videos' historian, Craig Symonds along with John Lundstrom, Jon Parshall, Tony Tully, and Robert Mrazek. Those are authors of books about Midway or have large parts of them about Midway that I have read. If I won the Lottery, organizing such a conference would be one the things I would like to do. LOL!

1:02:00 "Horatio Hornblower" - I discovered C S Forester in 1967, when I caught the film "Captain Horatio Hornblower" on my college dorm's TV. I spent that summer reading the entire series. In 2003 I saw "Master and Commander" and discovered the Jack Aubrey series of novels by Patrick O'Brian.

I believe another critical decision was for the IJN to hold back the 2 carriers damaged in the Coral Sea battle. They were no worse off than Yorktown but Nimitz ordered his carrier to enact emergency repairs and ready or not head out to join the task force. Now maybe the IJN would have lost all 6 carriers but those extra vessels might have made all the difference.

Pleasure hearing Dr. Symonds remarks on Midway.

This is an amazingly underrated interview and exposition. It is an excellent basic description of the Battle.

12.00 Nimitz considered writing off Midway. Would be a burden to Japan (distance) and since the fall of the PI the trans Pacific cable was not needed.

43.40 Luck People make their own luck. Decisions made the difference. If you are looking for your keys and find them is that luck? If you are looking for your keys and find the wedding band you lost 3 months ago, THAT is luck.

I note that "key decisions 2, 4 and 5" are all about correcting bad decisions or problems of the Spruance (Halsey trained) air groups. The fact that the air groups from Fletchers Yorktown, launched efficiently, flew to target and conducted a coordinated attack sinking the Soryu is just an afterthought in your presentation and totally ignored in the movie.

Thumbs up.

One aspect of the battle that wasn’t touched on was how Admiral Fletcher, overall “senior” tactical commander of USN forces marshalled (to defend Midway) during the action, purposely deferred much of the real-time decision making to his subordinate Admiral Spruance. I think that showed a significant command maturity on Fletcher’s part, and contributed to the battle’s success. I not absolutely certain, but I think the issue did come up at one point during the Midway operation and Fletcher did in fact verbally give his decision-making authority over to Spruance because he thought Spruance, at the time, had a better handle on unfolding events due to time and location of forces….

The Japanese CAP that took out VT-8 had almost seven minutes to get back to patrol altitude before the next attack force arrived. I think the treatment of this narrative is a bit too simplified and contains at least this one error. I expect a little more from a historian of this caliber.

Maps and diagrams would be helpful.

i have yet to hear any explanation about laps in position reporting of Japanese carriers. Up to two hour increments of lacking position acquisition knowledge! A B17 flying in constant contact and reporting Japanese carrier positions would have been nice. Was not anyone reporting position when attacking? Was anyone listening?

Even with our intelligence, the Japanese would have destroyed our carriers if Yamamoto had not been a fool suffering from 'winner's disease.' His battleships should have attacked the Midway Island, providing field artillery for the invading force. They could have had two flattops full of fighters to provide air support (top) for the battleships. Three of his carriers (including the one he sent to Alaska) should have had all of its bombers and torpedo planes armed and waiting for American naval force. No Japanese bomber should have been sent to attack Midway and use surface ordinance. Yamamoto was drunk with his victory at Pearl Harbor. Imagine if he had 200 bombers armed and fueled waiting for the American force to be spotted.

The story that all of the Japanese attack aircraft were in their hangars when the dive bomber attack began is blatantly false. Multiple contemporary American and Japanese eyewitness accounts, the carrier's TROMs, and the available time frame in which to spot their aircraft, together make abundantly clear that only Akagi's attack aircraft were in her hangars. Two of the carriers had their strikes spotted on deck while a third had approximately 20 aircraft on deck (although only a few of these were spotted). Continuing to repeat the story that our aviators were painting "lurid portraits" simply denigrates men who risked their lives to gain the victory- and distorts the historical record.

Another ridiculous commentary that parrots the good heart of Yamamoto...what a saintly fellow...a golden hearted love bird that sings with the angels above and would plant a wreath of flowers on the Arizona and weep if only he was here to do so. Better to remember him in his burning Betty bomber with a 50 caliber slug through his chest...justice served! Very sick that this video came from the Navy League of the United States. Short memories and misguided folks over that at NLUS.

Dude, several minutes to crank AA from low to high? Ridiculous statement...and if you make ridiculous statements nobody will believe anything you are selling...