All logical arguments for the existence of "God" are exactly the same: ' "God" has to exist, otherwise this argument won't work.'

Hell is sometimes defined as a realm completely separate from God, so: 1) God is supposedly a maximally great being. 2) Hell is completely separate from God, meaning that he doesn’t exist there. 3) If God does not exist in all possible realms, then he is not a maximally great being. There are actually several conclusions, being: 4-a) Therefore, God does not exist. 4-b) Therefore, Hell does not exist. 4-c) Therefore, neither God nor Hell exist.

logic done well reflects reality- it never *creates* reality

I reject the modal ontological argument right from the definitions--I reject an objectively "wholly good" being can exist as morals always require a value judgement, and are thus subjective. I also reject omnipotence as incoherent as defined by theists.

Wouldn't definition 1 at 7:57 end up with everyone being a maximally excellent being? Bill and Ted will be pleased.

To be honest, after years of watching videos where theists' arguments for god are debunked, it just seems so boring nowadays. The fundamental problem that I find is that people are trying to argue/logic a supernatural being into existence... but a logically consistent argument for something is not necessarily evidence for it, is it? What I see is not people trying to examine the world with the scientific method, but rather people trying to convince as many people as possible that fairy tales are real with word games. Perhaps that is harsh to some, but frankly the subject matter has lost its appeal to me. Come back when you've captured god in a lab.

This breaks down at Premise 3, because a maximally great being, existing in all worlds, COULD NOT exist in this one. Why? Evil. If the "tri-omni" problem is to be solved, it can't be done by the kind of God that monotheists envision, it just can't. Even if evil is a test that we have to pass, it's entirely unfair to us, which means that that God cannot be maximally good, or else It would at least make the test fair. Besides, if we're talking about the Abrahamic God, "he" already would have set us up to fail by putting two people, who were functionally children, into a garden with the fruit that would make them aware of evil in the first place. In other words, God WANTED them to fail. If that kind of God is all-knowing, "he" would have known that they would fail anyway, so why bother with the test at all? You're a teacher, Marty: if you knew the grade each of your students would get on any test you gave them, would you even bother creating the test? If not, you're already more efficient (and good, quite frankly) than the Arahamic God.

God is something that exists, therefore god exists. Also for every “maximally” great being, I can think of one greater, my being is the same as yours and can beat yours in a fight if needed be. ...ok? I didn’t know you can define things into existence, but good to know.

I've talked with some theists in person who used a version of this argument, though not phrased in a formal way. I don't bother with in-depth philosophy or anything, most people don't follow that. When I get served the "it is *possible* that god exists", I ask if they mean possible in the sense that you can *imagine* god exists or in the sense that there is an *empirically grounded reason to believe* that god exists. Dark matter & energy are my go to examples of the latter, because they are something about reality we know next to nothing about, but we can still tell that *something* is there with a high degree of objectivity.

One thing I would have added is that modal possibility just means “self consistent.”

I'd reccomend the article "does conceivability entail possibility" within the book conceivability and possibility by Clarendon Press Oxford. It goes into detail of the various kinds of ways conceivability can mean possibility and in this case it seems to be the distinction between prima facie conceivability and ideal conceivability. Where prima facie is conceivability with just a regular person (a kid might think it's possible to violate pythagoras theorem because at the surface it doesn't seem like there is a contradiction, they don't know enough) and ideal conceivability is conceivable through an ideal observer (someone who has no capacity for error and that has all the relevant knowledge to adequately assess the topic). There's also the distinction drawn between conceivability where it is conceivable because it doesn't present us with a logical contradiction and conceivability where one can imagine a possible world where such a state could be, that is often two very different things. It's a really interesting article that analyses lots of ways that the world possible could be interpreted. Like even granting the definition of possible meaning there is a possible world, how would one distinguish a possible world from an impossible world? So you are still stuck with having to define possible.

That was one of the most concise, clear, and educational breakdowns of a god argument I've ever heard. I've known the cosmological argument was bunk for a long time but I couldn't quite put my finger on where the breakdown occurs. Your video nailed it, getting directly to the fulcrum point where the apologist goes from good faith arguing to self-serving manipulation. Outstanding job, thank you so much for this video.

I love your videos bro. Hope to see more in the future!

Interesting timing. I just finished watching Rationality Rules's video on the Ontological Argument. I get done, I go back to the KZfaq homepage and the first video is this one. My first thought was "I didn't know Martymer 81 did a video on that. How did I miss it?" Then I saw "2 Minutes ago" I guess that explains how I missed it. :D

I always "grant their argument" I treat it like their hypothesis. Then I ask that they do experimentation, observation, and make sure they attempt to falsify their hypothesis. when they inevitably fail, I let them know I remain unconvinced and remind them you don't choose what to believe, you do or you don't.

I cant be the only person who thinks this argument is idiotic? From the first time hearing it up to now, its never striked me as an intelligent argument, just a leap in logic. For me its like saying. 1. Its possible Harry Potter exists 2. Therefore Harry Potter exists Im amazed anyone thinks this is a solid argument. Its not slightly convincing

The easiest way to point out how this argument is flawed is to simply point out the fact, that like any argument for god's existence that posits traits to god prior to establishing god exists in the first place, is question begging and fallacious by default. Only things which exist have traits. I contend with the proposition that god exists. To say god has trait X, Y and Z as a response to that to set up an argument is meaningless. If he doesn't exist, he has no traits. Granted the point of the exercise is to demonstrate that god must be a feature of reality because the opposite is logically impossible or incoherent, the problem is that the argument is a nonsequitor in that regard. While you might, on the surface, appear to make a syllogism that demonstrate god must exist by virtue of his traits, the fundamental problem is that while I might accept for the sake of argument that said traits would entail god, the fact is that the real burden would be to demonstrate that the state of reality necessitate god having said traits. If it isn't necessary for god to have said traits (it isn't, because it's logically possible that no god exists), then the fact that the traits would necessarily entail a god is an impotent conclusion. More clearly put : Even if I grant that being maximally great would entail existence, there's no reason to necessarily accept that god is maximally great, because the alternative, that he simply doesn't exist, is still on the table. To say reply and say "Well, god is maximally great BY DEFINITION" betrays the ultimately hollow nature of this argument. Definitions only become descriptive post observation. The definition used for god, since his existence is in question, is not descriptive. It's prescriptive. We don't say that dogs are the way they are by virtue of how we define them. The only category we generally treat the way apologists treat god, are concepts. Democracy is the way it is, purely as a matter of definition. You would not argue that democracy exists the same way as dogs do, and you would not say that the fact that we defined and now act out democracy gives it the same epistemological quality as dogs, rocks or stars. Herein lies the ultimate conceit and idiocy of religious apologetics. Treating the existence of something thought of as a concrete, treating it like a concept and engaging in verbal gymnastics that only appear to make a lick of sense to people who can't see that the rabbit is no longer in the hat. It's all just pointless word games.

Best video I have seen from you in a while Martymer, I thoroughly enjoyed that. Keep it up. Also, keep up the Jordan bashing, that is maximally excellent.

Imagine that a god could exist Therefore God exists Airtight

Oh, yeah? Debunk this: Premise: God exist Argument: if God exists, God exists Conclusion: therefore God exists My argument is perfect

A good thought experiment for the MOA is to consider a modal sentence about other necessary truths. For example, "It is possible that 57 is necessarily a prime number." If that proposition is true, then it is true in all possible worlds. And if it is false, then it is false in all possible worlds. However, you cannot logically prove possibility without FIRST proving necessity. Otherwise, the assertion of possibility is, itself, the proof of necessity, which is circular.

I can reject it even more easily. Deductive logic alone can never prove anything about the physical universe; it can only determine whether an argument is internally consistent within the language of logic used. External, empirical evidence is needed to demonstrate that the premises are indeed true and lift a _valid_ argument into a _sound_ one.

I'm re-watching your old content, and finding out points I missed in my previous lack of philosophical understanding. This is the best take on "everything logically possible" omnipotence argument I've seen, and I totally missed it on my first go around.

The ontological argument is a word game which is superficially “clever”, which is probably why it’s been around for centuries. Unfortunately for it, it collapses at the first premise and not only for the reasons in this video. Why should “excellence” (or “perfection” as older versions of the argument often put it) include “good” as a necessary quality? If it’s argued that whatever a “maximally excellent” being does, thinks or wants is by definition “good” then “good” loses all meaning because bad things happen and Abrahamic theists have tied themselves in knots for centuries trying to redefine what any human with a trace of a moral compass would consider to be bad things as somehow “good”. And they end up trying to excuse the Holocaust, the Black Death, horrible diseases etc. as really being “good things” in ways that puny humans can’t understand. At least, not until God reveals his grand plan to us, which conveniently for the apologists, apparently only happens after we are dead. One small issue I have with the otherwise excellent video is the omniscience/omnipotence business - they are logically incompatible in the same being. If God plays chess with himself he knows in advance not only his next move but every move he will make during the game. So can he make a move that forces him to change the move after that in response? No, because he knew before he even started playing what every move would be. Which means God can not change his mind (despite Biblical accounts indicating that he did at various times) because he knows in advance the outcome of every decision he makes. Can a being that can never change its mind be considered omnipotent? Not without some serious re-defining of omnipotence and vigorous accompanying linguistic and logical gymnastics it can’t. And you have to throw away biblical literalism while you’re doing the gymnastics. Though to be fair, most Christians outside the US aren’t biblical literalists - and therefore, according to the literalists, aren’t even Christians at all. And as well as defining rocks as equal to God, the structure of the ontological argument can be used to define pretty much anything into existence: 1. It is possible that a maximally great unicorn exists. 2. Maximal greatness necessarily requires existence, for something that exists is greater than something which doesn’t, etc. Therefore a maximally great unicorn necessarily exists in all possible worlds. QED.

Hi Marty, I'm completely new to modal logic, but I thought of a slightly different counterargument, and want to see if I'm making sense. I think we can turn this whole argument upside down and go with this: 1. A maximally great being (MGB) is a being which exists in all possible worlds (from definitions). 2. A being that doesn't exist in every possible world is not an MGB. 3. Our world is one of the "possible worlds". 4. A being that doesn't exist in *our* world is not an MGB. 5. Therefore, unless something can be proven to exist in our world, we cannot prove that it's an MGB. So now you only need to prove... that... God exists...... in our world. Oh wait.

I'm gonna check out TB's channel tomorrow! I look forward to it, thanks Martymer, love your videos!

The ontological argument basically collapses the second you substitute the vague and meaningless "great" with the meaning it's ACTUALLY used for in the argument: desirable. "I like the idea of a creator god that is real better than that of one that isn't real, so it must be real because it's more desirable". It starts from the fallacious assumption that there is this objective scale of "greatness" in reality that NEEDS to have something at the top. But reality isn't obliged to conform to what a philosopher would like to exist.

Huh, two of my favourite channels in an exchange. I look forward to TBS' reply.

I think the issue regarding "Possibly necessary implies necessary" has to do with equivocation on what the word "possibly" means. That is, in common usage, "possibly true" also means "possibly false" and is understood in an existential context. But in this context, the idea is that there is some scenario in which it is true, but it cannot be guaranteed to be true for all scenarios. Also in this context, "necessary" means it is always true no matter the scenario. Therefore, if you have something that is true no matter the scenario and you establish that it is true for at least one scenario, then that means it is true for all scenarios. In essence, this is the logical equivalent of proof by induction. It involves two steps: One step is to prove it for the n=1 case (but can be generalized to n=k for a specific integer k). This establishes that the proposition is true for at least one case. The other step is that if it is true for n, then prove it to be true for n+1. This establishes that if you can show it to be true for a particular case, you can then show it to be true for the next one. The two have to go together. There may be a logical process whereby if you assume it is true for n, then it will be true for n+1 but if you cannot establish it to be true for n=1, you can't get started. For example, if you assume that n+1 < n is true for n, you can then establish that (n+1) + 1 < n + 1 is also true. Therefore, if it's true somewhere, it's true everywhere. The problem is that you can't do the n=1 part (or generalized n=k part) to get it started. It may be true everywhere if it's true somewhere, but it isn't true somewhere. Thus, "possibility" is the idea that it is true for n=1 (there is at least one case where it is true) and "necessary" is the idea that if it is true for n, then it is true for n+1 (it is true everywhere). You put them together, and you have a statement that if a proposition that is true everywhere is true somewhere (possibly necessary), then that proposition is true everywhere (implies necessary).

"1: It is possible that a maximally great being exists." We don't know if it's possible for such a being to exist and we have no reason to believe it can.

I already see a problem with definition 2 as presented in your version. I prefer this version of Plantinga's argument, because it makes the issues clearer: D2: "A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world." Note how this merely defines the concept of God, a being that has maximal greatness = a being that is necessarily (in all possible worlds) maximally excellent. It doesn't tell us anything about actual existence, and it can't, because existence is neither a property nor is the negation of such a being's existence self-contradictory (which is required for it to be "necessary" in modal logic). So this is equivalent to saying that bachelor = someone who necessarily (in all possible worlds) is not married. This also just defines the concept of a bachelor, but it tells us nothing about the instantiation of such a concept - the "existence" of an actual bachelor. So everything that Plantinga tries to prove in this version of the argument has to be in the premise itself, and it is: P3: "It is possible that there is a being that has maximal greatness." This invokes the unsupported instantiation and basically asserts God into existence. This literally means not just that in at least one possible world the concept God = "being that has maximal excellence in every possible world", but that such a being actually exists... which is what the argument is supposed to prove in the first place! Btw, even ignoring that, this still does not result in necessary existence. Consider the bachelor. Saying it's possible that a bachelor exists is saying that it is instantiated in some possible world. The necessity still only refers to the properties of the concept of a bachelor, however. Consider possible worlds where no bachelors are instantiated/exist: here, the concept that a bachelor is necessarily not married still is logically valid. So this has no bearing on existing necessarily. Otherwise, it would also mean that actual bachelors exist in every possible world.

Ooh, more Martymer.

One of the unsolved Millennium Prize Problems is the famous P versus NP problem in computer science. Let me quickly show you that P = NP using ontological logic. 1. It is possible that P = NP (why not?). 2. So there exists a possible world where P = NP. 3. Since mathematical truths are necessary truths it follows (from Axiom S5) that P = NP in all possible worlds. 4. P = NP in our world. Guys, I solved it! One million bucks is waiting for me.

I hadn't heard the immovable object irresistible force contradiction. I like it better than the stone so big he can't lift it because it seems less like a "trick."

When all that can be provided are word games and elaborate mental gymnastics in defence of your claim (regardless of what the claim is) it is pretty much an admission that you have nothing at all. There is so much more peace in admitting to yourself what you are and aren't truly convinced of than there is trying forever to bury every doubt and block every difficult question.

Def 1: A maximally stupid argument is one whose premises are false, whose logic is invalid, and conclusion is false. Def 2: A maximally hovind argument is a maximally stupid argument, which applies to all possible topics (ie, applies necessarily). Axiom S5: Possibly necessary implies necessary. 1: It is possible that a maximally hovind argument exists. 2: There exists a possible argument for god's existence which is a maximally hovind argument. 3: (From axiom S5) A maximally hovind argument exists whose conclusion is that god exists. 4: The conclusion of a maximally hovind argument is false. 5: Therefore god does not exist.

For me, it breaks down at premise 1. The premise assumes that a maximally great being existing is possible. This has yet to ever be demostrated. Unless the meaning of "possible" changes so that absolutely everything is possible, in which case, the premise is meaningless.

You mean Ontological Assertion Def 1: God is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good Def 2: God exists in all possible world seriously why is this even called an argument

P1 Old MacFarland is a humanoid being that has the ability to travel between potential worlds, and can be summoned to any location by saying its name three times. P2 If it is possible that Old MacFarland exists, Old MacFarland exists in some possible worlds. P3 If Old MacFarland exists in some possible worlds, he can travel to this world. P4 If Old MacFarland can travel to this world, he can be summoned to this location by saying his name three times. P5 Old MacFarland, Old MacFarland, Old MacFarland. Observation: Nothing happened. I guess the modal ontological argument isn't true after aaaAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA OH MY GOD HE'S INSIDE ME! RUN! RUN!!!!!

That definition of a maximally great being fits rocks. Rocks can do all that they can do, they know all that they know, and they are consistent with their being.

Thank God you sorted THAT out 😁!! I would love to see KENT HOVIND comeback 🤤?

William Lane Craig constantly berates everyone who opposes him with his 'lack of sophisticated theology' rant, but states his fall-back position as symentically identical to, "I just know it!" Does anyone expect valid arguments from a person like that?

11:10 "You can't define money into a suitcase" Every national bank ever: "Hold my Beer"

Be maximally excellent to each other.

QED, Martymer81 is the maximally great being... as is all other life forms.

The Modal Ontological Argument may be the most complex, but its the absolute WORST argument for god BAR NONE. “A maximally great being can exist” No, it cant. “A maximally great being _must_ exist.” No, it doesn’t. The argument is just plain bunk

"Maximal excellence" must, of necessity, have human excellence as its unit of measure. Since "divine" measures are unavailable for human consideration, "God" can never exceed the limits of human comprehension.

I take care of the omni's this way: Omnipotence 1. If I can actually do X, then X is logically possible 2. If X is logically possible, then an omni being can do X 3. I can actually make a finite object that has the distinct property of being immovable by its maker 4. So, If I can actually do X, then an omni being can do X (1,2) 5. So, an omni being can make a finite object that has the distinct property of being immovable by its maker. Omniscience 1. An omni being has complete knowledge. 2. If an omni being has complete knowledge, then an omni being knows all integers 3. If an omni being knows all integers, then an omni being knows a set that is never complete (there is always an n+1) 4. If an omni being knows a set that is never complete, then an omni being does not have complete knowledge. 5. So, an omni being knows all integers (1,2) 6. So, an omni being knows a set that is never complete (3,5) 7. So, an omni being does not have complete knowledge.(4,6) 8. Therefore, an omni being has complete knowledge, and an omni being does not have complete knowledge (1,7)

only three questions to debunk the objections: 1. you did not object to the axiom 5 types of argument; should we consider it logically sound? 2. Can you define the epistemological possibility and logical possibility and prove that your algebraic example was not an epistemological possibility that could be refuted with logical possibility; can you refute the epistemological possibility of god with logical reality as you did with the algebraic equation? 2. Can you prove that your algebraic example was not an equivocation fallacy?

this video was better than i thought it'd be in all possible worlds

Yeah, there is a maximally great being in my world, and it's me. And yes, I am omnipotent - within my own nature; I can do all things that are naturally within my powers. And my ageing black cat IS turning white - just very, very slowly.

I was taught by a philosophy professor that this argument has never been refuted.... but in a paper I wrote a week layer I shredded it to absolute bits.

P1 State_A is a natural state which is necessary for any possible universe to arise (some timeless, spaceless empty quantumfield) P2 State_A is a possible state > ... > C = State_A is an existing state from which our universe unfolded

Thank you.

This argument is also based on trying to exploit circular reasoning to loop something into existence. But it is, as you say, a broken argument enabled by bad definitions. Maximal = exists in all realities; could exist in some (limited number) reality; therefore exists in all (infinite number) of realities... But if it doesn't, it's not maximal. Just a word game, or a number trick.

Ah, Russel's Paradox. Disproving the infinite for over a century.

Thank you. I refuse to miss any of your videos.

I have to agree that the supposedly most sophisticated argument for the existence of God is indeed, a "word game". *Well that about wraps it up for God* ( Douglas Adams ).

Yes, more marty videos.

I dosagree with the very first premise "it is possible that a maximally great being exists" possibility is something which must be demonstrated.

IMHO the key point of the argument is that It attempts, by way of including necessary existence in the definition of a maximally great being, to disguise a statement of necessity (in less technical terms, an argument of "it must be so") as a statement of possibility (aka "it might be true"). If we grant the premise that a maximally great being potentially exists, we actually grant that it exists necessarily. This is not how this kind of reasoning usually works, of course. I thus propose that our response to the argument should be to ask for proof of its premises, and to refuse to grant Premise 1 on these very grounds - that it implies a statement of necessity which the argument's proponent can't expect us to grant.

Love your work!

A quick note regarding the "possible worlds" thing: In this specific argument, I'm pretty sure that "world" is functionally identical to "set of circumstances", so "every possible world" means "every possible set of circumstances".

Bravo. Excellently presented, each step clear and to the point.

Oh cool I want to try this Def: Necessary Mr.Krabs is almost identical to the character "Mr. Krabs" from the popular television show spongebob except he exists in all possible worlds. Axiom: Possibly necessary implies necessary 1. It is possible that Necessary Mr.Krabs exists 2. There is a possible world in which Necessary Mr.Krabs exists 3. Necessary Mr.Krabs exists in all possible worlds 4. Necessary Mr.Krabs exists Woah this is soo cool, I can just argue characters into existence by sticking the word "necessary" in front of them. Now I can make myself some "Necessary Million Dollars".

The modal ontological argument is made complicated by the fact it uses two definitions that are entirely superfluous and are only there for the sake of obfuscating the logic, so that the fallacies are difficult to detect. If you unwind the jargon of the argument, the modal ontological argument looks like: 1. There exists a logically possible world in which, a being that is maximally capable, maximally knowing, and maximally good in every logically possible world, exists in it. 2. If there exists a logically possible world in which, a being that is maximally capable, maximally knowing, a maximally good in every logically possible world, exists in it, then a being that is maximally capable, maximally knowing, and maximally good exists in every logically possible world. 3. Therefore, a being that is maximally capable, maximally knowing, and maximally good exists in every logically possible world. 4. If a being that is maximally capable, maximally knowing, and maximally good exists in every logically possible world, then it exists in *our* logically possible world. 5. Therefore, a being that is maximally capable, maximally knowing, and maximally good exists in *our* logically possible world. Premise 3 follows from from premise 2, premise 5 follows from premise 4, and premise 4 is tautological. However, premise 1 is merely an assumption, and even if "maximally capable," "maximally knowing," and "maximally good" were well-defined properties, the assumption would still have to be supported, making the argument unsound. Premise 2 is also an assumption. In a certain system of modal logic, it is considered an axiom, but there is no reason to accept a system with this axiom over a system without this axiom, anymore than, in mathematics, there not being a reason to accept the continuum hypothesis as an axiom together with ZFC over accepting its negation as ax axiom together with ZFC. As premise 2 is an implication, premise 2 being an assumption also makes the argument invalid, on top of being unsound. So ultimately, the modal ontological argument is just an argument from faith anyway. If you grant that a few bold claims that are completely unsupported are true, then God exists. This is no different than simply granting the claim that God exists despite it being completely unsupported too. Also, it has yet to be demonstrated by any of the apologists proposing this argument that, whatever this being that is maximally capable, maximally knowing, and maximally good is, that it is the deity that the Bible claims to be the Christian Holy Trinity. In fact, this argument, if granted, does not even prove the existence of a creator deity from deism. At best, it proves the existence of an abstract entity. It is the "strongest" argument that Abrahamic apologists have, and yet it still is fallacious and faith-based.

11:58 ''world does not mean parallel reality or something like that'' *DAVID LEWIS TRIGGERED*

How about this: "Granting possibility to a necessary being, proves its existence". "Granting existence to a being, is to grant it an atribute, that proves its existence" "Granting existence to a being is impossible" "Granting possibility to a necessary being is impossible" Did I make a logical blunder somewhere, or is that good enough? :D There could be some extra steps, like "Granting possibility to a necessary being, is to grant it an atribute, that proves its existence". That makes the logical equivalency of "possibility of necessary being" and "existence of a being," more clear...

I'd like to know more about these possible words. Here's how Scotty defines them. "There is a possible world where I don't have a beard but non with a square circle." Possabilities for mathematical squared circles aside, it's a logically impossible thing or something that could be in our own world. The two extremes. Can these worlds include things that are physically impossible? Because what's physically impossible to us might not be so in some other world. Is there a possible world where psychic powers exist? Is there one where we breath hydrogen and not oxygen? Is there one where the events described in the legends of Robin Hood actually took place? It seems impossible to be able to say even accounting for the fact that these possible worlds are non existent and hypothetical. In order for us to say with certainty anything about these worlds, we'd have to put it like this. These worlds include X because that's how we define them. You can do that but now these worlds are kind of like "We made them up, we can do what we want with them." Sure but now god can't transcend that. And speaking of that anyway. Why premis 3? Why would he exist in all worlds? Because he's magic. Right? Is god really so magical that his conceptual self can make his actual self exist? I don't know but this has apologist written all over it. You need to be able to stretch definitions and these vague definitions are just what they need. But the point is, the more we learn about the nature of these possible worlds whether definionally or in some distant reality, the more they negate premis 3.

Yet more evidence for my conjecture that all philosophical disputes ultimately boil down to equivocation.

Hi Martymer, it is probably worth noting that Plantinga himself (and most if not all the academic papers I've read on the MOA) is not construing the term "possible" in P1 as epistemic possibility, but rather what he calls "broadly logical possibility" (some would call it "metaphysical possibility", or 'that which is metaphysically possible'). So when you say there is an equivocation fallacy going on, and that you don't get to "switch what you mean", IMO it's a major mis-reading of Plantinga's formulation. He isn't switching what "possible" means between P1 and P2. He is using metaphysical possibility throughout - it seems that you are the one reading it as epistemic possibility - but that's not what Plantinga is referring to. FWIW, you can just say "well, then, just don't know if P1 is true", which I think is totally fair (and it's the route guys like van inwagen, Oppy, and others take), although it's not initially obvious why it would be metaphysically impossible for a maximally great being to exist, which is where the force of this argument comes from. Either way, I think it's better to address a steel man of Plantinga's P1, rather than straw man it to death.

OK so I have to admit that I had to watch this video twice and pause it several times to let it sink in completely. But now that I understand, it is so simple to see how bad this argument truly is. It is flawed at so many levels, it is a wonder it is even used. But as he said, using the fancy language can confuse you; which I suppose is the intention. I often have discussions with theist family and friends about these topics. This video just gave me an arsenal to work with. Thanks buddy.

I'd like this video twice if I could

I was very confused for a minute when you said "It's not impossible, so it is possible". You solved it later. But still, maybe we need wrap that modal logic into intuitionistic/constructive logic, so that instead of directly dealing with possibility, we deal with demonstration of possibility. Because for me, the fact that X was not proven impossible does not mean that it was proven possible. We can't just cancel double negations like that.

When presented the assertion that something is possible, I cannot simply accept that assertion on the grounds that "I have no knowledge that it is impossible". In my opinion, both possibility AND impossibility require some sort of demonstration. Surely, the known facts about the universe may not prohibit something from existing, but that does not necessarily mean that there isn't/aren't unknown fact(s) that actually do prohibit that thing from existing. Since we do know know what we do not know, a demonstration of possibility AND impossibility is required to accept a claim about it. Put simply, I have no knowledge of an actual super-being in existence, and I don't have full knowledge of the facts of the universe that would/wouldn't allow for such a being to exist, so I can't even tell if such a being's existence is even possible or impossible. I just don't know.

Def 1 and Def 2 both start with an assumption based on an individual opinion from ignorance. One still has to produce the being behind the curtain before you claim an attribute.

I wish this argument worked so I could get my suit case full of money.

a maximally great butterfly is one that is in my hand right now.

I'm sorry, but I'm confused about S5. If something is possibly necessary in a possible world, then it is only necessary if it's true that it is necessary in that possible world rather than possibly necessary. Is it possible that the solution is X = 3. Actually, I don't know. I don't have sufficient information to determine likelihood.

I also have a problem with disproving omniscience. Your contradiction uses 2 assumptions: 1) The universe is deterministic. As in we can order all points of time with no points overlapping, while being able to use transitivity. In layman terms: there is only one possible future and only one possible past. 2) Omniscient beings has free will. As in there is a way for such being to choose the future they want based on the available information. As you can plainly see these two assumptions are contradictory. Thus the rest of the argument doesn't matter. As such we can have an omnipotent being with either free will or in a deterministic universe, but not both. Omnipotence in a nondeterministic universe will take the form of knowing all possible outcomes, but not what outcomes will happen.

Equivocation is part of why I like the idea behind things like Lojban. Changing the definition would necessitate changing the word itself so you can't do something like "possible as defined as can't be shown to be impossible" and "possible as in it can be logically coherent in some hypothetical circumstance" and have the same exact word for "possible" there.

I wish my college intro philosophy class had been more like this.

17:30 one way in which one could phrase it is that it's something like the difference between prima facie conceivability and ideal conceivability. To the mathematically ungifted it's conceivable to make a euclidean perfect triangle with a sum of angles above 180 degrees. But that possibility is being informed by an ignorance on the topic. If an ideal conceiver is given the task of conceiving of such a triangle he would tell you about how it is impossible and even explain why it is. The difference in one case being possible as meaning I don't know, or an adherence to being open minded, and the other meaning it is not logically impossible even if it is not the case in this reality.

Your conclusion illustrates what Bertrand Russell meant when he said "Most theology is just bad grammar."

11:28 - makes me think of the various fleet debates about the shape of the earth - crazy to think that you one can ‘decide’ the shape of the earth through debate and think that the earth should oblige.

But what about a Maximally Tubular being, who can do everything that it is logically possible to do while performing a kick flip?

I've seen that video prior to yours, and agree that it is hard to follow for non-mathematicians. Thanks for your more understandable approach for us mere mortals ;)

Heard that one. Complex, yes. But the Gist is in the details.

One could say that by creating an immovable object or an unstoppable force, an omnipotent being is introducing limitations to its power that did not exist before. I think that would be coherent and solve the issue you had with omnipotence for logically possible things. Also, your objection to omniscience is good, but doesn't that sort of disprove determinism as well? Like it's impossible for Laplace's Demon to know its own mind, or to predict the behavior of a contrarian who it tells the future to. "Based on the state of every particle in the universe, you will raise your right hand", contrarian raises their left hand.

I got lost at the part where possible somehow magically became "certain"

This argument is also a tautology, because is defines a maximally great thing as a something that should exist

Please correct me if I am wrong, however would not an omnipotent being have the ability to re-write the formal definitions of a certain "world" or "universe" assuming that it would have the relative intelligence which is based on that of extracting a refined model of intelligence from a human being? Also it is brought up about "God playing a game of chess with himself." I recently discussed this with a pal of mine. If a omnipotent being has the ability to predict every single permutation of the overall game, permutations from mathematics, then this would imply that he has already played the game. And he has already made all of the paths needed to win against himself, however he may also realize that by playing against himself he will always win. Therefore playing against himself is pointless.

Omniscience makes sense to me. Given a deterministic framework at least. Since it'd be possible to know all possible outcomes of all possible interactions if one knew all variables that need be accounted for, that would seemingly be omniscience. You'd know all things that had happened, are happening, and will happen, or could happen if alterations were made. Mind you it's in-congruent to the notion of free will, creating it's own issue for apologists.

Depends what you mean by "different worlds". If we're talking Multiverse here, because there are infinite Universes, there are, of necessity, infinite Universes in which this kind of God does exist, BUT there are also infinite Universes in which "he" doesn't. This is one in which our laws of physics and logic would not ALLOW for that God's existence.

Regarding Omnipotens, Omniscience and Omnibenevolence - The definitions are whatever the apologist needs it to be - Special pleading fallacy.

There is an issue here with the definition of necessity. The problem is that necessity in this case does not mean existence, per se. However, it means the property of Modal Transcendence which implies that if it is true, it is true in all possible worlds, and if it is false, then it is false in all possible worlds. Case and point, the mathematical proof that 1+1=2 is necessarily true. However the proof 1+1=3 is necessarily non existent, because of the proof of 1+1=2. Both statements are necessary, yet only 1 exists in reality and the other does not. With that the whole circular argument issue is pretty much defeated. The important question to ask is can the property of necessity be applied to concrete entities rather than abstract ones? I would say yes, as long as the entity itself fulfills the definition. The MGB being defined as the greatest possible being encompasses all possibilities, and would be the same entity regardless of what reality it is in. It is not contingent, and therefore, necessary.

Never got this so-called paradox, because there is no such thing in the universe as something that is immovable or a force that is irresistable.

In logic 101, you can prove anything if you start with a contradiction.

When an immovable object encounters an irresistible force they either move through each other without any reaction or they meet and destroy the universe.

Is an omniscient being one with free will or a slave to its own knowledge as it knows literally everything, which includes its own thoughts, thought processes, the end result of all of those thoughts, the responses and consequences of all of those thoughts, etc. Is it a being with knowledge or a being defined by the knowledge itself?