Thanks for the high praise!

thanks for the comment. I'm pasting a comment I made elsewhere as it seems relevant to your comment: Statements about the past are made true/false by events in the past. Statements about the future are made true/false by events in the future. This argument involves no denial of truthmaker theory (although I don't actually subscribe to that theory as I take truth to be primitive). Logical truths are atemporal in nature. They are eternally true, not true at given moments in time. The eternal nature of their truth falls out of the eternal nature of logic, in which temporal indexing of events is part of the _content_ of the proposition, not a temporal indexing of the _truth_ of the content.

@@AbsolutePhilosophy I don't think that's a satisfactory response to be honest. OK, so let's say we endorse eternalism about propositions, then me uttering "This video is cool" is equivalent to "This video has the property of coolness at 7:12pm on 18th July 2024" or something roughly like that. Similarly, "This channel will upload videos in the future" is equivalent to "There is a time t such that t is later than 7:12pm on 18th July 2024 and at t this channel uploads a video". Now assume that the present state of the universe doesn't determine whether this is your final video or not. What could possibly make it true that ""There is a time t such that t is later than 7:12pm on 18th July 2024 and at t this channel uploads a video", unless we assume eternalism about time? After all, there IS no time that is later than 18th July 2024, unless eternalism about time is true!

@@dominiks5068 There some good thinking here. You are correct to say it assumes eternalism, but I think a reasonable logic does, at least it must do if you hold bivalance applied to future oriented claims. (I realise this may be seen to commit the cardinal sin of assuming logic has metaphysical implications, but there you go, I think it does). If you don't accept eternalism (at least as a logical assumption), then you would seem to have all statements about the future false if understood as: there exists some future time etc., some of which _become_ true. Which I find to be an odd idea. And it would mean all claims about the future, even mundane ones, would be false. e.g. the sun will rise tomorrow.

@@AbsolutePhilosophy I think the problem here is that you are treating claims about trivial facts as logical truth claims. The claim "the table is brown." is not the same kind of claim as "1 + 1 = 2." The claim "the table is brown" is true dependent on the facts in a context, while the claim "1 + 1 = 2" is true in all circumstances. The claim "You will drown." seems much more like "the table is brown" than "1 + 1 = 2." That would mean it is context and fact dependent, however because it is a statement about the future it must necessarily be indeterminate until the context and facts collapse to a state where the claim can be determined to be true or false. We can at best say that, context dependent, the statement is _probabilistically_ true or false. For example, if I were to turn to you and say "You will drown." but we are both in a plummeting elevator falling from the 50th floor of a skyscraper, I am _probably_ wrong.

Thanks for the comment. You can go this route, but I think you get a cleaner logic by avoiding it. And since I see no reason why logic infringes on free will, you should keep it simple. For a deeper analysis of how I think free will is untouched by applied logic and mathematics, you can see my critique of Alex O'Connor (if you haven't already). Basically, I think atemporal and temporal reasoning are different things, and the supposed clash only arises when we mix and match the modes of reasoning and analysis.

@@AbsolutePhilosophy Yes, I saw it. And I think it is great that you stand up against what looks like a massive attack on free will. I guess that a lot of people do not realize how fundamental free will is to our understanding of ourselves as human beings. Even our legal systems are based on the assumption of existence of free will. I especially appreciate you laying out Alex O'Connor's assumptions and moments when he tries too "slip through" like: when he claims dichotomy of "determined" and "random". I mean, even without elaborate free will theory it should be immediately pointed out that there is also "probabilistic" somewhere in between, which you do.

That is just nonsense word play. A statement is a definite or clear expression of something in speech or writing. "this statement is false" is NOT a clear expression of something, since it does not specify which statement is false. The moment the statement stated which statement is false, you can indeed apply bivalence and show whether the statement is true or false.

@@ProgressIsTheOnlyEvolution The statement you are reading now is false. That statement clearly referred to itself and so it did specify which statement was declared to be false. The two former statements refer to the same statement, i.e. the first statement in this comment. The fact that this identity of reference is intelligible further demonstrates that the first self-referential statement had a clearly specified object it referred to, i.e. itself.

Also, I’ve just watched a couple of your videos back to back! Subbed!!!!

why would both be true? the future either already exists, or not. if it does, one of those is false. if it doesn't, there's just no matter of fact, since propositions don't refer to non-existence; they're just not even wrong gibberish.

@@real_pattern You may be right, but if you are right then his solution to the fatalist argument still doesn't work. If you are rigth then either fatalism is true or propositions about the future can't be true, at least not in the moment that they are made.

Thanks for the comment, perhaps this will help: Statements about the past are made true/false by events in the past. Statements about the future are made true/false by events in the future. Where's the logical issue? And yes, statements are not true 'in the moment they are made', because, as I argue, logical truths are atemporal in nature. They are eternally true, not true at given moments in time. The eternal nature of their truth falls out of the eternal nature of logic, in which temporal indexing of events is part of the _content_ of the proposition, not a temporal indexing of the _truth_ of the content.

​@@AbsolutePhilosophy If statements about the future are made true or false by events in the future how can we categorize them as true or false before those events happen? And how can they be "eternally true, not true at given moments in time" but also be "made true by events in the future"? The statement that they are "made true" implies that at a given time they are made true, since it implies that the statement was not true before it was made true.

Thanks for the comment. I am also a logician, I teach it at Cambridge, and I have a maths degree too. But I think these questions have a lot to tell us about the world in which we live and our human experience. Why think it is intellectual masterbation? I will soon be interviewing another philosopher who thinks these issues are some of the most important of our age.

@@AbsolutePhilosophy hi there. first, let me make clear that my comment was not an insult, in any way shape or form, i enjoy it much myself, my apologies if it was perceived as such. what i'm getting at is that, after contemplating on this myself for a very long time, i can't find any application in how *any* conclusion drawn from the "free will conjecture" is able to be applied to daily life, either mine (i'm so, so privileged) or all the mothers in every country in the world who are burdened with nothing more than figuring out how they will feed their children the next day, hence my comment. i have personally come to the point in thinking that if knowledge and ideas are useful only as a way of having fun when being really really smart, then its utility in contributing to making the world a better place is in question. that said, it's also entirely possible that the paths of thought which are traversed along the way to an inutile conclusion may very well be useful in the sense of how understandings of things evolve: perhaps this conclusion has no practical application itself, but it's entirely possible some future conclusion could, which could only have been arrived at via the previous discussion. and what i forgot to add in my original post: even though i "think" there is no such thing as "free will", this means nothing: - i can't prove it (the question itself is a solipsism, no? and what about perception? it's relative, so how can this variable be handled such that any conclusive statement on this subject is able to be generalized to all persons?) - i can't use it, and - whatever conclusion i would happen to come to changes nothing. - not to mention, assume i'm wrong, and still nothing changes. and let's not forget the possibility that i'm also completely wrong about any conclusion's utility or worthwhile application to daily life, i know nothing, after all. in the meantime, i will be eternally grateful that i have been blessed with a life so rich in content that i can conclude only that i'm the luckiest and most fortunate person to have ever been born. and because i "think" there is no free will, i will take absolutely zero credit for all the wonderful things that happen in it as a result of each and every action i carry out, made by choice or not. thanks for reading, richard

@@ivor000 Thanks for the comment Ivor. No offence was taken. But I do think these questions are relevant to every day life. How we understand our experience and its relationship to the world in which we live colours how we see our place in the world, and then how we act within it. If we think of ourselves as automata, especially once that thinking becomes mainstream, it will affect everything.

There is a distinction between 'always (or all times)', i.e. at every point in time, and 'eternal (or time independent)', i.e. in a way that does not relate to time. I see no reason why the latter supports fatalism. (I could say more here but it would relate to other positions I have in metaphysics).

why accept that determination necessitates mind? that's just begging the question, not a rebuttal. it's like presuppositionalist apologism.

@@real_pattern What makes determinations?

@@timottes334 reality's stance-independently patterned discrete structure may simply exist without having been ever 'made'.

@@real_pattern Since you can't reasonably answer the question, I'll give you your answer. You can only show reasonably, which means to me Synthetically, that minds make determinations. You can only speculate that matter per se makes determinations. This is no different than making the determination that God exists and determines matters. That is to say... both are speculations of Pure Reason. I am willing to say that one can make valid arguments for God and Panpsychism ( Though I'd probably object to some propositions not being factual in both cases, but taken on their own terms ( analytically, ) one could grant validity to the arguments ) - as well as other theories of Particle Consciousness - but you can't Synthetically show that these things actually exist - God or Conscious Particles. I can reasonably and scientifically show that only things with minds make determinations, but you can't show that other than mind makes determinations. The Materialist and the Theist are two sides of the same coin...

@@real_pattern Mind may simply exist without ever having been made, then. And... theists argue the same: God simply exists. His essence is His existence, is existence per se. I answered you before seeing this reply by you... That answer still stands... One arbitrary assertion is as good as the next... Pure Reason speculation that you may be able to make valid arguments for, but cannot show to be true...

Good question, but no. The drowning event occurs at some point in time, while the truth of the claim is timeless. Why? Because the 'you drowning' is an event of you drowning on, say, 12th January 2027. But the claim includes a temporal content within itself, rather than as an occurrence within time, say, if uttered today, that 'at some point of time after the 19th of July 2024 there is an event of you drowning'. And this claim is eternally true.

@@AbsolutePhilosophy thank you

You can say that. But the issue is that if it is true, it seems to be true before it happened, in which case the argument for fate still has bite.

@@AbsolutePhilosophy But now we're starting to carry some metaphysical baggage. If I say, "tomorrow it will rain in Boston," and it does in fact rain in Boston tomorrow, can't I argue that my statement had an indeterminate truth value until it actually rained in Boston the next day? It wasn't true when I said it, it only became true when it actually rained the next day in Boston, and then it was contingently true because it didn't have to rain in Boston the next day.

Thanks for the comment. Yes, it does presuppose there are facts (i.e. true claims) about the future, as this falls out of the application of logical laws to claims about the future. But it does not follow from this that those facts were determined by the present state of things. Logic is not causal in nature (same with mathematics, see my video critiquing O'Connor for more on this) nor is there a logical relation of determinism between facts. Logic is merely _truth functional_ , i.e. it tells you what truths can be inferred from others according to laws of inference. So there are no implications from logic regarding what is the cause or determinant of anything.

@@AbsolutePhilosophy Yes, I have similar views about logic, I think of it more like a instrument of inference rather then a set of principles that govern the universe. What I suggest is that exact talk about the future might be like talk about the present king of France. And this can then be solved by Russell’s theory of descriptions. And that even if fatalism is false, that we can still save probabilistic propositions about the future so that we can make true probabilistic predictions.

The alter ego of dawkins

Are they still new at this point?

I haven't read any of their atheist books, but I've read some of Dennett's papers, and watched them in debates etc. Dawkins and Hitchens seem philosophically lightweight. Harris seems marginally better, but too in thrall to science from what I can tell. Dennett is worth reading. But mostly because he carries the materialist metaphysics to its end point of dismissing the reality of consciousness. Which, to me, provides an argument from absurdity against materialism.