Could you please reupload a censored version of your last episode, so we could watch it without age restriction?

_I'll be home for Christmas_ _You can plan on me_ _Please have snow and mistletoe_ _And presents by the tree_

If a general tells you that he can end the war by Christmas, as a common soldier, you should always start to worry...

As the joke goes, the war will be over by Christmas... but they never said which Christmas.

Well I can understand the thought process that goes into that thinking. They beat the Germans out of one continent, wrestled control of the Mediterranean and Alantic oceans, and pushed the Germans out of France & Belgium, the Allies are on the verge of pushing them out of Italy, the Russians were just steamrolling over the Germans in Eastern Europe and most of their allies surrendered or turned on them. So I could understand why they thought Market Garden would work. I think that the reason it didn't work, though, was that the Americans working with British armor were always butting heads. We saw it with Dick Winters accounts in Band of Brothers and his own autobiography that working with the Brits was less effective than when they worked with American units during the Normandy campaign.

I am sorry to hear that he died for my grandparents and my family's freedom. Thanks for what he did and I hope that it gives some comfort that my grandparents, parents and family in general are thankful for his service and sacrifice.

2 weeks ago, I watch A Bridge Too Far on TCM

Thank you for sharing this, our thoughts go out to your family.

RIP. A true anti-fascist hero.

Us duchies are forever grateful for your great uncle’s ultimate sacrifice , may he rest in peace

Love to hear that! Thank you for watching.

+1 on this, what happened next with this narrow corridor established tend to be left out of this story

Yeah, they forgot to add that part to the movie.

​@@manofaction1807yes, A Bridge Too Far who I watch on TCM last 2 weeks

​@@KarlAxelZanderwell that is in the future. Also a pretty substantial number of men that have not evacuated are not captured. (Spoiler: operation Pegasus) 😮

Actually, Tito was very much liked by Stalin, becouse, at that time he. presented himself as stounch stalinist. Anyhow, Tito's partisans. entered Serbia only AFTER Red army.

​@@jacobdewey2053Tito was a Croat

Yes he admired him but it did not stop him from trying to assasinate him when he wouldn't follow Soviet direction later.

I imagine Tito had some education and would certainly not have said something like" "I ain't scared of you, bro." Whatever bro means.

@@KaiserFranzJosefI Tito was a Yugoslav

They do gloss over and ignore like 95% of the events happening in Yugoslavia, so I'm not giving them any props for what little they do mention.

It's the age-old issue of trying to cover a huge war with so many things going on. Historians, film-makers, documentarians, etc... all have to make choices about what matters the most when it comes to explaining why things happened the way they did. While events in places like Italy and Yugoslavia are interesting in their own right, they had little effect on the ultimate course of the war and get less coverage as a result.

@@Geraduss How many minutes do you think they should add to each weekly episode in order to fully cover Yugoslavia? Be specific, explain your reasoning and how it fits in with their efforts to broadly cover the entire war in this format.

@@Raskolnikov70 I'm actually rather surprised anyone saw my comment. So I wasn't going into any specifics. I'm not asking for much, I know they have a lot to cover. But they gave more attention to the Slovak, Greek and even Albanian resistances and troop movements and even some of the political events. As for Yugoslavia, where at the moment of the ongoing war so much is happening from battles, civil war strife and so on, nothing was mentioned, nothing at all, not even in the war against humanity series, some throw away lines and greater focus on Greece and complete focus on France and its "resistance" and let's be honest the French resistance was a joke. Meaning no disrespect to the man and woman who actually fought, but the scale of it was just barely enough that the post-war French propaganda had enough to prompt up to not make themselves look too pathetic. Yes, any and all life lost is a tragedy, but to omit all mentions of the crimes committed against the Yugoslav people is just petty. In the last WAH series, they mentioned a few villages in France that were wiped in punitive actions, yet not even a peep about hundreds of villages and teens of thousands of people killed in same and even more brutal fashion in Yugoslavia.

@@Raskolnikov70 yeah, the events where a company of Aussies fought 2 companies of Japanese in middle of New Guinea definitely had more impact on the ultimate course of war than the events in Yugoslavia.

He also later threatened Stalin IIRC.

Tito, the badass!

I just wish YT's auto-generated captions could keep up. They're interesting to say the least.

He has a bit more difficulty with Dutch names...

​@@TheEvertw TBF some of my Dutch friends have difficulty with Dutch names...

The British failed to supply the Paras nor could it supply XXX Corps.

​@@walterm140 you mean Eisenhower. Eisenhower did not provide the needed supplies for Market Garden.

stephie you staph infection Ike stopped TWO US Army Groups 12th and 6th to aid and abet the troubled tosser.And like you Bernard was NOWHERE around. He was worse at commanding than you commenting - if that's even possible *A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196* Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies.When he got them, he rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to *Canadian Gen.Harry Crerar wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions. He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.* *The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.288* "Even Montgomery now acknowledged the primacy of Antwerp."The opening of the Port" he wrote in late September, "is absolutely essential before we can advance deep into Germany."(BLM memoirs p.527,Sept.27,1944,National Canadian Archives,RG 24,vol.1054 2) *'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p. 215, Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit: The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked "the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent* If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us."* *"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke* entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place*

@@stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85 Eisenhower gave priority of all supplies on the western front to market garden. Monty planned poorly and lost. The operation probably never had a chance.

Thanks for the recommendation and thank you for watching. I've never personally seen Kanał, might check it out tonight. Thanks again. - Jake

@@WorldWarTwoPlease do prepare yourself though, it’s a tough watch, to put it mildly: definitely not a date night movie… but I’m sure you know that.

@@WorldWarTwo its on youtube

I can also recommend Warsaw 44 (2014), if you haven't already seen it.

Pacific is a great gritty series. I prefer BOB but it's a different series.

It can be quite strange to think about sometimes, it really wasn't that long ago in terms of history. Thank you for sharing and thanks for watching.

When you consider that the British did exactly that style of operation so successfully on the morning of D-Day with Pegasus Bridge, it does baffle me why they didn't do the exact same thing at Arnhem. Some have argued they couldn't land south of the bridge due to flooded areas, but that exact same problem was beaten on D-Day

​@@ukmediawarriorYou do need to consider that there are 2 bridges. The closest to the dropzones is blown when the first troops arrive.

​@@ukmediawarriorconsider also the sheer difference in scale. Pegasus Bridge was taken by a company of paratroopers against a handful of germans. It was also only a few dozen meters long. AND they had the element of surprise 😉

The clearly unworkable plan is evidence that Montgomery didn't care if the plan worked or not. And as always it was amatuer hour with the British Army.

Pegasus Bridge was nothing like MARKET-GARDEN.

Unintended German misdirection by vast amounts of cognac was so effective that commander of attacking force, major-general Siilasvuo (no-nonsense, bold and hero of Raate road) himself was drunk as fuck. He was placed command lieutenant-general Öhquist as result of insubordination he had shown and would later get Mannerheim Cross #183 because of his consistent competence.

Right? Hearing that it's ending is surprising. Idk why but it always felt several weeks long.

And, in fairness, Market Garden was surprisingly close to success. If Browning hadn't dithered around Nijmegen and actually concentrated on the objective of rather than doing anything but it is highly likely that the armoured support would have reached Arnhem in time.

"one more push would do it" sounds a lot like the reasoning for Barbarossa: "kick the door and the whole building will come crashing down" Even IF Market Garden had achieved all it's objectives, the supply line from Normandy was too long to sustain the breakthru into Germany.

@@alanmichael5619 Very unlikely. The entire operation was doomed from the start. Poorly planned based on wishful thinking. A terrible waste of resources and manpower. The idea of getting entire divisions across a single road under enemy fire, dropping paratroopers miles from their objective, fully knowing there’s substantial enemy forces in the area. This operation could only have succeeded if the Germans just gave up without a fight.

@@alanmichael5619 - Browning and Gavin were both in agreement that the Nijmegen highway bridge was a priority as well as holding the high ground called the Groesbeek heights. THe best analysis on this is in American historian John C McManus' September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far (2012), chapter 3 - 'Foreboding': As Gavin finished his briefing, the British General [Browning] cautioned him: “Although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen bridges, it is essential that you capture the Groesbeek ridge and hold it.” General Browning’s order, of course, made perfect sense. It was of paramount importance to hold the high ground. Any commander worth his salt understood that. Even so, the purpose of Market Garden was to seize the bridges in order to speedily unleash a major armored thrust into northern Germany, toward Berlin. High ground notwithstanding, the only way for the Allies to accomplish this ambitious objective was to take the bridges, and these were, after all, perishable assets, because the Germans could destroy them (and might well be likely to do so the longer it took the Allies to take the bridges). By contrast, the Groesbeek ridge spur wasn’t going anywhere. If the 82nd had trouble holding it, and German artillery or counterattacks became a problem, the Allies could always employ air strikes and artillery of their own to parry such enemy harassment. Also, ground troops from Dempsey’s Second Army could join with the paratroopers to retake Groesbeek from the Germans. So, in other words, given the unpleasant choice between the bridges and the hills, the bridges had to come first. General Gavin did have some appreciation of this. At an earlier meeting with his regimental commanders, he [Gavin] had told Colonel Roy Lindquist of the 508th Parachute Infantry that even though his primary mission was to hold the high ground at Berg en Dal near Groesbeek, he was also to send his 1st Battalion into Nijmegen to take the key road bridge. Gavin told Lindquist to push for the bridge via "the flatland to the east of the city and approach it over the farms without going through the built-up area." Gavin considered this so important that he stood with Lindquist over a map and showed him this route of advance. At the same time, Colonel Lindquist had trouble reconciling Gavin's priorities for the two ambitious objectives of holding Berg en Dal and grabbing the bridge. He believed that Gavin wanted him to push for the bridge only when he had secured the critical glider landing zones and other high ground. According to Lindquist, his impression was that "we must first accomplish our main mission before sending any sizeable force to the bridge." Actually, General Gavin wanted the 508th to do both at the same time, but somehow this did not sink into the 508th's leadership. "If General Gavin wanted Col Lindquist to send a battalion for the bridge immediately after the drop, he certainly did not make that clear to him," Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Shanley, the executive officer of the 508th, later wrote. Perhaps this was a miscommunication on Gavin's part, probably not. Lieutenant Colonel Norton, the G-3, was present for the conversation (Shanley was not) and recorded Gavin's clear instructions to Lindquist: "Seize the high ground in the vicinity of Berg en Dal as his primary mission and ... attempt to seize the Nijmegen bridge with a small force, not to exceed a battalion."

Not yet.

I've been through that area. It's pretty mountainous, with a few roads going through. Not ideal terrain for anyone's military offensive.

A little bit after Dragoon but not much due to the terrain, in April 1945 with the Germans in route the French will invade and try to annex the Aosta Valley.

In Nice there were battles between the resistence and the Germans but the Germans evacuated the city on August 29 1944. In Grenoble also battles between the resistence and the Germans and the Germans evacuated the city on August 22, 1944.

Thank you for watching!

But no subtitles (same last week) :/

Agreed. They had them for a while a few years ago (I couldn’t tell you when, exactly) but eventually went away

@@Lematth88 I assume it takes time and effort for someone to transcribe the episode script into subs for YT and they haven't had the time or resources to do it for a while. Unfortunate because I depend on the subtitles to understand the episode as well.

Sinclair had been shot and wounded the previous year while trying to escape, disguised as "Franz Josef", one of the guard NCOs, so nicknamed because he resembled the late Austro-Hungarian emperor. Sinclair was one of the most dedicated escapers of WW2 but it cost him his life.

Thanks for sharing a personal story and your connection too history with us.

That's the conventional narrative and is out of date. Montgomery knew they were there and also knew they were both reduced to regimental strength with few tanks. Receiving reports on the presence of the II.SS-Panzerkorps moving into the area is the reason Montgomery cancelled Operation COMET on 10 September, that involved only the British Airborne Division and the Polish Brigade taking the Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave bridges, and proposed an upgrade adding the two American divisions so that 1st Airborne and the Poles could concentrate at Arnhem. They had 84 anti-tank guns between them, which bizarrely exactly matched the number of panzers Model had listed as operational in his entire Army Group B for the monthly September returns. Allied intelligence had correctly estimated less than 100. Operation MARKET GARDEN failed at Nijmegen on the first afternoon, not at Arnhem, when the 508th PIR failed to move on the Nijmegen highway bridge while it was only guarded by an NCO and seventeen men. This was contrary to Gavin's instruction to move with speed on the bridge as soon as practical after landing and securing the initial objectives on the Groesbeek ridge. By the time Gavin the 508th moving, it was too late, as units of the 10.SS-Panzer-Division and started moving into the city and reinforced the bridges. Sources: Lost At Nijmegen, RG Poulussen (2011) Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012) September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012) The 508th Connection, Zig Boroughs (2013), chapter 6 - Nijmegen Bridge Little Sense Of Urgency - an operation Market Garden fact book, RG Poulussen (2014) Arnhem 1944: An Epic Battle Revisited vols 1 and 2, Christer Bergström (2019, 2020)

​@@davemac1197still their presence didn't help

It wasn't that they were Panzer Divisions that was a big issue as they were under strength and many of their tanks were captured French ones. But the presence of any extra troops was problematic. However, the paratroopers very nearly held on, and XXX Corps was only 12 hours behind schedule before Nijmegen. Perhaps the illusory, well-equipped two Panzer divisions that Gavin and Browning secured the Heights against were the ones that caused the most damage to the mission. People criticise Browning for ignoring reports of armour around Arnhem but that was probably partly because he was convinced it was further east.

​​@@wbertie2604True. They were in the area for rest and refitting so not at full strength. But like you said any additional troops was going to make it harder.

@@alexamerling79 - the point is they were known to be there and the 1st Airborne Division and Polish Brigade took plenty of anti-tank guns. The greatest immediate delay at Arnhem came from SS-Sturmbannführer Sepp Krafft's SS-Panzergrenadier-Ausbildungs-und-Ersatz-Bataillon 16, which had two training companies relocated from their Arnhem barracks to the west and north of Oosterbeek as additional protection to Model, because Krafft was the only officer to take seriously a warning from Generalmajor Walter Grabmann of the Luftwaffe 3.Jagd-Division at Deelen airfield that the fields around Wolfheze were ideal landing grounds for airborne forces and Model's headquarters might be vulnerable. That delay, and subsequent intervention by II.SS-Panzerkorps, prevented two of the three battalions of 1st Parachute Brigade from reaching their objectives in Arnhem, but this was not the reason the operation failed. The fatal compromise was at Nijmegen, because it delayed the relief trying to get to Arnhem.

We're thrilled to accompany you on your commute, thanks for watching!

Hope you're not driving while trying to follow the maps.....

@@Raskolnikov70double watch usual, listening on my drive then watching when at home haha

Thanks for watching.

It's a paraphrase of something Santayana and Churchill said at different times

Yeah, I caught that, too.

Thanks for the sweet comment, glad you enjoyed and thanks for watching!

Major Cain was an absolute Legend, the epitome of the British soldier!

Thank you for the mention of a very brave British soldier at Arnhem, but please, a VC is awarded for valour, not valor. 🙂

It's an interesting battle but only one part of a much bigger event (3rd Army's advance) that the channel did cover. They can't get into every detail with the limited time they have.

I understand your frustration. I remember similar questions about why the team omitted certain events in the early days of the channel. To break down everything happening week by week would take about an 45-90 minutes of filming, which they don't have time. Even I noticed the lack of guests, Out of The Foxhole, Spies and Ties, ON The Home Front videos. Everything is about the week by week or War Against Humanity series

@@TrickiVicBB71 It's annoying, and it's been going on since the channel started covering the war in 1939. They're giving an overview of events that contributed to the overall war effort, not trying to do a detailed documentary. But literally every week there's someone asking why this or that event wasn't important enough to be included. They've only got 20 minutes people, grr....

Steven Zaloga wrote that the battle of Arracourt is hardly mentioned generally because the Americans, specifically the 4th Armored Division, the only major U.S. unit involved easily won a decisive victory. At one point the Germans had a 4 to 1 advantage in tanks in the sector. 4th AD killed 200 German tanks and lost about 40 Shermans and a dozen or so Hellcats.

It was the biggest tank battle the Americans were involved in on the Western Front up until the Battle of the Bulge. The Americans performed admirably even though the German tanks like the Panther outgunned them. It was indicative of the spluttering German war effort. The Germans didn't employ any reconnaissance units and the tanks and crews were rushed into action without sufficient training. The early morning mists enabled the American tanks to emerge from concealed positions and get in the first strike time and again. It was exciting how that American in a small plane he had modified to carry missiles found a break in the clouds to launch a series of strikes on the German tanks. It is a great story and is well worth telling. @@walterm140

Well, like Patton, he probably decided he had been fighting the wrong enemy. He just did it in reverse.

He was self-serving and basically a criminal, like all communist "rulers."

Commies are enemies of democracy, same as fascists. Disgusting filth all of them.

You willingly gave your kids these murderous selfish genes?

In military strategy, a choke point (or chokepoint), or sometimes bottleneck, is a geographical feature on land such as a valley, defile or bridge, or maritime passage through a critical waterway such as a strait, which an armed force is forced to pass through in order to reach its objective, sometimes on a substantially narrowed front and therefore greatly decreasing its combat effectiveness by making it harder to bring superior numbers to bear. A choke point can allow a numerically inferior defending force to use the terrain as a force multiplier to thwart or ambush a much larger opponent, as the attacker cannot advance any further without first securing passage through the choke point.

Thank you very much and thanks for watching!

Thank you so much!

Don't forget to tip your waitress, Bridget.

The battle had taken its toll on the men, so they said, "Let's call it a draw - bridge." Nyuk nyuk nyuk.

Great Post and spot on this shouldn't have been considered let alone launched

@@bigwoody4704 bit like you being conceived lilwoody Whittaker it should never of happened.by the way how is your sister/mom? bet she is well happy that at least one of the Whittaker family can at least write a little bit even if it is just childish drivel.

Johnny have you thought of what you might when- if you grow up?Get it together kid. Grow up. Get a life. Stop being a burden on society. Now pick up your plastic soldiers mums coming home. She works so hard to pay for your therapy and all

It's remarkable how the tides of war can shift alliances so quickly, thanks for watching.

@@WorldWarTwo Romanians will soon be sent to fight the Hungarians, something many of them pursued more enthusiastically than they had ever done against the Soviets.

Model was known as the Fuhrers fireman always salvaging potential disasters on the Eastern Front. It was unfortunate for Market Garden his HQ was near Arnhem in September 1944. Might also be explanation for collapse of Eastern Front in mid to late 1944 .most of the top commanders. Model Runstedt were now in the West. At that time Heinrinci a defensive specialist was in exile because he wasn't a Nazi

I think he’s an important reason Market Garden failed. He organized a much stronger resistance than the planners anticipated.

@@Chiller11 Yes i wonder if the Allies knew he was in Holland they would gave gone ahead with Market Garden. I think though it was largely won by junior officers & Generals such as Brittich who realised that bridges were the key to the whole operation especially Arhnem & Nijmegan

Model in bad situation can find solutions

Too many people want to quibble about which general did what without keeping this in mind. The bigger picture is that it was a bad plan from the get-go and never should have been attempted. Someone should have sent the planners back to the drawing board to come up with a better one.

@@Raskolnikov70 The point is, if a certain general from the 82nd had done his job and captured the bridge at Nijmegen, despite everything else that had gone wrong, the operation still would have been a success.

Had the operation succeeded and they pushed north to the Ijssel it would have cut off the German 15th Army, making the capture of the Scheldt much less difficult, thus opening up Antwerp.

Market Garden was a high risk, high reward operation that would have knocked out Germany by Christmas, or soon afterwards. It also would have lead the Allies cross the Riene at a better position then what would ultimately be the outcome. You must understand that everyone involved in this war where damn tired of fighting it. This operation would have shortened the war.

@@andmos1001 yeah, but it failed. The war was clearly coming to an end with the allies on top before the mission ever started. It's not like they needed market garden to pull victory out of the jaws of defeat. Yeah, no shit it would have been real neato if it had been successful, but it wasn't, and it wasn't necessary. Just lives wasted for vanity despite the outcome being known.

I went to the American cemetery where many of the dead from the Hurtgen Forest are interned. It was butchery for, in hindsight, no gain.

@@nickhtk6285 Eddie Slovik's division, the 28th, was heavily involved in the slaughter.

I really hope they talk about the Hurtgen forest. My grandad lost his entire platoon in those woods. While playing dead he got a German bayonet in his back.

As the crow flies they were 15 Km or 9.5 miles from Frost measured from the Keizer Karelplein traffic circle in Nijmegen. Operation COMET had Pegasus Bridge style glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave bridges, landing D Company from each of the three British Airlanding Battalions in 6 gliders on the polder close to each bridge. The plan was removed for MARKET by Brereton, who decided on a single lift in the middle of the first day instead of the double airlift envisioned for COMET. COMET was not a pipe dream, it was ready to go on 8 September and delayed by weather to 10 September. Montgomery cancelled it at the last minute (because of intelligence on II.SS-Panzerkorps in the area), with word coming through at 0200 hrs just as troops were preparing to board their aircraft. As an alternative for Arnhem bridge, Urquhart planned for his 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron to rush to the bridge by coup de main - a role the Squadron was not trained or equipped for and Major Gough made his objections known. He first asked for the three Troops to screen the advance of the three Parachute Battalions on their separate routes, but this was refused. He asked for .50 cal machine guns, or failing that, twin VIckers .303 guns to be mounted on the Jeeps, and this was also refused, leaving only a single Vickers mounted, and a Bren clipped to the vehicle for the driver when dismounted. At Grave, Colonel Reuben Tucker of the 504th PIR had the experience and grit to demand (not ask) for a special drop zone so he could land one company on the south side of the bridge and got it. The longest multi-span bridge in Europe at the time, it was captured very quickly. There was no special arranagement for the Nijmegen highway bridge. Gavin instructed the 508th commander, Colonel Lindquist, to send a battalion directly to the bridge as soon as practical after landing, and this was something he failed to do. Lindquist had performed badly in Normandy and 82nd Airborne CO at the time, Matthew Ridgway, did not trust him and would not promote him, according to Gavin in his 1967 interview with COrnelius Ryan. Gavin did not elaborate and Ryan did no further digging, so this whole debacle has been swept under the carpet for decades until all the main players had passed away and only recently about 10-12 years ago have the junior officers witness to the bridge instruction have spoken out. Buckingham first published on 1 April 2002 and was very much part of the conventional narrative established by Ryan, and although he has published again on Arnhem in 2019, I don't know if it's a completely new book or a new edition recycling the same narrative. I recommend: Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012) September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012) Arnhem 1944: An Epic Battle Revisited vols 1 and 2, Christer Bergström (2019, 2020)

Lead elements of XXX Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day three and still 27 miles/43k from Arnhem, well over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem. The RAF picked 1st AB's zones and the 82nd could not land on the two heavy flak batteries defending the Waal bridges. 82nd was the only AB Div tasked with capturing bridges over two major rivers and they were miles apart. Lt. Col. J.D. Frost about Operation Market Garden kzfaq.info/get/bejne/o8qmo6Rqmb63pmQ.html

Thank you very much for watching!

Hardly! One or two people having epic melts because they've had their ice cream taken away is not much of a fight.

Says the monty fanboi dave bent on falsley blaming the Americans because his crown had to come calling as they got in over their heads - AGAIN and became 2nd fiddle to a former colony that's it isn't it dave? Couldn't use us like you did the Canadians/ANZACs/Indians as sandbags and cannon fodder for your Royals. Damn shame as the Tommies were as Luddendorf said in WW1 Lions led by Jackasses

@@bigwoody4704 When you insult people, you are just admitting you've lost the argument. The fact that you're posting replies through at least 3 accounts now is a little unhinged. It seems that you're also posting well into the night, posting irrelevant excerpts that only you agree with through your alternative accounts. You really need to take a break.

@@thebrigadier1496 obviously you haven't dealt with a jerk who doesn't mind blaming a Monty debacle on dead GIs. Or you're one of them. He's been caught bending facts with distressing frequency. Since the dead aren't here to defend themselves,I don't mind doing so with actual sources. Try reading the evidence And those are not irrelevant excerpts they pertain to actual history so perhaps your national jingoism is bleeding thru

She was considered by many in the late 1940s to be the most powerful Jewish woman in the world, though her origins did nothing to reduce the widespread tendency in Eastern Europe to think Communist = Jew.

the 82nd had the Waal bridge to take as soon as they landed,sadly Gavin did not follow orders and it cost the whole operation..

@adamminichino5731 There is an argument that the 1st Airborne should not have been used ahead of the 6th Airborne. The reason being as you pointed out, the 1st Airborne was a largely inexperienced division. Although some of its individual components had experience like the 1st brigade, as a division it was fairly green. I have read an argument that the 6th Airborne was really forward thinking and promoted independent thinking and aggressive tactics, whereas the 1st Airborne had not advanced beyond the rudimentary tactics developed at the paratroopers formation, and had none of the concepts of the 6th Airborne, as evidenced by the early slow movement during Market garden. They were also fairly arrogant and dismissive of the 6th Airborne, believing that they should have been given the premier role in Normandy as they were the "originals". They suffered by losing Richard Nelson Gale to the 6th Airborne. They almost managed to lobby to be dropped behind Caen, which would have ended in disaster

@@johndawes9337 denial isn't a river in Egypt - Bernard doesn't show up and Carrington stops at Lent going no further - as was expected.. But on your Island Asylum they are refered to as a Field Marshall and a LORD - can't make that shyt up

You've been misled, probably by an American. The Nijmegen mission was assigned to the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division on only their second combat operation after Normandy. 1st Parachute Brigade at Arnhem were veterans of the Bruneval Raid (Operation Biting) led by Major John Frost, the Allied invasion of French North Africa (Operation Torch), and the Allied invasion of Sicily (Operation Fustian). Elements of 1st Parachute Brigade (mostly Lieutenent Colonel Frost's 2nd Battalion, a Company from 3rd Battalion, the Brigade HQ and Brigade support units) secured the far (northern) end of the Arnhem highway bridge and held it for 80 hours - fulfilling the mission of the whole Division. At Nijmegen, the 508th failed to send its 1st Battalion directly to the Nijmegen highway bridge, as instructed in the final divisional briefing by 82nd Airborne commander James Gavin. The 508th CO had performed badly in the Normandy operation, particularly in the attack on Hill 95 (Sainte Catherine near La Haye) on 4 July 1944 and was not trusted by former 82nd CO Matthew Ridgway. The delay by the 508th cost the 82nd Airborne the race to the bridge, which was secured by SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 and subsequently reinforced by elements of 10.SS-Panzer-Division, imposing a delay of 36 hours on the capture of the Nijmegen bridges after the Guards Armoured Division had arrived. Sources: Lost At Nijmegen, RG Poulussen (2011) Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012) September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012) Little Sense Of Urgency - an operation Market Garden fact book, RG Poulussen (2014) Arnhem 1944: An Epic Battle Revisited vols 1 and 2, Christer Bergström (2019, 2020)

@@davemac1197 What other rare gems have you mined for us today you poltroon?American forces had not been "evacuated" from -Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940 -Greece, Crete,Hong Kong and Libya in 1941 -Tobruk and Dieppe,Singapore in 1942 Sad but expected Then took 4 full yrs to cross it's own Channel,so the Americans pitching in to help the floundering forces do not take the blame for Bernard using colonials and allies alike as sandbags in his last desperate grab for glory . Fancy some more?

Well he got off lightly!

Dick Bogarde read this book

Horrocks in an interview in "The World At War" (1973) said they were expecting "stomach battalions", soldiers with health problems and frequently middle-aged. Many German troops did fit that description but not all of them.

​@@stevekaczynski3793The 9th and 10th SS Divisions were effective Regiments of children at that point which had virtually no tanks or heavy equipment left.

That brings to mind a story about George Pickett, the namesake of "Pickett's Charge" at Gettysburg during the American civil war. Really it should be called Lee's charge, as it was his blunder rather than Pickett's, but nevermind that for a moment. Years after the war Pickett was asked why the Confederate attack on the 3rd day at Gettysburg had failed so disastrously, and he supposedly replied, "I've always thought the Yankees had something to do with it."

@@KaiserFranzJosefI Their role is somewhat exaggerated - they were elements of two severely mauled panzer divisions, not two full-strength ones, and they were indeed very short on armour. Full-strength panzer divisions might expect to have 200 tanks or assault guns and both formations combined were short of that. But they were not the only German units in the vicinity and if the British paras were not relieved soon, they would be overwhelmed, as indeed happened.

That scene was fiction. Sosabowski had raised some objections to the original cancelled Operation COMET and asked Urquhart for his orders to be given in writing in case anything went wrong. In the divisional briefing for MARKET, nobody spoke up when asked if there were any questions, so he remained silent. The RAF did not decide on the landing zones as the film suggested, Urquhart did. According to Cornelius Ryan's book, he could have ordered the RAF to drop troops south of the bridge and some of his commanders were even willing to risk injury jumping on the town north of the bridge, but opted for the ideal zones to the west away from the town's Flak defences.

"The location of these zones, however, was a matter for the Royal Air Force and not the 1st Airborne Division, and Air Vice Marshal Hollinghurst, the commander of 38 Group, one of the air force formations which was to transport the Division into battle and supply it thereafter, refused to drop paratroopers any closer to Arnhem. His reasoning was that after the troops had been dropped, his aircraft could only begin the return to their bases by banking left, in a northerly direction; to have banked right would have led them into the path of the 82nd Airborne Division's aircraft returning from Nijmegen. If the aircraft approached too close to Arnhem, their return flight path would lead them directly over the top of a very large flak installation on the nearby Deelen Airfield, and to fly over this would result in severe losses which Transport Command could not afford. For this reason, the air force insisted on dropping all of the 1st Airborne Division roughly eight miles from Arnhem. Worse was to come. The Allies did not have enough transport aircraft to fly thirty-five thousand airborne troops to Holland in a single airlift, and it was apparent that no less than three lifts would be required to carry all of the men and their equipment to their drop zones. The matter was further complicated by the fact that the first days of Market Garden would occur during a new Moon period, and so to avoid the inevitable shambles that would arise from dropping and assembling thousands of men in total darkness, the landings could only take place in broad daylight. All previous major airborne operations had taken place at night, with the aid of moonlight, but as the Allies enjoyed near complete air superiority in September 1944, the prospect of enemy aircraft attempting to interfere with the slow-moving and vulnerable transport aircraft was remote, and so a daylight drop was practicable." Pegasus Archive Arnhem 3. Recipe for Disaster page

JOHN BURNS It is not Ryan actually talked to participants of the battle,go run back to TIKs board where revision and horse shit is embraced!!!

@The09 bradman Para Dave (aka Big Woody) 'loses were light'?..

Movies aren't always historically accurate but a Bridge Too Far tried to be as accurate as possible .Sasabowski was not convinced by the Market Garden plan & in the end he was made scapegoat for its failure. It certainly wasn't his fault that rhe weather stopped his Polish Brigade reinforcing 1st Airborne until it was far too late.

why? Ike demanded it Brereton and Williams planned it Gavin of the 82nd messed it up..Monty was not involved

" it boggles the imagination at what the allied armies might have done to the Wehrmacht with out Montgomery working so effectively for them"

Making a statement like that is declaring that you're either ignorant of the facts or don't like the truth.

Try some history - just ask the Germans what went down *"It Never Snows in September" by Robert J. Kershaw,page 9,Kershaw states"Heinz Harmel 10TH SS Commander was still able to give one of the most lucid accounts of the battles for Nijmegen and Arnhem I have ever heard Kershaw states* "I've told the story in their own words".He also interviews 12 other German Soldiers who were present at Market Garden. Kershaw states that "offered were diaries and unpublished personal accounts for perusal that did much to paint a realistic scene" *'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.194 both the 82nd Airborne and British Guards Armored were aware they were up against seasoned SS troops of about 500 that held the road held the road bridge.They were supported by an 88 mm gun on the traffic circle and 4 - 47 mm and a 37 mm with mortars in the Hunner Park.* *SS Capt.Schwappacher was supporting battle groups "when ever the enemy was ready to advance onto the bridge we hit them with the full impact of an artillary barrage which immediately halted the attacks where upon out infantry,reinforced were ble to to maintain their positions* *'It Never Snows in September' by Robert J. Kershaw,map reference p.192-193 The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944.* The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent. *A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense.The Waal had been secured by 1900.There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North.* *'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw, p.201, SS Captain Carl-Heinz Euling came to a decision "the 1st enemy tank was able to pass over the road bridge during the evening of 20 September,the railway bridge had already fallen* *'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p. 215, *Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit: 'The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked'the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent* If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us."* *It Never Snows in September Robert J Kershaw, p.231-233 on the 1st day of the landings the Hohenstauffenn captured a British Officer in possession of the ground marking instructions to indicate drop zones* *It Never Snows in September" p.285, Robert Kershaw XXX Corp was paying the price for committing it's entire offensive force along one road to reach the besieged airborne divisions.It's forces snarled up in such a narrow corridor that was proving difficult*

The flanking attackers had great difficulty with the terrain as well and it should be noted that the first cut in the corridor only happened after XXX Corps had already reached Nijmegen, where the airborne operation had actually failed. 1st Airborne had plenty of artillery, and on the contrary, there is a hindsight argument for leaving the artillery to the 2nd lift and taking more troops in the 1st.

They didn't miss it as much as they relied on hope to cover for their poor strategic planning. Same mistake Germany made in 1941 when Barbarossa first went in. What's that saying - you can choose to ignore reality, but you can't choose to ignore the consequences of ignoring reality?

@@davemac1197 Right, XXX Corps named it Hells Highway because they had smooth sailing until they got to Grave.

@@nickdanger3802 - that was the US Airborne nickname for it. XXX Corps called it 'Club Route'.

I think by that point in time, in terms of military education, they didn't miss the fact of impossibly long supply lines so much as ignored it or the consequences. By that point in the war Montgomery and his staff surely could read a map and knew about logistics.

Haven't seen him in quite some time unfortunately. I miss his reviews, and hope all is well.

Maybe by next? Thanks for watching.

Totally agree. If XXX Corps had found the bridge in American hands they could have driven on and taken the Island before the Germans had had a chance to occupy and fortify it. Instead, Gavin deployed the bulk of his forces to defend his drop zones from an imaginary panzer force which he believed to be hiding in the Reichswald Forest. Given WW2 US generals' reputation for aggression, it was a terrible moment of timidity which virtually guaranteed an Allied defeat. I'll never understand why history condemns Roy Urquhart yet gives Jim Gavin a pass.

@@paulclarke1207 "an imaginary panzer force which he believed to be hiding in the Reichswald Forest." British AO, British Intel. Browning was in command, what was his take on it ?

Lead elements of XXX Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day three and still 27 miles/43k from Arnhem, well over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem. If you can spare the time and energy Search Images Pegasus archive map of Arnhem 1944 progress and map 1st Para Brigade plan You may notice LZ Z is 4 miles/6k from the rail bridge. 82nd was the only AB Div tasked with capturing bridges over two major rivers (and a canal) and they were miles apart. map Nijmegen day one i.pinimg.com/originals/6a/5c/de/6a5cde8f149179bb749b61c2b92bb3e3.jpg

@@nickdanger3802 Browning wanted Gavin to secure the Heights, but he also wanted the Waal Bridge taken on Day 1. But it wasn't Browning's job to micro-manage Gavin's division. That was Gavin's job, by definition. By the by, Gavin was further distracted by wanting to take all the minor canal bridges too, none of which were anywhere near as important as the Wall Bridge. Meanwhile, the regiment assigned to take the bridge were still sitting in their foxholes on the Heights at 18:00 on the 17th, when Gavin called them and asked them if they'd taken the bridge yet. This regiment, the 508th PIR, had dropped shortly after noon. So for 5-6 hours on that first, all-important day, Gavin was unaware of the activities of fully a third of his paratroopers! But, yeah, blame Browning.

@@paulclarke1207 "still sitting in their foxholes" Thanks for illustrating just how little you know about it. Without a bridge over the Maas Waal canal, XXX Corps has to put up a Bailey bridge which took about 14 hours at Son and "Oh look everyone, it's day four before XXX Corps reaches the Waal Bridges!"

Presumably captured from American troops at some point. American .50 calibres from crashed or crash-landed bombers were also occasionally issued to German ground troops, if they were undamaged in the crash or damaged slightly enough to be repaired. The big problem was finding enough ammunition for them as the ammunition stocks came from an enemy country.

Some NCO is going to be out-processing in the states in 1946 and the clerk is going to pull out a piece of paper - "Looks like you signed this hand receipt for a Browning machine gun back in 1942 and never turned it back in. We're gonna have to take that out of your separation pay....."

@@Raskolnikov70 "Statement of charges" forms for loss of military equipment feature in William Wharton's novel "A Midnight Clear". But in that case two jeeps, a .50 calibre machine-gun and a number of rifles are lost. The lieutenant generously overlooks the loss of a 20 power scouting telescope.

@@stevekaczynski3793 Stuff like that is generally written off as 'combat loss' but bureaucrats are going to bureaucrat. I had a supply sergeant try to pull this on me months after getting back from Iraq in 1991 - "you signed for a footlocker that went missing, come up to supply and sign a statement of charges" even though we all turned them in as a group at the end of the war. She probably stole it herself, so I flat out refused and said "let's talk to the CO about this". Never heard another word about it after that because she knew I had 40+ witnesses who saw me turn it in.

"Yay, the Soviets are here! We're saved!" said nobody, ever.

The heavy losses in the opening months of Operation Barbarossa and the subsequent meat grinders meant that soviets had to conscript the criminals locked in prisons and gulags, also many ethnic minorities from the other republics were poor and tribal in nature still , could this be the cause of the rapes and theft?

@@Archer89201: and. . . History repeats

@@dewiz9596 unfortunately war brings out the worst in us humans, especially costly ones manpower wise. There were rapes by allied soldiers in France, England and other western countries too too, not on the scale of the soviets and the Germans though; Japanese although take everything to the extreme like they do with everything

​@@Raskolnikov70I imagine the victims at Auschwitz were probably quite happy to be liberated by the Soviets

good

Surprised the deaths are so low honestly

The figures for October from a book by Niklas Zetterling are 21,620 KIA, 100,549 WIA and 26,691 MIA. I assume your source is Overmans. One of the two sets of figures has to be very wrong.

@@ramonzzzz It is from Overmans.

@@stc3145 Don't worry it will increase much more and it doen't include the Western Front.

Airborne operations were a new thing. I am speculating but there may not have been anyone with experience of airborne operations ranked higher than major or even captain. For general officer rank they might have had no choice but to bring someone from outside...

@@stevekaczynski3793 Maybe for the Brits. It certainly wasn't that way in the US Army.

@@Mondo762 Where would the US army have gotten more experience than the British army in WW2, since they had only even joined in very, very late 1941--less than 3 years earlier? Especially in the European theatre of operations?

@@ToddSauve I did not say the Americans had more experience than the British Army. By this point in the War, the Americans certainly did have enough experience to have generals that were Paratroopers. They also trained their paratroopers to a very high level.

@@Mondo762 I'm a Canadian so I have no dog in this fight. But if you are assuming the British and even Canadian armies did not train their paratroopers just as hard and effectively as the US army you are mistaken. If there was any problem it was that the British had lost _so many_ officers by this point in the war that they had to borrow a large number of Canadian officers just to make up the shortfall! That is how bad things were in Normandy and throughout the entire campaign into Germany and their surrender. This was called CANLOAN. Here is a Wikipedia article about it. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CANLOAN

I saw that too.

The original planned Polish drop zone ('K') near the south end of the Arnhem bridge was located between two heavy Flak batteries and had high tension lines running across it from the Arnhem power station just SE of the bridge. It was deemed unsuitable for the 1st lift, but it was assumed on D+2 the area would be under the control of the 1st Parachute Brigade, so the Flak would be neutralised and the HT lines cut on the zone. So there were reasons for the landing zones being chosen at Wolfheze and Renkum. The other point about the Nijmegen bridge capture is that it was already getting dark when Robinson's tanks were machine-gunning German troops running about like rabbits silhouetted against burning buildings in Lent after they crossed the bridge, and much of the mythology about this episode was constructed by the peaceful looking scene being filmed in broad daylight for A Bridge Too Far. Tanks could not operate at night in WW2 and were usually withdrawn to laager behind the infantry front lines. For that reason, John Sliz in his book, Bridging The Club Route - Guards Armoured Division’s Engineers During Operation Market Garden (2015, 2016), made the point that since the Son bridge was replaced entirely in the hours of darkness, when it was doctrine that tanks were not advanced, the effective delay was zero. The tanks would have laagered for the night somewhere in the 101st Airborne area that night anyway. The delay was later at Nijmegen when the Guards arrived still in good time, only to be told the Waal bridges were still in German hands. In his book Corps Commander (1977), Brian Horrocks said he had gambled on advancing tanks at night on only two occasions and both times it had paid off. He was wary of trying his luck a third time, and he was already unnerved by MARKET GARDEN starting on a Sunday, because in his experience no operation starting on a Sunday had ever gone well.

MONTY GARDEN

British paras did kill a lower-level German general and his driver in the vicinity of Arnhem after his staff car blundered into them on a road. The general was photographed dead, hanging out of the open door of his car, his brains spilling out onto the road.

@dr.victorvs Outgunned? The British airborne had one of the best anti-armour capabilities of attacking infantry forces, as it included batteries of 6pounder & 17 pounder anti-tank guns dropped in Horsa gliders.

Of course Model buggered off with his tail between his legs. He was commanding from his HQ, not the turret of a panzer. Check the German sources and you'll find the same story.

@@hughbeastodonnell3733 I didn't mean physically leave. I mean give up the battle.

@@DrVictorVasconcelos fair enough. Sorry for the hang time, life got in the way.

Yes. But you should concetrate on Island Samar. The world wonders what will happen there...

24 bridges involved and they got 9 out of the 10 required on the main supply route ('Club Route').

@@davemac1197 thank you for correction I was thinking the main bridges everyone mentions

@@stucar7677 - no problem. The full story is a lot more complex, but A Bridge Too Far simplified it as much as possible, and that's what sticks in most people's minds.

A Bridge Too Far is so realistic thew Monty did not show up there either. just ask the Germans what went down *"It Never Snows in September" by Robert J. Kershaw,page 9,Kershaw states"Heinz Harmel 10TH SS Commander was still able to give one of the most lucid accounts of the battles for Nijmegen and Arnhem I have ever heard Kershaw states* "I've told the story in their own words".He also interviews 12 other German Soldiers who were present at Market Garden. Kershaw states that "offered were diaries and unpublished personal accounts for perusal that did much to paint a realistic scene" *'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p.194 both the 82nd Airborne and British Guards Armored were aware they were up against seasoned SS troops of about 500 that held the road held the road bridge.They were supported by an 88 mm gun on the traffic circle and 4 - 47 mm and a 37 mm with mortars in the Hunner Park.* *SS Capt.Schwappacher was supporting battle groups "when ever the enemy was ready to advance onto the bridge we hit them with the full impact of an artillary barrage which immediately halted the attacks where upon out infantry,reinforced were ble to to maintain their positions* *'It Never Snows in September' by Robert J. Kershaw,map reference p.192-193 The German Defense of Nijmegan 17-20 September 1944.* The KampfgruppeHenke initially established a line of defense outposts based on the two traffic circles south of the railway and road bridges on 17 September.The 10SS Kampfgruppe Reinhold arrived and established the triangular defense with Euling on the road bridge,Henke and other units defending the approaches of the railway bridge,and his own Kampfgruppe on the home bank in the village of Lent. *A surprise assault river crossing by the U.S. 3/504 combined with a tank assault on the road bridge on 20 September unhinged the defense.The Waal had been secured by 1900.There was nothing further barring the road to Arnhem 17 kilometers to the North.* *'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw, p.201, SS Captain Carl-Heinz Euling came to a decision "the 1st enemy tank was able to pass over the road bridge during the evening of 20 September,the railway bridge had already fallen* *'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p. 215, *Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit: 'The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked'the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent* If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us."* *It Never Snows in September Robert J Kershaw, p.231-233 on the 1st day of the landings the Hohenstauffenn captured a British Officer in possession of the ground marking instructions to indicate drop zones* *It Never Snows in September" p.285, Robert Kershaw XXX Corp was paying the price for committing it's entire offensive force along one road to reach the besieged airborne divisions.It's forces snarled up in such a narrow corridor that was proving difficult*

Thank you very much!