The Freethinking Argument is a terrible argument and I say this as a libertarian. I'm glad you addressed this.

I just recorded a three hour video detailing the multiple mistakes Pallmann has made in his full length video entitled Why I Don't Use the Freethinking Argument. I am going to try to edit it down to make it a bit shorter, but I plan to release it before the New Year. Stay tuned.

Wow! Stratton owes you a thank you letter for engaging with such clarity and charity regarding his work! Good work.

Thanks for putting all the work into this video. Stratton's argument is yet another variation of C.S. Lewis' "argument from reason". This argument is quite popular to assert against atheists and it does take a lot of time to unpack it. In debate though, you have to have to refute an argument in a short amount of time or the modern audience just zones out.

As a person who sees Tim as a mentor, and who respects the work you've been putting out and sees you as a friend I have to admit I'm a bit torn here, but I watched the whole video and feel like Im giving it a fair hearing. That being said I'm just wondering at a possible solution to your counterexample and would like your thoughts on it (but if the back and forth on this vid has worn you out I totally understand). In world A you have a subject (John) believing a proposition based on evidence and in world B you have the same subject (John) believing the same proposition based on the same evidence and so both seem to conform to your account of inferential justification despite John having free will in A and being determined in B. Im wondering if the difference isn't in the proposition or the evidence justifying it, or the account of justification, but what if the difference is the subject(John)? So for example if John in world A meets the necessary condition for free will (the sourcehood condition) regardless of whether he meets the sufficient condition (the PAP) he's an agent, he can refer to himself as "I". But if determinism is true it doesn't seem like he could be an agent in the same sense. The "John" in world B wouldn't be the same subject, the same I as world A. So is it possible that the reason the proposition is justified in world A but not world B is that theres a genuine(so to speak, though I know thats imprecise) subject believing the proposition based on the evidence where in world B there isn't? Just to preface the above I am working with a incompatibilist conception of free will and take the sourcehood condition to definitionally affirm incompatibilism (you are free if you are not determined by anything external to yourself to do what you in fact do). But Im not dogmatic on that front and realize I need to read more incompatibilists on their accounts of the necessary and sufficient conditions for free will. If it could be shown that the source-hood condition could be affirmed by compatibilists then my proposed reason for why the proposition is justified in world A but not B would fail. Now even if that works to solve your counterexample I have no idea how to respond to your points on transcendental arguments nor how to escape the horns of your argument for premises 3 and 4 contradicting eachother. I'll definitely be giving it a lot of thought. But thats just my thoughts on your video. It's all off the top of my head but what do you think? And again if you can't get back to me or are feeling too warn out by this topic I completely understand, just figured Id put it out there.

What a coincidence! I was reading Malpass' critiques of this argument some days ago (because I watched a debate between MadeByJimBob and some random atheist where Bob brought that nonsensical argument). I'm looking forward to watch it!

Here's a question I have (I'm about half-way through, so my apologies if you answer later in the video), because I tend to agree with his basic ideas, even if they aren't precisely drawn out in his premises. There was one part of the video where you said determinists can say that the reasons they believe something can also be predetermined, justifying their belief. This seems to me to only let some sort of compatibilist theist off of the hook for justification - it seems highly unlikely that a purely materialistic world would have any intentionality in order to bring about reasons in a determined way. So it seems unlikely that such reasons would be predetermined given materialism. This gets me to my question: Since his argument is against materialism, wouldn't some consideration like this lead us to believe it is much more probable that God exists if *reasons* are unlikely to be predetermined by an atheistic universe?

What arguments do you use?

This was extremely good.

Hey bro these are offtopic questions, I have two questions for you I hope you can answer these: 1. Do you have like a sort of paypal account? It may be useful for you so people like me can donate to help your KZfaq channel. 2. Have you try to consider to make a series to refute the JEPD theory?

Has anyone tried to argue that consciousness requires free will? It seems intuitively true to me, but I don't know how to argue for it.

If you are determined by God to see that the wall you are looking at is blue, or if you freely see that the wall you are looking at is blue, does either case change the fact that the wall being looked at is blue? In either case a false belief can also obtain. If you are determined by God to see water on the road which in fact is a mirage, or if you freely see water on the road which in fact is a mirage, does either case change the fact that the water on the road is a mirage? As you think about that keep these scriptures in mind... 19 Then Micaiah continued, “Listen to what the Lord says! I saw the Lord sitting on his throne with all the armies of heaven around him, on his right and on his left. 20 And the Lord said, ‘Who can entice Ahab to go into battle against Ramoth-gilead so he can be killed?’ “There were many suggestions, 21 and finally a spirit approached the Lord and said, ‘I can do it!’ 22 “‘How will you do this?’ the Lord asked. “And the spirit replied, ‘I will go out and inspire all of Ahab’s prophets to speak lies.’ “‘You will succeed,’ said the Lord. ‘Go ahead and do it.’ 23 “So you see, the Lord has put a lying spirit in the mouths of all your prophets. For the Lord has pronounced your doom.” - 1 Kings 22:19-23 New Living Translation And if the prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing, I the Lord have deceived that prophet, and I will stretch out my hand upon him, and will destroy him from the midst of my people Israel. - Ezekiel 14:9 King James Version 11 And for this cause God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie: 12 That they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness. - 2 Thessalonians 2:11-12 King James Version

I'm a Calvinist, but in Stratton's defense, does the video conflate 1. the truth of LFW with 2. the justified tru belief in LFW? Why must one first be justified in believing LFW before transcendentally or abductively showing that a rejection of LFW precludes the ability to reason and/or to have knowledge?

Im not a philosopher. I am a Christian though and there are many parts in this video that seems very unchartitable and unchristlike. I have no issues with questioning positions, statements, and claims by others such as Tim, but dont attack the person and assume the worst in them. Challenge the content.

If logical inference based on evidence was determined, then surely everyone who comes upon the evidence would believe it, but since that is not the case, and we get people disagreeing all the time, does that not mean we can simply reject this as being possibly true?

🤔

You could be determined to believe something true for good reasons on determinism, but how would you know that your reasons are good when another person can look at the same evidence and come to different conclusions? Being as both of you are equally determined, how would you know that you are interpreting the evidence rationally? If you say 'because of the evidence', it seems circular.

The Free-Thinking Argument vs David Pallmann: 1- If David Pallmann’s beliefs about metaphysics and epistemology are true, then human mental activity can be exhaustively determined by non-rational and mindless stuff (antecedent conditions) that knows nothing of metaphysics and epistemology. 2- If DP’s mental activity is exhaustively determined by non-rational and mindless stuff that knows nothing of metaphysics and epistemology, then DP does not freely think in a libertarian sense. (That's true by definition.) 3- If DP does not freely think in a libertarian sense, then DP is not rationally responsible for his metaphysical and epistemological beliefs (rather, non-rational and mindless stuff that knows nothing of metaphysics and epistemology is responsible for that much). 4- But, DP is rationally responsible for his metaphysical and epistemological beliefs. 5- Therefore, DP freely thinks in a libertarian sense. 6- Therefore, DP’s mental activity cannot be exhaustively determined by non-rational and mindless stuff that knows nothing of metaphysics and epistemology. 7- Therefore, David Pallmann’s views on metaphysics and epistemology are false.

John's belief in world B is NOT based upon evidence. John's belief in world B is based upon what he was determined to conclude. The evidence is irrelevant albeit that it at least "looks good" (to God) for evidence to be present.