Wow 😲

RAD

hey @BattleOrder i think you didnt make the second video for soviet artillery in ww2, the video that was supposed to compare soviet doctrine + employment with that of the german and US ones

68 МСБр стояла в Оше. 66 и 70 МСБр воевали в Афганистане.

Airborne It is "light" division

Yep, that technology is absolutely crazy. Some good videos of it not working are online as well. It's basically a rod that dangles below the vehicle. When the rod impacts the ground (around 5-6' I believe) it fires all the rockets to basically stop the momentum of the dropping vehicle and let it "land" easier. It's pretty wild to imagine how much material went into outfitting a unit for a full drop like that.

Retrothrusters, they use them for Soyuz landings aswell

@@TonyBustaroni Orbital Drop Soviet Troopers

PRSM-915 rocket parachute

I mean tbh I think Hostomel Airport proves that air assault can work in the same niche roles as it always has, the failure there was on the relief forces not the VDV themselves

@@impguardwarhamer Under the premise, that Ukr is a revolting province with a local defense deforce to counter, maybe. The Problem starts if you have to engange Artillery, Aircraft and Armor. Because everything that is worth to be taken by airborn operations, is worth to be blown up by your own artillery to deny access to the enemy. 230 sorties to a singular location in a contestant airspace is doable, but redicolous costly. I mean the US has round about 250 each of C130 and C 5´s. So it would take half of the US airlift capablitie to deploy this light infantry division.

@@impguardwarhamer It's true that the VDV managed to capture the airport, but I don't see what the Russians gained from capturing it and doing it with an air assault. My understanding of the timeline is: VDV captures the airport manned by NGU conscripts and clerks, Ukrainian mechanised assault retakes the airport, Russian mechanised assault recaptures the airport but Ukrainian artillery destroys the runway and the Russians eventually retreats after some months when the whole Kyiv axis became unsustainable. As far as I'm aware, they didn't get to fly in any fixed wing aircrafts with heavy equipment, and they could've formed a helicopter bridgehead anywhere. And if the VDV needed armoured support to hold off the Ukrainians, why not just send tanks to take it in the first place? And if Ukrainian artillery could destroy the runways relatively easily, why even bother capturing the airport? To me it seems like airmobile operations are most useful to rapidly project power in COIN and possibly to deploy harassing troops behind enemy lines. But with all the vehicles and logistics the VDV needs, it seems like their focus is to capture some desolate airfield and form an airbridge to move in their vehicles, and then roam around the rear as light mechanised infantry. What did the VDV expect would happen after Hostomel was captured? Did they not think the Ukrainians would counterattack with their heavy units when Russian soldiers landed 10 km outside of Kyiv? I don't think it makes sense unless they thought the Ukrainians would fold after their show of force like in a COIN operation.

" I don't think it makes sense unless they thought the Ukrainians would fold after their show of force like in a COIN operation." Thats exactly what they planned for.

​@@DIREWOLFx75one ruble deposited in your account

Считайте, что не было. Одна экспериментальная, и всё. Увы-увы.

@@AVPozdeev Жаль, что тема умерла..🤷‍♂

@@user-uf3gh6tp5o Это было неизбежно, в связи с неприкасаемым статусом ВДВ. А такие инициативы рождались в СВ.

@@AVPozdeev А эти дивизии хотели на базе ВДВ формировать, как я понимаю? Но Десант не проникся идеей, они хотели всё сохранить как есть?

@@user-uf3gh6tp5o нет, это проект сугубо СВ, как и десантно-штурмовые части. ВДВ не позволили бы себя реформировать.

To be fair though, in Soviet doctrine, if they ever had to fight a defensive war on Soviet soil, it would be fought with nuclear weapons (against NATO cities), not with an actual defensive force. To such as extent, it does make sense why a territorial defense division was not pursued - by the time it was needed, nukes would already be flying.

@@DIREWOLFx75 "Hardly! USSR was MUCH less easygoing about using nuclear weapons than the west was." The Soviet plan for WW3 was to literally glass West Germany with nuclear weapons and run over the remains, they certainly would've done the same if the USSR was invaded. "That would not happen until the existence of the nation was under threat. And an invasion by landforces alone does not such a threat make." The USSR, especially after the Great Patriotic War, saw an invasion of its soil as a threat to its national existence - certainly, the second NATO troops stepped foot on Soviet soil, the nuclear option would be used.

@@AUsernameWeShallMarchToKiev That claim isn't backed by any actual soviet doctrine I've read, including western translations. To the contrary, the use of ANY NBC is put as contingent on the enemy using them first, not ever using them first, especially since they considered themselves having an advantage in conventional war.

Gorbostrelki ‘90 gang

It would not. Point of trucks is to transport infantry from point A to before point B, from where infantry fights on foot, like classic infantry.

@@TonyBustaroni That's a fair point. But what I've seen the Ukrainians do was sending one or a couple of trucks at opportune moments. Even armoured units have truck based logistics, so rotating units with trucks is different from mounting your combat troops in them. I would think a Cold War conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be higher intensity and involve a lot more air power, especially by NATO. Any massed units in softskinned vehicles, like a convoy moving to the front, would be a huge target for air, artillery, even just a machine gun ambush, and the trucks have to stick to roads so their movements are predictable. If this unit is truly meant for complex closed terrain, I don't understand why it includes all the tracked and wheeled armoured vehicles. To me this unit looks more like a budget and airliftable version of motor rifles instead of a purpose built light infantry unit for closed terrain. There's a reason why mechanised infantry has almost fully replaced motorised, even convoys are being uparmoured. The VDV would also sometimes swap out their BMDs for BMPs etc. in Afghanistan and Chechnya, which was largely urban and mountain fighting like this unit was supposedly built for.

@@TonyBustaroni It's more out of necessities. There isn't enough protected transport like M113 to go around, nor military trucks. Plus, it's perfectly fine to have a civilian car to commute from the rear to near front. The US army have an insane number of trucks and tankers to keep it fed. Russian units are actually under motorised, tying them down to railheads as we have seen, making it difficult to impossible to get to the last mile.

Think of it more like US units driving in humvees and trucks in Irak. They didn't get more casualties than those in Bradley and when they got IEDed neither a truck nor Bradley would survive...

@@0jrhindo-907 I don’t think you can compare the relative power between the coalition and Iraq to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Not to mention that Iraqi air power was destroyed before the ground campaign, and that the Soviets would face NATO that overwhelmingly rely on air power. I’m also not sure how much artillery the coalition faced, but I don’t think it would be comparable to WW3.

I do not have info that goes down to that low of a level

@@BattleOrder dang. Oh well.

You can extrapolate that they would be equipped similarly, if not exactly the same, as a standard motor rifle company, gear wise. They're not deploying by parachute, so no need for special rifles (e.g. AKS-74), and the unit's lighter equipment doesn't seem drastic enough to call for specialized gear (backpacks, web gear, etc). Only thing in question is whether the lack of BTRs means there would be more MGs or grenadiers. I would think not, though If anything, the official organization would be the same, but weapons units would be more likely to get farmed out to rifle platoons to bolster their firepower.

They are using the exact same equipment. Or what's left of it.

Wow is that your professional opinion?

I mean, yeah? 1989 saw so much more in terms of quantity of equipment and troops than the modern Russian army.

​@@MardukTheSunGodInsideMethat equipment was good in 80's not now.

that why they should have started yugoslav war style confict and invaded ukraine the moment it declared independece they had nothing to lose anyways by doing that becouse life is hell anyways

I took it down years ago because the argument I made in it was flawed

also if the argument you made was that soviets ended up using more bodies than TNT to solve tactical problems (compared to germans and US), its not really incorrect. Using massed short sharp preparatory fires to make up for laggard sensor-shooter cycle was also not incorrect. wish i could watch it@@BattleOrder

It's a shame it was canned before the new soviet/Russian airborne support vehicle could be tested and inoperated. The 125mm and planned 152mm varients could have helped with the main identified defisionancies while still keeping it air deployable and lower logistical footprint.

There were only a couple of separate air assault regiments (1318 ODShP and 1319 ODShP) attached to a specialized type of army corps, whereas there were a lot of separate air assault battalions. The graphic is actually slightly wrong because while most Army Corps were made of divisions, the type that had a separate air assault regiment were made of brigades But the two army corps in question (the 5th and 48th) were basically operational maneuver groups working for the front (army group) that would exploit breakthroughs in the enemy's depth, so it makes sense why they'd have slightly more air assault resources. A regiment had two maneuver battalions and fires batteries in support as opposed to battalions, so it was like sort of a mini-brigade. Although the two corps were disbanded in 1989

I was thinking the same thing. Sure it’s “underpowered” but it also takes a lot less resources to fully deploy this entire unit. Compare that to a NATO division still getting its gear together or still trying to deploy and the Soviets have a good advantage on their side.

@@turtlecheese8 Ukraine are spanking VDV troops everyday. I dont think any RUS troops would bother NATO.

Это обычное сокращение слова Company - Coy, равно как Battalion - Bn или Brigade - Bde.

Coy is short for company.

Nice doctrine, but how to use it in non totalitarian states?

@@maksimfedoryak what He is obviously talking about the Order of Battle of Soviet Ground Forces, has _absolutely_ nothing to do with politics. irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm100-2-1.pdf

pentagon looked at the pristina march and wanted that capability but GDLS had another idea and made an overweight LAV that couldn't drive out of a ditch

Until the moment he is suppressed

One of the first units to arrive in Saudi Arabia during the invasion of Kuwait were the 101st and 82nd airborne divisions. They were expected to hold off the Iraqi's just long enough until the armored and mechanized divisions arrived. So yes, a very rabidly deployed meat shield.

@@robertalaverdov8147I thought the 101st were deployed to blockade a main supply road, if I recall, not deployed to buy time against an Iraqi force.

@@robertalaverdov8147And Iraq, due to the immense pressure of the coalitions combines arms was only able to mount a few counters attacks, and most of these went straight into armored forces, again if I recall, only one during the first few days against a command outpost was able to almost capture it, but was driven back. So I want to know what are you talking about.

@@kylezdancewicz7346 This was during the first few weeks or so in August 1990. You may have forgotten but the buildup lasted for 6 months before the air campaign. Then another month before the ground invasion. Prior to that there were attempts to get Iraq to leave Kuwait diplomatically. But even before then there were fears of an Iraqi invasion into Saudi Arabia, the northern Saudi oil fields were a stones throw away. Perhaps the Iraqi army was overestimated in its abilities, but there was a real fear that the Saudi army wouldn't put up much of a fight before the bulk of us forces arrived. Thus the 101st and 82nd were sent, to state that the US was serious, to reassure the Saudi's that they had their back. And if push comes to shove, to be a meat barrier.

@@robertalaverdov8147 Ok, your wording made is seem like they were deployed against an actual Iraqi attack and not a potential one. And from the 101st track record, they probably would have done there jobs, hold out.

You are a fool. First of all, they need a government that will replace them, then there will be no need to realize geopolitical ideologies by sacrificing the lives of stupid people.

I think the closest thing is their militia and conscript units they use to man the trenches. The Russian/Soviet use of conscripts is to put them in the front to man a wide front, and then send in their experienced troops to counterattack, rather than to use conscripts for rear security which I think is done more often by their National Guard etc. Otherwise the closest the Russians have to light infantry is probably their fairly large GRU special purpose units (they have 8 Special Purpose Brigades) but it seems that they are mostly used to support and strengthen their regular forces instead of being used separately to penetrate into the enemy's rear like doctrinally intended.

@@fridrekr7510 Well they should get their shit together and work it out. It's not rocket science the 18th century Germans worked it out with Auftragstaktik. Let the officer on the spot make the decision. Otherwise it's a disaster like Ugledar and now Avdeevka.

​@@fridrekr7510под лёгкую пехоту лучше всего подходят Внутренние войска, но у них задачи другие. ГРУ изначально предполагалось использовать, в случае начала войны с НАТО, как диверсантов которые будут формировать лояльные ячейки сопротивление из местного населения для подрыва линий снабжений и диверсий на военных заводах. В Афганистане ГРУ вело контрпартизанскую войну, а реализовать свою концепцию им удалось только вовремя войны в Таджикистане.