China should allso be helping Ukraine

TAIWAN #1

Taiwan IS a country. COME AT ME CCP

🤘🤘🤘❤️❤️❤️👍👍👍

How much does he get paid?

I wish we could get the same value build in America.

How is this unique lol. Maybe in Taiwan I guess

Getting some practice for China eh?

God bless you both and protect you all. Take care. And be sober. 🙏

Slava Ukraini!!

Taiwan: "See?! Even Linus likes us!" China: "Linus Torvalds?" Taiwan: "No, LinusTechTips." China: "Whodafakadat?"

Not very bright!!!!

I'd rather have proper bike lanes so I don't get killed

Taiwan is the next Ukraine 😂😂😂

it is worth it?

People in Taiwan will start wearing socks and sandals

it took the algorithm a while, but it finally made the connection between LTT's video, this formosa TV video Edit: something y'all got wrong, and the sign-off makes it seem like it wasn't a translation error... The computer wasn't self-assembled, it was pre-assembled. And what an amazing job the PC technician did too!

🇺🇦 🇺🇦 🇺🇦

👍

freedom are lousy lies, shameless liars. too greedy for money, sell live and soul for money

Lol, so Taiwan the Karen is accusing law enforcement of harrassment. There, I both corrected the title of this click bait video and saved everyone 2 minutes

Be safe, learn all you can, bring it back to Taiwan. Thanks for your service.

this doesn't really prove about R&D. But the rest, sure.

Lies again? Oscar BAFTA Ramenten Rakuten

Of course she's the KMT.

White seats would be a cheaper option to sheds. 😉

It served as an ad for Taiwan indeed, especially after watching the WAN Show commentary that followed up. Linus talked so good about his experiences in Taiwan, that a place I never even considered visiting, became an appealing choice.

They are called Fishermen, enough of the woke language nonsense

It doesn't matter how many times the Chinese regime repeats the *lies,* or how *dirty* it plays, - Taiwan 🇹🇼 is still an independent country.

This is interesting considering the US and Taiwanese policy experts have zero concern over the fact that minority Americans are NEVER posted as senior-level US representatives in Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, China, and possibly many other Asian territories. US minorities can die for Taiwan, but never benefit. Please read the following: The Secret Race Problem Found in US-Taiwan Diplomacy by Kurt Munroe At a forum recently organized by the Formosa Republican Association (FRA), international policy experts gathered to honor the 45th anniversary of the US’ Taiwan Relations Act. Some experts at that event argued for 'strategic clarity' to better define Taiwan's identity and its multifaceted relationship with the US and other states, ultimately safeguarding Taiwan's global interests. This focus on strategic clarity allowed the attending experts to analyze policy language, intent, innuendos, and other nuanced motivations that guide outcomes. Tommy Lin, president of the FRA and the Taiwan United Nations Alliance discussed opportunities for the government and the public to act independently to combine support for shared interests. This, of course, implies an open invitation to the American public to contribute to an informed environment, from which, to cooperate on advancing democratic principles. The hitch, however, is that Alexis de Tocqueville had already problematized the foreign policy issue for potential American change agents. He discussed a reoccurring theme within democratic societies, where the democratic principles, observed in diverse or heterogeneous states, in particular, and producing favorable public harvests, were without a doubt, not put into practice concerning matters of international relations. Later, Noam Chomsky added that one of the relationships between democracy and capitalism is contradiction. In America, race is central to this conflict. He meant that you cannot have a perfectly capitalist democracy because some targeted groups would inevitably lose out on participation to serve the interests of concentrated private wealth. So, how do Tocqueville and Chomsky’s warnings, if they are accurate, matter to government and public collaboration toward strategic clarity? To address this question, we can conduct a hypothetical exercise that explores the potential characteristics of a mobilization effort that empowers a marginalized, but well-informed public. Essentially, we can synthesize a better understanding of Tocqueville and Chomsky by analyzing additional language, intent, innuendos, and nuanced motivations guiding five hypothetical scenarios that describe US policy in Taiwan and the region. By reimagining US conduct, we can bring attention to processes that potentially cause US policy to appear unnecessarily combative, divisive, and racially offensive concerning collective goals. Before we begin, we must evaluate what we mean when discussing US-Taiwan relations. Where does this relationship between Americans and the people in Taiwan begin and end? Which Americans and which people in Taiwan define US-Taiwan relations? Do all Americans and all in Taiwan share the same global interests? Where do we agree and disagree? Which alternatives are excluded? How is US-Taiwan policy packaged and marketed to influence significant outcomes? The first hypothetical scenario assumes a concerning situation: the US government and the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) administer policy activities in Taiwan in a way that makes them far more complex and potentially risky than necessary. Within this unlikely situation, it seems most policy experts overlook or downplay how distortions and manipulations in US policymaking, in general, and how policy is presented, in particular, undermine the US-Taiwan pro-democracy message. The most significant inconsistency lies in the complete lack of senior-level minority-American representation throughout US diplomatic history in Taiwan, dating back to the first point of contact. This raises a critical question for policymakers: does the absence of ethnic diversity in these roles pose a challenge, or is it ultimately unimportant? The second hypothetical stipulates that if US-Taiwan policy lacks senior-level leadership from astute minorities, then the system, led by non-minorities, their Taiwanese counterparts, and involved corporations may have less incentive to consider minority perspectives or ensure their fair participation in economic, defense, and other collaborative endeavors that generate wealth. This perspective suggests that US representatives, who are not minorities, have not self-recognized and adequately communicated the potential negative perception of senior, non-minority appointments to policy leadership. If there are shared public benefits from non-minority, senior representation in Taiwan, none have communicated what they are. In the third hypothetical scenario, let us assume the US Department of State (USDoS) and the AIT managed to convince the public that the lack of senior-level minority representation in Taiwan was unintentional. However, further research revealed a surprising fact: since 1859, the US has never appointed a minority individual as a senior ambassador (including resident minister, liaison, or envoy) to Vietnam, China, Japan, Taiwan, and potentially many other Asian territories. This broader historical pattern could suggest a more deliberate strategy rather than mere oversight. The fourth hypothetical element of this thought experiment suggests a potential lack of transparency in US foreign policy institutions. This could include limited public awareness about how these institutions function, the potential influence of corporate interests in key decision-making roles, and the discouragement of participation from certain interest groups, ethnic groups, or ideological perspectives. As a result, such policy outcomes might continue to benefit primarily established interests. The final hypothetical condition posits a more extreme scenario. It suggests a long history of the US government and its agencies ignoring minority-activists’ demands for fair participation in the policymaking process. It also suggests the US responding with lethal force to select public challenges to America's image of unbiasedly promoting democracy and inclusion. While the author supports the friendly people in Taiwan and acknowledges the many dedicated assets within the US government, the thought experiment explores potential risks in US-Taiwan ties. It asks what would happen if doubters like Tocqueville and Chomsky were right. Then, if the US has downplayed minority voices in the past, might it do the same regarding concerns about inclusivity in cooperation on strategic clarity? This raises a possibility that the White House, various government departments (State Department, Justice Department, Defense Department, Energy Department, the Commerce Department), foreign policy entities (Senate Foreign Relations Committee, AIT), and multinational corporations might dismiss or distort any concerns about controversial US conduct. This dismissal could be aimed at preventing serious discussions about challenging traditional power. The above, in turn, could make it difficult to convince Taiwan, regional allies, and the American public of a genuine shift in policy attitudes. The author acknowledges that there is room for dialogue with US officials. However, he also warns against diplomatic niceties that do not address the core issues. If the US is found to refuse inclusivity concerning senior-level minority representation, substantive policy input, and shared economic outcomes, Tocqueville and Chomsky may be right. If these doubters are proven correct, we may have to overhaul our understanding of US-Taiwan relations, which suggests any collaboration toward strategic clarity will require a far greater effort. Yet, this could all be about nothing. The policy experts likely understand: it is highly unlikely a marginalized American outsider mentioning hypothetical situations linked to Tocqueville and Chomsky would ever uncover abysmal US conduct in Taiwan. Right?

Thank you very much

I'm just assuming they go there to gain battle experience and knowledge, in order to share with the home country military? Like China does aswell with troops in Ukraine.

were they both trained in Taiwan military ?? video says Ah-ta, 44-year, previously served in the R.O.C. Army. oops, says BOTH ex Army As of 2023 the Taiwan armed forces are estimated to have between 169,000 and 180,000 active personnel. Starting in 2024, Taiwanese male citizens are required to serve 12 months in the military. The number of reservists is estimated at 1.657 million. The Taiwanese Army, is the largest branch of the Republic of China Armed Forces. An estimated 80% of the ROC Army is located on Taiwan, while the remainder are stationed on the Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, Dongsha and Taiping Islands.

Stop Putin in Ukraine, and hopefully that'll stop Xi from messing w/ Taiwan. The free world stands w/ both!

TLDR: He bought an overpriced PC because it was hand made at the shop for 5, 560 US Dollars. Take pride in the fact that he overpaid for something that was made right there in the country. If its a country founded on oil, oil prices are cheap, if you're in tech country, the prices are cheap. He over paid handsomely to help put a price tag for the country to artificially inflate. Prices are going to skyrocket here now. You heard it here first. YT Algos are really scary. This is a scary narrative.

Nice.🌹🌹🌹💘💐💐💐😍😍😍😍😍🇹🇼🇹🇼🇹🇼💋💋🦋❤️

-1000 social credit🤬🤬🤬

VOTE FOR TRUMP. FJB

Peace thru Strength, you made a sacrifice, come back safe so you can enjoy freedom, thank you for your service. U.S. Army (Retired), SFC, 2007.

Congratulations to Warren Chang!!!

I hope (and assume) they can legally serve with the Ukrainian foreign legion, since they do not seem to hide it. I wonder how many Taiwanese serve there?

Never been to Taiwan but after watching LTT's videos and seeing the people there I kinda wanna visit ;)

linus' social credit has been destroyed by this video

Lol why the hack a youtuber are being broadcast in television 😂😂

The Secret Race Problem Found in US-Taiwan Diplomacy by Kurt Munroe At a forum recently organized by the Formosa Republican Association (FRA), international policy experts gathered to honor the 45th anniversary of the US’ Taiwan Relations Act. Some experts at that event argued for 'strategic clarity' to better define Taiwan's identity and its multifaceted relationship with the US and other states, ultimately safeguarding Taiwan's global interests. This focus on strategic clarity allowed the attending experts to analyze policy language, intent, innuendos, and other nuanced motivations that guide outcomes. Tommy Lin, president of the FRA and the Taiwan United Nations Alliance discussed opportunities for the government and the public to act independently to combine support for shared interests. This, of course, implies an open invitation to the American public to contribute to an informed environment, from which, to cooperate on advancing democratic principles. The hitch, however, is that Alexis de Tocqueville had already problematized the foreign policy issue for potential American change agents. He discussed a reoccurring theme within democratic societies, where the democratic principles, observed in diverse or heterogeneous states, in particular, and producing favorable public harvests, were without a doubt, not put into practice concerning matters of international relations. Later, Noam Chomsky added that one of the relationships between democracy and capitalism is contradiction. In America, race is central to this conflict. He meant that you cannot have a perfectly capitalist democracy because some targeted groups would inevitably lose out on participation to serve the interests of concentrated private wealth. So, how do Tocqueville and Chomsky’s warnings, if they are accurate, matter to government and public collaboration toward strategic clarity? To address this question, we can conduct a hypothetical exercise that explores the potential characteristics of a mobilization effort that empowers a marginalized, but well-informed public. Essentially, we can synthesize a better understanding of Tocqueville and Chomsky by analyzing additional language, intent, innuendos, and nuanced motivations guiding five hypothetical scenarios that describe US policy in Taiwan and the region. By reimagining US conduct, we can bring attention to processes that potentially cause US policy to appear unnecessarily combative, divisive, and racially offensive concerning collective goals. Before we begin, we must evaluate what we mean when discussing US-Taiwan relations. Where does this relationship between Americans and the people in Taiwan begin and end? Which Americans and which people in Taiwan define US-Taiwan relations? Do all Americans and all in Taiwan share the same global interests? Where do we agree and disagree? Which alternatives are excluded? How is US-Taiwan policy packaged and marketed to influence significant outcomes? The first hypothetical scenario assumes a concerning situation: the US government and the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) administer policy activities in Taiwan in a way that makes them far more complex and potentially risky than necessary. Within this unlikely situation, it seems most policy experts overlook or downplay how distortions and manipulations in US policymaking, in general, and how policy is presented, in particular, undermine the US-Taiwan pro-democracy message. The most significant inconsistency lies in the complete lack of senior-level minority-American representation throughout US diplomatic history in Taiwan, dating back to the first point of contact. This raises a critical question for policymakers: does the absence of ethnic diversity in these roles pose a challenge, or is it ultimately unimportant? The second hypothetical stipulates that if US-Taiwan policy lacks senior-level leadership from astute minorities, then the system, led by non-minorities, their Taiwanese counterparts, and involved corporations may have less incentive to consider minority perspectives or ensure their fair participation in economic, defense, and other collaborative endeavors that generate wealth. This perspective suggests that US representatives, who are not minorities, have not self-recognized and adequately communicated the potential negative perception of senior, non-minority appointments to policy leadership. If there are shared public benefits from non-minority, senior representation in Taiwan, none have communicated what they are. In the third hypothetical scenario, let us assume the US Department of State (USDoS) and the AIT managed to convince the public that the lack of senior-level minority representation in Taiwan was unintentional. However, further research revealed a surprising fact: since 1859, the US has never appointed a minority individual as a senior ambassador (including resident minister, liaison, or envoy) to Vietnam, China, Japan, Taiwan, and potentially many other Asian territories. This broader historical pattern could suggest a more deliberate strategy rather than mere oversight. The fourth hypothetical element of this thought experiment suggests a potential lack of transparency in US foreign policy institutions. This could include limited public awareness about how these institutions function, the potential influence of corporate interests in key decision-making roles, and the discouragement of participation from certain interest groups, ethnic groups, or ideological perspectives. As a result, such policy outcomes might continue to benefit primarily established interests. The final hypothetical condition posits a more extreme scenario. It suggests a long history of the US government and its agencies ignoring minority-activists’ demands for fair participation in the policymaking process. It also suggests the US responding with lethal force to select public challenges to America's image of unbiasedly promoting democracy and inclusion. While the author supports the friendly people in Taiwan and acknowledges the many dedicated assets within the US government, the thought experiment explores potential risks in US-Taiwan ties. It asks what would happen if doubters like Tocqueville and Chomsky were right. Then, if the US has downplayed minority voices in the past, might it do the same regarding concerns about inclusivity in cooperation on strategic clarity? This raises a possibility that the White House, various government departments (State Department, Justice Department, Defense Department, Energy Department, the Commerce Department), foreign policy entities (Senate Foreign Relations Committee, AIT), and multinational corporations might dismiss or distort any concerns about controversial US conduct. This dismissal could be aimed at preventing serious discussions about challenging traditional power. The above, in turn, could make it difficult to convince Taiwan, regional allies, and the American public of a genuine shift in policy attitudes. The author acknowledges that there is room for dialogue with US officials. However, he also warns against diplomatic niceties that do not address the core issues. If the US is found to refuse inclusivity concerning senior-level minority representation, substantive policy input, and shared economic outcomes, Tocqueville and Chomsky may be right. If these doubters are proven correct, we may have to overhaul our understanding of US-Taiwan relations, which suggests any collaboration toward strategic clarity will require a far greater effort. Yet, this could all be about nothing. The policy experts likely understand: it is highly unlikely a marginalized American outsider mentioning hypothetical situations linked to Tocqueville and Chomsky would ever uncover abysmal US conduct in Taiwan. Right?

uhoh, linus is going to get held up at customs the next time he tried to go to mainland China.

According to you, it's just crazies supporting anti-reason solutions. While the friendship between Czechia and Taiwan is about mutual respect. You do you, though, your bosses are desperate.

bro is SO LATE😡😡😡🔥🔥🔥🗣️🗣️🗣️

CCP Health Organization.