In 1:50 you show a picture from Wittgensteins School, there are two persons marked. Wittgenstein to the left and Adolf Hitler to the right. Just wanted to mention this. How or if they influenced each other is very controversal but its interesting to think about it.

Hey, i know it have no relation with your video, but you have considerer talking about more rare or complex logic or authors, like Newton da Costa, and is paraconsistent logic for example, this guy is a beast, it will very interesting seen a video abaut it, i see very few people talking abaut it in anglo community, but in hispanic an latin lagic community, he is a big reference, or maybe de negationless logic of Griss, and the conception of negation in intuitionistic logic that is very interestinhg to, Greetings from Spain

I love you man

i feel like i now have a better idea of what ⊧ is, but what about A⊧B vs A⊢B? (sorry for abusing of your time but may i add the difference between the previous and A⊩B to this question?)

How is constituting somsthing not a cause for it? Im confused by this. Doesnt the brain confirgutation cause the mind to be a certain way?

I watched until 1:31 and get annoyed with the lack of answer. Hahahaha.

How would things be if Wittgenstein had access to category theory?

What is language? Language is under the highest genus of quality. It is sensible quality. It is sensible quality that is auditory in character. It is sensible quality that is auditory in character and significant of something. It is significant sensible quality thay is auditory in character, significant of something and whose to power to signify comes convention.

love your work

This is brilliant and trippy

His popular essays are wonderful - wise, funny, cheerful, brave, compassionate, and written in a crystal clear prose that is a pleasure to read. Re-reading him is like meeting up with a much loved old friend.

Watching this before my Wittgenstein Tractatus exam, let's hope this will go well...

So the conclusion is that language is a social, communal activity thay gets its meaning through some form of verification with the norm of the language. Why are private sensations different? Toothache refers to a certain embodied feeling instructed by certain nerves which are shared by all *normal* humans. When we say toothache, we are referring to the same beatle, because we share the same physiology. Although It cannot be verified that someone is lying, or perhaps misunderstands the use of the word toothache or each part of it, tooth and ache. This does not matter, these are isolated cases. To return to the conclusion, i can verify my own pain as a sensation caused by certain nerve endings, and perhaps even due to something i.e lack of brushing. This has meaning in the language due to our shared physiology. Am i misunderstanding something?

I am a student from a non-English speaking country, majoring in philosophy. I read philosophy papers quite slowly, usually taking about a week to complete one paper. I summarize the main ideas of the paper paragraph by paragraph. I would like to ask, do you have any good tips for reading philosophy?

I’m trying to expand the language of predicate logic, and so I need to introduce some new inference rules, but I want to ensure that there are no redundancies. How would I do that?

Second order logic is complete, but you have to enlarge the space of semantics. Sets, functions and relations aren't large enough semantics for second order logic. Henkien proved that so called generalized models can provide complete semantics to second order logic. Then there are semantics that category theory offers that allow one to prove completeness of second-order logic and variants of it.

This is a well put together video.

Im struggling here because one the one hand im fascinated by the subject and on the other hand i think it might be complicating something that is quite obvious. I mean is there really strong opposition to the idea that we socially construct things and that we endow objects with our constructed ideas? I cant see what the counter argument would be? But maybe, that is a cue for me to keep digging haha. Great and informative video here. Thanks a bunch!

1.3. Paraconsistency and contradiction Another key feature of the both/and logic is its embrace of paraconsistency, allowing for the toleration and even acceptance of contradictions without trivialism or logical explosion. This stands in contrast to the principle of non-contradiction in classical logic, which holds that no proposition can be both true and false at the same time, and that any contradiction or inconsistency in a logical system leads to its complete collapse or absurdity. The concept of paraconsistency has a relatively recent and controversial history in the tradition of non-classical logics, dating back to the works of Vasiliev, Jaśkowski, and others in the mid-20th century. The basic idea is to develop logical systems that can handle contradictions or inconsistencies in a controlled and localized way, without allowing them to infect or trivialize the entire system. In other words, paraconsistent logics aim to preserve the possibility of meaningful and informative reasoning even in the presence of contradictions, by restricting or modifying the classical inference rules that lead from a contradiction to arbitrary conclusions. One of the most well-known and influential systems of paraconsistent logic is relevance logic, developed by Anderson and Belnap in the 1960s. In relevance logic, the classical inference rule of ex falso quodlibet (from a contradiction, anything follows) is rejected, and replaced by a weaker and more restrictive rule that allows for the derivation of a conclusion from a contradiction only if the conclusion is relevant or related to the premises in a substantive way. This ensures that the presence of a contradiction in one part of the system does not automatically lead to the derivation of arbitrary or unrelated conclusions in other parts of the system. Another important system of paraconsistent logic is dialetheism, developed by Priest and others in the 1970s and 1980s. In dialetheism, the possibility of true contradictions or dialetheia is not only tolerated but actively embraced as a fundamental feature of reality and thought. Dialetheists argue that there are genuine and unavoidable contradictions in various domains, such as self-reference, change, or the foundations of mathematics, and that a consistent and complete logical system is impossible or undesirable. Instead, they propose to develop a logic that can handle contradictions in a meaningful and productive way, by allowing for their local and controlled occurrence within a broader paraconsistent framework. The both/and logic incorporates and extends the principles of paraconsistency from relevance logic, dialetheism, and other non-classical systems, while also grounding them in the metaphysical and ontological framework of the monadological system. In the both/and logic, contradictions are not just formal or linguistic phenomena, but are rooted in the fundamental nature of reality as a complex and dynamic network of interrelated monads. Specifically, the both/and logic allows for the coexistence and mutual implication of seemingly opposing or contradictory properties or relations within the same monadological configuration, without leading to trivialism or absurdity. This is because the monads themselves are not simple or indivisible entities, but are infinitely complex and multifaceted, containing within themselves a diversity of perspectives and potentialities. Each monad reflects the entire universe from its own unique perspective, and thus contains within itself a multiplicity of seemingly incompatible or contradictory aspects, which are nevertheless unified and harmonized within the overall monadological system. Moreover, the contradictions in the both/and logic are not arbitrary or chaotic, but are themselves structured and organized according to the principles of coherence, compatibility, and mutual implication that govern the relations between monads. A contradiction between two propositions A and ¬A is not a simple logical opposition, but a complex and dynamic tension between two aspects or perspectives of the same underlying reality, which can be resolved or transcended through a higher-order synthesis or integration. The formal semantics of the both/and logic can be defined in terms of a paraconsistent truth-value space, such as the four-valued logic of Belnap or the many-valued logics of Priest, which allow for the simultaneous truth and falsity of propositions, as well as their independence or indeterminacy. The inference rules of the both/and logic are designed to preserve or respect the paraconsistent nature of the propositions, by restricting or modifying the classical rules that lead from a contradiction to arbitrary conclusions. For example, the both/and logic rejects the classical principle of explosion, which states that from a contradiction, anything follows (A ∧ ¬A ⊢ B for any B). Instead, it adopts a weaker and more restrictive principle, such as the principle of controlled explosion, which states that from a contradiction, only relevant or related conclusions follow (A ∧ ¬A ⊢ B only if A and B are related in a substantive way). This ensures that the presence of a contradiction in one part of the system does not automatically infect or trivialize the entire system, but can be contained and managed within a local and coherent context. In addition to these basic paraconsistent inference rules, the both/and logic also introduces some novel and distinctive principles and relations that are specific to the monadological framework, such as the principle of holistic contradiction, which states that every monad contains within itself a diversity of seemingly contradictory aspects, which are nevertheless unified and harmonized within the overall system (∀M ∃A, B: M ⊢ A ∧ ¬A and M ⊢ B ∧ ¬B and M ⊢ (A ∧ ¬A) ∧ (B ∧ ¬B)). This allows for a more nuanced and context-sensitive representation of the logical structure of reality, and for the expression of complex and paradoxical patterns of thought and experience. The paraconsistent nature of the both/and logic has important implications for the philosophical and methodological foundations of the monadological framework. It challenges the traditional assumptions and dogmas of Western logic and metaphysics, such as the law of non-contradiction, the principle of sufficient reason, or the dichotomy between appearance and reality. By allowing for the coexistence and mutual implication of opposites, the both/and logic provides a more adequate and flexible framework for capturing the complex and dynamic nature of reality, and for navigating the paradoxical and often ineffable nature of human understanding. Moreover, the paraconsistent approach of the both/and logic has important applications and consequences for various fields and domains, from the natural sciences to the social sciences and humanities. In quantum mechanics, for example, the both/and logic can help to make sense of the seemingly contradictory behavior of subatomic particles, such as the simultaneous wave and particle nature of light, or the entanglement and non-locality of quantum systems. In psychology and cognitive science, the both/and logic can provide a more nuanced and realistic framework for representing the complex and often conflicting nature of human cognition and emotion, such as the coexistence of conscious and unconscious processes, or the interplay of reason and intuition. And in philosophy and theology, the both/and logic can help to articulate and explore the paradoxical and ineffable nature of ultimate reality, such as the unity and diversity of the divine, or the transcendence and immanence of the absolute. In summary, the concept of paraconsistency and contradiction is another central and distinctive feature of the both/and logic, which sets it apart from classical logic and opens up new possibilities for representing and reasoning about the complex and paradoxical nature of reality. By grounding paraconsistency in the metaphysical and ontological principles of the monadological system, and by introducing novel and specific logical principles and relations, the both/and logic provides a powerful and flexible framework for capturing the dynamic and often contradictory nature of thought and being, and for navigating the ineffable and mysterious depths of human understanding. In the following subsections, we will explore in more detail the formal semantics and proof theory of the both/and logic, and demonstrate its coherence, expressiveness, and philosophical significance.

I remember reading Thomas aquinas on essence & being thinking I’m gonna fly through these six chapters just to be proved wrong .

"Constitutive reasoning" is just making it up as you go (lying). 🤦🏼‍♂️

That's a flawed opinion. A child cannot be alive outside of the womb unless they were also alive inside the womb. The child doesn't magically become alive by changing their location. The child has Ben alive the entire time since the moment of fertilization. The classic definition is correct. New age hippie logic loses again.

Any clue on how to derivate material implication (ex: (p > q) to (~p v q); ~(p > q) to (p ^ ~q). I'm struggling to find examples online

Can you explain the meaning of concepts and mental images in philosophy with simple examples?

2:44 What a dapper gent.

The answer to the Question: Yes The Reason: Because it is necessary, which is to mean, that the opposite is Impossible. Look into the Eyes of Ananke and you will See.

To ask, where the necessity comes from, is a invalid Question, Just Like asking, when Time began. Invalid is to mean, that it presupposes a contradiction. This being Most obvious in the example of Time. It is Not, that one cannot understand These Questions, and that one cannot get an answer. It is Just, that they are already directed at Something, which is Not possible to reach.

Do you have anything on the "direct method" where the conclusion is stipulated false and the premises true (??) - see, that why i need it ;)

An important adjustment: Contingency May only refer to what is Not epistemically necessary, which is to mean, that although my Cat is orange, It could be Black, as all Cats are Not orange necessarily. But that my Cat is in fact orange (If i Had one:') ), is No Contingent Matter, of which a Truth could be Contingent, because in fact, and Not solely epistemically, Truth can never be Contingent, If understood by that possibly false. As it is true, it is Not false, so never could it be or have been otherwise. Ontological contingency is Impossible, for it is contradictory. Epistemic contingency is possible only to the extent of meaning by it the destinction between Universal and particular matters. For of course, no epistemic Matter could be possibly Contingent, as they also are ontological 'objects'. To illustrate this subtle Point, one must only realize what is possibly meant by saying, that Error and Falsety do both exist and are Made. For of course, one could never mean it ontologically, as Error is nothing other then contradiction, which is the Essence of Impossiblity, and what is Impossible is Not. So, how would one possibly Talk about what is Not? Clearly only, in what might be suggested at as epistemic, as it is our thoughts and judgments, that can 'have' such Qualities. Considering this, one might reasonably doubt the usefullness of the term contingency at all, for all is necessary, Rendering this Term also redundant, as it only means: What is, is. Therefore, what is true, is true. Nothing above and beyond it, as If Ananke herself holds sway over it. The retain their use, one might therefore only use them for Analytic purpouses, which i tried with this Message right from the start. The lengthy walk of words was only necessary, die to the Error in Most peoples thought, which i hopefully have resolved, albight the shortness at Last. All the best to you.

Don’t tell me what to do Wittgenstein.

The point of a theory of truth is to provide a definition of what it is to be true, right?

very helpful stuff

Guy spent the entire time NOT defining the term, and ends up saying just not to use the term. Don't subscribe!

I actually just finished reading the Tractatus a couple of weeks ago, and I found it far easier to understand than some other works, like Hegel or Satre. Not to say this video is unnecessary, but Wittgenstein is refreshingly clear.

This sums up this country “The beautiful illusion “

Hello I have a question is logic the study For correct reasoning or its just contain the formal arguments and its logics?

I‘m so glad you made these videos, they‘re really fun to watch 😊

I've recently learned that there are quite a few UK university phil departments with distance learning options for a PhD. What are your thoughts on those programs? For context, I'm a US grad student about half way through my Masters in Philosophy and want to pursue a PhD after completion. But i have some financial and family commitments. At the same time I'd have some flexibility to travel periodically throughout the year to visit campus. I'm a little reluctant to pursue the US PhD model just because the MA degree isn't really considered at all, and there are virtually no part-time options.

Interesting 🤔🤔

i want to learn math and computer science, dont have high school education learning on the internet doesnt work for a drop out

There are actually loads of free college-level courses offered by places like MIT and Harvard on KZfaq!

Also I would like to add that a major difference between the traditional school approach and the self study approach, is that at school you get to socialize and discuss the subject with your classmates who are studying the same thing. This can be valuable for both deepening your understanding and staying motivated.

On KZfaq, MIT open courseware is a my favorite channel for learning stuff. It’s mostly scientific subjects though

What are your experiences of learning online? If you're interested in studying 1-to-1 with me, there's info here: www.markjago.net/tutoring/ You can request a video from me by starting an AbleBees petition: www.ablebees.com/team/atticphilosophy

But at the same time the metaphysics still follows The logical rules

what good videos and what a good channel! I hope you can make an abstract argumentation video soon! thanks for your content!

I have mixed thoughts on Russell. Essentially since he painfully misrepresented many very good philosophers, e.g. Kant, Leibniz (arguably, Aristotle-the-logician and Hegel), to push his own points. Especially his reading of Leibniz is horrendous, for example, which is even more sad since it turned out that the concept of a possible world, which is due to Leibniz, proved invaluable for the development of modal logic and thus philosophy in the 20th century. Russell rather reinterpreted Leibniz in the light of his own, rather naive, view of the new logical calculus instead of appreciating Leibniz's unique insights. He also started the unfortunate trend of disregarding nineteenth century (with the exception of people like Bolzano, Frege and Peirce on the "analytic" side) in history of philosophy. This was especially destructive especially for our understanding of Kant, since he's the root of all nineteenth century philosophy, and nowadays most theses which were developed to "correct" Kant's theory are ascribed directly to Kant. E.g. Poincare's conventionalism. So, while nowadays saying that "X is a Kantian" or "thesis X has Kantian roots" is quite widespread, this is usually not due to its affinity with one of Kant's own theses (on which there is little agreement for some reason), but due to its historical links to some positions which aimed at being "Kantian in spirit", but weren't the historical Kant's theses. Russell also - and this is a very good thing - often changed his mind on various topics, often due to Wittgenstein's critique of his previous position. But he never, it seems, made an effort to explain the evolution of his views in order to justify the new ones. Especially due to Wittgenstein's not always transparent influence, only now are we often learning what caused Russell to abandon some of his positions. This caused some confusion, especially in regards to the relation of logical calculus to philosophical inquiry (e.g. the picture that logical calculus somehow trivially determines philosophical results, requiring only thorough analysis, of course benefited Russell's program of logical analysis etc., but also caused some understandable opposition among, e.g. phenomenologists, widening the analytic/continental gap - I'm not sure if Russell is solely responsible, but he's partially responsible). But Russell also nearly single-handedly established a philosophical tradition, which, with some struggle, carefully reconstructed the insights of past thinkers whose importance Russell failed to acknowledge or misrepresented to better fit his logicist agenda. Perhaps this was a necessary move afterall, I have no idea. Definitely British neohegelianism was such a degenerate research program that it had to be replaced, sooner or later, by something else. It's a miracle that analytic philosophy was able to take its place.

dear professor, if you are a nominalist you don't get to use predications and universals at all you can't justify them, and the translation project is a failed project

from its Latin root I was assuming it'd pronounce like 'ah-pree-oree' and was shocked it is acutally 'ae-prai-orai' Has it changed the way people pronounce it over time or it's been 'ae-prai-orai' from the beginning, just like the word prior?