RIP Richard McSpadden. You were one of the greats and you made me a better pilot.

Appreciate these early analyses, but would really love some more Accident Case Studies.

Occasionally I used to fly Havana charters with EAL, leave midnight, hour on the ground, return. No problem. One time we had to wait for some reason and left at 4 or 5 am. We could not get a checklist done without a mistake and in hindsight I would say we were punchdrunk. Luckily benign conditions and an uneventful flight. I have done numerous international back side of the clock flights and with preparation and crew rest have never had a problem but I still remember that one midnight trip to Havana and know the back side of the clock is a dangerous place to be without preperation.

I so appreciate the care and concern in your delivery of these videos. No attempt at blame or attempt to solve, just enough questions so that a pilot in a similar situation, until the official report comes out, might recall how this flight ended and make better choices.

Based on reporting in the San Diego Tribune, this wasn't a charter flight carrying paying passengers but the lead pilot of the charter company taking his friends to Vegas, so it's unlikely he got any rest at all. I'm sure the NTSB will be looking hard at what the pilots were up to in the hours leading up to departure.

On corporate operations many younger pilots will just do what ever they are told and not usually say no- which is a part of the job… only because if you say no you are done flying with that owner.

still can't believe this exceptional pilot and articulate guy is gone.

Remember Richard Collins saying many times that unless you had a real good reason to believe a second approach was going to be successful it was one of the most dangerous things you could do. Condolences to the families of all those lost.

That could be the dreaded part 91 wait-and-return where the crew stole whatever rest they could find in the crew lounge. Those are the absolute worst!

Another contributing factor is this runway had no approach lighting system, just runway edge lights, PAPI and REIL. An ALS may have helped them with the runway environment at minimums.

I don’t believe I have heard a more comprehensive analysis of an accident before a final release of NTSB’s accident report. Very well done and thank you.

Another channel speculated that parking lot lights "not too far" (which is a relative thing) from the end of the runway may have had the pilots think they were seeing the glow of runway lights through the fog.

what a disaster. family has everything going for them. handsome man and beautiful wife with children and now parents are gone forever. All I can do is shake my head. Life is precious. Prayers for everyone effected

Thanks for your great analysis and excellent presentation. The aircraft was equipped with a GTN750, so they were almost undoubtedly shooting the LPV approach. In fact, on the first attempt, Flight Aware shows them going missed at 1600 feet. The lighting, or lack thereof, (along with the poor visibility) is likely one of the major factors in this mishap. PCL is set to 15 min and even if they keyed the mike on final during the first approach, the lights may have turned off when they were on final for the second approach. Because of the reduced visibility, they wouldn't have noticed the lights had switched off. And although the runway is listed as having REIL, I can't remember the last time I saw them on. There is a shopping center about 1 mile north and some industrial buildings with security lights about 1/2 mile north of runway 18. It's likely that they saw those lights, and in the fog mistook them for the runway environment, particularly if the runway lights were off. If one pilot was on the gauges/GPS moving map and the other one looking outside, perhaps they could have known that they were not over the airport before being suckered into descending another 100 feet to look for the runway and ultimately landing short - at 130kts/150mph. I believe DHS has cameras near the threshold which may be able to answer the lighting issue, perhaps NTSB can obtain that info. And yes, the haunting question is what made them decide to shoot the second approach as opposed to diverting to KRIV, KHMT or several others reasonably close. Even if equipped with a CVR, it probably didn't survive the fire unless it's in the tail.

One reason to shoot a second approach is if you forgot to activate pilot controlled lighting. I might know a guy who did that to once.

So very sorry to hear of Richard's passing. I am not a pilot, but have always been fascinated with aviation and the remarkable men and women that dedicate their lives to mastering something as complex and unforgiving as manned flight. Richard's analyses have always been professional, insightful, easy to understand for the non-pilot, and ALWAYS respectful to the subjects and their families. There are many fine people on KZfaq doing similar analyses, but none come close to Richard's extraordinary refinement, objectivity, and sensitivity. Richard's work is the benchmark of excellence that I hope future channels will strive for. You will be missed, sir.

Crew rest fail! As managers and leaders we have got to ensure the folks we are asking to execute missions for us are fully rested before we send them into harm's way. Whether we are leaders in trucking, medicine, or aviation, we have got to stop setting our folks up by expecting them to work beyond safe human factors limits.

Well done! And this from a retired airline pilot. Back in the 1970s, I flew the mail in Beech 18s and we were always flying on the back side of our body clocks on all night flights. It was tough to fly 5 all nighters every week so I can sympathize with these pilots and their late night/early morning flying.

Thank you so much Team AOPA for all the wonderful work you are putting into these videos. Sad for the families and friends.

11 am shutdown, back at the airport at 3am is simply madness. And would be illegal if they were driving a semi truck

Such a great quality video, thank you guys for improving these!

May God comfort the families of those who perished. My sincerest condolences. Thank you for this information.

Excellent analysis and importantly NOT jumping the gun.

Sincere thanks for continuing to share 👍

They were technically proficient because the first approach was spot on. For the 2nd they just went runway hunting, maybe they had spotted the rwy lights just after starting the go on the 1st approach? Were there street lights on the undershoot?? Proficiency includes decision making and they fell down on that one. Another getthereitis accident. Very sad and totally avoidable

SIC required is a normal limitation on a CE-500 type, regardless of other experience and type ratings. That should not be confused with a SIC only type. To get a type without the SIC requirement, you would need a separate (more expensive) check ride, and most people aren't flying Citations single pilot anyway

Oh, most know that if the crew rested for the estimated 2 hours between flights it was in a lounge chair at the FBO and the major factor that forced the crash was "get-there-itis, not the weather. There were airports in the area that were clear. A parked car at French Valley is no good if you land at Ryan Field and that fact has more to do with choosing to land where they did.

According to local media reports this wasn’t a revenue flight. He was transporting a bunch of friends to Las Vegas. Why so little time in Las Vegas I don’t know.

Excellent analysis. Thx!! Love the new format. !

Hopefully NTSB can determine if the pilot controlled runway lights were on for the second approach. They time out after 15 minutes.

Professional, non biased and factual as usual. Like that you refrain from mud slinging.

I am very sorry for your loss. I always looked forward to Mr McSpadden's videos. I wish the McSpadden family my sincere condolences.

Our boy… we will always remember the fun times we had with you in your dad’s office.We know you are resting and flying high. Thanks you for sharing so we can have closure on this accident. #LoveLikeRiese

“Maybe this, maybe that.” Gotta love these comments. RIP Manny, Riese, friends and family onboard. Fly high.

Such a great quality video, thank you guys for improving these!. Such a great quality video, thank you guys for improving these!.

Landing at 10pm to be wheels up at 3:15am the very next morning is a red flag to me. I know, i wouldn't even feel comfortable driving traveling distances under those conditions.

Excellent breakdown. Thx for sharing your thoughts.

Read video. Love the detail and hard work put into these that you do

Excellent analysis.

Thank you for sharing great information for our Aviation Industry.

Very, very good explained! Greetings from old Germany 🇩🇪

Colonel McSpadden, Thank you again for these videos. As a non-pilot your explanations of these incidents are excellent. I appreciate your expertise and professionalism. Paul (in MA)

The citation looks like it hit stalled, not at the normal 120 plus mph approach V ref. Why? It has a very short ground scar and hit tail first. Also notice on the photos from above, the elevator is full up too. For me looks like they got low, saw the lights of those buildings and panic pulled stall he did in fear. If panic pull with drag flaps on, (Some do the Panic Pull with both hands and add lots of up trim too) and delay the power that way, then you will stall it in a few seconds. Jets take more time to recover from a flaps down stall due no prop wind on the flaps. I used to teach 5 Feet Go Arounds as a CFI. Almost got killed by panic pullers with 2 hands. I had to add power for them. Yes, rushy and low go arounds are also Emergency Low Maneuvering. EFATO AND LOTO ARE BOTH ELM too.

Ok, lots of people making a ton of assumptions and totally bashing on ops they probably have no experience in. Firstly, let me just say I work for a Pt 91 jet management company and we also fly many similar airplanes to this one. No one yet has any idea what led to this accident, but there are so many people already bashing decisions they no know nothing about. Time - Yes, it was late in the evening. But weird hours are one of the reasons why people buy their own airplanes. Ignore the clock time for a second, and we see a duty time (assuming 1 hr before takeoff and 1 hr after landing) of 9 hrs, with a 4 hour rest in between flights. This is super typical of private jet operations, it just takes some coordination. Honestly, its a pretty light day really! Like the video says, we don't yet have any idea if they even worked the day leading up to the accident, so everyone already bashing the schedule as ridiculous is just wildly speculating. I've had many 'nocturnal' days myself. Mins - Tons of stuff to unpack here. First, as said in the video, for Pt 91 ops we can shoot the approach no matter what the reported weather is. That does *not* mean we can always land, but we can always try the approach to see. With sufficient gas, it almost always makes sense to give it a go. This isn't LAX where there's 10 people's full time job to maintain the weather station and put out weather reports. Small, podunk airports can have some really shitty weather stations that are just plain wrong sometimes. So while after the fact it's easy to say 'Oh the reported visibility was 1/4 mile less than mins, why bother?!', the reality is most automated weather stations can give some really shitty reports that might be inaccurate. Also, the visibility given is the visibility at the automated station, which could be entirely on the other side of the airport, maybe even in it's own patch of fog that doesn't exist on final. My home airport AWOS is basically in a swamp and is very vulnerable to radiation fog after a rainstorm, causing it to read very low visibility when in reality the airport is clear and a million. Shooting the approach again - When it comes to shooting the approach again, this is also super common, if you have the gas. Especially at night, you may catch lights below you and think that you have a chance of breaking out the second time. Sometimes you just get unlucky with a bit of clouds right at the missed approach point and then have to try again. Assuming you're doing everything right, the 'cost' to just come around and try again is really quite low. Gas is usually the limiting factor here. It's not immediately 'Ohmygosh you shot the same approach twice, its get-there-itis and thats why they're dead!'. No, customer is paying to go to X, so you try to take them to X. If that doesn't work, or it isn't safe, then go elsewhere, but there has to be some effort to at least making it to where you're supposed to go. If the pilots thought there was a reason to try the approach again, then they probably had some reason to believe the second time would be easier. That could, of course, not be the case, maybe they truly did go below mins just in an effort to get there no matter what, but *we just don't know that yet*. Just like usual, everyone is jumping to conclusions. Just chill out, listen to the great early thoughts and analysis this channel always puts out, and you can bash schedules, operators, pilots, etc once the accident reports come out.

Possibly misidentified lighting on buildings in the final stages of the approach as the runway lighting, so continued to the accident sight.

My money is that someone onboard, who was in a position of power, insisted that they land and take off with minimal rest, and insisted that they land at French Valley, regardless of weather, due to convenience. There are people out there that think that thier convenience trumps realities like weather and crew rest. And they will intimidate pilots into doing things they would not normally do. I'd bet this was one of those cases.

Wow, F70 was my solo airport! Flew in there many times last year. So sad to see such a devastating accident in this small community

As always, an excellent, measured and constructive first take on the incident.

he died doing what he loved and probably saved many lives with his method of teaching. RIP.

The beast flight crash analyst out there! Thank you for your outstanding job!

Nice one, thanks for sharing.

A fog approach is not a difficult approach. No rain, turbulence, icing, etc. But it is the one which draws pilots into pushing mins. But at the time of the accident, it was still dark making the airport environment all more difficult to perceive at min or below.

N819KR had a GTN625 installed. I have a video of it. I sat right seat on its delivery flight from PTB to Chino May 2022.

Based on footage from the scene and map imagery, the impact location was about 600 ft or so north of the runway, and about 50 lower in elevation than the start of the runway. Additionally, the impact location had higher obstacles like power lines and buildings just a little bit further north, which were not hit. This may suggest they had a very steep rate of decent. They very well might have been chasing the RV lot lights north of the runway, mistakenly thinking it was the lights at the start of the runway given the thick fog. I am curious what the NTSB findings will be with the CVR, but I agreed that poor aeronautical decisions were made, I would bet that "get there-itis" was a factor too. Very sad situation, I feel for the families of all involved.

Excellent analysis of the fatal crash . It seems like the two pilots were very young not to imply that they lacked proficiency. I believe rest after landing at Vegas will become more of a focus in the accident investigation since both approaches were almost identical. Thanks for your insightful analysis.

Reminds me too much of my commuter days, continuous duty overnights (where you never really rest). As for the SIC required indicating low experience. Not necessarily (but probable in this case). If they typed in the plane, and the plane was not equipped for single pilot ops, they would’ve gotten the SIC restriction. If they trained in the sim, it would’ve been an add-on that the operator may have opted to not take. For example, when I was with the commuter and got my BE02 type, as an instructor the company usually got us single pilot rated. However, because of a conflict with the union (and I was low time), the fleet manager decided to hold off on my single pilot authorization to keep me out of the union conflict. As for the ‘pressure’ that Richard alludes to. Brings me back to one of my first 135 jobs. Management had a ‘nod and wink’ policy on minimums to the home field. One night I flew in. Back in that day the only approach was an NDB. Did the first approach, saw nothin and went missed. My FO saw the runway lights as I went around and said I was right over the runway. Repeated the approach to the miss. Now it’s late, no one in the office, and I decide to divert to the company base south. Next morning the Chief Pilot is on the phone reaming me out for not making it in, and then not going to the other base north of destination. Things like this start becoming subtle pressures that have to resisted, even if it means losing the job.

Airport landing lighting should also be taken into consideration.

Very well done on the analysis, definitely human error from the start, fatigue brings along miss judgment, sad for the families involved, every pilot needs to understand we are humans, would have been better to get to a hotel, sleep a few hours and then get back in the air. Let's learn from this horrible preventable accident. Thx for your very professional overview of the whole flight. Cheers

Great video . There are many tragic factors which you covered so well . Approach lights could have helped, however there are many factors here. Unfortunately I feel there may have been pressure to get in .

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RIP Richard! Loved your videos, sadly we didn't meet!

good work

Never flew into this airport but drove by it for years. As I recall fog and wind hit this valley pretty regular in the early mornings. I distinctly remember creeping across that valley at 5mph in pea soup many a morning.

They do not put “CE500 SIC required” as a limitation because it’s the first type rating for a pilot. That is actually a different limitation which requires a certain number of hours of supervision from another CE 500 PIC typed Pilot. Since the CE500 can be flown as a single pilot airplane- “SIC required” is added as a limitation if the PIC type rating is earned with the benefit of an SIC rather than single pilot without the assistance of an SIC (called single pilot exemption). Basically you can sign up for either program when you do your training.

Reported on numerous pilot forums that the airplane had a Garmin 750 NAV/COMM.

Sad situ. RIP.

I'd be interested in knowing their fuel situation and/or if and how much fuel they added in Vegas. It would seem that they did not know the destination weather until they dialed in ATIS, since they had already canceled IFR. Perhaps fuel was a concern and motivated "another look". It will be interesting to see what the NTSB can determine.

Verry Sad Story, RIP to the personell on board 🌹

It looks like a stacking of factors that led to this horrific outcome.

Flying an approach with Wx reported below mins is nerve racking, exciting and gratifying; all at the same time. I fly in FL where you hardly get good IMC. I had to fly an ILS approach into VDF with Wx reported below mins to pick up an Angel Flight. My Mooney is equipped with 80’s steam gauges but at least an HSI. While intercepting, I thought about that Mooney the got stuck in the power-lines during an approach. So while stablished, I laser focused on those gauges, kept those needles in the center and only looked up right at min and thankfully saw the threshold. I do do practice a lot of approaches with home sim. Even if it’s as simple as Xplane in an ipad, besides keeping current, I think it does help.

Lots of excellent comments and insights. I’m sure the NTSB will look at fatigue. Hours of continuous wakefulness and circadian rhythm are likely to play a significant factor in their analysis. Another very important issue is the illusions that can lure a pilot to continue descent below minimums. A few lights here and there at night can lead to disorientation, or can be misinterpreted as the runway environment. Further, a Part 91 operation with young pilots would seem to have a very high risk profile. These kids want to please the boss, and are likely have very little experience and conviction to challenge the pressure that they had to complete the mission.

Very good initial analysis, thank you ! Given ,25 yr old PIC Trying to fool Mother Nature ! New pilot trying to keep the boss happy ! Let’s go a little lower on the second approach! I’ve seen it over and over ! ( True Safety Is No Accident ) God Bless all the families involved ! Hart Broken Captain Mark H Wirth

Does ground proximity alarms turn off automatically when plane in landing mode?

IF the panel is like the one shown, is there even a way to couple the waas gps to that HSI? if not how could you shoot an lpv approach with vertical guidance? Either way the vertical profile of neither approach looked like a step down nor a glideslope derived approach profile. JMO

Well now, let's check it out... Little or no crew rest. Get theiritis once again has played a factor.

Based on what's shown in google earth pics and where the aircraft crashed, this might be a case of chasing lights that ended up not being the runway lights. This runway didn't have strobe approach lights, the runway lights aren't high intensity, there's a large building with parking lot lights right near where they crashed. The fact that they left Vegas in the middle of the night is a pretty good indicator that their passengers wanted to get back to French Valley before the morning, so it seems reasonable to believe this played a major role in their attempt to get in despite the fog, especially knowing it was likely the fog would burn off just a few hours later. Such a waste of life and yet another example of terrible decision making that takes so many lives.

He should have picked out an alternate airport. He was hopeful to the max, thinking he could beat that poor visibility. Bad move. He had evidently plenty fuel to go elsewhere as he burned up after he crashed. Very sad, for the families.

Good briefing. The CVR will be very helpful, if recovered. Fatigue has to be a major contributing factor, especially before the first flight. Pressure from someone in the cabin may factor in. Who flew the second approach? Interesting to see how the cheese matches up here.

There was recently a crash involving 5 people at Grand Strand airport in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. I was wondering if you guys can do a video on this happening? I am training at the airport next to it and am curious why the plane went down.

A ceiling is not a requirement for a minimum. In either part 91 or part 135. You may prspeed as long as you have the required visibility At the final approach fix. Additionally you may descend below decision height with any of the items listed visible.

Good analysis, but that limitation does not mean it was there first type rating, it means they did not complete their single pilot course for the CE525. The limitation you are referring to is worded slightly differently and is found in 61.64F2

I've had tule fog stop me at Hemet at night. I watched it coming in going from clear to fog in minutes. I didn't even attempt the approach and went to John Wayne and flew the ILS. Palm Springs has a great FBO and hotel rooms. It is very unlikely that Palm Springs wasn't clear.

Of note: part 135 turbojet charter requires the PIC to hold an ATP, so with a commercial, so it would have had to operate 91

Any info on a King Air mishap in Libby Montana?

Notably the runway does not have approach lighting system which under the circumstances could have resulted in confusing other misc lights with the runway end lights, esp in haze, extraneous lights can be very confusing and disorienting, the other thing is that haze or fog can cause distance/height estimation illusions as well as sometimes very bad back scatter (eg of landing lights). Getting a clearance so close to destination is itself hazardous as it (esp single pilot) means pilots(s) were likely not fully prepared for contingencies, prob did not have an alternate planned out, etc. F70 is also boxed in by hazardous terrain making low level maneuvering very hazardous at night. They should have planned back at Henderson - if missed, then we go to the relatively close by class C towered Ontario airport where they have landings light systems and long wide runways then Uber to destination. Also there can be a difference between fatigue and sleepiness - fatigue can usually be overcome but not sleepiness ; sleepiness is very bad, it facilitates confusion, hallucinations, and other cognitive/perceptual impairments.

Hmmm, for starters operating VFR in IMC. Respectfully, I see implications to return to this field before a deadline impacted multiple personal and professional decisions during this operation. My heart goes out to those affected by this tragedy.

This is another great analysis by Richard that is so educational for me as an instrument student pilot. I am unclear, though, what likely caused them to bust the minimums so badly. Engine failure, stall, or spacial disorientation don't seem likely. Could they have misjudged the sink rate of the plane and got too far behind the power curve?

Saw images and bieard a lot of lights just short of runway may have been mistaken for strip lights.

How much consideration is given to the age and level of experience? The “I can handle this situation” mixed with less experience, age where the risk side of the brain is less developed and toss in fatigue = a recipe that results in a very sad outcome. Great first look at a sad ending.

The FSB report for the CE500 type requires the Second in Command Required limitation.

I havent heard/seen any intel on the crew's duty & rest times, but the flight was conducted right in the midst of typical/normal circadian low

The box on the top of the approach chart says that if the local altimeter setting is not available, then the approach minimums increase.

That airplane top photo looks like he had full up elevator. Stalled on second low go around as it happens in VFR many times. Low go around stall again ?

When I was getting typed in the XLS the instructor said “Part 91……a license to kill your self “

if the general public knew that hired pilots were getting 2 hours of sleep at 0-dark anything, they would freak out.

There was another crash at F70 in the week prior

And why did they bust their decision height on the second approach?

Anyone mentioning the fog that was a possible reason for the first go-around? And fog being one of the reasons they crashed?

The aircraft has multiple landings at French Valley earlier in the week on multiple days

There should have been an airmet and/or forecast for fog. I doubt they spent time on a weather briefing that early in the morning.