Okay Tik. That's cool and all but like stick to saying things about Karl Marx that you don't actually here about. You know, the type of things which people like me research about and then mention in a politics class which is very left-leaning and then get the diversity officer at your school's attention because some leftist got annoyed. (This genuinely happened to me last thursday for the 2nd time, further proof Britain is an authoritarian state).

having an argument based on actual reason and evidence rather than emotions is rare these days

As an American, I have always seen TIK as fair and level headed. Regardless of which country he is focused on. I don’t know where people get the “TIK is Anti-American” nonsense from. People need to show more appreciation for the insane amount of work TIK puts into his content (which is free to us btw!)

I love seeing shit like this in my sub feed every Monday. I can't recall many other HistoryTubers who'd go so in depth about a commentator's question and turn it into an informative video. Gold standard shit right here.

"Clone Warrior" all debate is always helpful, but arrogance isn't. Calling other people's work a , specially after the invested time and effort is disrespectul. We are happy to have a valuable contribution, but not like this.

I thought the first rule of History Club was not to talk about History Club?

"Haha panzer division go brrrr"

Success has many fathers, failure is an orphan.

American here. Go for the truth and the damn the torpedoes.

You know TIK is mad when he reads comments using "Hitler Voice"

This ages old discussion about wo was to blame is really tiresome. If we have to look at all the sources, we cannot discount the interview with John Frost, who was at that final meeting, and who heard Browning give Gavin the order to secure the Heights before the bridge. If we approach it militarily, and supposing that Gavin is acting on the assumption there was a threat from the Reichswald and wanted to protect his flanks, Browning is still the one that gave the permission. He could have just as easily told Gavin no, and take the bridge first. The blame must fall on Browning.

Tik, you do a great job. Are you always right? Nope, are you always wrong? Nope. But I can see from your videos and the way you present your findings, that you have a grand love of History. In that I count you a brother. Keep up the good work and don't let those who have no other arguments than name calling and hysteria, change your love of History. Semper Fi.

As a Veteran of the 325 Airborne infantry regiment, 2nd brigade, 82nd Airborne Division... Ill buy you a pint... AATW... i blame for the failure of operation mkt garden on my parents... On a side note My Uncle 1st LT. Raymond Hiltunen . B/326 Glider Engineers, 101st ABN Div. Was killed near Oisterwijk Holland, on 18 Sept 1944. His glider was shot down with 5 other soldiers on board... Thank you for remembering all those who served in this battle... AIRBORNE ALL THE WAY!

This is a textbook example of historical analysis and critical thinking. Well done.

First thought when i saw that report was yes prime minister. "The purpose of minutes is not to record events, it is to protect people". Sir Humphrey Appleby. Potential meeting minuted by someone with interest in covering gavin. Hello browning, ive begun taking the hill and will go for njemagen as soon as possible. Why didnt you go immediately? Need to secure our position as there are major german forces in the reichswald and setting up your hq here would be impossible if we dont ensure this is secure. Very well, secure the position, then go for the bridge as soon as possible. *scene* Writing the minutes: Browning directed to secure area before going for the bridge. Nothing incorrect there, its the truth and nothing but the truth, the whole truth? Absolutely not.

Bravo!!! 115% professionalism. Clearly, carefully, completely and courteously. Dealt with situation in its entirety and hopefully put all the nonsense to bed. Well done bloke 👏. Keep up the splendid work 👍👍👍

TIK destroying Clone with facts and reasoning. If Separatists had more people like you Clone Wars would end differently.

As you pointed out, a document written well after the fact by a Staff Officer is a questionable piece of evidence. As an individual with 36 years of experience working for/with U.S. Military Flag Officer Staffs (I assume other nations are the same) - the fact that it was written by a Staff Officer who was still working for the General at the time, makes it worthless. No UCMJ court, no formal investigation within the U.S. Military would consider it as evidence as it's tainted by date and by authorship. Please for God's sake TIK, keep up these lines of investigation and critical examination of roles and responsibilities in major conflicts. While I'm consuming the Stalingrad series as it is produced - I love the fact your taking time out to produce these videos. The cancerous problem with/in our Military Organizations in the west today is a complete lack of critical review and historical oversight. It simply doesn't happen within the military culture today - in fact it hasn't in since the end of the Cold War. The civilians, many of whom have never served, most of the rest for very limited periods at junior levels - have placed their military organizations on such high pedestals, they are actually destroying them with their unbridled faith and adoration. Generals and Admirals are CEO level figures whose primary duty is in fact to protect the organization, particularly in peacetime and certainly after winning a war. There are notable exceptions in history, but they are exceptions.

Every time they try to test this man, everytime they fail. When will they learn ?

if they had taken the bridge earlier Robert Redford wouldn't have had his moment

"who was to blame?" The brave and stoic resistance of the defenders ?

Oh wow those simple maps, envisioning the current Stalingrads maps. Grown much lol. Great Job and Congratulations TIK, proud to be a Patreon.

Hi Tik, my Grandfather was a senior NCO at Arnhem and a very famous and popular figure within the regiment. We talked a lot about the battle and was lucky enough to accompany him to Arnhem in the nineties. At the end of the film "A bridge too far", when the plan has clearly collapsed the main characters discuss all the mistakes that have been made and all are valid. But, the film ends with Urquhart meeting Browning at his HQ. This final scene depicts what everyone knew at the time but were obviously reluctant to talk about due to the culture and structure of military heirarchy. Did the conversation between Gavin and Lindquist centre around the idea that the 82nd was primarily a personal securty force for Browning and secondarily a force tasked with capturing a bridge? Did Gavin make a career move considering the weight Browning had in the British establishment. Finally, my own personal question is, considering the Germans had captured plans of the operation, what would the outcome have been if XXX corps had been allowed to cross the bridge at Arnhem, cut off and ambushed by German counter attack north and east of Arnhem. Keep up the good work, this story will cotinue.

It isn't a question of if its Gavin's fault or not. In fact the entire point of why I disagree is that it completely ignores the colossal mess this entire operation is. By dissecting it into trying to blame one person it removes a lot of nuance. First of all the operation in its core was flawed. The operation had so many mistakes and blatant oversights that it was an accumulation of screw ups that lead to its failure. And in this regards the shoddy plan itself is and always will be Montgomery's fault the responsibility always goes to the man in charge. He didn't even have the courage to come discuss the ending of market garden and sent his aide. Says a lot about the man. Plans, and operations need to have enough flexibility to adjust to a situation. This plan did not. It was dependent on too many factors. Your entire 1 hour video highlighted these mistakes. from the British being routed in Arnhem due to the lack of radio's. Where entire battalions went in piece meal. The poor planning of the drop sites, the supply zones being overrun. Yes the Nijmegen bridge if it was taken on day 1 would have made things easier if the tanks had shown up. But those days the tanks weren't there the Germans would have packed the island and slowed things down again this is making a huge assumption. We are looking at this in hindsight. We cannot and should not assume just because Gavin made a single mistake that it was the singular point where this colossal mess went wrong. Montgomery rushed this plan and there were 0 contingencies. There is a reason Overlord needed more planning than just 2 weeks. I will never say the British at Arnhem didn't' fight well. but it depressing to know how much of them died due to flat out incompetence and over optimistic planning.

It was all Hitler's fault! Oh wait, I'm not a German general. - General Gavin.

"When the debate is lost.... Slander becomes the tool of the loser" (Socrates)

Operation Market Garden was lost by the air planners before it even began. Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst simply made the wrong decisions. It was never lost by any individual airborne commander. Brereton should have told Montgomery at the beginning that he didn't have the resources. He didn't.

TIK, if it were up to me I would make you head of historical research at a major university or private institution. I think you do an outstanding job researching and presenting history and bringing all sides of the story together, while pointing out contradictions when they are apparent. Keep up the great work!

Authoritative history stands on the shoulders of EVIDENCE. Legitimacy of truth requires documentation, timelines, contemporary quotes from those who were there and perhaps even tangible evidence. Plenty of 'historic facts' have been skewed via people who made serious mistakes and then lied to cover their own arses. Because those people who could deny or argue against their lies are now deceased, the lies now stand as truth. Bravo Lewis, for saying it like it is!

"I was just following the evidence I had at the time." Just following evidence sir!

All of the arguing back and forth and trying to place blame for the failure of Market-Garden, and specifically at Nijmegen, avoids the most relevant questions. 1) Given the multitude of missions Gavin and the understrength 82nd had to accomplish on day one( take and hold other bridges further south, secure the Groesbeek Heights, guard landing zones for subsequent landings), what was the maximum force that could have been directed to Nijmegen to capture the bridge there? 2) Even if sent immediately upon landing, could that force march the distance to Nijmegen, fight its way through any German resistance within the city, and then capture and hold not just the bridge, but also a perimeter north of the river for the 30th Corps to exploit; all before elements of the SS panzer divisions arrive later that day, or the Germans destroyed the bridge? The idea that Gavin could have seized the Nijmegen bridge if only he'd acted sooner is just speculation, unsupported by the facts on the ground. At best, Gavin might have sent perhaps two battalions towards Nijmegen, and then only by cutting things close elsewhere. There were at least as many, if not more, small miscellaneous German training, security, and ad hoc units in and around Nijmegen as there were further north at Arnhem. It was those kind of units that delayed the British from getting to the Arnhem bridge until later in the day when reinforcements from the SS panzer Korps finally started arriving. It's logical to assume the same thing would have happened at Nijmegen, regardless of how quickly Gavin might have sent units towards the bridge. The distance of the landing zones to the bridge alone made any quick attack with the element of surprise impossible. If I'm the German commander in Nijmegen, it becomes clear very quickly that the Americans are there for the bridge. I fight a delaying action in the city with whatever troops I can scrape together, while establishing a fall back defensive line on the north side of the river. Even if the Americans get to the southern end of the bridge, they won't be able to cross before my reinforcements arrive from up north. The situation would end similar to Arnhem; Allied airborne forces holding one end of the bridge, but unable to take the other. The 30th Corps would still have to make a forced crossing, and establish a perimeter north of the river, before they could resume their way to Arnhem. By then, the British airborne at Arnhem would be overwhelmed. If the bridges were the overall most important mission of Market-Garden, then they should have been treated as such. The bridges at Arnhem, Nijmegen, and elsewhere should have been targeted by direct assault by troops landing by glider on or next to the bridges, then reinforced immediately by at least a battalion of paratroopers landing nearby, as was done with the Pegasus bridges on D-Day. For Nijmegen, a battalion of paratroopers should have been dropped north of the river to take the north end of the bridge and establish a perimeter. Even then, who knows if it would have been able to hold against the elements of the SS panzer divisions that would show up later that day and beyond. Market-Garden was poorly planned, without sufficient resources, and with an almost criminal underestimating of German strength. As such, it was destined to fail.

17:20 - "So Gavin is admitting that he didn't follow orders by giving out pre-drop orders, and we know he really didn't give those pre-drop orders." - Actually we do, but you need a couple of books not on TIK's booklist, which dig deeper into the story and contain first hand accounts by people who were in the final divisional briefing confirming Gavin instructed Lindquist to send a battalion directly to the bridge: September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012), Chapter 3 - As Gavin finished his briefing, the British General [Browning] cautioned him: “Although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen bridges, it is essential that you capture the Groesbeek ridge and hold it.” General Browning’s order, of course, made perfect sense. It was of paramount importance to hold the high ground. Any commander worth his salt understood that. Even so, the purpose of Market Garden was to seize the bridges in order to speedily unleash a major armored thrust into northern Germany, toward Berlin. High ground notwithstanding, the only way for the Allies to accomplish this ambitious objective was to take the bridges, and these were, after all, perishable assets, because the Germans could destroy them (and might well be likely to do so the longer it took the Allies to take the bridges). By contrast, the Groesbeek ridge spur wasn’t going anywhere. If the 82nd had trouble holding it, and German artillery or counterattacks became a problem, the Allies could always employ air strikes and artillery of their own to parry such enemy harassment. Also, ground troops from Dempsey’s Second Army could join with the paratroopers to retake Groesbeek from the Germans. So, in other words, given the unpleasant choice between the bridges and the hills, the bridges had to come first. General Gavin did have some appreciation of this. At an earlier meeting with his regimental commanders, he [Gavin] had told Colonel Roy Lindquist of the 508th Parachute Infantry that even though his primary mission was to hold the high ground at Berg en Dal near Groesbeek, he was also to send his 1st Battalion into Nijmegen to take the key road bridge. Gavin told Lindquist to push for the bridge via "the flatland to the east of the city and approach it over the farms without going through the built-up area." Gavin considered this so important that he stood with Lindquist over a map and showed him this route of advance. At the same time, Colonel Lindquist had trouble reconciling Gavin's priorities for the two ambitious objectives of holding Berg en Dal and grabbing the bridge. He believed that Gavin wanted him to push for the bridge only when he had secured the critical glider landing zones and other high ground. According to Lindquist, his impression was that "we must first accomplish our main mission before sending any sizeable force to the bridge." Actually, General Gavin wanted the 508th to do both at the same time, but somehow this did not sink into the 508th's leadership. "If General Gavin wanted Col Lindquist to send a battalion for the bridge immediately after the drop, he certainly did not make that clear to him," Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Shanley, the executive officer of the 508th, later wrote. Perhaps this was a miscommunication on Gavin's part, probably not. Lieutenant Colonel Norton, the G-3, was present for the conversation (Shanley was not) and recorded Gavin's clear instructions to Lindquist: "Seize the high ground in the vicinity of Berg en Dal as his primary mission and ... attempt to seize the Nijmegen bridge with a small force, not to exceed a battalion." Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012), Chapter 9 - Captain Chet Graham was assigned as the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters. "I sat in on a high level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation." - Chet Graham was also witness to what happened when Gavin found out Lindquist was not moving on the bridge, because as liaison officer he was the messenger: Nordyke, Chapter 10 - Captain Chet Graham, the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters, decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge. "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' " - Based on the timelines, Gavin's intervention to get Lindquist moving, and Lindquist's orders to Warren Shields to get his 1st Battalion out of the line along the Groesbeek ridge and moving into Nijmegen, occurred at 8 PM, around the same time that Gräbner's SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 arrived at the Nijmegen bridge. The first clashes between the two units occured hours later, between 10 PM (when A Company of 1st Battalion moved off from the IP - Initial Point - at the Krayenhoff barracks) and midnight (when the Kanon-Zug of SS-Pz.AA.9 that Gräbner left behind in Nijmegen was withdrawn). The clash occurred at the Keiser Karelplein traffic circle, near the railway station, about 1 km from the highway bridge. The German movements are recorded in Retake Arnhem Bridge - An Illustrated History of Kampfgruppe Knaust September to October 1944, Bob Gerritsen and Scott Revell (2010). Chapter 4 is based on the diary of SS-Untersturmführer Gernot Traupel, who was acting adjutant to SS-Sturmbannführer Leo-Hermann Reinhold (II./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 and Kampfgruppe Reinhold in charge of the Nijmegen defence). My conclusion is that Lindquist was a poor field commander, and Nordyke's earlier chapters on the 508th in Normandy bear this out, so the fault is squarely on Lindquist. However, Gavin was his supervisor and was responsible for his divisional plan. He told Cornelius Ryan in his interview for A Bridge Too Far: 'Gavin and Lindquist had been together in Sicily[?] and Normandy and neither Gavin nor Ridgway, the old commander of the 82nd, trusted him in a fight. He did not have a “killer instinct.” In Gavin’s words, “He wouldn’t go for the juggler [jugular].” As an administrative officer he was excellent; his troopers were sharp and snappy and, according to Gavin, “Made great palace guards after the war.” Gavin confirms he ordered Lindquist to commit a battalion to the capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the jump. He also confirms he told Lindquist not to go to the bridge by way of the town but to approach it along some mud flats to the east. We discussed also objectives. Gavin’s main objectives were the heights at Groesbeek and the Grave bridge; he expected and intelligence confirmed “a helluva reaction from the Reichswald area.” Therefore he had to control the Groesbeek heights. The Grave bridge was essential to the link up with the British 2nd Army. He had three days[?] to capture the Nijmegen bridge and, although he was concerned about it, he felt certain he could get it within three days. The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized.' (Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967 - James Maurice Gavin, Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University)

Dear Folks, I spent nearly 30 years in the Army both in senior enlisted and Officer ranks. Most of my time was spent in Special Forces Units but I also spent a few years in Airborne Infantry and Combat Engineer units. I want to be brief as possible on my comments. In the analysis of this battle we must go back to the beginning of "the plan". Monty was always credited with being a very cautious commander. His thinking in this plan was totally out of his character. In planning a combat operation at my level we ALWAYS had a primary route and MULTIPLE alternate routes. Throwing everything up one road knowing that there are multiple opportunities for being ambushed is absolutely insane. A leader at the squad level would have never done it. Add to this a shortage of INFIL aircraft and the total disregarding of credible INTEL regarding the enemy situation. There were no contingencies for the most critcal phases of the operation. The blame for MG's failure must go to the most senior commander and senior planners.

I think everyone can agree that market garden was a mess from the start. Many things contributed to its failure. Gavin and Browning were just a small peice of the overall issues. Great video tik.

"Just following orders" the worst defence someone can make, especially a soldier.

After looking at this for about 35 years I actually think that no one person is responsible for the failure. Operation Market Garden was a failure of logistics, but not in the way that people think. In the film "A Bridge Too Far" Jeremy Kemp's character states that we can't afford to lose a single (transport) aircraft. This was the key. Allied transport aircraft numbers had doubled since D-day. However the number of maintenance personnel hadn't increased at all. So a damaged aircraft was essentially lost due to the lack of resources to repair even lightly damaged aircraft. Also, a second lift on day 1 was out because of the lack of ground crews to turn the aircraft around. The quality of transport crews had also fallen considerably since D-day, with a particularly shortage of trained navigators. As days get shorter in September a lack of trained navigators could lead to a second lift being a disaster, making operations on further days impossible. A second lift on day 1 would have led to Market Garden being successful. However the logistic situation meant that a second lift was impossible. I've often blamed Williams for this, but Williams was always helpful towards airborne operations and if he couldn't organise a second lift then he obviously had good reasons. The reason, logistics. Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics.

You are one of the most credible historians on KZfaq

Most folks need more than a week to plan a family getaway. Market-Garden was a toss-up from the start.

Spot on! Best definition of History and method I've ever heard on KZfaq, and one of the best ever!

I think one good way to approach the question would be to reframe it into less "emotive" terms, and terms which perhaps more neatly align to the military environment. Thus I would not talk of "blame" or "fault". I think the two questions are: "Whose IDEA was it to prioritise the heights over the bridge?", "Whose DECISIONS was it to do so?" and any nuances within those questions. In terms of a decision, I feel the evidence is strongly that it was Browning's explicit decision. Not just in terms of "this is your priority #1 and this is secondary" or something similar, but the wording seems clear that the order was "secure the heights first, THEN go for the bridge". Even if the sequence was: Gavin "I think we should do this" Browning "Yes, you should do that" then the decision is Browning's. Only if Browning had made no order (prompted or otherwise) or if Gavin had gone AGAINST an order and essentially "acted alone" can we say it is "his decision". Not all lower level command decisions are a upper echelon decision - where to site a platoon is the company commanders decision, unless the battalion commander has explicitly told him what he expects, for example. In terms of the originator of the idea, it's more murky. Here the various statements seem more along the lines of the concern was originated by (or perhaps BELOW) Gen Gavin. I doubt he originated this concern over "1000 panzers" from nowhere, it would not be surprising if a regimental officer voiced a concern when they were planning, and Gavin took this as a serious concern. ==== As a side note, I think often people get mixed up between criticising decisions by certain officers and criticising the troops they commanded, which are two very different thing. And I feel that to some extent the definite heroics of the combat crossing of the Waal by 504PIR has to some extent acted to "shelter" the command decisions earlier in the battle from scrutiny - "we can't throw mud at Gavin because look what his troops did". (And it's actually a similar situation at Arnhem in some ways - Frost's stand at the bridge deflects scrutiny from the fact that 2 full brigades couldn't push aside a scratch battalion (Krafft's bn)

"Cheers Gav" - Monty 1944

Another great video TIK. Your Market Garden documentary was brilliant. I had read several books on the subject and still learned a lot. One question though - if there were apparently 1000 tanks nearby then they would have defeated the whole of the 82nd airborne and probably 30 corps - so why would the operation go ahead if it was thought this force was nearby?

To conclude that the events at Nijmegen is the root of Operation Market-Garden's failure is an extremely wild reach. So many issues with M-G's overall plan, objectives and the Allies overall prejudice that Germany was through play a gigantic part in M-G's failure. M-G was an operation that never should have been executed. Given the high rate of dismissing intelligence, due to established prejudice, is the first fatal flaw. Secondly out of control egos were hard at work here as well which I firmly believe lead to political pressure that ultimately forced the implementation of M-G. No Nijmegen was NOT the key factor to the operation's failure. However mistakes at Nijmegen did occur, but then I wasn't and I did not have to decipher all of the real time information at the moment either. Therefore no one in this conversation cannot truly and accurately analyze the real moment on the scene circumstances versus looking at it in the year 2021. Ultimately this was Montgomery's brain child and in the ETO I feel he was grossly overrated.

Are we possibly using after-the-fact reasoning? What if there WERE loads of tanks in the Reichswald and the bridge was well defended (as well defended as Arnhem)... where they'd be completely occupied trying to approach the bridge then an armoured attack surges out of the Reichswald and wipes them out before they could even take the bridge. Then we'd all be saying "Gavin made a fatal error by NOT setting up defences in preparation for a counterattack which he had been given intel on and should not have dismissed as just a rumour" Maybe this is why Browning said "yeah, sure, if you want to prioritise setting up defences that's your decision". that's the nature of delegation, when Browning gives Gavin this mission he can't then just make every decision for him. This was Gavin's decision to make. I doubt Gavin somehow was incapable of comprehending that bridges were vital to the whole plan. The problem is after the war it turns out "well I don't know how you got the idea there were a load of tanks there" and "well turns out you wouldn't have run into much resistance if you had jus gone straight to the bridge". Then you have to explain your actions based on what is known after the battle rather than what's known before and during the battle. Remember, sending out scouting parties is not a light matter, sending out a reconnaissance in force against a position you know is well defended is pretty much sending people to their death. It's not something many commanders do lightly. Really, I still leave a lot of blame on Browning, how are you supposed to make the right decision here with the information that you have and the resources you have? This whole operation was far too rushed.

Many battles and wars were lost in their planning stages. This applies to the Operation Market Garden. The planners never allowed a thought that "things might go wrong" and that their troops might not be able to secure the critical river crossing. When gen.Sosabowski asked during one of the pre-op meeting "what will happen if Allied troops don't capture the bridge?" his question (based on his extensive combat experience) was ignored by Browning and others. Hubris walks before the fall. Unfortunately, common soldiers paid with their lives and blood for the arrogance and stupidity of their commanders.

Bleedin' ell. We here in St Augustine, FL appreciate your efforts towards civility. Alas, you nor I can control the emotions of some. New viewer enjoying the reports and analysis. Cheers and carry on sir.

The hostility is clearly out of place. However, the preponderance of the evidence presented on this channel so far leads me to draw the opposite conclusion from TIK. It is gracious of Gavin to share blame with Browning, but that’s all I see in his words taking responsibility for making the decision. Gavin didn’t even say it was his idea initially, merely that his decision was thus-and-such and that his commanding officer approved it. Browning was that commander, and therefore bears the real responsibility.

I love the series on market garden. It’s amazing to me that there is still so much to learn and uncover about a battle that has already been so well documented. Always look forward to hearing TIK’s thoughts.

You seem to be confusing "Not attacking the bridge at all" with "Not making the bridge the primary objective". There's a world of difference between the two. Even the 1945 memo does not say the bridge should not be attacked at all. Gavin never "admits" to ordering no attack on the bridge -- he says that the order he gave was that Groesbeek was the primary objective. His (supposed) pre-drop directive to Lindquist was that no more than a battalion be sent toward the bridge and that a careful watch be kept on it in case it needed to be recalled. Still emphasizing that the bridge was NOT the primary objective. One can argue that the "mistake" (at least in 82nd zone) was not making the bridge the primary objective. There's plenty of blame to go around for that, as it seems to have been agreed to by all the command from Monty on down. But the real blame for Market Garden is too many disparate objectives. Too many moving parts all of which had to go right and anything unexpected in any one place would throw off the whole operation.

There was a similar situation in Korea war. The Chinese army was about to encircle a large amount of South Korean army when there was a misinformation reported that there was US military presence. The division commander who was responsible to close the cap wanted to delay the attack until the situation was clarified and the corp commander agreed. Half of the South Korea troops escaped as the result. After the operation, all the blames were placed on the corp commander and he took all the responsibilities personally as well. The name of the corp commander was Liang Xingchu （梁兴初）of the 38th Corp。

@TIK - in my opinion, Gavin's main problem was that he was responsible for security for the command center of the entire operation. Therefore, his focus on the threat to the security of the entire operation from the Reichswald forest is tactically correct. Strategically, it resulted in a serious failure. In my opinion, that is the responsibility of his superiors for failing to give priority to the bridge vs. securing the HQ area for Market Garden.

Due to social distancing rules TIK will have to post Clone Warriors backside instead of handing it to him. Love it!

Since, from the start, the right flank was open to attack at will along the road all the way to Arnhem, the operation was doomed from the start. There was no plan to secure this flank and perhaps there was no realistic way to secure it anyway. Unrealistic planning from the get-go. Sorry TIK, the problem began at the top...

Don't worry about the criticism... there are too many people that are so patriotic that they can't accept the truth

As an American, thank you for pursuing the truth TIK. It does not matter who the blame falls on and what their group identity is.

The problem with this type of history evaluations/discussions is that a conclusion is reached based on after action information on a situation that was very fluid and not properly documented; in the end it is the Commander that is at fault for the failures of those under them. I hate these kinds of discussions due to having to evaluate statements made by different viewpoints and the lack of political motivations that are not put in context.

@TIK I want to point something out. In March 1965 Browning died. In 1966 (no specific date given in your video) Gavin changes his claim. Fascinating. I'm sure it wasn't an attempt to discredit someones memory. Certainly not. While I'm not completely sure either way, I do think that perhaps the only person who could refute Gavin having just died at most nearly two years prior, would have contributed to his decision to adjust context and information.

It was largely Brereton and Williams of the USAAF who planned the airborne part of the operation. It seems their decision to drop so far from the bridges caused Gavin to turtle up and not move for the road bridge immediately. _”In early September Montgomery had a plan ready for employing airborne forces-Operation Comet-and some details of Comet should be noted here. Comet called for the 1st Airborne Division and Sosabowski’s 1st Polish Parachute Brigade to seize the Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges, using gliders for coup de main attacks, landing close to the bridges, rather as Pegasus Bridge at Benouville had been taken by the 6th Airborne Division on D-Day. Once the bridges had been taken the parachute brigades would land on nearby DZs (drop-zones) and join up with the glider parties to hold the bridges until the ground forces arrived. In the Comet plan, Brigadier ‘Shan’ Hackett’s 4th Parachute Brigade was tasked to take the road bridge over the Maas at Grave, landing on a DZ just 1,000 yards from the north end of the bridge-which, hopefully, had just been taken by a force from the 1st Air Landing Brigade in four gliders landing at the south end of the bridge. Operation Comet was planned for 10 September; then it was called off and replaced one week later by Market Garden._ _The Comet plan stuck to the basic airborne rule-land as close to the objective as possible-and to the basic rule for capturing any bridge-take both ends at once. In view of the subsequent arguments over the deployment of 1st Airborne at Arnhem, one cannot but wonder why the Comet plans for taking the bridges with one reinforced British division, using glider coup de main tactics, were regarded as far too risky for an airborne assault by three Allied airborne divisions just one week later?_ _It has to be clearly understood that taking the bridges on the road to Arnhem was only a means to an end. The final aim was to establish Second Army just west of the Rhine, north of Arnhem, and just south of the Ijsselmeer (or Zuider Zee). Once there, having outflanked the West Wall, which petered out some distance to the south, Second Army could either turn south-east to outflank the Ruhr, or head due east towards Berlin. Any decision on its final destination would rest with General Eisenhower._ _Having elected to use the Airborne Army, Montgomery had first to decide where to cross the Rhine. His own preference was for a crossing east of Arnhem, close to the town of Wesel, and Wesel was also the choice of Dempsey in Second Army. Wesel lay just south “of the Ruhr and was the better option for Garden, with fewer canals and an easier approach to the river. However, Wesel lay within the Ruhr anti-aircraft gun flak belt and the airborne planners stated that low-flying and slow-moving glider-tugs and parachute aircraft would suffer severe losses if Wesel were chosen (readers should note that Wesel was chosen for the last airborne operation of the war, the Rhine crossing in March 1945, when the US 17th and British 6th Airborne Divisions were dropped around the town)._ _Therefore, since the air planners-specifically Brereton and Major-General Paul L. Williams of the IX US Troop Carrier Command-had the casting vote over the air element in Market, the decision was made for Arnhem, the target town for a thrust north from the narrow bridgehead over the Meuse-Escaut canal east of Antwerp, a route that would require the crossing of some wide rivers or canals: the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon, the Willems canal at Veghel, the River Maas at Grave, the Maas-Waal canal, the River Waal at Nijmegen and the Lower Rhine (Neder Rijn) at Arnhem (the Waal is the southern arm of the Rhine, which divides in two to form the Waal and Neder Rijn, some distance upstream of Arnhem). There were, in addition, any number of minor streams and canals restricting movement off the main north-south axis. “The point to note here is the destruction of the first Arnhem myth. The choice of drop zones was in the gift of the US Air Force commanders, not the airborne commanders - and the factor that governed the Air Force commanders’ choice of parachute drop zones ( DZs) or glider landing zones (LZs) was the presence, actual or feared, of anti-aircraft batteries around the bridges. Since the US Air Force commanders considered that these bridges would be surrounded by flak guns, they selected landing zones that were, in the main, well away from the bridges._ _This decision had some dire effects. The obvious one is that it gave some airborne units-most notably 1st Airborne-a long way to go through enemy territory before they even got to their prime objective. If that were all it would have been bad enough, but there was more. It also deprived the airborne soldiers of that other airborne asset, surprise. Once on the ground, airborne units lack mobility: instead of swooping from the sky onto their objectives in a matter of minutes, the men of 1st Airborne had to march there from distant DZs, and this took hours. Long before they reached the bridges over the Neder Rijn the enemy were fully alert._ _In addition, one of the other prime assets of an airborne division is that it can leap over obstacles that would hinder a ground force by landing on both sides of “a river bridge at once, which the 82nd Airborne did at the Grave bridge, but not at the Nijmegen bridge. At Arnhem both these assets were lost by the Air Force commanders choice of DZs, but the choice of the Arnhem drop and landing zones was not made by Major-General Roy Urquhart, commander of the British 1st Airborne Division._ _Nor was this the only error committed by the air planners. Another was their decision that ground-attack fighters were not to be sent over the battlefield while escort fighters were in the air protecting supply drops. This decision denied the airborne units the vital assistance that these ground-attack aircraft had been giving to the troops in Normandy just a month before, and a lack of air support exacerbated the problems of the airborne units. Among other tasks, these ground-attack aircraft could have taken on the flak positions around the bridges, those anti-aircraft guns the air planners were so wary of. But the truly dire effect was, as Julian Thompson relates: ‘that the 1st Airborne Division was denied the use of a weapon the Germans, after their Normandy experience, dreaded. The enemy was able to bring reinforcements into Arnhem in broad daylight, with impunity, a move which would have been fraught with risk in Normandy a few weeks earlier.’_ _.....’Ideally, an airborne force, be it battalion, brigade, division or corps, should be landed in one lift. For Market it was judged impossible to fly in all the Allied airborne units in one lift as there were not enough aircraft available. In fact, it was judged impossible to land any of the Allied Airborne divisions intact on the first day._ _This difficulty was put down to a shortage of transport aircraft and glider tugs, but the problem actually went further than that. **The British transport commander, Air Vice Marshal Leslie Hollinghurst of No. 38 Group, RAF Transport Command, wanted to solve the aircraft shortage by flying-in two lifts on D-Day. His colleague of the US IX Troop Carrier Command, Major-General Paul L. Williams, did not agree, believing that time was needed to service the aircraft and rest the crews-and this view prevailed at Allied Airborne HQ where Brereton supported it. Since the principal asset of an airborne operation is surprise, the two-to three-day deployment-an attack by instalments-was throwing this vital asset away. This decision would have some profound effects on the ground, most notably on Urquhart’s 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem._ *_...As for Gavin, his actions seem to have been motivated by a desire to avoid the situation inflicted on Urqhuart by the air commanders’ choice of drop zones. Like Urqhuart’s, Gavin’s DZs were set several miles from the bridges and a large town stood in the way. Urqhuart elected to follow his orders and go for the Arnhem bridge on D-Day: Gavin decided to hang on to his DZs and only go for the bridges when the DZs were secure-a laudable aim except for the fact that it undermined the entire Market Garden plan._* *_....As related, when Brigadier General Jim Gavin heard Urquhart’s plan for the Arnhem drop, it caused him considerable surprise and not a little alarm: ‘As he outlined his plan and told us that he had selected drop and landing zones six to eight miles west of the Arnhem bridge, I couldn’t believe my ears,’ said Gavin. ‘I turned to my G-3, Colonel John Norton, and said, “My God, he can’t mean it,” and Norton replied “He does and he is going to try to do it.” ’What Urquhart was ‘going to try and do’ was carry out his orders and take the Arnhem bridge.”_* - The Battle for the Rhine 1944: Arnhem and the Ardennes, the Campaign in Europe by Robin Neillands

We need to first understand how military planning works. Presumably the division commanders were asked to formulate a plan for their objectives, and then Browning and other senior commanders would make adjustments, then approve the plan. Ultimately the failure of MG has everything to do with the overall concept and the planning at the senior levels. If you understand how the brass works in the Army you understand the backbiting and willingness to throw others under the bus. Therefore we may never fully know exactly what occurred. What we do know is the fundamental assumption, and what the entire plan was based upon, was that the German Army was in tatters and unable to form a cohesive defense. Once this failed to be true, the entire plan was doomed regardless of what the various airborne division plans were. And we know these were largely flawed as well. It was mere chance that Frost made it to the Arnhem bridge anyway. In regards to Gavin, have you ever considered he was simply taking responsibility as the division commander when asked about who made the decision? The buck stops here sort of thing? The military at the General officer level, especially inter-war, is very political and we should always take this into consideration. Whomever was responsible, the lack of focus of the Nijmegen bridge was unforgivable. Browning could and should have overruled any plan that did not give this bridge AT LEAST the attention the other bridges received. I suspect that the concern about the Reichswald came from above division level and therefore Gavin may have had this pushed on him. Not everything discussed in planning makes it into reports for the benefit of historians. Even had the Nijmegen bridge been captured, the plan was likely to fail, but that is another discussion.

it was amazing how the table was turned in 27 minutes of video

TIK following the evidences without any bias, such a rookie move in 2021!!! Great work as usual!!

Well done TIK, your expertise & fairness at getting as near to the truth as possible is very welcomed in my book ! People who throw insults are just ignorant & dis-respectful. Keep up the Good Work it is much enjoyed & appreciated.

One thing about this 'high ground' argument is that the high ground is not very high. Nor does not control the bridge, it does not loom over it or provide potential artillery siting out of the ordinary. Whereas conventional military wisdom is to secure a bridgehead before moving on to capture objectives, this goes completely against the plan which was for surprise. The Maas is a fast and wide river, the bridge was far more important than any other target particularly given that paratroopers had already gone for Arnhem further north. There is a very good Market Garden museum at Groosbeek which is a rather fitting place to put it in the circumstances.

18:58 - context on the German tanks - I don't know where the intelligence report on the 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald comes from, except that it was suspected there was a tank depot near Kleve behind the forest, and that the forest could conceal up to 1,000 tanks. The depot was later discovered to be near Münster, the HQ of Wehrkreis VI (military district 6) deeper into Germany. So the 1,000 figure was a rumour, not a serious estimate. Generalfeldmarschal Model was actually assessed to have less than 100 operational panzers in his Heeresgruppe B (Army Group B) front between Aachen and the North Sea coast, and we now know his 5 September returns actually listed 84 as operational, so the Allied intelligence estimate was actually correct. By a bizarre coincidence, the combined anti-tank gun establishments of the British 1st Airborne Division and attached Polish Independent Parachute Brigade was exactly 84 AT guns, as if the universe were trying to tell the naysayers something! For additional context, Model was facing Montgomery's 21st Army Group with 2,400 tanks, and the US 1st Army at Aachen with another 1,500. This is why confidence in the Allied camp was so high in September of 1944.

A point of trivia "Ohio University" in this context refers to the collective state university system of Ohio, not Ohio University of Athens (OH). Ohio State University (Columbus, OH), with its excellent programs in military history, are probably why this entry exists.

I appreciate the efforts you are making in your studies, but the method itself is flawed by the question you ask. You cannot define success or failure of this operation (or place blame) through examination of a singular order on when to take or not take Nijmegan bridge, by either Gavin or Browning. It is foolhardy to suggest that either person failed to realize the necessity to immediately take the bridge. It is equally foolish to suggest that no pre-flight orders had been made to immediately take the bridge, whether recorded or not, given its importance. Then what emerges, which is not in conflict with any report you note, is a clear understanding between all generals that the bridge could not be truly secured until the divisions flanks were proven secure. Doctrine required a maneuver battalion be in support of a battalion move upon the possible forested German positions. Given unfolding intelligence, the remark that a company movement on that possible entrenchment would suffice is laughable. A simultaneous movement to the bridge and forest would have left both forces improperly supported, both in force, maneuver, logistics, and heavy fire. Finally, it is hardly laughable to suspect 1,000 German tanks were forested, given Dutch, Belgian and French intelligence of same, British reconnaissance of heavy tank concentration in the area, dynamic intelligence of heavy concentration, and the actual presence of armored formations. This is all not to mention the fact that just two months later, not much less than 1,000 tanks (600 tanks directy and some 300 support vehicles) would find their way through the Ardennes. The decision was made by both Browning and Gavin, wisely, and according to doctrine. It may have shown unworthy, but it was not a failed decision. The only failed decision was the choice of terrain for such an offensive. As to blame, it would buck once again to Montgomery, himself approved by Eisenhower. The decisions were collective. All men were brave, on the scene, dedicated, and heroic - but all were flawed humans, as are we. The blame is war, itself. ejdotw@yahoo.com - Chris S. UCLA/CSULB History, BA, S.Cum, 5 degree emphasis

I commented in an earlier episode about this operation, but I think it was a response to a question as to who we thought was most responsible for the failure of the Allied effort. Your entire rant in this episode it the reason why I subscribe, and the fact that you also recognize, and highlight, that you are still learning. I have the good fortune in being raised by Parents that pointed out that the moment you stop learning, you start dying.

I think assigning blame after the fact is not an important question. I think it is more important to understand why the decisions were made. One important question: given the history to date with Airborne operations, what priority should have been given to the intelligence of a large combat force in the area? One can confidently assume that both the Corps and Division staffs debated this quite a bit. The risk analysis had to include the likelihood of a strong force and the effect that force would likely have if it was not adequately checked. Whoever gets credit or blame for the plan, it seems that opposing the expected force was chosen as the critical task for the Division, and Browning and Gavin were in agreement. Yes, in hindsight it was a mistake. But given the background of their experience, training and the intelligence, I think it is arrogant for one to "blame" those who had to make difficult decisions. The only blame I think is legitimate is the operation itself. The weakness of Airborne operations were well known from their recent experience.

Market Garden began on the afternoon of the 17th (Sunday), and I would contend it had failed by the evening of the 19th (Tuesday), and at that point turned into a rescue mission. By Tuesday evening, the British 1st Airborne Division had been gutted, was essentially out of infantry and starting to circle the wagons at Oosterbeek. The parts of 2Para and 1st Brigade HQ that had reached the bridge had been fighting for two days, were low on food and ammunition, and really only controlled a handful of burning buildings clustered around the northern ramp. Even if XXX Corps had reached the southern end of the Arnhem road bridge in "two to three days", they would have been attacking across an elevated bridge and down the northern ramp on a one-tank front directly into an enemy-held city. Assuming they got that far, they certainly would have been compelled to turn left and fight their way through to Oosterbeek to reach the remnants of the 1st Airborne Division rather than continuing north towards Deelen airfield and beyond. Given the scale and ferocity of the German response all along the airborne corridor, it's difficult to see how XXX Corps could have mustered the strength to take and hold a substantial bridgehead at Arnhem while simultaneously holding open the long corridor, especially given the slow advance of the other two corps moving up on either flank. As it was, the Germans managed to cut the corridor multiple times in multiple places, and had XXX Corps actually managed to get forces across the Rhine, it's reasonable to believe the German response to that event would have been such that those forces might well have been cut off and lost. I am reluctant to assign blame, because that implies the plan was preordained to succeed, if only this person had done that, or that person hadn't done this. Personally, I think the plan had pretty close to zero chance of succeeding in its intended goals, given any sort of German resistance at all. There is a fine line between audacity and foolhardiness, although sometimes only hindsight can reveal the line. (See Inchon as an example of a plan that should not have worked, yet somehow did). If blame must be assigned, I would suggest Browning, Guards Armored Division, Urquhart, and the Germans. I really do see Browning as the primary villain. By the accounts I've read, he was an empire builder with no actual command-level combat experience, but Montgomery (who had no real airborne expertise himself) trusted his advice on airborne matters. This probably explains Montgomery's "hands-off" attitude towards the operation. Browning was eager to get into the fray and make his name for himself, hence his insistence on taking dozens of sorely-needed gliders away from 1st Airborne Division to unnecessarily transport his corps HQ to Nijmegen on the first day. Once on the ground, due to communication difficulties, he effectively removed himself from the battle. He would have been more influential if he had stayed in England. The Guards Armored Division never really displayed any sense of urgency, and moved far too slowly for a plan that depended above all else on speed. Blaming Urquhart, in fact all the senior leadership of 1st Airborne, feels a bit like blaming the victim, but they really did make a number of very poor decisions. The division had never previously fought as a division, and it showed. Urquhart probably could not have done anything about the choice of landing zones, but the decision to send three widely-separated columns into Arnhem, unable to support each other, certainly was questionable. It was more like a peacetime exercise than a wartime plan. Had all three columns made it into Arnhem, they still were heading for different parts of the city, out of support range of each other. Even Frost's force was supposed to capture and hold both sides of THREE bridges (road, rail, and pontoon), although in the event the rail bridge was blown by the Germans as they arrived and the pontoon bridge had been disassembled. In hindsight, it appears a better course of action might have been to land as much as possible on the first day, preferably including the gliders Browning had requisitioned for his HQ (which could have carried another battalion of infantry), and then abandoned the landing zones and immediately pushed everyone into Arnhem as quickly as possible. This would have consolidated 5-6,000 men in the vicinity of the bridge(s) on the first day, a force that surely could have held out until XXX Corps arrived. The subsequent drops (perhaps minus the glider elements) could have been landed either south of the bridge (where the Poles originally were scheduled to land), or somewhere between Arnhem and Nijmegen, or perhaps even on the 82nd's drop zones where they could assist in clearing Nijmegen before moving north to Arnhem.

Brigadier Hackett goes to the high ground on the 18/19th September knowing Frost is in trouble, argues against going to the bridge and ends up losing most of 4th Para Brigade, all while General Urquhart is hiding in an attic. How come the British commanders don’t get the same treatment as Gavin

The whole point to the airborne operation was to seize the bridges before the Germans had time to react. The critical failure was Gavin's failure to seize his bridge before the Germans had time to take it. That is what caused the delay in getting the main force to Arnhem in time. It was a mistake not to drop the British airborne forces closer to their objective. That mistake was probably recoverable if Gavin had taken his bridge when he had the opportunity to do so. Either Gavin made the fatal blunder himself or Browning did. People fail to give the Germans credit tor the speed and skill of their reaction. Battles always have two sides. The whole point of Gavin being there was to seize the bridge quickly so the main could cross it and get to Arnhem in time. There is way to much BS nearly 80 years after the battle. Either Gavin or Browning made the fatal mistake. All other mistakes were probably not fatal to the operation. We know when Gavin's force was on the ground and when he could have taken the bridge. We also know when the Germans reinforced the bridge. We know when the main force could have crossed the bridge if Gavin had seized it when he had the chance.. The key issue is whether Browning did, in fact, order him to delay in taking the bridge. Is Monty responsible for Gavin's delay in taking the bridge? If Browning ordered Gavin to make the fatal delay, Monty is responsible for Browning being in that position. If Gavin made the fatal blunder on his own, it would less within Monty's control since he had no control over Gavin's selection. It puzzles me what Gavin thought the Germans were going to do if he sat around after landing. Once paratroopers started landing and seizing the other bridges, it was bloody obvious t the Germans what they were up to. They were bound to rush forces to h old or destroy the bridge Gavin was supposed to take. It was obvious that giving the Germans time to do that would doom the whole operation. A tremendous amount of ink has been wasted to divert attention from Gavin's failure to seize the bridge he was responsible for before the Germans could reinforce it. It should be possible to establish whether Gavin made the fatal blunder himself or was ordered to by Browning.

Strange how I watched “A Bridge Too Far” just yesterday.

Great History Tik. I love the detail that you present and the way that you frame such. I do feel that people sadly automatically come to the defence of their respective countries without really standing back and looking at the evidence. Please keep these historical lectures coming. I do not want to learn history via Hollywood or war comics.

Look Beevor has to keep the yanks sweet because he sells a lot of his books there. Blaming a yank for the failure wouldn’t go down well.😊

He never said that he was ordered to ignore the bridge. He said that he ordered a small force to take the bridge with the support of his corps commander. As corps commander and present, if there was an unnecessary delay then Browning has to take the blame. Frankly, this much ado about nothing. The entire road was constantly under attack and the fact of the matter is that the inability to take Arnhem bridge (both ends) made the whole plan a failure. As I said before, its weakness was that it assumed the Germans wouldn't fight. Bad assumption, bad plan, worse result.

Keyboard warrior calls himself 'Clone Warrior', then proceeds to provide evidence that he, in fact, is one.

Thank you. Sadly, your amazing example on how to rebut an argument will be lost on those needing it the most. Shouting and name calling are the distraction devices of ignorant and fearful.

TIK is to me an excellent (amateur?) historian who does not show a bias toward or against any country of nationality. I'm an American and I think his work is enlightening. I loved his work pointing out Gavin's error(s) at the Nimejin bridge as an important addition to the story that I was unaware of. I think the people who dump on him with hostility are badly, even evilly misguided. People like him make history a pleasure.

In military strategy, a choke point (or chokepoint) is a geographical feature on land such as a valley, defile or bridge, or maritime passage through a critical waterway such as a strait, which an armed force is forced to pass through in order to reach its objective, sometimes on a substantially narrowed front and therefore greatly decreasing its combat effectiveness by making it harder to bring superior numbers to bear. A choke point can allow a numerically inferior defending force to use the terrain as a force multiplier to thwart or ambush a much larger opponent, as the attacker cannot advance any further without first securing passage through the choke point.

Personally i believe that the fault is both Gavin and Browning’s. If Gavin wanted to push for the bridge he should’ve been making more clear to his corps commander and we would have more evidence of a fight on the matter. If Browning wanted to push for the bridge he should’ve overruled his subordinate Divisional Commander Poor lindquist is just a cog in the machine.

Sigh....too often I see hostility for the sake of hostility in comments about any subject. We should be able to respectfully disagree with each other and make our arguments calmly and logically. I was subjected to much the same once when I argued that if Lee had won at Gettysburg, it wouldn't have guaranteed that the American Civil War would have ended with a Southern victory. Got called a "dolt." But back to the topic of Market-Garden...Where did this rumor about the thousand panzers originate, and why did Gavin and Browning think this rumor was strong enough to impact their plans? I'll watch the video again to make sure that wasn't covered, and my apologies if it was. Fighting a cold today!

I've been thinking about the possible ways that Operation: Market Garden could have been a success for the Allies. And I've come upon one solution. Instead of landing the entirety of the 1st Airborne Division on the north side of the Lower Rhine near Oosterbeek, why not land them on the south side of the river near the town of Driel? I know that the 1st Polish Airborne Brigade had their drop zone near Driel, and despite heavy casualties initially, they ultimately prevailed. So what were the reasons for not landing the 1st Airborne Division where the Polish did? If this simple change wouldn't win the Battle of Arnhem for the Allies, perhaps at least the 1st Airborne could have fallen back in good order, and not have been destroyed. If anyone knows why these potential alternate landing zones weren't chosen please let me know.

It would be really interesting to dig up the actual intelligence reports or any related documentation that supported the decision to occupy the Grossbeek heights? What is clear as that both Browning and Gavin thought it was important. If the the claims of a tank repair park weren't compelling then what was? Was it just a tactical decision in that that was the terrain best suited for defending Nijmegen from counter attack? Was there other intelligence suggesting that the Reichswald was the most likely avenue of counter attack? Was it presumed that the 1st Airborne drop at Arnhem would preclude a response from that direction? Gavin was in general a capable commander and had a long and respectable career in the army. He likely fouled up at Nijmegen, but he can't be dismissed merely as a fool. What were the influences on his thought process?

Thank you for this well laid out presentation on this battle. I'm reminded of the movie "A Bridge too far" when they are all trying to figure out what went wrong, and each commander has a different reason: it was the single road; it was the weather on and on. Probably each based their opinion on what they had experienced or perhaps what kept getting mentioned to them as causing problems during the battle. Each was right from their perspective and together all these factors no doubt contributed. There can be little question that Market Garden was an enormous undertaking, very ambitious, very complicated, with many moving parts. A problem with any phase of the plan could lead to failure. You can sense Montgomery's ego at work coming up with this Rube Goldberg of sorts. I'm sure he could already read the headlines as he is heralded as a hero for ending the war early. Now I dont know what the directives were to Gavin with respect to Nij bridge. Obviously he was told to take it and hold it for 30 Corps. But was he told to land and take immediately? Or, does he have operational discretion to evaluate the situation and then act accordingly? The paratrooper/glider infantry assaults that I know about, all go the same way: a specific objective is stated; the troops land and immediately assault the objective to maximize surprise; they then dig in and prepare for the eventual counterstrike and hang on like hell till relieved. But that didnt happen here. Why? Could it be that multiple objectives were given and then Gavin could evaluate the situation and then decide which to do first? Probably. I cant believe Gavin would simply not go straight to the bridge and take it if that was his mission. Now there is no doubt that not taking the bridge ended up being a costly mistake. Gavin probably evaluated the situation, determined that the heights were critical because if they didnt take the heights the Germans could occupy them and shot at the bridge or at the road as the tanks tried to go by etc. and decided to do that first then he figured he could take the bridge. He probably over thought things and should have just focused on the bridge. Browning concurred with the decision and voila, there you have it. A mistake no one wants to take blame for. It seems that in order of errors you have the following results: 1) Gavin not ordered clearly and directly to FIRST take and hold the bridge at all costs. (Monty or Browning to blame) 2) Gavin is given discretion and cant recognize the danger of failing to take the bridge FIRST (Gavin to blame) choosing instead to focus on other objectives 3) Browning still doesnt recognize the importance of taking the bridge FIRST and allows Gavin to do what Gavin wants (Browning to blame) 4) Gavin lolly gags and doesnt even send a single battalion right away to take the bridge (Gavin to blame) Ultimately, in the absence of Gavin failing to do what he was ordered to do, the main fault has to lie with his superiors. If Gavin had ignored the mission directive to take the bridge FIRST then you blame Gavin. Otherwise Gavin is guilty of making a bad decision on what to do first and in hindsight it was a BIG blunder. Of course, had the bridge been taken and the Germans taken the heights which in turn allowed them to shell the road or otherwise slow and disrupt the advance, Im sure Gavin would have been blamed for not taking and holding the heights. Ultimately, the Germans were still far from a defeated foe, we underestimated them again, tried to shortcut the war using an overly complex plan that suffered from LOTS of issues/challenges and now we are trying to blame Gavin for the failure? Doesnt seem fair especially when we have no evidence at all that he didnt follow orders.

Another American here. Well Done, Sir! Your video is spot on and factually correct. Thank you for this brilliant presentation. Keep up the good work.

I've been a long time supporter and the only thing I have ever disagreed with you on is the Market Garden video on who is to blame. There were many issues with Market Garden apart from what happened at Nijmegen bridge. But the main thing I always comeback to which all high ranking military officers will agree on is that the superior commander (in rank) is responsible for their juniors. So Browning is responsible for giving Gavin the proper orders just as Montgomery is responsible for then Browning and Eisenhower for Montgomery. The thing that pulls Montgomery and Eisenhower out of responsibility though for me is once the airborne troops are dropped they can't give orders to those troops very easily or at all in most cases (in 1944). Browning landed with Gavin so Browning could have at any point during the battle or prior to told Gavin "Hey, I really want you to get that bridge that is your top priority". Gavin at that point has to listen to Browning as his superior commander. The division commander is supposed to be given the general operational plans by their corp and army commander and then once the battle starts that is when a division commander can start to have their impact on the plan of a battle. I also let Montgomery and Eisenhower off on this further since they were not airborne commanders trained in airborne tactics. If their airborne corp commander is explaining to them what the 3 airborne divisions are going to do during the explaining of the plan for Market Garden they are most likely just to accept the plan unless they see some glaring issues (which maybe they should have). As I was saying I think there were many issues with Market Garden beyond what happened at Nijmegen. The intelligence that German Panzer divisions were in the area was ignored when it shouldn't have been. The airborne troops were tired of all their missions prior to Market Garden being cancelled for reasons like that. The British airborne division being landed so far from their objective was another major issue. If the British were able to get more troops to the Arnhem bridge they probably could have held it until 30 Corp got there. The time table for the advance 30 Corp was going to be able to make was far to generous. 30 Corp was going down a single lane road with German troops positioned all around it trying to slow them down (as they did). And then lastly I think far to often people just forget that the German were still able to win battles and fight harder at points then the Allied forces were. So pinning all of the blame on 1 or 2 man (Gavin and Browning) is still just wrong to me. There were many things that go wrong and just like in regular jobs military officers can and do make mistakes as well. I'm not sure about Browning but I know Gavin was highly decorated prior to and after Market Garden many times. So putting so much blame on Gavin and Browning here just doesn't seem fair to me. Those are just 2 guys doing the best they can for their countries in a time of war and maybe they made a mistake in this case that helped contribute to the failing at Market Garden. But I still don't think their actions alone caused the failing of the whole operation.

Bloody well said Tik. I see this sort of thing happening in my own area of work all the time. So many people don't know how to have a reasonable discussion about a point of contention, rather they see it as a fight they have to win at any cost, including lying. The goal appears to be to humiliate and ridicule the opponent whilst facts are secondary or jettisoned completely in pursuit of a gleeful, gloating "win". You make now and have made in the past an excellent point that the truths of history may indeed change with future discoveries about even well documented events. I think in your position you're something of a target for both history hobbyists and professionals who want to feed their ego's by trying (and in this case clearly failing) to prove you wrong. Which is utterly the wrong approach to investigating history. New information if it's credibly sourced is, as you say, to be welcomed and should not be used as a weapon against those who've gone on the record before it was known.

Who writes reports during battles? It is common to have an AAR (After Action Report) after a battle or operation to write what went well and what did not. But the point is it comes AFTER. It is not called a During Action Report.

First, thanks for these excellent videos. But the plan was flawed from the start. It had to many moving parts, at least four things needing to happen, before mission success, and each of those four things had other critical points of failure, which is just too complicated to run against a competent enemy. If a battle plan completely depends on all its parts working perfectly in combat, and it has a lot of parts, the probably of failure starts to get pretty high.

Hi TIK, the last couple minutes are wonderful and well spoken. Thank you for standing up to the age of cancel culture.

You should be a history professor at a prestigious University, such as my alma matter. Watching your videos, I have learned more history from you than any teacher before! Your ethics and research are impeccable.

Hello TIK. Enjoy your material tremendously. Usually agree. Not always. In this case you underestimate the value of the Grosbeak Heights. Seizing the Heights does seem more important than seizing the bridge. There was reasonable evidence that the Germans were in the woods, strength unknown. Holding the Heights allowed Gavin to dominate the area with fairly limited artillery. believe he was only using 75 mil howitzers or PAK 75s. There are three reasons to hold the Heights. 1. Guard against German counterattacks from the woods. 2. Deny any German forces control of the Heights. They had larger artillery available and had they placed it on the Heights the 82nd could not have kept the road clear or held any bridge within artillery range. 3 The artillery provided cover for the landing zones. Thompson had excellent artillery near the British LZs DZs but the terrain there did not allow him to dominate the area defensively. He could only react to German attacks as they approached. Tanks pose a much greater threat if they can close with the target. If Thompson had been able to gain better fields of fire the Airborne might have been able to protect their resupplies and reinforcements. But Thompson had nothing to work with... and Gavin did. Browning and Gavin's decision has only been called into question because the Germans in the woods couldn't get their act together the way the did at Arnhem and Osterbeek. Browning and Gavin prepared for a real and reasonable threat. Just because it did not materialize does not make them wrong. Th e101st did not need to anything like that because XXX Corps was very likely to reach them quickly pretty much no matter what else happened. XXX Corps stopped just after crossing The Nijmegen Bridge. They probably did have tea but that is not why they stopped. The road past the bridge rises up onto the top of local dykes. Vehicles on the dykes could be targeted from a great distance. XXX Corps needed infantry to clear the way to Arnhem and they did not have it. Their infantry had been dispersed along Hells Highway to fight off incessant counter attacks. If that was not done the road cold not be held open. Even if Browning and Gavin had prioritized the bridge there was no realistic way forward. No infantry, no advance. The dykes in that area are so tall they are collectively called "The Island". Nothing but target practice for German 88s. A plan with too many moving parts.

What about Montgomery and Browning's records? Where are the UK military records? All I hear is reference to US army records.

I suspect that Gavin told Browning that he intended to take the high ground and the Reichswald before taking the bridge and Browning accepted this. I suspect the Generals are like all busy managers - they accept the suggestions of lower level managers and staff. The big question is why would Browning want to delay the ground forces of Operation Garden from reaching Arnhem?

I love how tik always refuses to follow the over simplified view of history most people follow.

The thing I love about this channel is that you've pissed off every single political faction at some point or another. Good content

Hey TIK, good video and a good reminder of your History 101 lesson as well. I also couldn't help but notice some elements of Ludwig Von Mises book, "Human Action" stuff in your video. Arguing with Reason, Evidence and Logic, and not name calling stuff and trying to discredit them like the Enemies of Reason do. Also been listening to Henry Hazlits Economics in One Lesson as well. Thanks for posting the link that you gave to another. Very Interesting stuff.

I think proper sources and information is integral to having a conversation on these topics. Revisionist historians are really focused on making a narrative. TIK I definitely think that what you do with your videos is far from the revisionist historians out there. It is a shame that we can barely even have a discussion these days because of the name calling and the unwillingness of people to even have the discussion. Appreciate the content TIK. Definitely one of my favorite channels to watch. Hope all is well with you.

I served in the 82nd. Officers there have continued in the proud tradition of fluffing their resume and avoiding all blame. Some of the worst men I've ever been forced to spend time with.

Excellent video on how a critical historical thinking and evaluation of the sources should look like! Keep up the great work, thanks for the videos, TIK!