Hey all! Time stamps 00:00 Intro 01:07 Browning's Life 12:44 Frustration 17:57 Market Garden 28:52 Criticisms of Browning 29:28 Criticism 1 31:06 Criticism 2 32:30 Criticism 3 33:33 Criticism 4 35:36 Criticism 5 38:24 Browning's Defence is Flawed 43:45 Decision Bibliography (Sources) Brereton, L. The Brereton Diaries: The War in the Air in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941-8 May 1945. Kindle, 2014. John Frost, A Drop Too Many. 2009. Max Hastings, Armageddon. London, 2004. Robert J. Kershaw, It Never Snows in September. Surry, 2007. Mead, R. General Boy: The Life of Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Browning. Kindle, 2010. Martin Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, 17-29 September. 2009. Robert Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944. UK, 2014. Poulussen, R.G. Lost at Nijmegen. 2011. Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far. USA, 1974 Major General R E Urquhart, Arnhem. 1958. Major General S Sosabowski, Freely I Served. Great Britain, 1982.

Who was to blame for the failure of Market Garden? I'd wager the Germans had something to do with it.

i wrote my dissertation on 'Market Garden' at university 10 years ago! i am so pleased that many of the key points that i raised were bought up in this video especially that about Gavin and the 82nd prioritising the heights over the main bridge! i feel vindicated in my conclusion! fantastic video and i will be watching more of them!

To blame the poles who weren’t there until the battle was basically lost is ridiculous. It’s like having a platoon armed only with rifles attempt to stop an armored division and then blame the failure on them being lousy shots

A quick note - Browning may not have actually said 'I think we might be going a bridge too far' at all, which is why I said "supposedly". It is disputed, and apparently the evidence for it came after the battle, which is why it probably wasn't said. However, it is a cool phrase.

Brilliant, absolutely brilliant. Your videos are the best, most carefully researched, and thoughtfully presented lectures on the subjects you choose I’ve ever seen. Better than any documentary on TV. I’ve read much of the source material and after watching you I come away informed. Everything else seems like mindless propaganda. Please keep up the work. I don’t know what you do for your day job, but not devoting your time to this work full time would be to deny us the work of the best military historian of our time.

I blame Brereton. He set the tone for all the mistakes. No 2nd lift on day 1, no coup de main assaults, glider troops to defend landing zones instead of going for objectives...all his decisions. I also get the impression that the Americans didn't really get the point of Market-Garden. The 101st under Taylor were sluggish to reach their objectives and Gavin's mistakes are well known. With the hostility from Brereton and Ridgway and Gavin with his first divisional command I can see how Browning...out of a sense of having to appease the Americans...didn't use his authority properly and instead used the Poles, who weren't as high up in the Allied pecking order, as a scapegoat.

It's scary how much people's personalities play in these conflicts.

Just bad leadership if your subordinates are afraid to question your decisions. The Snobbery and hardheadedness of both the British and American Generals makes me wonder how we won the Wester Front. The only time they worked together was to blame the poor Polish officer.

sasobowski was more then just blamed he lost everything because of browning...it was criminal.

I had two relatives in Market Garden, Major William Conran RE, a road construction expert seconded to XXX Corps staff for Comet and MG. The other was Major Brian Urquhart of Brownings Staff. I knew both growing up and keen as I was on a military career I badgered them both for advice and stories. Bill was British Army from birth, he like all regulars was a product of his class, times and the slaughter of WWI, the highest form of criticism he could make of a fellow officer was 'maybe there was another option'. Brian was a hostilities-only idealist, who later became an advocate for the UN, he thought the UN should hold all nuclear weapons and control its own army. He could criticise senior officers, but, and I respect him enormously, post war he had a few political axes to grind and his story needs to be seen through those goggles. Something I've heard from both (they were unknown to each other until the 70s) is the success of market garden, the genuine opinion of German Panzer reserves and real reason the operation was launched. Both told me independently, so it was well understood by anyone who could read a map - "If it was only a quick right turn from Arnhem to the Ruhr, then it was only a quick left turn from the Ruhr to Arnhem!" The Ruhr had to be host to the best reserves on the Western Front, possibly the whole of Germany. The 2-3 day time limit on getting to Arnhem was forced on XXX Corps by the proximity of those reserves nothing else. This is where your 1,000 tanks could come from, but a tad higher north, across two rivers, and a few days late. This could be where Brig Hackett got his belief, shared with his officers pre-launch, that Arnhem was an interesting way to commit suicide. Gen Gale summed up its chances as worthy of resignation. Anyone trained to read a map and work out train time tables would have laid poor odds on survival at Arnhem beyond 36hours, without need for intel, photos or ULTRA. The Panzer fear at Arnhem was understood, genuine and obvious, but the hope was XXX Corps could get there first. And in fairness the majority of the German armour wasn't present on day one or even two. On Day 1, the 1st Airborne was held up more by snipers from Krafts force and MGs around Den Brink and the hospital. Only 3 Para met one SP gun en-route to Arnhem. Hardly a significant threat. If Son and Nijmegen had been taken on time, its not unreasonable given XXX Corps timetable they could've made it. Certainly the medium artillery would have got to the 1st Airborne's perimeter before the King Tigers came from the Czech border on Blitztransport. Regarding Brian's famous Panzer photos, I remember him telling me straight, the film was rubbish: He didn't brief Browning direct; he didn't argue with Browning, Majors don't do that with Lt Generals. He laid out ALL the intelligence he COULD to the Chief of Staff, a Brigadier, this Brigadier took it to Browning, this Brigadier told Brian to stop with the Panzer scare stories. Brian also wasn't sent on leave prior to take-off, he was never going to fly in. The reason had nothing to do with politics, stress or his earlier injury. We wouldn't know this until well into the 80s but he was the Airborne Corps ULTRA officer and wouldn't be risked in the mission. He was always going to be following up in the sea tail. Not long after Market Garden Brian was promoted to Lt Col and given a plum intel job rounding up German scientists. Hardly a censure from the top brass. He claimed he had photos of tanks, but these pictures have remained elusive to researchers. I admit we never discussed this (his brother was MI6, his cousins (my grandfather and his brother) were both SOE and war office we didn't talk about details in our family) but I think he lied to Cornelius Ryan. He said he had photos. We now know he had ULTRA, in the late 50s he could not tell Ryan that. I think the photos were a cover story. It also means Brian couldn't tell the Brigadier, Johnny Frost or anyone else what he knew and how he came by it. This has always been one of the problems of really good intel; how to share it. Divisions and Convoys had been sacrificed to secure ULTRA before Arnhem. Now for the true purpose of Market Garden, and why Montgomery was given all those resources. The single biggest issue for the Western Allies in September 1944 was opening the port of Antwerp. For this the whole of the Southern Netherlands had to be taken. I can remember Bill hanging his fingers over a map, along the Rhine, Maas and Scheldt so they formed a grabbing motion over the Antwerp approaches. You had to clear each river as far as the Southern ramp of Arnhem to secure Antwerp. This was Eisenhowers plan. The Northern ramp of Arnhem was unnecessary for this objective. Montgomery wanted Arnhem because that was his springboard into Germany. His longed for narrow thrust. Eisenhower wanted Antwerp to supply his wide front. This was the root of the blazing row between the two just before this battle. Yet everything up to the island between Nijmegen and Arnhem HAD to be taken if the Allies were to advance anywhere, anyhow in 1944/45. So Market Garden did achieve vital aims for the loss of two light infantry brigades. This is not a disaster. Both Bill and Brian said that part of the operation HAD to take place and HAD to be successful. The losses were less than some of the positional battles around Caen, less than British attempts to hold Greece, take Sicily, breakout of Anzio or destroy Monte Casino. These were harsh times, casualties were to be expected, the transport planes rated higher among the brass than the idle airborne in the UK. But did they have to go so far, was it vanity to send the British over the Rhine? Bill grudgingly agreed there might have been a better option than the springboard into Germany through Arnhem idea. Thats British Army for Monty was wrong. Brian's post-war opinions on the mission are well recorded. Brownings alleged 'Bridge too far' quote might have its roots in this conflict of objectives and may account for his tussles with Brereton. It may also explain what he was doing flying in on day 1. If his part of the Airborne Army was going to be sacrificed in a temper tantrum between his bosses he would have wanted to go down with it. Given a plan from Britains pre-eminent Field Marshall, a differing mission from Europe's Supreme Commander and unworkable boundaries by his immediate superior. I'm not convinced Browning didn't fly in with the sure fire intent of getting killed in action. It was a shit detail and he was a solider, what was he supposed to do? And still had the 101st and 82nd done ALL their jobs on day 1, the crazy British plan may just have worked. But I would bet all the money in my pockets Eisenhower would have cut Monty's supplies as soon as XXX Corps made it to Arnhem: on day 2 or day 9.

I find both Gavin and Browning responsible for the Nijmegen cock-up. (which to my mind ultimately cost the succsess of Market Garden) However I do not think for a second they believed there were 1000 enemy vehicles near Nijmegen. They would have assumed the report grossly exaggerated. But even if it was a thenth of the reported vehicles, that would be 100 enemy AFV's, - A threat indeed. However as stated in the video, both of them (instigated by Gavin) neglected to carry out the crucial task of taking the bridge immediately.

I don't buy the 1000 panzer argument. If they had really thought that there were 10 panzer divisions worth of armor in a small forrest, any sane commander would have leveled the forest with heavy bombing, as this would have represented a significant chunk of all tanks on the western front. And why they didn't scout it, I have no idea.

Wow. I didn't expect you to produce a 50-minute video so quickly. I thought your excellent Monday videos would be primarily 5-10 minute nuggets of history and enlightenment. Your ability to produce marvelous results so rapidly is Rommel-like. ;)

A skilled, talented and passionate young modern historian / historiographer - who gets down in the dirt and does his research! Thank you!

My Father was in 12th Devons 6th Airborne. He was a pegasus bridge and Arnham. He was one of A company who went in by glider to the bridge .He was injured at pegasus bridge in Ranville while recovering injuries, he qualified as a sniper a number one shot. He was then sent to Arnham. He told me that he was one of the men who laid the tape to the river when they withdrew. His name was Alfred Patrick Secker A company 12th Devons

Have read many accounts of Market Garden and this by far the best explanation for its failure. Your conclusion about Gavin and Browning makes complete sense and how experienced commanders could really believe there were 1,000 Panzers parked in a forest at this stage of the war is inexplicable. It also baffles me how airborne troops could be expected to defend any area from any large force of German armour. That is not what airborne does, no matter how good the quality of the men and the American and UK airborne were some of the best troops of the whole conflict. Thank you very much for your analysis and taking the time to produce this history lesson.

I have been watching your video's for the last two weeks now. They are so clear and well brought that I would like to compliment you... They have become a must see for me! Keep up the good work. Greetings from the Netherlands.

There is one criticism that this video does not discuss. There seems to be evidence Browning countermanded the last promising attack to take the bridge before it was too well reinforced. On the morning of the 18th (D+1) Gavin ordered all of the 508th, save one company to move on Nijmegen bridge. At 10:00 a regiment strength German counterattack struck that company, and Gavin ordered the entire 508th to rush back and charge the drop zone to prevent the afternoon reinforcement drops from being massacred. (At this point, Warren's battalion was recalled from its fighting in Nijmegen.) After the drop was complete (around 14:00) Gavin then moved to repeat his move from that morning. The 82nd's operations log then records the following. "At 1530, 18 September, General Gavin had a conference with General Browning at which General Browning asked for the plans for the ensuing 24 hours. General Gavin stated his plan for the night of 18-19 September was to seize the bridge North of Nijmegen using one battalion of the 504 and in conjunction with the 508 envelope the bridgehead from east and west. General browning approved the plan in general, but on giving more thought, in view of the situation with XXX Corps, he felt retention of the high ground South of Nijmegen was of greater importance, and directed that the primary mission should be to hold the high ground and retain its position west of the Maas-Waal Canal. Therefore, General Gavin assembled the regimental commanders and issued an order for the defense of position." The operations log is a contemporaneous account recorded by division staff. And it clearly suggests that Browning explicitly countermanded an attack on the bridge by four battalions the night of D+1. This was probably the last chance for lightly-armed paratroopers to take the town alone, before it was too well reinforced. Doesn't some blame accrue to Browning based on this?

Even as a casual observer of WW2 history, "1000 panzers" in random forest in Netherlands seemed absurd to me.

Not landing the Poles on the south side of the Bridge on day 1 or 2, and not having 2 lifts on the 1st day doomed Market Garden from the start

"Success has many fathers, but failure is an orphan".

General Browning remained convinced that Market Garden was a sound plan which had been thwarted by bad luck. The incessant reference to the operation as a "failure" was a continual annoyance to him as the parts played by the two American airborne divisions had been a great success, and it angered him that they were never, in his lifetime, given due credit. In private correspondence he wrote "People don't seem to have been told that it [Arnhem] was only rather less than a third of the Airborne effort and the whole thing was 80% successful. The two US Airborne Divisions which I have the honour to command have done marvellously and if it hadn't been for the atrocious weather and sheer bad luck the whole thing would have been 100% successful which in war would have been phenomenal." He also said "I only wish that the exploits of the two American divisions and everyone else during those hectic days when we were holding the corridor open, fighting the battle against the Germans in the Reichswald and struggling to force a corridor to the 1st Division, might be more fully appreciated." Browning received no British recognition for the part that he played in the Battle, but he was, ironically considering his relations with both countries, honoured by the United States who awarded him the Legion of Merit, and by the Poles who gave him the Order of Polonia Restituta. Pegasus Archive Browning page

Since I come from the Arnhem area, I have studied operation Market Garden foor a great number of years.. This video was enormously helpfull. Well done.

Back in the 1970s, I had a workmate who was a veteran of the British Parachute regiment who dropped on D-Day, Arnhem and across the Rhine. I didn't realise at the time but we had been paired-off so that I could act as his minder because of his PTSD. Something unknown to me back then. I had to drag him off a roof parapet once as he was about to jump off it - a drop of about fifty feet onto a concrete floor. He was bathed in sweat and trembling all over which scared me witless and left me confused. The root of his angst was that he had fought with distinction in three major battles, witnessed so many of his comrades killed and wounded while he escaped without so much as a scratch and lived to tell the tale. Survivor guilt? He never mentioned the war at all in the six months or so before he retired early on health grounds except once when he spotted me reading Cornelius Ryan's famous paperback account of Arnhem - then he let rip! He told me that his regiment feared that the war they had been training for incessantly for several months past would be over before they had a chance of a crack at "Gerry". The delay was beginning to affect unit morale and it was his firm belief that the Arnhem drop - a bridge too far - was specifically intended to let loose British Airborne against the Germans before unit discipline broke down completely. I am not expert in such fine military details though I do have an interest in military history, which is the reason why I am here, therefore, I cannot enter into any arguments defending my old long-departed workmate's personal belief and conviction that Arnhem was designed to fail to satisfy the vanities of the Allied top brass.

Saw this come in my notifications last night and was chuffed to have something to listen to on my way into work. Market Garden has taken its place in pop culture history and very often is used by many as an anglophobic stick with which to prop up American superiorism. Your documentaries have helped shine some light into the misconstrued reality surrounding the operation and fairly deals out criticism and blame. I have to ask, you often quote books, do you use sources from the Archives or elsewhere as well or just use off the shelf books such as biographies, memoirs etc?

I read the book on Browning-not bad. A word in defense of Gavin is needed. Data on the 1000 tanks came from US Intelligence. Gavin could not ignore that. Even if the 1000 tanks turned out to be 100 and even if they were just a mix of Panzer II, III IV tanks, that is a problem for an airborne unit. Allied intelligence was correct about SS Panzers in the Arnhem area. The report of tanks near Njimegen could also have been correct. Allied commanders had no way of knowing for sure until their troops were on the ground.

Dad who was in the 1st airborn said that they felt let down by Montgomery and listening to your video leans me that way did find it very interesting at the moment writing a short story about Tommy my father for his great grandson who he is named after, we are finding out some interesting information thanks again

The treatment of Sosabowski is unforgivable. Browning and Monty thinking he was in the wrong for criticizing them? Sosabowski as you pointed out save 1st airborne from being annihilated. The 2,000 men they saved in Arnhem would've been captured or killed. Now my own view is while Browning is not the sole person to blame, he does share some of the blame for the failure.

I said this after watching your detailed video on Market Garden. I know some commanders emphasized the importance, and insisted on, aggressive patrolling to gather information and capture prisoners for interrogation. This expedient and crucial step apparently was not taken. Given Gavin's his fear that there were 1,000 tanks in the forest it is gross negligence to not send patrols to assess the treat, if any.

I am English. I find it disgusting that free Polish Forces were ever thought as failures in official reports. Half their country was the first to be occupied in WW2. See Battle of Britain fighter squadron results, Cassino, etc. They fought the Nazis with a passion to help us, we betrayed them in 1945.

This was a very comprehensive and enjoyable video - clearly a lot of hard work to produce - so thank you for creating and putting it here. In the search for a blame victim(s) I was reminded of the last scene in the film "The Charge of the Light Brigade" where the General staff do their appraisal - a battle that took place 90 years before Arnhem.

browning knew the armor was there he did not report this fact he is to blame.

Browning was a protected man, he served at Buckingham Palace as Queen Elizabeth’s Royal Treasurer after the war

Who needs documentaries when you exist?

It doesn't matter it was a glorious defeat ...it doesn't matter that the armoured German SS battalion fighting the paras ( light troops ) treated them as equals and sharing doctors and medical orderlies etc etc...it doesn't matter that 6 of the 7 bridges which were the targets for market garden were taken and held ....what matters is that it tied up and focussed German attention which in itself shortened the war ....hail the paras , the American airborne and the guards armoured units amongst others !!!

General Browning comes across like the US General McClellan. Very good at organizing and training soldiers but poor leadership in the field.

General Gavin's fixaton on the Grosebeek Heights may have been more of an attempt to keep themout of German hands so they would not be overlooking his positions. Given the German army's fearsome reputation, a bit of a defensive mindset would probably be expected.

Do not forget Brownibgs boss was an American.... entry about him from wiki Brereton, however, made key changes to the Linnet plan, first in restricting glider missions to "single-tows", that is, one tug aircraft towing one glider, whereas Linnet had contemplated a double-tow mission. A combination of poor weather, extensive resupply missions to the pursuing Allied armies, and anticipation of last-minute airborne drops cancelled virtually all training for IX TCC in August, as a consequence of which Brereton believed that untried and unpracticed double-tows were too hazardous. Brereton also decided that the operation, protected by massive air support from the RAF and the AAF, would take place in daylight, to avoid the dispersion experienced during both the British and American airborne landings in Normandy in June. His decision was finalized when weather and other delays pushed back D-Day for the operation to September 17, which was the dark moon. Finally, the shorter hours of daylight in September caused Brereton to refuse authorization for two lifts per day, and as a result of the limited number of troop carrier aircraft, the air movement of the Army required three consecutive days to complete.[63]

Very competent biography. Well done, old chap!

I blame the 2 SS bands for Operation Market Garden Failure and who put the military plan ( Montgomery )

My grandfather was in Hohenstaufen division 9SS and he always said to me that with all the tanks they had along with fundsberg 10SS which amounted 14, 1 or 2 were running at the time of the landings. They only had serviceable halftracks and stug111

again it is right out stupid not to consider intel on the tanks. especially when it came from more than one source

My Farther told me that on occasion he was ordered to drive Browning around. I was to young and never asked or was interested. Wish i could talk to him now. Dad was in 1st Airborne artillery and never really spoke about the war. Not to me anyway.

The thing that struck me after reading Meads book was the almost sycophantic nature of its treatment of its subject. I've read a lot of the peripheral stuff about this and you can see that there are patterns that emerge. Firstly, many (including this author) are professional biographers with sometimes a limited military background. Secondly, there is no way that a really critical biography of someone like Browning could be written. That is because his old unit and family would have simply not cooperated, leaving the author very short of the necessities for a successful book. So, really, to look for a revealing straight synopsis will result in disappointment...... as indeed it does. Actually there are areas outside MG that are dealt with somewhat similarly by Mr Mead. But, hey that's life. History is full of such acts. Some of the higher ups were responsible for writing their own versions - at least Browning didn't do that.

I just saw History Buffs "A bridge too far". here we go again.

Excellent quality of video, I agree Richard Mead’s book does fall into the trap of confirmation bias,, although it is General Montgomery and Horrocks are most associated with the operation General Browning should be held accountable. Montgomery post-mortem the airborne plan. “The airborne forces at Arnhem were dropped too far away from the vital objective-the bridge. It was some hours before they reached it. I take blame for this mistake. I should have ordered Second Army and I Airborne Corps to arrange that at least one complete Parachute Brigade was dropped quite close to the bridge, so that it could have been captured in a few minutes and its defence soundly organised with time to do so. I did not do so” . This effectively vindicated General Sosabowski original argument. Whilst there is merit in your argument at the Tactical execution level, Market Garden was in many ways doomed because of the Strategic Eisenhower’s decision of a broad front attritional campaign than Montgomery’s plan of a immediate focused concentrated thrust towards the Ruhr. Revisionist Historians, tend to agree with Montgomery failure to accept this plan permitted the German Army to regroup.Consequently Germany could have been entered before winter set in and the Ruhr area encircled cutting the Reich off from essential industry. The Ardennes offensive would not have taken place to prolong the war. The war in Europe may have ended before 1945, the ‘Hunger Winter’ in Holland would not have taken place, and millions of Nazi victims would have survived. I agree with Montgomery that Eisenhower’s strategic failure in August 1944 was a very costly mistake, Market Garden and the Battle of the Bulge were the tactical consequences of that mistake.

I was born in Arnhem in 48. So I took an interest in the fighting there and why Frost could not hold the bridge for 48 hours more. Despite all de failures and delays at Nijmegen, the Arnhem bridge could have been held if the operation of the 1st Airborne had been better planned and executed. Read the book "Arnhem"written by the general Urquhart. First: the landing zones where 20 miles from Arnhem bridge. Nice space to land without losses, but undefendable. Second the radios did not work.Contact with England could not been made nor between the units an HQ of Urquhart. Third : with exeption of Frost, who went along the Rhine tot de Bridge, the rest had tot fight through a city. ( compare with the problem at Nijmegen for XXX corps). Urquhart could not get in contact with his units fighting in the outskirts of Arnhem. He went tot look for himself and was then surrounded by Germans and could not get back tot his HQ for two days. His second in command did'nt know what tot do. The main error was not tot land south of the bridge. They did not because of fear for heavy losses at the landing. So with exepcion of Frost, the entire division only got as far as Oosterbeek and never got tot Arnhem, and when driven back could not contact England for change in dropping zones. Nearly all supplies fell in German hands.. Conclusion. Yes there are errors made in Nijmegen which caused delay, but the real disaster was the bad preparation and execution of 1st Airborne division : Not the soldiers, but the general are to blame. Then they tried tot blame the Polish brigade. Well thanks tot te courage and skils of these man a lot of the 1st Airborne could escape over the Rhine. Personally knew a Polish soldier of the Polish Brigade who had fought in Arnhem and was after the war married with a Dutch women. He never talked about is, but when he died his son found his personal things from the war and the medal he got years after when finally the Polish where rehabilitated.

Everyone seems to forget about the small toll bridge. 30 corps had to request a special drop of enough nickels and dimes to cross. That money drop was delayed due to the banks closing early for their annual cricket match.

I didn't even know I wanted this video. But now I'm hyped about watching it.

As to your final conclusion, I completely agree with you. Thank you very much for making huge complex questions plainly simple.

Thanks Tik :) trying to catch up with all the market garden videos

It sounds to me like inter ally rivalry was very important. Browning was concerned about losing his job to Ridgeway and he positioned his HQ with an American unit so that his information was based upon American actions and what they were doing.

Commander is responsible for everything the unit does or fails to do and this responsibility cannot be delegated. At the 2 - 3 start level, or even at the 03 level, you have to check stuff before you plunge ahead unless you want to take a high risk. Eisenhower made a similar statement for D-Day failure, if it failed. I agree with what you are saying in that he left it to others but it was his responsibility to check their work. The whole thing had a lot of politics, which is normal in warfare (check Ceasar's Gallic Wars, or Thermopylae or Isandlwana or Little Big Horn) , but when told so, he should have checked it out given the nature of the information. The same thing applies to Biddle Smith and Eisenhower who was informed but Eisenhower said that he did not want to override Montgomery's decision. Even so, Montgomery was the driver and the commander. I also agree that Gavin has responsibility for failure to act or at least raise the issue with his superior command who was Boy Browning. They were the commanders in the field and were therefore responsible. In addition, the math of the 1k panzers should have been challenged. Checked OOB's is what intels do all the time. In this case, they were checking on the whereabouts of Panzer div anyway. These were not 2Lts just out of Sandhurst, these were experienced commanders at the star level, but Browning was THE commander on the ground. (I like this discussion)

I watched a Bridge to Far then started reading more and ended up here. An excellent analysis with more detail facts than I can absorb in one watching. One caution, as facts are obvious, in the pressure and fog of war, second guessing too much to assign blame, is fraught with risk. I would prefer to say mistakes were made from the first inception of the operation. Contention between Ike and Monty was no secret the fact that they essentially argued for 5 days over its' merit set the failure in motion. your attention to detail is however admirable. and the facts you present are an excellent resource.

Obviously, Gavin choosing to ignore the Bridge was critical but Browning being right with him left him no excuse for not commanding Gavin to take the bridge. I can not for the life of me figure out how the Poles can be blamed for the failure considering that by the time they arrived there was little chance of changing the course in the battle. As the battle was conducted not taking that Bridge becomes the last straw in many mistakes but the one they could not recover from.

I thought it was Monty's plan. Why didn't he plan every detail of the operation? they had one road to use and time was extremely critical yet he didn't know everything about his plan! I think the blame rests solely on Monty; He should have known about this and insisted on taking the bridge first.

I know it's been a while now, but what was the reasoning given for 6th Airborne Division never being committed, or 17th Airborne Division as well? To me, Arnhem ought to have had two divisions there just based on the sheer level of importance overall.

Your criticism of Mead is intetesting. Reminds me of Michael Senior's "Haking: A Dutiful Soldier" in which he defends one of the most incompetent men ever to wear a Lt General's badges, and does so poorly. I think some historians just think it is fun to defend clowns for the sake of being able to write provocative phrases on the book's cover: "a radical re-assessment", "correcting the record", "unfairly criticised".

TIK, this is the best channel I’ve found on KZfaq. It’s always a pleasure.

I agree with Beevor, It was a bad plan from the beginning and Montgomery should bear the blame

EXCELLENT ,CONCISE AND VERY WELL PRESENTED.

I think this is one of your best vids so far. It covers an aspect of a campaign that I had not even encountered before. Excellent.

From Dunkirk, at the beginning of World War II, to Normandy, almost at the end, the Allied Armies did not put a single soldier in Germany. Not a single one. The participation of the Allied Forces in Europe was limited to Aerial Bombing. These actions received a lot of publicity to make us believe that the Aerial Bombings were winning the war. But, there is a very long list of Bombing cities by “Mistake”. The bombing of Nijmegen in the Netherlands (February 1944), it occurred when US bombers returning from a failed mission, as occurred in most cases, were looking for "Optional" targets. Nearly 1,000 Dutch civilians were killed by the bombing. It is proven fact that Aerial Bombardment does NOT win wars, unless it is Atomic. Aerial Bomb't can destroy cities but does NOT destroy armies. If there is any doubt, then Nazi Germany would have defeated England, after nearly a year of bombing, or the US would have won in Korea, Vietnam or Afghanistan. In fact, it wasn't until 1949-50 that Precision Instruments were available for aerial bombardment. Until then, if a bomber hit within 300 or 400 meters of the target, it was considered a "Bullseyes". In night bombing raids, 500 meters off target was then considered a "Perfect Shot". Propaganda has always led us to believe that we, "The Yankees", beat Hitler. But, I have news for you: The US did not win the war against Germany. The Russians won it. The Allied Army of the US, UK, Canada, Belgium and France (and Poland, and other countries), was able to reach Normandy, thanks to the Soviets destroying the Nazis in Stalingrad, Leningrad, in Kurks and in Kiev, in 1943. It took them 289 days but the Russians won and without the help of nobody… OF NOBODY! Normandy was until June 1944, and Mr. “Hollywood” Patton did NOT manage to set foot on Germany until February 1945, when the Red Army was going over Berlin. In Fact, General Patton was able to cross the border into Germany only when the Russians were 150 kilometers from the Oder River (LOL). The Allies were defeated at Arnhem (Market Garden Sep. 25-1944), and at The Battle of the Bulge (Jan. 25-1945). Now, "Operation Varsity" took place near the end of the War (March 1945), and only 85,000 German soldiers fought against almost 700,000 Allied Forces who could NOT cross the Rhine River due to the heroic resistance of an "Army" of 18-year-olds and 50-year-old Reserve Infantry. So, here General Patton was paralyzed without fuel, while the Red Army was preparing for its last offensive into Berlin. Look here: The average age of the German Army that fought in Normandy was between 18 and 24 years old. And these soldiers faced each other in a ratio of 37 to 1, without Tanks, without Artillery, no Navy nor Air Force. To make matters worse, knowing that four Parachute Divisions were inland behind their backs. This was the reason the Allies won in Normandy. Never the less, It took the Allies 8 months to advance only 500 kilometers from Normandy to Arnhem, and from there, start the Withdrawal back to the border of France/Belgium (What?), facing a virtually defeated German Army cuz USSR. It's a Verifiable Fact that is written in all the History Books, that the German High Command surrendered to the Russian Generals six days BEFORE the first US soldier set foot in Berlin. Well… The US has been defeated in Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Lebanon, Somalia and now, in Afghanistan. However, the powerful US Army defeated the tiny island of Grenada (1983), as it faced a fearsome army of 287 Police Officers, since Grenada does NOT have an army. In fact, they were half this number, since the Policemen on the afternoon shift had not yet come to work. What seems incredible is the fact that the US was defeated by Vietnam. What? Did the US lose the war against Nam? OMG! Against a poor country, undeveloped, malnourished, without Navy, without Air Force, NO Marines, Green Berets, SEALs, Rangers, Delta Force, USMC, Rambos nor Chuck Norris. Defeated by a country of peasants without strategic plans, no B-59 Bombers, PT-Boats, no Northrop F-5 "Freedom Fighter", nor Atomic Submarines. Without Aircraft Carriers, NO Continental Missiles, nor Tanks, Choppters, AR-15, Gatlin Machines’, Flamethrowers, Napalm, Agent Orange. NADA! And to top it off, defeated by an army of teenagers who had no shoes: WITHOUT SHOES!!! Army that fought with bamboo sticks!!! Charlie Kicked Our Asses and even invaded our Embassy. Jeezzz!!! Here is the Duty, Courage and Chanting of Heroism of the US Army. This is the True Story of our Country. This is the History that is already written in the US Books. And the History that was written in Afghanistan is made with the same ink.

Monty. He conceived of the plan, and the political screws were applied to Ike to accept it. It was a Rube Goldberg contraption with too many moving parts.The failure of any would bring down the whole. The idea of advancing 60 mi along a ten-yard front, trailing 120 mi of flank, is just nuts. Staging five successful, simultaneous coups de main equally so. Monty was a bold, romantic dreamer; also a complete egotist who felt personally compelled to vault the Rhine and knock Jerry out of the war by Christmas. You need people like that, but you also need to rein them in. (Churchill's [not so] "soft underbelly of Europe" -- in two wars -- comes to mind; also Haig's "big push" to break through into open country where the cavalry can operate.) But once you've sold a monster plan, and mandated buy-in by all subordinates, those subordinates are confronted by all sorts of niggling realities -- and also a panicky desire not to be the one who screws everything else up. You have hard, inconvenient intelligence that is ignored, and rumors of enemy forces that are credited. You have planned resources that are really non-existent or cunningly withheld. You have sudden concerns about the fatigue of your men, and landing areas declared temporarily unsuitable. You have commanders who consume transport to be seen as commanding from (not quite) the front. You have CYA and you have grandstanders. And you always have the weather. If the plan was truly messed up by a momentary loss of focus and initiative by one (or two) commanders, why, Monty was uncharacteristically modest in claiming that it had been 90% successful! I'd give him 98%! At least! But any plan that fails even at 90% performance is a bad plan, too fragile for the real world -- let alone the real world of war.

Nice one, well presented, and entertaining. cannot believe Sasobowski ended up at working at Lucas in London as a factory worker. (wiki) But my money is on Browning. Looking forward to your next production. .

I always wondered why an Air Force raid on Neimegan AA defenses and its immediate area just before the drop would not have assisted a direct assault on the bridge? I also never understood why Urquehart not a paratrooper was put in immediate command? Even the presence of a hundred panzers in the Reichwald were a strong threat and I understood Gavin to be more a screening force and basically potential forlorn hope. You mentioned a general Ritchie as division commander. If was the same desert general could he have been trusted for the extremely aggressive action needed? Who else knew about the weatherizing problems with the radios? Thank you for your always inciteful presentations. You fill in and explain so much

Cheekily I should say it is the Urquhart the Intelligence Officer's fault for not pulling his service revolver on Browning and Montogomery, to reinforce the point about the panzers. It would have probably got him sacked and court-martialled however back then things like that weren't done!

Love how you revise history. Are you by chance related to Monty? Is that why you try to place the failure on Market Garden at everyone else feet? Here are a few facts for you. 1: Always have 3 to one odds in your favor in the attack. They received intel that they would not have those odds at Arnhem and in fact that the British and Polish airborne troops, not at all armed to fight tanks were sent in anyway. You can blame the failure on Ike. He not only should have refused to allow Market Garden to proceed IMO he should have sacked Monty in France. IMO Monty insisted on this attack for 2 reasons. 1st was people were questioning his actions. Complaining that he was too timid. Was he trying to erase that criticism? 2nd was like Patton he just loved seeing his name in the news! For the most part Monty was a brilliant planner. Once the battle was joined he lacked the ability to be flexible to changing situations. That is what set Rommel apart from the crowd. Once the battle was joined he could react to changing situations in the blink of an eye. Patton was good at that too. Ike should have had Monty in charge of his G2 (planning staff). Heck with Monty in charge of G2 and Patton in command of the ground forces they could have conquered the world!Now one should keep in mind that Monty being as timid as he was wasn't really his fault. Churchill was having commanders relieved for losing battles they couldn't have won not matter what. Once relieved they were done. Monty was driven to succeed. Failure was not an option. So he spent more time making sure he wasn't going to be beaten than he did on winning.Most folks miss the fighting done by the Russians. But Monty nor Stalin won WWII. Neither did Patton or Ike. WWII was won on the US factory floors. While Germany at their best was producing 12,000 tanks or aircraft a year the US was producing 12,000 a MONTH! The battle of the Atlantic wasn't won when the convoys could avoid the wolf packs. It was won when American ship yards started producing ships faster than the Germans could sink them! It was won when America could build combat ships fast enough that Jeep carriers could roam the Atlantic in hunter killer groups while others provided coverage for the convoys. The hunter killer groups were to late to make much of a dent in the German Uboat fleet. But production had reached a point that those ships could be used in such missions. Heck because US factories/ship yards were not under attack the US was able to support landings in Normandy, the allies launch a summer offensive in Italy, land in the Marianas and invade southern France all in the space of 3 months. Lets not forget that both the US and British forces were still engaged in the China Burma area all during that time too. I don't care how many men you have. If you can't provide them with the tools of war they can't fight. Neither Russia nor England had the ability to produce enough to win. While the US only used about 45% of it's industrial ability to supply the war effort.Kinda like today. US citizens claiming that corporate greed moved jobs offshore. What really happened was after WWII was over only one industrial nation could provide the goods the world needed and wanted. The US. Sometime in the mid 70's most of the waring nations had recovered to the point where they could start exporting again. All of a sudden US manufacturers had competition. Competition that did not have US minimum wage laws. Got cheaper to import goods than producing them ourselves. Simple greed did the rest. I want, I want it now, and I want it at low enough prices that I can afford something else!Rick

Very well done, but I still have to disagree with your conclusion. How does dropping 8 miles from Arnhem bridge not trump a few hours delay in Gavin sending troops to Nijmegen bridge as the critical error in this operation? Gavin was under Browning's direct supervision and had his approval. The 8 miles also allowed for the other critical issues to affect the probable success, such as the radios and 1st Airborne resupply. It's pretty much insane to drop paras that far from their objective. Even if there were only 50 tanks in the Reichwald, anybody commanding a partial, already spread out airborne division, would have to consider that a priority. Moreover, how was Gavin or Browning to know 10th SS was going to be sending significant forces down to that bridge straightaway? In a nutshell I would say the overriding problem with this operation was that, "there were too many chiefs and not enough Indians". Ike and Monty should have had a much more hands on role in this affair considering it was dealing with complex combined operations between two nations and several branches of the military. In the end when you expect XXX Corps, 101st Airborne and 82nd Airborne to have to stick their neck out in a big way to save 1st Airborne, it's probably not going to happen to the extent you hope. (Such as air commanders worrying about how tired their guys would be.) Commanders usually set not getting their unit wiped out or severely mauled as first priority. That would be my first priority. It takes an overall commander to set these bickering self-interests straight in an operation like this. If the plan was better, it would have worked. It almost did anyway, but I can't single out Gavin or Browning for this. In the end one could say Gavin put "his guys" first, and Browning didn't. They cut too many corners in the planning to assure victory.

Thanks for an interesting and very informative video! It seems to me truly bizarre that Browning (and others) should dismiss well-founded intelligence regarding the Panzer divisions at Arnhem, yet obsess over a 'ghost' Army Group in the Reichswald. If such a formation had existed, with 1,000 serviceable tanks, the threat should have been enough to cancel the entire operation. After all, this would (I think) have been a stronger force than everything the Wehrmacht had thrown into the Normandy campaign. Prioritizing the capture of the Groesbeek Heights - by lightly armed paratroopers - would have had no effect whatsoever and the axis of advance would have been irrevocably cut. To me, this demonstrates severely muddled thinking. You cannot argue on the one hand that the advance is opposed only by scratch forces to justify its ambition, while on the other hand giving credence to a hug force threatening the right flank.

The real fault of Market Garden was not clearing the river to Antwerp. Regardless of the success or otherwise of Market Garden, the Allied armies still needed the supplies that only Antwerp could provide to go anywhere.

A quick Googles will tell you just how formidable an obstacle the Groesbeek Heights would have been. It is a whopping 34 meters above sea level. As for Browning and the tanks, it's funny how a man who sees photographs of several tanks and other armored vehicles can dismiss them out of hand as "wrecks, unfit for duty" but buy wholeheartedly the "1,000 tanks" lurking in the woods past Groesbeek.

Shouldn't we blame the Wehrmacht and weapon SS for the failure of Market Garden? Why is there so much obsession with blame for it? It was war, it's risk-taking based on imperfect information. The whole Western Front always struck me as a 'mopping up'-operation. In this case there was a high risk, high reward opportunity which didn't pay off but didn't change the balance of the war at all. Basically an 'oh well, that didn't work but it was worth trying'-moment than real failure. Or am I very far off the mark here?

Really enjoy your videos. Great to be able to discuss these actions as there are so few of us who care to spend the time discussing. My issue is with the Reichswald..... if there were rumors of "1,000" armored vehicles hiding there... and this intelligence came from SHAEF... how could they allow Montgomery to move forward with the operation? I know SHAEF gave Montgomery the go ahead and the supplies... and then essentially washed their hands of the deal. Of course getting to those V2 sites was paramount, which is why I don't argue using the airborne corps to support Patton in getting over the Rhine. Patton's armor would have had much more in terms of attacking axis in getting to the airborne divisions. XXX Corps was in a tough and near impossible job from the start in asking the advance to go down a single road. The intelligence failures at the top as usual played the crucial part in the failures of an action... before the battle was even fought.

Signals, the Dutch Telcom workers made available all of the telephone networks available to the allies. But the allies were just not interested. Instead of blowing up railway lines the railway workers went on strike. But apart from a boy looking out of the window, nothing else was mentioned of the Dutch underground. All that Sean Connery had to do in a Bridge too far was to make use of the telephone boot in the street. But I suppose it was not in the script.

If they truly thought there might be a heavy number of tanks in the Nijmegan area. The operation should have been scrubbed. If those tanks were real they would have destroyed the airborne and kicked 30 corps right back to their starting point. So the logic is truly flawed.

Who the blame for thousands of lives be lost at arnhem ? Bad boy Browning by ignoring the pilot mission about the Panzer and tiger tanks

Agreed on the blame. Well put.

23.30 the Battle of the Bulge or Ardennes Offensive was launched exactly three months after MG. German armor: 557 tanks, 667 tank destroyers and assault guns 1,261 other AFVs

Well said. But Browning was Gavin's superior and if there was confusion about tactical priorities, it was his job to resolve them. He can not pass the buck.

Great work, TIK.

(1) Market Garden can only be labeled as a "foreseeable accident in waiting", and like the vast majority of accidents, several concurring "factors" caused it to happen, making it very difficult or even impossible to pinpoint one single "culprit". It seems to me that removing one or two of those flaws would have been enough to prevent the disaster. (2) In order to present a valid opinion about the dropping of Browning's HQ on Niejmegen, I would have to be duly acquainted with its roles and functions, so I could confront them vis-à-vis the onus of spending air transport and weapons required to drop them there. (3) All said, my personal impressions are that, once Panzer divisions were considered as de facto planning risks, which soon proved real, the two most damaging flaws that caused MG's disastrous outcome were (a) only one drop per day, most importantly in the first two days of the operation, and (b) the unjustifiable delay to take and cross the Niejmegen bridge, with all its consequences. But, again, the use of armor in single line in Holland was a well known liability beforehand, radios failed to work etc., so back to number 1 above... (4) Eisenhower, Montgomery and other key commanding figures down the line failed to realize the importance and/or support the assignment of close air support by the tactical air forces. Were it treated accordingly, fighter-bombers and/or light bombers would have been properly assigned to MG, and they would have saved the operation for sure, bad weather considered. So, it's not solely what was improperly done, but also what wasn't done, that doomed such brilliant endeavor and led to the loss of so many beautiful, brave soldiers. Well, in the end, all in all, I think this was the major factor: the absence of air fire support when all else failed.

Great class! Thanks!

Dame Daphne du Maurier, famous novelist and playwright, wife of Gen. F. Browning strongly objected to his negative portrayal in the movie about Operation Market Garden - 'A Bridge Too Far'. Simple fact is that no person/s can be blamed for such a large scale operation going wrong. Great people do great things by taking great risks & consequently they sometimes go wrong.

Especially a battle like this, it is impossible to "blame" any one person or thing...These conclusions are always open to the "OK, if everything had gone perfectly, would the outcome have been different", of course this is impossible to know....Good video

"The US Official History attributes this faulty Reichswald intelligence to the 82nd Airborne Division’s G-2, Lieutenant Colonel Walter F. Winton Jr." "The various Allied intelligence reports fail to mention them and soon after landing, says the US Official History, the 505th PIR, having sent a patrol into the Reichswald, reported that ‘no tanks could be seen’. This report confirmed other information, obtained from Dutch civilians, that _‘the report about the 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald was false.’_ " - Neillands

Great stuff as always! I'd agree with you on the primary blame being on Gavin. It shouldn't really have been Browning's responsibility to tell him to...well... capture his objective as quickly as possible. However as the senior commander he really was quite "worthless" in the hour of need, and the treatment of the Poles is, well, just childish.

I have Mead's biography of Boy and it is somewhat superficial, except his rather bizarre appreciation of Browning's guilt or otherwise re Market Garden. For me, there are still some very curious issues for which Boy needs to take significant blame. Firstly, there's the very strange mix of Browning et al dismissing the B Urquhart / Dutch Resistance evidence of German armour near Arnhem (the relevant photographs and even PR recce request and sortie documentation cannot be traced), whilst concurring with the extraordinary idea - minus evidence - of one thousand German tanks hiding in the Reichswald. No matter how well camouflaged armour is, hiding that many vehicles and their associated troops and equipment in even the densest of wooded areas seems beyond the realms of likelihood. Secondly, the importance attached to Groesbeek Heights seems inexcusable. Whilst being theoretically "higher" than the surrounding countryside, they cannot possibly have had that much of a strategic advantage against the supposed massed armoured strength allegedly lurking unseen in the nearby Reichwald, as they are simply not that high. In that part of the world, "height" is a relative term! Thirdly, the fact that Boy wouldn't expressly and firmly challenge the drop zones being so far from Arnhem is inexcusable, irrespective of airborne doctrine being that air power's leadership holds sway. And finally - perhaps an elephant in the room - is the possibility that Boy was simply swept up in an air of over-confidence that pervaded British high command. Whatever the answers are to these questions (and we'll never know now), RIP those brave soldiers and civilians lost, maimed and traumatised in this operation. I have the privilege to often visit RAF Tarrant Rushton from where many airborne operations were flown, including elements of Market Garden. Little remains of the airfield, but a memorial exists. On this anniversary of Market Garden I saluted those brave souls there.

Of the errors of this operation, thanks for the through analysis and presentation.

A Bridge Too Far is my favourite movie and Operation Market Graden is one of my (I hesitate to use the word "favourite" for an event where people die in large numbers) battles that I am most interested in. I think the biggest thing the movie missed was the Groesbeek heights. That would have given a whole different flavour. Also, what do you think about the criticism if XXX corps? They seem to get accused of stopping and drinking tea and being generally incompetent. This seems to be the US depiction of British forces. In my opinion they did a pretty good job of pushing up one highway where they were being constantly ambushed and their supply lines overstretched. But they were forced to turn from a fast exploitation force into a force fighting heavily defended enemies in Nijmegen, a role for which they were not suited and which they wouldn't have had to fulfill had the Nijmegen Bridge been taken earlier.

Was there actually any evidence for panzers in the Reichswald? And if there actually were panzers in the Reichswald shouldn't they have set up the defensive positions in Nijmegen itself, I would think airbourne troups have a much better position in urban environment instead of the quite open terrain around Groesbeek.

Well stated. I can only add that the Americans were fed up with Monty and did not hold Browning's plan as viable. Monty pushed Ike on Market Garden and got his way. Monty takes the blame here. Gavin was wrong, the poles were hung out to dry. The Brits in general had little respect for the way Americans fought, but envied their eqpt. Ego, Ike knew it to be a major problem. Monty ran for cover an got away with it.

Thanks for this fascinating video touching real history, even at the risk of talking about British people. They won’t hear any of this in our schools. Personally I blame Richard Attenborough and dirk Bogarde and their obvious bias in favour of any critic of their country, ensuring that a fair hearing is almost impossible.

On the upside, we all can agree that Ole' Sosabowski could take Browning in a fist-fight any day of the week.

Dirk Bogarde who played Frederick Browning in A Bridge Too Far said that Browning received a bad rap for his role in Operation Market-Garden. Bogarde in WW2 was actually part of the staff around Browning and knew the general.

I have to agree with Charlie B. - excellent research. This will assist me a great deal when I go in pilgrimage of O.M.G. this September (2019) for the 75th anniversary. Perhaps you'll be at the Commemoration Base Camp in Vehgel, if so I'll look for one of your lectures! Thanks again. -jack

Operation Order WO171/366: QUOTE "US 82nd Airborne Division - will seize and hold hold bridges at NIJMEGEN and GRAVE with the same object in view. The capture and retention of the high ground between NIJMEGEN and GROSSBEEK is imperative in order to accomplish the Division's task"

You are looking at this from 70years of study. Gavins' bridge was lightly held, but no one knew that at the time. The allies THINK they know there are 1000 tanks in the forest. IF the tanks existed Paratroops taking a bridge only to be ground beneath Panther tanktracks would have been stupid. The issue of "broken" tanks at Arnhem is symptomatic of the times. They trust intelligence that the Germans are in retreat and are broken, because that suits their belief it will win. The then ALSO trust mistaken intelligence about 1000 tanks pointed at the flank, because that threatens their success. Besides, no one knew what the hell Hitler had, least of all Hitler. The Germans propaganda machine was very effective. I have said it is just a matter of if it works, it was a fantastic plan. Since it didn't, it was a fantastic failure. But it was a success in a way, it provided useful intelligence, it siphoned off even more German forces and it was a propaganda event all it's own. The Allies were able and willing to commit that kind or force so soon after D-day. We had unlimited resources.

But wasn't Major General S Sosabowski the scapegoat of the operation?