I don't think the argument in this video is as strong as the one he gives in his book. Namely, if English satisfies a set of conditions (called Tarski conditions) then a contradiction similar to the heterological paradox must be concluded to be true. He argues pretty forcefully that not only are attempts to prove that language doesn't satisfy the Tarski conditions flawed, but that it is more difficult, *in general* than was originally thought to even conceive of an argument in favor of regarding English as not satisying these conditions, namely because, no matter what structural accomodations are made to the language to accomodate a paradox by presuming one of the conditions false (including any structural accomodations that have a notion of some sort of higher level "Truth predicate" and "Non-Truth (either False or Vacuous) Predicate", we can always extend the "Liar's Paradox" to the structural accomodation. This video seemed to be an attempt at giving an overarching summary in 5 minutes. At any rate, his books "In Contradiction" is, even if we "hold out" on the existence of dialetheisms, a really good summary of the flaws in attempts to avoid paradoxes in languages and formal systems. As a student of mathematics, things like ZFC and Category Theory, while interesting in their own right and sometimes even useful or beautiful, always seemed like they were patching the analogous issues (like Russell's paradox) that would appear in set theory, and he does a really good job of explicating some bothersome features of these theories (large parts of which were quite literally concocted to patch Russell's paradox).

I think the liar paradox is like self application in computer science which results in an infinite loop. So with infinite loop the function never return the answer. Same with the liar paradox, so essentially the same in liar paradox sentence which also an infinite loop because of self referencing. A premise cannot also be a solution.

It is not a conclusion of an argument, it is a hypothetical position which he tries to take. "i) All previous attempts to cure cancer have failed. ii) So let's stop attempting to cure cancer." - You mean ii) All future atempts will also fail. To not mix is and ought.

I hate that in a quantum context this wouldn’t even get the bat of an eye, not that it would make any more sense to me

You're absolutely right. The logic used that makes this appear to be a paradox is based on Aristotle's logical calculus, which there are only two possible values for any proposition: "True" and "False" There are many forms of propositional calculus that allow for more than just two possible outcomes. This type of calculus is called many-valued logic. While there are some forms that allow for infinite values, the most popular form is the three-valued logic calculus. With this form of propositional calculus, the value possibilities are: "true", "false" and "unknown". This logic is used to find truth values of propositions that bivalent logic isn't able to. Aristotle suggested that bivalent logic isn't applicable to future contingents. For example, the statement "There will be a sea battle tomorrow" cannot be said to be true or false using classical bivalent logic. Using three-valued logic, we can address the issue. Three-valued logic would say that the statement "There will be a sea battle tomorrow" can have three possible values. Since we ruled out true and false, the statement would be given a value of "unknown". ....so, there really is no paradox in the "liars paradox" unless one limits their logical calculus to create a paradox. This type of "paradox" has a different name: a 'falsidical’ paradox "A ‘falsidical’ paradox is one whose ‘proposition’ or conclusion is indeed obviously false or self-contradictory, but which contains a fallacy that is detectably responsible for delivering the absurd conclusion" Considering the definition above: the liars paradox is clearly self-contradictory (it says its false, making it true and false at the same time) ....but there is a fallacy that creates this contradiction. In this case, it's the idea the truth-value of a declaration can be determined by assigning truth-values to the declaration's components and determining if the opposite statement can negate the statement. This would require the assumption that "if the statement is made, then it can only be true or false." When we limit ourselves to two outcomes.... paradox created. When we accept that 'unknown' is also a possible solution, there is no paradox. "My hair is blonde right now." There is no way to know if that declaration is true or false. 1) people have hair.... but the declaration isn't an argument, so there is no premise. it's just a conclusion. That is to say: the statement doesn't say "My hair is a light golden color right now, thus, my hair is blonde right now" ...instead it makes a conclusion based on nothing. 2) people have blonde hair and can dye their hair, so "my hair is blonde right now" is still feasible 3) the negation, "my hair is not blonde right now" isn't in any contradiction with the proposal. ....still: we can't honestly say that the statement is true. We can say it's "unknown" if we wish to put a truth-value on it... otherwise, the best we can conclude is a probability and not a fact. If we are given context or added information, then we can do more with the statement. "My hair is actually brown and I was lying when I said it was blonde" ....that, incidently, is true in reality. That fact, however, is unknowable to a person who just has access to my first statement. Using logical calculus and reasoning to find the truth of my first claim.... will only result in a probability value (uncertainty) or a value of unknown (a certainty). Nothing about this form of propositional calculus is unreasonable. The truth of a satements being 'unknown' isn't an illogical or irrational. 🤷‍♂️ instead, when this paradox is presented: its omitted as an option completely. The assumption, then, us that "every single statement is either true or false. there is nothing else it could be." .....which, itself, isn't an invalid argument as the premise doesn't actually provide evidence to support the conclusion in anyway. "it's can't be both" doesn't answer "why can it not be both? why does it have to be one or the other?". 🤷‍♂️ ...so, I find it odd that "The liars paradox" is still thought of as a real paradox when it clearly isn't. There are many more values a statement can have: valid, flawed... Yet, when it's stated that the only possible values are true and false...and a statement can't be both at the same time, then yep: paradox created. It's, basically, "schrodinger's statement" but instead or being both "true and false until measured", the statement is neither true or false but 'unknown', unless further information is presented or collected (kind of like measuring somehting) and constructed into a premise or set of premises that claim to support the conclusion (the proposal made in the declaration). At that point, we can tell if it's true or false because it's has stopped being a declarative statement and has become an actual argument. (jokinly, it could be said: it's 'wave function' ostensibly 'collapsed' and it went from a 'superposition' of unknown many values to one known value 😂) Turns out: once you measure, the cat is either dead or alive.... before then, it's unknown to you. Same with the liars paradox.

@@evilpandakillabzonattkoccu4879 since you wrote all that out I'm going to put some time together tomorrow to read through it properly

@@chicken29843 my apologies if it ends up being a waste of your time (for example: a clearly flawed post).

(1) ‘This sentence’ is not the statement the liar is negating. (2) ‘0/9=0’ is just an arithmetic truth. ‘This sentence is true’ is not a truth, it seems semantically underdetermined . (3) I didn’t understand the rest. What does it mean for neither the liar nor the truth teller to be ‘logical’? The proof of a contradiction in the liar reasoning is prima facie valid. That’s why it’s called a paradox. Did you mean illformed? What gives rise to a contradiction here is semantic closure. That is, the fact that natural language can express its own semantic concepts.

> logic is true and mind-independent but only when it doesn't question the LNC

He’s not negating “Absolute Truth” but rather just stating how the LNC is a lot more difficult to perceive than it already is from an objective standpoint. You certainly can’t have for an example two cloned persons accounted as the “same” because they’re two full complex beings. But what does that mean? What does it even mean to be the “same” while having two objects apart from each other? The difficulty lies within the source of evidential properties when accounting for absolutes. Hence there’s no negation of truth- otherwise we just fall into nihilism (which is still another absolute view another can see).

The extended Liar demonstrates your argument to be nonsense. Eg "This sentence is either false or incoherent"

Corey Herrick this sentence is either misbehaving or it is grue. *Grue being green until a time (T) at which point it will be blue. The extended liars paradox is an attempt to salvage that which was demonstrated by this sentence is 0 or it is blue by defining a paradox into existence.

1)This statement is not true 2)Meaningless statements arent true 3) proposition 1 is meaningless 4) therefore proposition 1 is not true

Lel but this is just the value gap argument, which is again brought down by an extended liars paradox that you would be compelled to accept even given your reclassification of sentences as possibly being meaningless in addition to true or false. The basic gist of your examples is that truth values can be trinary: True, False, or "Meaningless". But if you take the sentence "This sentence is not true", then you get the same result and you still have to acknowledge it. If "This sentence is not true" is true, you get a contradiction, but if it is either false or meaningless, then it is also true, which just gives you the paradox again, because if you are claiming that the sentence is meaningless then it is necessarily not true.

Actually, he says something as: "30 years ago I've been questioning the principle of non-contradiction, and the establishment considers me a bit heretical, but not a complete fruitcake." He's right: something went wrong in the academy.

I think you need to start listening a bit more.

You're right

Yes he did, probably you what lack the ability to understand

I'm sorry but the machine you're using wouldn't be here if it weren't for Alan Turing "wasting" his time on topics like this.

@ericray7173: 🤦