Intention in Action with John McDowell

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University of California Television (UCTV)

16 жыл бұрын

John McDowell is a contemporary philosopher whose most influential work has been in the philosophy of mind and language. He questions whether empirical thought is rationally grounded in experience in this Howison Lecture in Philosophy from UC Berkeley. [8/2006] [Show ID: 11509]
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Пікірлер: 28

@вернат 6 жыл бұрын

I love his work so much.

@Hegelmaus81 12 жыл бұрын

I never quite understood Davidson until I read McDowell's Mind and World. Truly a living legend in philosophy. Pitt is incredibly fortunate to have him.

@jonobrow 15 жыл бұрын

He actually sounds bored by himself! I've never seen that quite so pronounced in any other philosopher than here with McDowell. It's unbelievable. He might as just be saying out loud "God this is so fucking boring" every few minutes.

@aub741 16 жыл бұрын

great lecture , i wish i was there to ask him great speaker

@luannalovell 15 жыл бұрын

lol i my intention is to execute the intention to perform the prior action of intention to watch this another day!

@kyrillpotapov9687 3 жыл бұрын

I'm sad I can't find the dance remix of this anymore

@gyarreto 12 жыл бұрын

what are his books ? are they good? can u tell me the titles that i may read afterwards ^^ helps a lot a big fan of philosophy

@Fafner888 6 жыл бұрын

You should read his "Mind and world".

@langengro 14 жыл бұрын

When Searle introduced the idea of an "intention in action" (IA), as distinct from the "prior intention" (PI) that causes it, he addressed a famous problem from Davidson: Namely, that sometimes our intentions are the cause of the intended effects, but the causation doesn't happen "in the right way". By introducing an IA in between PI and bodily movement, Searle could say exactly what is wrong here: IA is missing. McDowell's claim here that IA's are just PI's brings back Davidson's puzzle.

@fr.hughmackenzie5900 3 жыл бұрын

McDowell has PI + willing = IA. So I think he is suggesting it's the rational willing which makes the overriding intention a special type of cause.

@iamabirch7363 Жыл бұрын

I don’t think so. Davidson’s problem arises on the model of the event causal theory of action, which might be understood as a form of dualism between mind and world. The latter idea is just what McDowell consistently rejects in his works nearly on every domain in philosophy. In his view, intention in action just is acting intentionally.

@Dritani 10 жыл бұрын

Did she cross the street in the end or not?

@langengro 14 жыл бұрын

@runciblewall Quoting Davidson: "A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it might be the case that he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he do it intentionally. " It's not the case that, in this example, a prior intention ceases prematurely.

@dontonti99 14 жыл бұрын

To *langengro*. I don't see the problem. DD's problem was about a deviant causal chain: actions might not be intentional, even if the action is caused by an intention. Causal chains aren't enough to make an action intentional. What in McD's talk forces a denial of that? If PI is just IA, given the typical conditions, then McD can say the same. The issue is whether IA, as Searle but not McD understands it, is required for this kind of move.

@ajaxpc 13 жыл бұрын

Isn't this just a pedantic exploration of a confusion? (Searle's confusion, then McDowell's confusion ...) Attribution of intention is indefinitely corrigible - following Kripke's observation on rule following; and it has an irreducible normative content, since we only attribute it to 'agents'. It is not a kind of empirical fact that someone, or something, is an agent. If our intentional language has these confusing implications, we just shouldn't push it that hard.

@gyarreto 12 жыл бұрын

1 mins = 5hours of dream time

@betoperdido 14 жыл бұрын

solved? by which philosophy/philosopher? Wittgenstein?

@bluetoebeing 13 жыл бұрын

@ajaxpc yeah, but McD has to pay for his lunch. And so do you. If you no know of another way, please inform.

@raffen79 16 жыл бұрын

Reading him is ok, but listening to him can be pure torture.

@gyarreto 12 жыл бұрын

20mins.. tomorrow is still another day to live...

@wrightclick 11 жыл бұрын

I bet he's fun at parties.

@langengro 14 жыл бұрын

And then here is Searle on this: The climber "has no intention in action of loosening his hold. Even if on the basis of his belief and desire he formed a secondary desire to loosen his hold and this desire caused him to loosen his hold it is still not an intentional action if he does not have an intention in action to loosen his hold". Not that one has to find this reply satisfactory. But this context is what motivated the term "intention in action" - and McDowell doesn't address it at all.

@Fafner888 6 жыл бұрын

I think that McDowell could give here a very simple answer. In Davidson's story, the climber loosens his hold unintentionally, so it cannot be a manifestation of his intention in action. I don't see why McDowell should be committed to the claim that the climbers prior intention is identical with his unintentional behavior.

@asktheanswer424 11 жыл бұрын

changing world feng shui from 'trying to emulate literally living inside of google/youtube/the internet' to 'living in an organic world called Earth in a free country with lots of creative and mostly positive people' though we're going to use the internet freely, we wont live inside of it, all it does is provide information letters, and flat images even games that might reference reality of fantasy not virtual reality but that can give us info but its not a dwelling/physical portal