Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Theory of Perception

Рет қаралды 15,877

Жыл бұрын

In this video, Dr. David Peña-Guzmán discusses key features of Merleau-Ponty's theory of perception, drawing from early essays written by Merleau-Ponty in the 1930s. These features later go on to frame the French phenomenologist's book The Phenomenology of Perception.

Пікірлер: 47

@alexhubanov1526 Жыл бұрын

This guy communicates information very effectively! Pleasure to listen to.

@Charles-qf6vo Жыл бұрын

Speaks in a very weird way. I was distracted and could not follow.

@gmgoenawansusatyo Жыл бұрын

an excellent introduction to Merleau-Ponty.

@joezagame5598 Жыл бұрын

That was a great explanation. Thank you.

@mephesh Жыл бұрын

Wow, now my new interest is perception, I like the idea that perception as a child and adult is different, such a new concept to look into

@luiscarlosrodriguezsancho1436 Жыл бұрын

Science has evolved so much and intersecting with philosophy. Te matter of perception in Neuro is much different now that 100 years ago as the meaning of time and space. New thinkers will need to figure that out both versed in science and philosophy.

@mu.makbarzadeh2831 Жыл бұрын

Thank you for sharing. I hope to have some discussing online video chat on your channel.

@cultureandtheory5097 2 ай бұрын

Thank you so much for the video; your knowledge is greatly appreciated and has been incredibly helpful!

@cpn1011 Жыл бұрын

can i ask you if there is the transcript??

@artemisXsidecross 6 ай бұрын

Well done, thank you

@ComradeDt Жыл бұрын

I cant find these early essays anywhere

@roygbiv176 8 ай бұрын

Very good presentation. I'm a bit skeptical of the whole move away from Kant in this period though.

@rskyler1 Жыл бұрын

Kant the phenomenologist?

@sleepingbadgers Жыл бұрын

Yeah I had the same thought… I’m pretty sure early interpreters thought that he was phenomenalist idealist a la Berkeley but that has since been supervened by other interpretations of his philosophy I.e from Henry Allison among others.

@davidfragoso6366 Жыл бұрын

maybe it was a lapsus, confusing him with Husserl, both germans

@jimmyfaulkner1855 7 ай бұрын

Does Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological theory of perception a form of direct realism (naive realism) or indirect realism (representationalism)?

@DjTahoun Жыл бұрын

🌷😇🌷

@kensho123456 7 ай бұрын

Maurice MP's book was Heideggerian NOT Kantian.

@bebopbountyhead Жыл бұрын

Aren't these just as arbitrary as Kant's transcendental categories? Assuming that one's perception is accurate regarding things like figure/background and depth begs the question of "how do you know that?" Here's the problem in a nutshell: you've got a set of things labeled "things I know." I come along and ask you "how do you know that you know these things?" You can't reference inside the set, as that would be viciously circular. You can't say "I just do," as that would be affirming arbitrariness as part of philosophical argumentation, which would affirm contradictions. You can't reference outside of the set, as you don't know those things.

@fede2 Жыл бұрын

You seem to associate "arbitrary" with "unmediated".

@bebopbountyhead Жыл бұрын

@@fede2 I don't see exactly what you mean by that. "Unmediated" replacing "arbitrary" could lead to a number of interpretations. By "arbitrary" here, I mean that these things (Husserl's transcendental reductions/Kant's transcendental categories) are taken to be foundations of experience without justification.

@fede2 Жыл бұрын

@@bebopbountyhead "...without justification". Eh?? The justification is that they are required in order for experience to be intelligible. They're both pretty clear on that...

@noahlibra Жыл бұрын

@@bebopbountyhead Their internal coherence to experience itself. Their relation to ontological primitives is another story though.

@bebopbountyhead Жыл бұрын

@@noahlibra Seeming coherence, genuine correspondence, and facticity aren't the same things. In order to distinguish between parts of experience for the sake of thinking or talking about them, one must delineate between them. To take these delineations as defining basic elements of experience is to put them beyond that which can be questioned. However, this leads to the question "how do you know that your delineations are true?" not being answerable. It's the same problem that all foundationalist systems of inquiry. Saying "I can't think of it differently" isn't a justification for knowledge of the truth of something. If, on the other hand, one decides to say that the delineations are contrived, then they're left with the same problem of not being able to confirm or deny any claims about their experience.

@LeopardKing-im4bm 8 ай бұрын

It is not wise to dispense with the matter/form distinction. Neither am I arguing for naïve realism. Somethings which exist conceptually can be denied genuine material expression. That is not cause to abandon a useful axiom. The phenomenon of becoming can not be explained outside of dualism. That polarity does not need physical rootedness anymore than irrational numbers need to be physically handled to understand indebtedness or want. This idea of brute physicality is the wall against which philosophy breaks it's nose. A preposterous desire to have real world corollaries pushes modern thinkers to believe that ancients were hasty. This reminds me of the scavenger hunt for unified field theory. We need to knock on the wood of our thoughts as superstition. That is why philosophy has come to a screeching halt with the aid of fools like Habermas. Truth is not found in appearance, so it makes no difference how we apply it's already analogous import. It is reason that accelerates insight, not the most accurate lay of the land.