fraud ; see above

@@brandgardner211 Cut it out. What you are saying is absurd. Frauds cannot attract a WHOLE generation of experts. There is not one professional philosopher in America who wouldn't dismiss what you are saying out of hand. Professor Kripke is philosophizing in this video, trust me. Listen and learn, if you want to be wise.

It is sad to revisit these videos, for Kripke has passed away quite a while ago. Peace be upon him, the greatest philosopher…

​@@kaffeephilosophy wheres the Sellarsian perspective on philosophy you promised on your channel mugi kon?

Everybody was laughing, but he didn't even notice.

Maybe your teacher is a descriptivist lol

When it comes to proper names, the easiest way is to go with names like Confucious, or "Yao", "Shun", "Yu" (just to be safe). Chinese is a notoriously analytic language, so it too confuses me a lot when I am thinking about definite descriptions in Chinese (Also, there is not a counterpart of "the " in the language). But another point is that some descriptions are in fact proper names in disguise. I think the example people usually give is Holy Rome Empire (with reference to Voltaire).. also band names are good examples too.

@@JohnLee-cl2ht Yeah, I agree with you

no: wrong. see above

If that's true it must be trivial

@@firstal3799 Perhaps more right: In every possible world, Saul Kripke's conclusions must lure the beginners

Hello! I'm just an undergrad student who is minoring in Philosophy, but I am recently reading Kripke for a class. I think I understand your objection, and I'd like to try and help you as much as I can. So, Kripke would basically say that only names are rigid designators (meaning they refer to the same object in all possible worlds). The descriptions of these names are not rigid designators because they are not essential properties of the name (most of the time). For example, that Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander the Great is not an essential property of Aristotle. He could simply have been a construction worker in a possible world. Being AG's teacher is not his necessary property. However, Kripke does say that a person's initial baptism is a part of his necessity. Kripke believes that there is a causal chain that traces back to the initial baptism. For instance, let's say you heard about Aristotle from your father. And he heard it from someone else, and he heard it from another person. This chain traces all the way back to the initial baptism, which is ultimately Aristotle's parents because they named him. We must refer to Aristotle in the same intention as his parents did. I might have been spitballing, sorry. But I essentially agree with your objection. I think we must need descriptions that are rigid designators in order to refer to them in a counterfactual world :) I think you should check out the cluster theory for more information. Kripke says that just because a property of an object is unique, or popularly known, it doesn't mean that it is a rigid designator. Having the most amount of descriptions attached to a name is not sufficient, says Kripke.

Hi! I think your concern makes sense, but like Zeynep said, a name is a rigid designator, not the descriptions associated with that name in this world. It also seems like you’re confusing metaphysical and epistemological concepts. I say this because while a rigid designator picks out the same thing in different worlds, it doesn’t require our knowledge of those different worlds, or even of this one.

byronfoodjikla, im interested to read your paper. May i request for a copy?

@@fkparawan87 sure, ill post it as a comment later today

@@lonelycows3464 I don't think I am confusing metaphysical and epistemological concepts. Also, I'm not arguing that the description of a name is a rigid designator. All I'm saying is that for a name to be a rigid designator we are required to have a distintion between factual and counter-factual descriptions for that name. This is, in my understanding, the very definition of a rigid designator, no? That a a constant designation is realized between different possible worlds. Therefore, in the context of this argument, I would say that in order for the metaphysics to work and make sense, a certain degree of epistemological knowledge is required. In any case, I will be posting my paper below if you're interested. And of course, thanks for replying to my comment!!

Wow

Truth should be viewed as a concept of magnitude and not a stand alone entity? It makes sense to me to say that without context, truth loses meaning. But I don't understand how scalar, understood as magnitude without regards to direction, applies

@@d36williams Maybe he just reflects on a fact, that in everyday life we may often seem to act as if truth were matter of degree given to vagueness of our expressions and knwoledge of reality. On the other hand it would be very much bold to asume, that truth of every sentence should be considered liable to matters of degree. Even if we accepted, that the sentence like "The water in bathtub is warm" were considered partialy true, the sentence "The former sentence is partialy true" would be very curious to be considered partialy true because ten it would seem to mean, that the first sentence could happen to be considered partialy partialy true. This is just idea.

Lol

Have you taken the time to read Kripke's published work? Do you understand it in any depth? If so, you are perfectly entitled to disagree with his philosophical views (might be a good idea to state why in some detail though), but calling him a 'fraud', a 'dweeb', and claiming that he 'doesn't know much about philosophy' is absurd and, given his numerous contributions to the field, quite frankly insulting.

@Monty Cantsin Chill bro. 1] K might be a brilliant logician, but logic and phil. are two different things. As I noted, Is it not obvious that logic broke away from phil. and became a discipline of its own? (as did psychology, at around the same time)? and thus one might be good at the one, and only...eh so-so at the other....2) K.'s ideas in N&N are an attempt to understand the meaning of a word -- eg 'water' by means of various equivalence relations -- i.e. it has a rigid whatever hanging off it, that it got by a "baptism", which then gets perpetuated by a "causal chain". These ideas are feeble attempts to solve Chomsky's Problem, i.e. quite apart from whatever we think re syntax, [a] where does the basic meaning of any word come from? [note: not just proper names, this would have to apply to ANY word, trying to limit it to proper names is an arbitrary move, done only because of the prejudicing influence of His Lordship Bertie] and [b] how does it remain stable across all times, places, contexts, etc.? so that, in effect, whoever knows that word, knows the same thing [forget all the contrived 'twin earth' bs]; and then [c] given the fact of [b] as a principle, then clearly the stable meaning of any word across all contexts CANNOT BE BY MEANS OF AN EQUIVALENCE RELATION ie, a word does not have an equals sign hanging off it, no matter how you conceptualize that equals sign, or the rules by which you stick it there, or the rules you follow to see what it connects to etc. and then [d], given that fact, how to account for the fact that sometimes -- in fact often -- words can nonetheless be used in exactly that way -- as in technical terms, terms of art, etc when they do indeed function within essentially an equivalence relation, e.g. 'water = H2O' etc. Chomsky has always said that words do not have reference in the sense that these philosophers are obsessed with. They have never listened. The result is the confused digressive discussion of N&N resulting in paradoxical abuses of terminology such as a postiori necessity etc. -- which creates more problems than it solves, and amateurish excursions into the ontology of 'natural kinds' etc. All are attempts to solve Chomsky's Problem by means of tools from math/mathematical logic. And this can never work. The way language functions in our mind -- the sorts of mental events it creates -- simply is not like that. Chomsky does not claim to be able to solve the problem either -- he has referred to it as a mystery etc. and has confined himself to what he can elucidate with precision and evidence. He is very honest. Is K honest? by the way.

@@brandgardner211: I appreciate your more reasoned response. I am a bit baffled as to why you think logic and philosophy are totally separate, perhaps even irreconcilable, disciplines though. Yes, they might have diverted somewhat, and Logicism as espoused by Frege and Russell failed in the 20th c., but philosophy still relies on logic (predicate, modal, doxastic, paraconsistent, etc) , just as neuroscience and psychology rely on philosophy for conceptual clarity, framing questions properly, and knowing what types of questions to sensibly ask in the first instance when attempting to solve a problem. Logic is not purely the domain of computer science, mathematics, and cognitive science. What is your definition of philosophy if logic plays no part? And for the record, because analytic philosophers make frequent use of logic, I think that most are good at both; inferring logical truths by way of critical reflective thinking. I sympathise with much of what you say in relation to Chomsky's ideas about language, truth, and meaning. I'm familiar with many of arguments he has put forward in this area and that the picture of language proposed by Kripke is leading us off target to a path that is based on theories of mathematics (derived from Frege's work); this being unhelpful, or perhaps entirely wrong. I am also aware of Chomsky's distinction between problems and mysteries and do side with his use of the latter term for a number of philosophical problems. I think Kripke's does try to get at the truth as best as he can though and I wouldn't therefore want to claim that he's dishonest, hence why I was a little perturbed by your ad hominem attacks. Philosophy is in large part about discussion and disagreement; no need to call a figure like Kripke a fraud (as much as I disagree with many of his views too).

i'm really confused by the comment about not understanding chomsky's linguistics (from someone studying both philosophy and linguistics)... what prompted you to say this? "Of the various general critiques that have been presented over the years concerning the program and conceptual framework of generative grammar, [Kripke's rule following paradox] seems to me to be the most interesting." - Knowledge of Language, 1986

GCBrin Following rules is a fairly trivial thing [for human beings]. They are not what they are, and they do not have the capacities they have, because they follow rules. Existence is not a game. A word is not a rule, nor is it a sign. It is a mental event and cognitive tool of a specific kind. (It might actually be the intersection of several cognitive capacities.) The most important thing Chomsky ever says about language is when he says "you shouldn't talk about language learning; you should talk about language growth." And he compares this to embryological development: language is the form that the brain takes [under proper developmental conditions -- or certain aspects of the brain, presumably]. The philosophers of language/mind have never really understood this. They remain preoccupied with secondary ideas -- rules, recursion, competence (Habermas), etc. Moreover, Chomsky himself gets confused and is not necessarily the best interpreter of his own discoveries.