2024 NYIP Lecture Series
Prof. Hannah Ginsborg (UC Berkeley)
"Normativity Without Reasons"
Lecture Two: "Primitive normativity as a condition of understanding"
Handout available at the following link: drive.google.com/file/d/1GZbK...
Abstract:
In Lecture One, I argued against the reasons view of normativity by appealing to considerations about counts as genuine normativity. In this second lecture I introduce a different line of argument which is intended to apply even if formal or rule-relative normativity is disqualified as normativity proper, and hence excluded from the scope of the reasons view. The argument turns on the idea of "primitive normativity," a form of normativity whose recognition is developmentally prior to the recognition of other forms of normativity, and which-at least on a common understanding of rules as items of intentional content-cannot be made out in terms of conformity to rules. I present the idea of primitive normativity in the context of children's early language-learning and concept-acquisition, but I also argue that the recognition of primitive normativity is required for adults' understanding of words and grasp of concepts. Primitive normativity offers a counterexample to the reasons view of normativity, even if that view is construed as excluding formal normativity, since primitive normativity is substantive rather than formal, yet still independent of reasons.