Yes I don't think this video has featured in the Google algorithms which is a pity. However the information is there for anyone who cares to look for it. Part 2 will of necessity be more technical which will reduce the viewer base but someone needs to document how the Titan should have been designed.

I am sure you understand probabilistic design. If there's high uncertainty you need a large safety factor to achieve the target reliability (which would be typically 10-6 chance of failure). I will address this when I get round to the second video.

Requirements management? In my world we work to a detailed scope of work and project specifications as specified in the contract. The client would always want more and we'd always work strictly to contract. We'd only deviate from contract if there was an approved VO (variation order). It kept us on track. The Defender is back from SA, battered but unbowed. It needs a lot of work this summer. I'll try to video it.

Oddly enough I don't feel that the use of CFRP for the hull was a mistake, it just needs a lot more development. Who would have believed 30 years ago that CFRP would be used for the main wing spars of airliners? These are subject to compressive loads in bending and fatigue loading which many people assume CFRP can't handle. It clearly can but it just needs the correct development, quality control and a rigorous NDT programme to detect defects at the earliest moment. As you can see from the video I was appalled at the cavalier way in which the engineering was handled and that the individuals concerned just went along with it.

Yes agree. Also, I think composites are wonderful and I have flown on many composite air craft and felt safe. I just think that the whole Titan incident was avoidable. In offshore there is always money for safety. Oil companies should be applauded. Accidents are not Occidental.@@defendermodsandtravels

@@adelarsen9776Oxy was my client until they got run out of the UK after Piper A.

Roger :-) @@defendermodsandtravels

​​@@defendermodsandtravelsAmazingly now a year on from this disaster. Not sure if Part 2 emerged ? I was previously under the impression that carbon fibre composite in extreme compression would be about as useful as a concrete or cast iron air receiver, so structural thoughts would be interesting.

Pertinent comments, thanks. The Operations Director who was sacked and sued made a point of saying that he wasn't a qualified engineer however he knew when things weren't right. The engineering interns (the kids) would just have been excited to work on an innovative project without realising how risky everything was. They were cheap and would do what they were told. The mid level guys, well there may have been some but they haven't given any interviews to my knowledge. I suspect they weren't there. The CEO didn't want them because they'd be quite expensive and they wouldn't allow themselves to be pushed around to cut corners. On the other hand, as you point out, they probably got wind that OceanGate didn't have a good engineering environment and wouldn't want to work there. I am interested to know what the Engineering Director is doing now. He was quite prominent in promotional videos before the accident but has disappeared from the scene now. He's quite probably hanging his head in shame.