Operation Hailstone - Attacking the Gibraltar of the Pacific

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Күн бұрын

In February 1944, the US Navy conducted an attack, Codenamed Operation Hailstone, on the major Japanese naval base located at Truk Atoll. This raid was an important step for the US, as Truk was an anchorage for major elements of the Japanese Combine Fleet and its airfields enabled the Japanese to ferry aircraft to their remote bases throughout the Central and South Pacific. There were also submarine installations, a communications center and a radar station located within the atoll’s boundaries. The attack itself marked a major step up in American carrier tactics as the US Navy threw out its prewar doctrine of hit and run carrier strikes, in favor of sustained aerial strikes over the course of multiple days. The attack was also important as it marked the introduction of several innovations in carrier tactics by the US Navy.
#history #unitedstatesnavy #usnavy #navalhistory #pacificwar #worldwar2 #battleship #cruiser #aircraftcarrier #worldofwarships #worldofwarshipslegends

Пікірлер: 52

@steveb6103 3 ай бұрын

My dad was in the fighter sweep. His Hellcat was hit by flak. He made it back to the USS Essex missing 3 cylinders.

@mikecimerian6913 3 ай бұрын

Radial engines were tough.

@windborne8795 3 ай бұрын

God bless him! Thank you for your father's service! My condolences sir! 🇺🇲🇺🇲🇺🇲 We all owe members of, like your father, the greatest generation! 🇺🇲🇺🇲🇺🇲

@jackmoorehead2036 3 ай бұрын

That's why the Navy used nothing but Radial Engines during that War and Korea and Vietnam in their AD 1s. They brought the pilots back, even missing cylinders.

@manilajohn0182 3 ай бұрын

I'm betting that he loved the P & W R2800 radial. While I'm at it- kudos to your father. He did his duty for his comrades and his country. That warrants high praise, my friend. Count yourself lucky (and I know that you do) to have had such a man for your father. I know the feeling as well...

@williamromine5715 3 ай бұрын

It is amazing to see how fast American industry was able to respond. Truk was hit by a very large armada of American ships that were just not available two years before. If the Japanese naval comand had been told about the size of the U.S. fleet that would attack Truk after Pearl Harbor, they would have not believed it possible. I am 82, and sometimes I find it hard to believe the naval operations in the Pacific, especially when we realize the U.S.'s primary effort was to defeat the Germans first. Great video. It is much more informative about Truk's defeat than any other video I have seen. Good work.

@manilajohn0182 3 ай бұрын

The vast majority of the warships in question were authorized long before Pearl Harbor. The capital ships involved were laid down long before pearl harbor as well.

@Cbcw76 3 ай бұрын

I think there were two primary naval-funding 'acts' pre-Dec 1941 - one in 1934, and another in 1936. I think the first was rather cursory and aroused some interest among Japanes leaders (Yamamoto's peer and superiors) but the 1936 addressed major expansion. Yamamoto is reputed to claim this was the beginning of the end because Amerifcan industry was handed enough money to far outproduce all other shipping nations. And that the warships from that was was due at-sea by end of 1942 and 1943. Yamamoto concluded, "We strike Pearl before the end of 1941 or else their retaliations will overwhelm our shipping in 1943." He wasn't far off. These quotes and reports included Yamamoto statement about Pearl, "We can do OK for six months but I can't promise anything after that." Which was about right, too.

@daveweiss5647 3 ай бұрын

@@Cbcw76 yup, he knew well about our industrial power (at that time) because he had spent time here and he realized Japan couldn't compete, but he misread public mood... we were extremely isolationist so he thought a big strike followed by multiple loses would convince the public to want peace and force a negotiation... it did the opposite.

@Cbcw76 3 ай бұрын

@@daveweiss5647 I think the Navy (Yamamoto etc - the ones who'd traveled the world - Europe, England, the US) had the far better vision of reality. But there were Army officers who did, too. But sort of like Marines in China in the '20s and '30s - the Real Leaders were in Tokyo (or WashDC) and no Truth was useful there. The decision makers ignored the far better advice. What I never properly estimated - and certainly not the Pentagon/FDR - was the depth of death-wish enmity that Jap Army had against the Navy, and it seems to have gone on since ?? 1600s? Evidently, all storms that sunk 'troop ships' were the sole blame of the Japanese Navy, and there were episodes of murderous retaliation on the Jap mainland against the taxi-driver Navy and sailors.

@joechang8696 3 ай бұрын

@@Cbcw76 Vinson-Trammell Expansion Program in 1934 and Naval Expansion Act of 1938 were resumption of major building as allowed for by treaty. Then two big 1940 expansion acts, collectively 2 ocean navy acts. The two North Carolina's were commissioned in early/mid 41 as Pearl Harbor was in planning. The old battleships were not really good choices to sail across the Pacific for fleet action. The four South Dakota's were scheduled to be commissioned in 42/43 (3 year regular, 2.5 year accelerated construction). So, for 43, the US would have a force of 6 good battleships. Counting Hornet, the US would have 5 good carriers for 1942 action + the weak Wasp. Japan's carrier force was larger, including the light carriers. There was gap of 1.5 yr between Hornet and Essex. I am not sure if Yamamoto was factoring in accelerated construction schedule, and I don't think he was considering the Independence class light carriers. So, a powerful carrier force should not have been expected until late 43 or early 44 if training is included. I am thinking Yamamoto was thinking 42 to build up the defensive ring, then withstand the 43 assault by 6 new BB's and 5+1 CV's? and then overwhelming force in 44?

@Cbcw76 3 ай бұрын

I wish we'd get a more thorough study of the US Navy's lost chance to bottle up the capital ships 2-3 weeks earlier. Some books give half-hearted explanations of Navy Brass twiddling their thumbs and missing the superior launch dates, but there are references to weather and typhoons for that delay. Of course, that same brass gave Halsey little or not land-based warnings later in 1944 for 'his' typhoon encounter. Also, I wish we could get more about the Taiwan Raids and the Hakkaido "Coal Train" Raids. The Taiwan Raids include the Japanese reports of 'wiping out the US Navy' and Halsey's offer to continue the destruction with his 'sunken fleet' which did have two damage cruisers. Apparently, there were Japanese leaders who immediately believed Halsey's transmissions and steered clear of sending him untraining replacement forces against Halsye's still living forces. But that fleet-action was much more than a radio-quip here or there. Meanwhile, the "Coal Trains" between Japan's northern most Hokkaido Island and the mainland had been targeted by subs for perhaps 2 years, including at least of rotten American torpedoes. There isn't written about the Iron Ore and Coal Train 'wars'. (The 'trains' were ferry/ships with tracks aboard to coal and ore cars were wheeled aboard and off again without any need to offload cargo.

@azjonz 3 ай бұрын

A masterful presentation. Thank you ~ arizona.

@flkoolguy Ай бұрын

Your presentation is fantastic. Accurate and to the point information. Keep the videos coming sir. Love your page!!

@navyhmc8302 3 ай бұрын

If you're a diver and have some experience, I would strongly recommend that you book a dive trip to Chuuk (the original and current name of the atoll). It is very sobering experience. Excellent dives as well. I booked 10 days on the Thorfinn with 34 dives on 26 different ships.

@Wild1BillS 3 ай бұрын

Been there twice already. Both trips were Awesome

@georgekraus9357 3 ай бұрын

At 3:47, you can see Rear Admiral Mark Mitcher sitting in his favorite chair, facing aft of the carrier. He loved watching the action on the carrier deck.

@migram4190 3 ай бұрын

Nice coverage thanks

@redtobertshateshandles 3 ай бұрын

Well done. Subbed. 😊

@steveshoemaker6347 3 ай бұрын

I REALLY LIKE THE NARRATOR'S VOICE ans this very excellent video.....Also i just Sub'ed to this awesome channel.... Thanks from an Old F-4 Phantom 2 pilot Shoe🇺🇸

@robertsolomielke5134 3 ай бұрын

Nice to get some 'fresh" archival photos , instead of the stock shots that we see too often.

@sjb3460 3 ай бұрын

Very good prsentation. Well researched and well narrated.

@ericvadekro8334 3 ай бұрын

Good information!

@Bob.W. 3 ай бұрын

First like and comment. Shigure sure was lucky. Hara must have been captain yet.

@richardmeo2503 3 ай бұрын

Shigure was a Lucky ship, surviving many a battle.

@highplainsdrifter9995 3 ай бұрын

Quite a few pilots got killed from concussion and shrapnel after a big hit on some of the Japanese ships....

@RobertPaskulovich-fz1th 3 ай бұрын

Truk Atoll was not “the Gibraltar of the Pacific” - Rabaul was.

@shawnc1016 3 ай бұрын

The Japanese had been building up Truk for 30 years. They had Rabaul for only about a year before attacks made it useless and it was bypassed.

@xz569 3 ай бұрын

Sometimes, you gotta roll a hard six!

@drj.r.cooper2493 3 ай бұрын

Reconnaissance flights wouldn't necessarily signal an impending attack. More significantly, the IJN is said to have been alerted to the attack on Truk Atoll by diplomats from the Soviet Union. The Soviets, who were NOT officially war with Japan, learned of the operation from Australian diplomats. The USSR did not declare war on Japan until August 1945.

@sillyone52062 3 ай бұрын

Intrepid was damaged so often that one of her nicknames was the Dry One.

@manilajohn0182 3 ай бұрын

Also "The Dry I" and "The Decrepid".

@manilajohn0182 3 ай бұрын

The claim that Nowaki was damaged by splinters from New Jersey is internet myth. It likely stems from Captain Holden's after- action report, in which he suggested that this may have been possible. Nowaki reported no damage from the engagement. During Operation Hailstone, Iowa and New Jersey recorded hits only with their 5" secondary batteries.

@750suzuki7 3 ай бұрын

Near misses from 16' rifles cause busted welds and other concussive damage.

@manilajohn0182 3 ай бұрын

@@750suzuki7 Didn't happen. Nowaki reported no damage from the engagement.

@bkjeong4302 3 ай бұрын

Between that and the fact Nowaki probably would never have gotten away if Iowa and New Jersey never were present for this operation (and that Katori and Maikaze could have been finished off by more air attacks)….why were they there again?

@manilajohn0182 3 ай бұрын

@@bkjeong4302 Oh, I agree. IMHO, the sole reason that Nowaki escaped was because Spruance authorized a surface action. I've never discovered why, but I suspect that the purpose was to give the crews of the surface warships live- fire practice. A constant theme throughout the latter part of the war was the lack of main battery gunnery practice/ experience for the crews of the battle line's battleships (and possibly the cruisers and destroyers of 50.9). More than any other factor, it drove Lee's decision not to accept an offer of a night action with the Japanese in the run- up to the Philippine Sea (a decision which "shocked" Mitscher's Chief- of- Staff, Arleigh Burke). An interesting question is why, once it was clear that Nowaki would escape from Iowa and New Jersey, Spruance didn't order an airstrike to sink Nowaki. Perhaps night was imminent, but I don't know. Cheers...