Thank you! Appreciate your comment! John

And why does some attorneys tried to say that child support is not a dick collections agency and they try to say it's Court and and not a third party

You are saying that attorneys say child support is not a "debt" under the fdcpa? Some courts have ruled as I recall that child support is not considered a "debt" under the FDCPA. I haven't studied those as never had a case where it came up so I'm not sure what the current state of the law is. But my hunch is that is not covered by the FDCPA unfortunately. If you were asking something else, let me know and I'll see if I can get you an answer. John

Yes -- 1681s-2a -- (3)Duty to provide notice of dispute If the completeness or accuracy of any information furnished by any person to any consumer reporting agency is disputed to such person by a consumer, the person may not furnish the information to any consumer reporting agency without notice that such information is disputed by the consumer. [Can't sue directly for this as no private cause of action under (a) but there is a workaround]. Here's a video you might want to watch that shows how this works.... kzfaq.info/get/bejne/nL-FadZ8sMrKfHU.html John

It has to be a consumer debt and it has to be from a debt collector as those terms are defined under the FDCPA (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act). So not every debt is covered and not every "collector" is actually a debt collector under the FDCPA. Definitions are kind of boring but sometimes needed. :) John Watts

Can you elaborate? Im willing to learn and interpret.

@@cherylagyemane8672then go read the intel you were given. Go read!

Chris, Normally not as the original creditor is excluded from the definition of a debt collector. See 1692a(6)(F). For one thing, the debt was not in default when obtained by bank as it made the loan. Now if the bank is in the business of buying DEFAULTED debt, then it might be but there has been some bad law on this. Easiest test is to say, "When this company got the loan, was it current or in default." If current, then almost certainly not a debt collector under the FDCPA. Thanks for your good question. John

@@johngwatts Pursuant to 12 usc 1431 did they ever really loan anything though? Seems like the consumer is the original creditor.

@@jorgelopez-lg4gw I agree.

Most courts actually rule child support is NOT covered as it is not a consumer debt. Same with toll violations, etc. It can get a bit strange but you go back to was this a consumer type transaction? Mabe v. GC Services Ltd. Partnership, 32 F. 3d 86 - Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit 1994 In the instant case, the appellants' child support obligations arose out of an administrative support order issued by Virginia's Department of Social Services ("DSS"). These obligations, therefore, do not qualify as "debts" under the FDCPA because they were not incurred to receive consumer goods or services. Rather, the DSS imposed these obligations upon appellants to force them to fulfill their parental duty to support their children. Because the obligations at issue herein are not "debts" governed by the FDCPA[2], there was no federal question raised in the instant case. The decision of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED. Here's a lengthier quote that gives you some examples: By the plain terms of the statute, not all obligations to pay are considered "debts" subject to the FDCPA. See Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C., 111 F.3d 1322, 1324 (7th Cir.1997). Rather, the FDCPA may be triggered only when an obligation to pay arises out of a specified "transaction." Although the statute does not define the term "transaction," we do not find it ambiguous. A fundamental canon of statutory construction directs us to interpret words according to their ordinary meaning. See Anderson v. Singletary, 111 F.3d 801, 804 (11th Cir.1997) (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 314, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979)). The ordinary meaning of "transaction" necessarily implies some type of business dealing between parties. See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 1230 (1979) (defining "transaction" as "a business deal"); Bass, 111 F.3d at 1325 (citing Webster's New World Dictionary 1509 (2d ed. 1986)). In other words, when we speak of "transactions," we refer to consensual or contractual arrangements, not damage obligations thrust upon one as a result of no more than her own negligence. See Bass, 111 F.3d at 1326 ("[T]he FDCPA limits its reach to those obligations to pay arising from consensual transactions, where parties negotiate or contract for consumer-related goods or services."). While we do not hold that every consensual or business dealing constitutes a "transaction" triggering application of the FDCPA (such a holding would be contrary to the plain language of the statute limiting applicability to specified transactions, as well as to other portions of the statute not relevant to this analysis, which require the existence of other conditions before the FDCPA applies), at a minimum, a "transaction" under the FDCPA must involve some kind of business dealing or other consensual obligation. Because Hawthorne's alleged obligation to pay Mac Adjustment for damages arising out of an accident does not arise out of any consensual or business dealing, plainly it does not constitute a "transaction" under the FDCPA. Moreover, the fact that Mac Adjustment may have entered into a contract with the insurer for subrogation rights does not change the fact that no contract, business, or consensual arrangement between Hawthorne and the damaged party, its insurer, or Mac Adjustment exists. Consequently, the FDCPA does not apply because this is not a transaction. Moreover, the statutory language further limits application of the FDCPA to debts arising from consumer transactions. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a; Shorts v. Palmer, 155 F.R.D. 172, 174 (S.D.Ohio 1994); Battye v. Child Support Servs., Inc., 873 F.Supp. 103, 105 (N.D.Ill.1994). Indeed, as noted above, the statute provides that a "debt" is "any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to a judgment." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (emphasis added). Quite simply, Hawthorne's alleged obligation to Mac Adjustment does not arise out of a consumer transaction; it arises from a tort. In conducting herself in an allegedly negligent manner that precipitated an accident, Hawthorne engaged in no consumer transaction. She neither purchased nor used goods or services. Rather, Hawthorne finds herself indebted to Mac Adjustment because she allegedly failed to conduct herself with the reasonable care that society demands of all of us, and she cannot somehow transform this payment obligation arising out of an accident into a consumer transaction. Thus, we hold 1372*1372 that the district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings for Mac Adjustment.[2] Review of other cases concerning the FDCPA confirms our interpretation of the statutory definition of "debt" to exclude tort obligations such as the one at issue in this case. In Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir.1987), and Shorts v. Palmer, 155 F.R.D. 172 (S.D.Ohio 1994), for example, the courts concluded that obligations to pay money arising out of the alleged theft of property or services did not constitute "debts" under the FDCPA.[3] Obviously, theft is neither consensual nor contractual; nor does it constitute a business dealing. Consequently, it fails to meet the definition of a "transaction" under the FDCPA. See also Mabe v. G.C. Servs. Ltd. Partnership, 32 F.3d 86 (4th Cir.1994) (an obligation to pay child support arising out of an administrative support order issued by Virginia's Department of Social Services does not qualify as a "debt" under the FDCPA). On the other hand, several courts have concluded that bounced checks may well involve "debts" protected under the FDCPA. See, e.g., Bass, 111 F.3d 1322 (7th Cir.1997); Ernst v. Jesse L. Riddle, P.C., 964 F.Supp. 213 (M.D.La.1997); Narwick v. Wexler, 901 F.Supp. 1275 (N.D.Ill.1995); In re Scrimpsher, 17 B.R. 999 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y. 1982). Unlike torts, however, bounced checks represent legal obligations to pay. In other words, they constitute evidence of a business dealing, or a "transaction" under the FDCPA. scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6290982573048779123&q=child+support+fdcpa&hl=en&as_sdt=40003 Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F. 3d 1367 - Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 1998 Best wishes! John

Alabama Consumer Protection Lawyers well that’s funny cause I most certainly beat child support using the fdcpa

Alabama Consumer Protection Lawyers and yes it was a consumer type of transaction became the social security card is a credit card per federal law

@@auditingamerikkka1627 Big Facts

Two consumers got together and made another consumer 3 natural people that birth certificate can be rescinded just like you can rescind your job. The government in fact owes you child support not the other way around. Just study everything is in black and white and yes they will try to fight it but put up a good fight until they cave in. The law is the law. That SSN is a credit card.