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The result of the whole combat consists in the sum total of the results of all partial combats; but these results of separate combats are settled by different considerations. First by the pure moral power in the mind of the leading officers. If a General of Division has seen his battalions forced to succumb, it will have an influence on his de- meanour and his reports, and these again will have an influence on the measures of the Commander-in-Chief; therefore even those unsuccessful partial combats which to all appearance are retrieved, are not lost in their results, and the impressions from them sum themselves up in the mind of the Commander without much trouble, and even against his will. Secondly, by the quicker melting away of our troops, which can be easily estimated in the slow and relatively little tumultuary course of our battles. Thirdly, by lost ground. All these things serve for the eye of the General as a compass to tell the course of the battle in which he is embarked. If whole batteries have been lost and none of the enemy's taken; if battalions have been overthrown by the enemy's cavalry, whilst those of the enemy everywhere present impenetrable masses; if the line of fire from his order of battle wavers involuntarily from one point to another; if fruitless efforts have been

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CHAPTER X. STRATAGEM STRATAGEM implies a concealed intention, and therefore is opposed to straight- forward dealing, in the same way as wit is the opposite of direct proof. It has therefore nothing in common with means of persuasion, of self-interest, of force, but a great deal to do with deceit, because that likewise conceals its object. It is itself a deceit as well when it is done, but still it differs from what is commonly called deceit, in this respect that there is no direct breach of word. The deceiver by stratagem leaves it to the person himself whom he is deceiving to commit the errors of understanding which at last, flowing into ONE result, suddenly change the nature of things in his eyes. We may therefore say, as nit is a sleight of hand with ideas and conceptions, so stratagem is a sleight of hand with actions. At first sight it appears as if Strategy had not improperly derived its name from stratagem; and that, with all the real and apparent changes which the whole character of War has undergone since the time of the Greeks, this term still points to its real na- ture. small, which lies at the foundation of every attempt to surprise. But however much we feel a desire to see the actors in War outdo each other in hid- den activity, readiness, and stratagem, still we must admit that these qualities show themselves but little in history, and have rarely been able to work their way to the sur- face from amongst the mass of relations and circumstances, The explanation of this is obvious, and it is almost identical with the subject matter of the preceding chapter. Strategy knows no other activity than the regulating of combat with the measures which relate to it. It has no concern, like ordinary life, with transactions which consist merely of words--that is, in expressions, declarations, &c. But these, which are very in expensive, are chiefly the means with which the wily one takes in those he practises upon. That which there is like it in War, plans and orders given merely as make-believers, false reports sent on purpose to the enemy -is usually of so little effect in the strategic field that it is only resorted to in particular cases which offer of themselves, therefore cannot be regarded as spontaneous action which emanates from the leader. But such measures as carrying out the arrangements for a battle, so far as to impose upon the enemy, require a considerable expenditure of time and power; of course, the greater the impression to be made, the greater the expenditure in these respects. And as this is usually not given for the purpose, very few demonstrations, so-called, in Strat- egy, effect the object for which they are designed. In fact, it is dangerous to detach large forces for any lengeh of time merely for a trick, because there is always the risk of its being done in vain, and then these forces are wanted at the decisive point. The chief actor in War is always thoroughly sensible of this sober truth, and there fore he has no desire to play at tricks of agility: The bitter carnestness of necessity presses so fully into direct action that there is no room for that game. In a word, the pieces on the strategical chess-board want that mobility which is the clement of strata gem and subtility. The conclusion which we draw, is that a correct and penetrating eye is a more nec- covary and more useful quality for a General than craftiness, although that also does no harm if it does not exist at the expense of necessary qualities of the heart, which is only too often the case. But the weaker the forces become which are under the command of Strategy, so much the more they become adapted for stratagem, so that to the quite feeble and lie te, for whom no prudence, no sagacity is any longer sufficient at the point where all art scems to forsake him, stratagem offers itself as a last resource. The more helpless his situation, the more everything presses towards one single, desperate blow;, the more CHAPTER XL. ASSEMBLY OF FORCES IN SPACE THE best Strategy is ALWAYS TO BE VERY STRONG, first generally chen at the decisive point. Therefore, apart from the energy which creates the Army, a work which is not always done by the Gencral, there is no more imperative and no simpler law for Strategy than to KEEP THE FORCES CONCENTRATED,-No portion is to be separated from the main body unless called away by some urgent necessity. On chis maxim we stand firm, and look upon it as a guide co be depended upon. What are the reasonable grounds on which a detachment of forces may be made we shall lcarn by degrees. Then we shall also see that this principle cannot have che same general ef. fiests in every War, but that these are different according to the means and end. It seems incredible, and yet it has happened a hundred times, that troops have been divided and separated merely through a mysterious feeling of conventional manner, without any clear perception of the reason. If the concentration of the whole force is acknowledged as the norm, and every di- vision and separation as an exception which must be justified, then not only will that folly be completely avoided, but also many an erroncous ground for separating troops will be barred admission.

CHAPTER XII. ASSEMBLY OF FORCES IN TIME WE have here to deal with a conception which in real life diffuses many kinds of il. lusory light. A clear definition and development of the idea is therefore necessary, and we hope to be allowed a short analysis. War is the shock of two opposing forces in collision with each other, from which it follows as a matter of course that the stronger not only destroys the other, but carries it forward with it in its movement. This fundamentally admits of no successive action of powers, but makes the simultaneous application of all forces intended for the shock appear as a primordial law of War. So it is in reality, but only so far as the struggle resembles also in practice a mechan ical shock, but when it consists in a lasting, mutual action of destructive forces, then we can certainly imagine a successive action of forces. This is the case in tactics, princi- pally because firearms form the basis of all tactics, but also for other reasons as well. If in a fire combat 1,000 men are opposed to 500, then the gross loss is calculated from the amount of the enemy's force and our own; 1,000 men fire twice as many shots as 500, but more shots will take effect on the 1,000 than on the $00 because it is assumed that they stand in closer order than the other. If we were to suppose the number of hits to be double, then the losses on each side would be equal. From the S00 there would be for example 200 disabled, and out of the body of 1,000 likewise the same; now if che 500 had Arpt anocher body of equal number quite out of fire, then both sides would have 800 effective men; but of these, on the one side there would be $00 men quite fresh, fully supplied with ammunition, and in their full vigour; on the other side only 800 all alike shaken in their order, in want of sufficient ammunition and weak- med in physical force. The assumption that the 1,000 men merely on account of their greater number would lose twice as many as $00 would have lost in their place, is cer- tainly not correct; thercfore the greater loss which the side suffers that has placed the half of its force in reserve, must be regarded as a disadvantage in chat original forma- cion; further it must be admitted, that in the generality of cases the 1,000 men would have the advantage at the first commencement of being able to drive their opponent out of his position and force him to a retrograde movement; now, whether these two advantages are a counterpoise to the disadvantage of finding ourselves with S00 men to a certain extent disorganised by the combat, opposed to an enemy who is not mate- rially weaker in numbers and who has 500 quite fresh troops, is one that cannot be de aided by punuing an analysis furcher, we must here rely upon experience, and there will scarcely be an officer experienced in War who will not in the generality of cases as- sign the advantage to that side which has the fresh troops. In this way it becomes evident how the employment of too many forces in combat may be disadvantageous; for whatever advantages the superiority may give in the first moment, we may have to pay dearly for in the next. But this danger only endures as long as the disorder, the state of confusion and weakness lass, in a word, up to the crisis which every combat brings with it even for de conqueroz. Within the duration of this relaxed state of exhaustion, the appearance of a proportionate number of fresh troops is decisive. But when this disordering effect of victory stops, and therefore only the moral su- priority remains which every victory gives, then it is no longer possible for fresh troops to restore the combat, they would only be carried along in the general move- ment; a beaten Army cannot be brought back to victory a day after by means of a strong reserve. Here we find ourselves at the source of a highly material difference be Tween tactics and strategy. The tactical results, the results within the four corners of the bartle, and before its done, lie for the most part within the limits of that period of disorder and weakness. But the strategic result, that is to say, the resule of the total combat, of the victories re- alived, let them be small or great, lies completely (beyond) outside of that period. It is caly when the results of partial combats have bound themselves together into an inde- pendent whole, that the strategic result appears, but then, the state of crisis is over, the feces have resumed their original form, and are now only weakened to the extent of chose actually destroyed (placed hors de combat). The consequence of this difference is, that tactics can make a continued use of forces, Strategy only a simultaneous one. If1 cnnot, in tactics, decide all by ch quarters or in suitable camps. Both these wants will no doubt be greater in proportion as the number of men on one spot is greater. But does not the superiority in force af- ford also the best means of spreading out and finding more room, and therefore more means of subsistence and shelter? If Buonaparte, in his invasion of Russia in 1812, concentrated his Army in great masses upon one single road in a manner never heard of before, and thus caused priva- tions equally unparalleled, we must ascribe it to his maxim THAT IT IS IMPOSSI- BLE TO BE TOO STRONG AT THE DECISIVE POINT. Whether in this instance he did not strain the principle too far is a question which would be out of place here; but it is certain that, if he had made a point of avoiding the distress which was by that means brought about, he had only to advance on a greater breadth of front. Room was not wanted for the purpose in Russia, and in very few cases can it be wanted. Therefore, from this no ground can be deduced to prove that the simultane- ous employment of very superior forces must produce greater weakening, But now, supposing that in spite of the general relief afforded by setting apart a portion of the Army, wind and weather and the toils of War had produced a diminution even on the part which as a spare force had been reserved for later use, still we must take a compre- hensive general view of the whole, and therefore ask, Will this diminution of force suf- fice to counterbalance the gain in forces, which we, through our superiority in numbers, may be able to make in more ways than one? doubt, come in contact with throughout, but which, as we shall see in the following chapter, is connected with some other considerations. What we desire to establish here is, that if in tactics the military force through the mere duration of actual employment suffers a diminution of power, if time, therefore, appears as a factor in the result, this is not the case in Strategy in a material degree. The destructive effects which are also produced upon the forces in Strategy by time, are partly diminished through their mass, partly made good in other ways, and, there- fore, in Strategy it cannot be an object to make time an ally on its own account by bringing troops successively into action. We say on "its own account," for the influence which time, on account of other cir- cumstances which it brings about but which are different from itself can have, indeed must necessarily have, for one of the two parties, is quite another thing, is anything but indifferent or unimportant, and will be the subject of consideration hereafter. The rule which we have been seeking to set forth is, therefore, that all forces which are available and destined for a strategic object should be SIMULTANEOUSLY ap- plied to it; and this application will be so much the more complete the more every- thing is compressed into one act and into one movement. But still there is in Strategy a renewal of effort and a persistent action which, as a chief means towards the ultimate success, is more particularly not to be overlooked, it is the CONTINUAL DEVELOPMENT OF NEW FORCES. This is also the sub- ject of another chapter, and we only refer to it here in order to prevent the reader from having something in view of which we have not been speaking. We now turn to a subject very closely connected with our present considerations, which must be settled before full light can be thrown on the whole, we mean the STRATEGIC RESERVE.

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