Suvorov's 2009 Icebreaker Lectures: Stalin enables Hitler to start WW2

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7 жыл бұрын

Former GRU officer (Soviet military intelligence) Viktor Suvorov (a pen-name), toured Israel, Europe, and America in 2009, to promote his book CHIEF CULPRIT, which combined material from several of his previous books together (especially ICEBREAKER) concerning the socio-military strategy of Josef Stalin (per Suvorov's theory) in raising up and supporting Adolf Hitler and Germany's Nazi Party from the 1920s, through Hitler's invasion of Poland, into Hitler's war on Europe more generally, up until the time of Hitler's Operation Barbarossa: a pre-emptive attack on Russia before Stalin could finish preparing his own attack on Germany.
One lecture (the longer one) was given in February 2009 at the Woodrow Wilson Center and broadcast on CSPAN2. The other, given in October at the US Naval Academy, was shorter but more personable in Suvorov's delivery, so while it didn't include some details its presentation is generally more entertaining. (Also it included a few details missing from the longer lecture.)
Having recently run across both lectures separately on KZfaq, presumably in the public domain as educational material, I decided to edit them together, omitting only a few things irrelevant to the presentation. (Although, this includes some extended trivially aesthetic comparisons between Hitler and Stalin. I thought his point was going to be either that Hitler modeled himself, which from the context would seem a coherent claim, but he never got there. Perhaps it was part of a dry joke he sets up; anyway, I kept the good joke and the salient comparisons.)
Not all voices from the Q&A after the CSPAN2 lecture are preserved in the edit, but I did keep the touching comments provided by a fellow defected author, presenting them as a prelude to the main part of the video. Suvorov's non-comments on Russia's Ukrainian strategy at that time, are preserved as an epilogue. I thought about putting his interesting biographical comments toward the beginning, as an introduction to his topic, but decided to leave them and the remaining Q&A discussions in their original order, so his biography follows immediately on the (first) end to his CSPAN2 lecture.
I have also added a few text overlays to help explain some of the terms and context he's talking about.
One part from the CSPAN2 lecture I meant to change, and then forgot until I was already uploading, was Suvorov's accidental switch of two or three text slides early in his presentation, which present sets of topical points out of order for what he is talking about. I may attempt an update later to fix this for his presentation.
(My card introductions to parts of the main lecture, occasionally misspells his pseudonym by accident as Suvarov, which is my own error; something else to update later I hope. On the other hand, this thing took 15+ hours to upload, so...)
Aside from being topically relevant to my multi-player match of DECISIVE CAMPAIGNS: BLITZKRIEG with Barthheart (which probably won't get a new video until next weekend); part of Suvorov's theory also informs the gameplay of the third game in Victor Reijkurz's series, DC: BARBAROSSA, which simulates the Red Army's extreme vulnerability early in Germany's operation due to Stalin's aborted preparations for his own offensive strike.
I hope my fellow Grogheads will appreciate this collection!
The English edition of Suvorov's CHIEF CULPRIT can be found at Amazon here in several formats: smile.amazon.com/Chief-Culpri... (I haven't read it myself but his lecture material seems valid to me for the most part; his book is heavily sourced.)
Readers may also consider his autobiography, which he also talks about (for about 20 minutes) in the CSPAN lecture, THE LIBERATORS: MY LIFE IN THE SOVIET ARMY smile.amazon.com/Liberators-M... (No Kindle version for this yet, unfortunately.)
On the Spetsnaz: smile.amazon.com/Spetsnaz-Ins...
On Soviet Military Intelligence (the GRU): smile.amazon.com/Inside-Sovie... (No Kindle version)

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@jem5231 4 жыл бұрын

It`s interesting that those who present evidence and logic for their claims are dismissed by the majority, and those who promote popular belief based on no evidence and no reason are still accepted!

@jasonpratt5126 4 жыл бұрын

Eh, the traditional view does have some support to it -- it isn't just pulled out of nowhere. The main problem is sussing through Soviet propaganda claims (and to some extent Nazi propaganda claims), which becomes more of a problem when both sides went to some effort to destroy and/or bury their own records. Suv's main professional nemesis, David Glantz, has duplicated Suv's work in several regards independently, working against and around that primary problem. (See G's reports on forgotten tank battles of the Eastern Front, for example: there is little direct evidence for them because both sides destroyed records afterward for different reasons, so he has to infer them from indirect sources.)

@user-wj6dt5bq3w 5 ай бұрын

@@jasonpratt5126 But Suvorov isn't the only historian who talks about Stalin's plan to start WWII and later to attack Europe in 1941. Glantz does a poor job at countering all the numerous arguments. First, if Stalin was so scared of a war with Germany, why did he send Molotov to Berlin in November 1940 with such aggressive new territorial demands? Wasn't that more likely to anger Hitler?

@mrd7067 Жыл бұрын

There is the the claim of multible other authors that state that Operation Barbarossa was started short before the planned sowjet attack. This authors base their statements on archives, inncluding russian archives and war diaries from people who were there. Some of such authors are: Dr. Bernd Schwipper (Generalmajor a.D. ["former" major general] of the GDR, he studied on the university in moskau back in the day and after the cold war ended had access to and researched in archives there) Generalmajor a.D. Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof (Generalmajor a.D. ["former" major general] of the Bundeswehr) Walter Kempowski: Das Echolot - Barbarossa '41 (war diaries) Erkki Hautamäkis: „Finnland i stormens öga“ (Finnland in the eye of the storm). I haven`t read this one because it isn`t aviable in a language that i understand. Supposedly it speaks of a alledged Churchill Stalin pact (15. October 1939 vs the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact 23. August 1939) Supposedly according to a war diary of a higher member of a sowjet army staff financial soldier Awdejewski wrote that: The barracks were already empty. The troops have been moved to their marshaling area on the western border. The army staff was ready to fight, all staff officers were at their posts. 21. Juni 1941 the staff moved to their advance command post towards the border (Operation Barbarossa started 22. Juni 1941). Quote from Avdejewski: "With my statements I would like to emphasize that the assertion that our troops went to war unprepared is at least incorrect."

@nicholaskukushin6626 3 жыл бұрын

I am very thankful for the publication of Viktor Suvorov and the publishing house of the Naval Institute "The chief culprit : Stalins grand design to start World War II." We were deceived in Soviet schools. They said all the time that the USSR, as a peaceful country, was allegedly not ready for war.

@1pierosangiorgio 4 жыл бұрын

fascinating. I'll read this book. by the way, in it, did Mr. Suvorov mention what was the approximate date of the planned soviet attack against Germany?

@jasonpratt5126 4 жыл бұрын

In both Icebreaker and Chief Culprit (the latest books available in English, last I checked), Suvorov estimates that the attack was planned for two weeks after June 22, plus or minus a little perhaps for random events. I think this was mentioned in at least one of the stitched lectures in the video, too, but I haven't watched in a while. I can't read Russian, so I've been unable to catch up with subsequent publications (up through "Defeat" if I recall correctly) to see if he has adjusted this estimate. There are indications in the two latest English editions (both from around 2012) that what he nicknames "Operation Thunderbolt" (not official, just his pet nickname playing on the idea of a Soviet Blitzkrieg) was planned to start on or around June 22nd itself! -- but due to logistic problems in getting the trains carrying the troops and equipment for the sixteen strike armies (i.e. covering armies) on the border, this was delayed a couple of weeks. He provides at least one reference, for example, to the Soviet Baltic Sea surface fleet having already sailed on June 21st, (or perhaps a little earlier, "on the eve of the war"), with orders to start combat operations against "the enemy's lines of communication", and to consider themselves already at war. Notably, the subs at the Lieptya (I've probably mis-spelled that) naval base, with the first and at that time only Soviet Marine Brigade camping nearby (out of defensive arrangement and with no transport ships, so only with a river crossing in mind), were overrun by the Nazi forces starting on the first day (June 22), still stacked in their docks like sardines in a can (an analogy apparently reported by both Nazi and Soviet commanders). So they hadn't sortied with the surface fleet on June 21st or earlier. Their crews weren't even available to try to get the ones in front out in an emergency surge. That's rather odd! -- normally you'd surge the sub fleet first against an enemy's naval supply lines, and follow up with surface raiders, if you've got the subs available. This suggests (1) the Soviets didn't think they'd need the subs to shut down their "enemy" LoC (and of course at the time the only feasible enemy was Germany); and (2) the subs were intended for some different offensive operation at a later time, somewhere that they thought this base would be a safe surge-point from. Naturally this fits Suv's theory that Stalin intended this attack to start the final revolutionary world war which would continue until all the world's resources were brought under direct management of the Communist International through becoming Soviet Republics: the subs weren't expected to be needed against Germany, but against nations farther westward. Anyway, if the largest Soviet fleet had already sailed from the Estonia regions on offensive combat operations against German naval LoCs by June 21st (at the latest), then at the time they sailed the kickoff had to be planned much sooner than two weeks later. (Having read both books since editing together this video, and then taking a break to do some other things, I'm currently in the process of trying to cobble together his material from both books into a chronological order, since Suvorov definitely doesn't do that. Almost done with the material from "Icebreaker", but "Chief Culprit" is a much larger book so while I'll be able to skip over any duplicate information aside from any corrected areas, I'm nowhere near done yet. Once I'm done, and probably after a break, I'll post a series of articles at a couple of "grog" sites for commentary, review, additional information, and/or corrections, and then start producing a video series trying to summarize the chronological case in bite-sized pieces. I expect this to take most of next year, 2020.)

@1pierosangiorgio 4 жыл бұрын

@@jasonpratt5126 thank you. the topic is fascinating and as in the 90's I used to design wargames for the TOAW franchise, I wish I had these infos then to design such an operation!

@jasonpratt5126 4 жыл бұрын

@@1pierosangiorgio The 3rd Decisive Campaigns game, on Barbarossa, explicitly attempts to simulate some of Suvorov's theories. It was meant to be moddable, so you might be able to use that game engine for the same purpose! (Vance Strickland, i.e. Barthheart, who wrote the printed tutorial for DC1, got a taste of some of this while playing against me just after the game's official release, when he, playing as the Germans, would start running up against giant stacks of well-equipped armies suddenly appearing in my backfield -- armies NOT organized for offensive ops. He still won our match, when he cracked my central line after I tried a short blitz against his own rail line. Links to our AARs and our afterchat analysis are conveniently gathered here: grogheads.com/forums/index.php?topic=17083.0

@NicHolayou 3 жыл бұрын

@@jasonpratt5126 Viktor Suvorov should have made a summary at the end of each book, because he has a style of logically leading you to some conclusions, presenting a lot of facts, historical documents. That is, you seem to discover for yourself, logically, what the author does not seem to want to say.

@NicHolayou 3 жыл бұрын

6 july 1941 !

@robertmaybeth3434 2 жыл бұрын

It's a very odd thing to me but, somehow this guy looks exactly like I pictured him after reading his books (in the 1980's, yet).

@pdd60absorbed12 9 ай бұрын

An "icebreaker" model may be argued for the Pacific theater as well.

@NicHolayou 3 жыл бұрын

Viktor Suvorov should have made a summary at the end of each book, because he has a style of logically leading you to some conclusions, presenting a lot of facts, historical documents. That is, you seem to discover for yourself, logically, what the author does not seem to want to say.

@Ardistan667 3 жыл бұрын

What do you mean?

@NicHolayou 3 жыл бұрын

@@Ardistan667 maybe he's scared? He should say clearly and bluntly, not draw our own conclusions! But who wouldn't be afraid to go against the flow?

@Ardistan667 3 жыл бұрын

@@NicHolayou I think he is doing a fine job not to make bold statements about values and virtues, but sticks to the facts. It is in my humble opinion exactly the problem with history today that people refuse to see the obvious because their moral prejudices do not allow for them to see that events such as these are not compatible with a black and white view of history. They are convenient with the idea that Hitler was a mad man who is to blame for everything. It provides a feeling of safety and defends against the notion that maybe bad guys sometimes do the right thing, as it also implies that sometimes the alleged good guys can act sinister. Evaluating national socialist politics in an objective way seems to feel threatening to many people, psychologically. I therefore appreciate that Suvorov does not derail from present cold facts. ''Now the direct opposite of opinion is the Truth; it is Truth before which mere opinion pales.'' - Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

@Tracks777 7 жыл бұрын

When is your next video? :D Keep it up!

@romanm5728 4 жыл бұрын

Хорошее советское произношение!

@user-vc3im3kj5u Жыл бұрын

Этого человека приятно слушать на любом языке, с любым текстом. По праву заслужил. Снимаю шляпу.

@brianr3720 Жыл бұрын

У него отличная личность. Но даже более того, если то, о чем он пишет, верно, мы все должны пересмотреть то, что, как нам казалось, мы знали о прошлом.

@nana-hi2xu 6 жыл бұрын

how do people not know about this?

@jasonpratt5126 6 жыл бұрын

To be fair, some of it is a little controversial, and "Suvorov" overstates his case occasionally. And the rest is actually pretty public knowledge (at least among scholars), e.g. Soviet dispositions before the kickoff of Barbarossa. The overall argument isn't really as controversial as Suvorov sometimes promotes it. On the other hand, some of the controversy is manufactured by people who think this somehow makes Hitler a hero (which is NOT AT ALL Suv's argument) and/or that it somehow belittles the struggles and sacrifices of the Russian people (very much NOT AT ALL Suv's argument). VS's personal perspective amounts to a strike back at Soviet propaganda from the Stalin era (lasting into his day) which promoted the Man of Steel as a hero for opposing Hitler.

@nana-hi2xu 6 жыл бұрын

I remember that I took a class in college on the war and the professor said that Hitler made 2 great blunders, invading the soviet union and declaring war on the usa. It shows how mistaken all of these historians are because invading the soviet union was not a blunder as suvorov points out but actually prevented germany from losing the war in 41. By invading the soviet union in 41 Germany could have defeated the soviet union. Perhaps if the russian citizens didn't put up as much resistance and instead turned on the communist leadership. You could say that the real blunder was signing the non aggression pact. As suvorov says. And as for hitler being a hero. Maybe he was. He won the Iron cross during the war. When he was in his mid twenties. I don't think you or I would be doing that. And lets not forget that even though there is no signed hitler order for killing civilians in the concentration camps hitler came to power in 33. There were no killings at all until 10 years later and that was after Germany was being bombed and millions of German citizens were being killed. The USA burned alive hundreds of thousands if not millions of Japanese civilians with incendiary bombs and 2 nuclear weapons. What is the difference between burning them alive with bombs or killing them with exhaust from a tank engine.

@jasonpratt5126 6 жыл бұрын

I have no intention of defending Hitler's policies, which I think you're somewhat misrepresenting. But an accurate analysis of Suvorov's argument depends first on getting his details right and much (not all) resistance to it involves the implication that Suvorov was arguing that Hitler was morally justified in attacking Stalin and the Soviets (and the Russian people in front of them) first, and even that Hitler's regime was a peacefully defensive one. Neither of those are Suv's positions at all. That his arguments are occasionally appealed to by Hitler's apologists, who naturally reject Suv's positions about Hitler being a mafiosa crocodile and an evil man (like Stalin, per Suv), is irrelevant to an analysis of Suv's own arguments. As I occasionally have to point out elsewhere, aggressive murderers can launch pre-emptive strikes when they think they're in danger, too. The concepts (of "Hitler is evil" and "Hitler defended with a pre-emptive strike") are not mutually exclusive. Unfortunately, the marketing for the books sometimes goes so far as to claim that Hitler was not to blame for WW2, a claim Suvorov's own argument denies: mutually competitive responsibility, with Hitler being a rebellious and treacherous puppet, does not exonerate Hitler. How much Suvorov has his own responsibility for misleading but spiced-up marketing about his books from his publishers, I don't know.

@nana-hi2xu 6 жыл бұрын

Hitler was not to blame at all. Hitler was a symptom or a reaction to a problem. The problem was communist expansion or conspiracy. At that time there were many bombings and assignations. If you recall the night of broken glass occurred because of the assignation of a German diplomat and a communist also burned the Reichstag. The communists managed to take over all of Russia and almost took over Spain if not for a civil war there. So the communists come to power by killing millions of people and the nazi came to power through a peaceful election. Which they also try to cover up as well.

@econogate 5 жыл бұрын

yes its funny when you try to explain to people what really happened and they just get discombobulated and recite some book they read 30 years ago.

@russmonsanto5359 3 жыл бұрын

22,841 recording; 15256 Mhz Ukichi.

@markgonzales8778 4 жыл бұрын

It is a curiosity that up to the point of operation barbarossa the germans were flawless in there tactics .This invasion never made sense without first securing their western front .They weren't stupid almost seems to make sense that they were forced to take the offensive before ready .Would explain the quick encirclement of large Russian forces unprepared for a defensive operation .Not saying it's TRUE or not seems to make sense though and honestly so much is suspect on written history .Ide like to hear from some of the Russian infantry that were on the front if they are still alive .Question everything and take all things into consideration so many lies so much deception

@jasonpratt5126 4 жыл бұрын

Mark, Suvorov in his books quotes extensively from the memoirs and other primary docs, of officers from Colonel upward, talking about what they were doing (or more often chatting about what other officers were doing) in the leadup to Barbarossa. This doesn't come through well in his lectures, unfortunately. He notes a peculiarity that in memoirs and interviews, officers don't talk nearly as much about June 22nd and the opening days of Barbarossa, compared to June 21st, or especially June 13th (when the final strategic movement to the western border kicked off), or even May 5th and 6th (when Stalin took public leadership of the USSR and sent out the M-Day Red Packets to all general level officers -- something else his lectures don't include.)

@jasonpratt5126 4 жыл бұрын

As for Hitler's intentions, Suvorov up through the 2012 edition of Chief Culprit (at least, I haven't read the subsequent books because I can't read Russian and they haven't been translated) doesn't understand why Hitler would try such a suicidal gamble doomed to failure. But Suv also occasionally emphasizes that Hitler almost won several times, and that Stalin's government was on the brink of falling several times! -- and he passes along enough bits of information to build a picture of what Hitler and his generals were really trying to do: in Hitler's famous saying (repeated several times), kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crumbling down. Their goal was to inflict so much damage on (what they thought were) all of Stalin's armed forces, while those forces were in their most vulnerable alignments, to inspire a general uprising against Stalin's tyranny, overthrowing his government, and so ending any organized threat to the Romanian oil for the foreseeable future. Thus they planned and hoped they could achieve their goals in three weeks, on two weeks of supplies! They had some vague handwavy plans beyond that, ideally setting up long-range bombing fields on the eastern side of the Volga, to keep the Urals and areas east of that from organizing again into a counter-invasion, but those plans were years away.

@markgonzales8778 4 жыл бұрын

@@jasonpratt5126 amazing it appears that Hitler was a gambler of epic proportions. Still his officers were masters of war surely they tried to dissuade him pride was his enemy maybe who knows one things for sure there is always a lot more behind the scenes going on and many times we only know a fraction of the truth .Thanks for you're response I love history

@jasonpratt5126 4 жыл бұрын

@@markgonzales8778 Mark Gonzales Yep, an epic gamble -- and one which almost worked! But he felt like he had no choice but to take the gamble, because Stalin had maneuvered him into either ceding Romania (and thus becoming an overt puppet for Stalin at best), or else trying to protect Romania. Suvorov, by the way, regarded this as a fatal mistake for Stalin! -- I mean provoking Hitler with the half-step toward the oil (by taking Bessarabia and northern Bukhovina.) But in context of Suv's own arguments, Stalin's reasoning seems clear enough: he was goading Hitler into lining up all his own forces on the border so that Stalin would be the one to catch them out of defensive formation. It was a high-stakes gamble on either side, though Stalin had far, far more preparation for it. And both of them lost their gambles, in the long run. Stalin's real misjudgment was that he expected Hitler to try to conquer and control western Russia, which Hitler did intend to do but not from this operation. Consequently, even up to the early pre-dawn of June 22nd, Stalin and his pre-GRU chief Golikov were dead certain that Hitler was not yet going to pull the trigger to invade, because neither of them had seen any signs of preparation to hold onto western Russia yet.

@markgonzales8778 4 жыл бұрын

@@jasonpratt5126 interesting what are you're thoughts on his decision to abandon was it the 6th army in stalingrad when they probably could of broke out .

@bluedot6933 Жыл бұрын

Hitler should have let Danzig go. Instead of fighting the west he should have set up more defense against the Soviet Union. He had to just outlive Stalin.

@jasonpratt5126 Жыл бұрын

I'm not sure he could have had defense enough to stop everything Stalin was preparing to throw against him; but if Britain and the US could team up with Stalin, they could have possibly teamed up with Hitler against Stalin. True, the Holocaust was God-awful, but Stalin was doing as bad or arguably worse, and for longer. (Though this was less obvious at the time, and more of an equal-opportunity super-murderer.)

@PikeBishop1 Жыл бұрын

@@jasonpratt5126 Churchill never mentioned anything about a Holocaust in his many thousands of pages worth of memoirs. Literally not one word.

@jasonpratt5126 Жыл бұрын

@@PikeBishop1 He doesn't talk about it a lot in his autobiography of the war, but in a July 14th 1944 note to his foreign secretary he insists on not obstructing attempts by the Jews to flee being murdered by "the Huns" in Greece even if that means letting one of the local Marxist revolutionary groups profit from their escape (and descends into sarcasm against anyone trying to obstruct this.) A few days earlier, 11th July 44, to his same Foreign Secretary, Churchill wrote, "There is no doubt that this," meaning the persecution of Jews in Hungary which had been recently discovered by advancing allied troops (as he clarifies in his own bracketed statement, replying to a prior telegram on the topic), "is probably the greatest and most horrible crime ever committed in the whole history of the world, and it has been done by nominally civilized men in the name of a great State and one of the leading races of Europe. It is quite clear that all concerned in this crime who may fall into our hands, including the people who only obeyed orders by carrying out the butcheries, should be put to death after their association with the murders has been proved." He distinguishes this from the ordinary mistreatment one might find in a wartime prisoners' camp, "as, for instance, the lack of feeding or sanitary conditions," and concluded accordingly: "There should therefore, in my opinion, be no negotiations of any kind on this subject. Declarations should be made in public, so that everyone connected with it will be hunted down and put to death." It was in this context that throughout July 1944, Churchill advocated the creation of a Jewish Brigade under British command, sent first to Italy to gain experience fighting Germans there, and then later to join the advance into concentration camp territories. For example, to the Secretary of State for War, 26th July 1944, "I like the idea of the Jews trying to get at the murderers of their fellow-countrymen in Central Europe, and I think it would give a great deal of satisfaction in the United States. [...] I believe it is the wish of the Jews themselves to fight the Germans anywhere. It is with the Germans they have their quarrel." Thus, don't send them to fight the Japanese, for example! "I will consult the King about this," which Churchill reporting the telegram in his memoirs explains, "[proposal that the force should have its own flag]. I cannot conceive why this martyred race, scattered about the world and suffering as no other race has ever done at this juncture, should be denied the satisfaction of having a flag." He alludes to it elsewhere in other ways; and I don't know why he doesn't talk about it more openly in his war memoirs, but he does talk about it -- and he's pitiless against its perpetrators, even if they were only following orders. Why you're bringing Churchill into this when his contemporaries at the time wrote about it, Shirer for example in his classic Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (composed when C was writing his war memoirs), and Albert Speer among the Nazis in his autobiography, I have no idea.

@PikeBishop1 Жыл бұрын

@@jasonpratt5126 Yes I apologize, I have no idea where the first *large* half of my comment went. I noticed it was missing when I got the notification, I had a lot prefacing the Churchill comment. I don't disagree with what you said per se, but I will try to retype my initial comment when I get time.

@mrd7067 Жыл бұрын

California Digital newspaper collection Madera Tribune, Volume LXXIV, Number 98, 24 August 1939 POLE GUNS FIRE ON DANZIG PLANE German Planes Detour to Avoid Attack DANZIG, Aug. 24. -Early morning bathers reported today that Polish guns fired 10 shots at a Danzig sports airplane and that shell fragments fell in the streets of Zoppot, in free city territory. The German Lufthansa company abandoned direct airplane service, across the Pomorze area of Poland, separating Germany proper from East Prussia and Danzig. Planes were detourned over the Baltic as the result of today’s and yesterday’s alleged Polish firing on German planes.

@hugbug4408 2 жыл бұрын

What puzzles me is that Stalin did sum major damage to his officer corp. in his bloody purges of the general staff before , and during the ww2! I couldn't see this attack by the Soviets as successful , because his officer corp delpleted from purges , non - training usage of Stalins , very much , up to date armour(t-34 and Kv-1s) . They weren't adroit in the stategic uses their capablities had , until Zhukov !

@jasonpratt5126 2 жыл бұрын

Suvorov has a lot more official information about those purges in his books, even the two English ones. The overly short answer is that the officer purges, scary as they were, actually amounted to very few of his officers being taken permanently out of play -- and a large proportion of those were going to be gone anyway for other, normal reasons (even by the standards of a tyrannical supervillain), such as retirement, disorderly conduct, crime (normal crime like sexual assault not crimes against Stalin), or even being moved laterally over to state department jobs where the former officers better fit into their organizational strengths. The political fatalities mostly amounted to getting rid of Tukhachevsky and his allies, and even then there were limits. In slightly more detail, according to Soviet sources reported to Stalin and the Politburo during 40 or 41 (I'd have to look at the source compilations), only about 20% of the officer corps was removed in total during the entire Purge. That's absolutely everyone, including officers who would normally be removed due to typical job attrition (as noted above). The raw numbers look freakishly large compared to any other army in the world, but, well, insert a Russian numbers joke here! -- in Soviet Russia, fourteen thousand officers is just a statistic! The vast majority of officers arrested on Stalin's political gamesmanship, survived their ordeal, and starting in 1940 they began to be released from prison and re-integrated back into armed forces command (Rokkosovsky being perhaps the most famous). By June 21st, 1941, practically every one of those officers (with very few exceptions within a percentage point) was back in command, sometimes with one or two levels of rank reduction, sometimes with a promotion, mostly back where they came from. This was obscured however by Stalin having meanwhile instituted a new command structure for "generals" instead of "commanders", with new uniforms, insignia, titles, etc. Some of the released officers were immediately shifted over to the new system, but most of them were reinstated under the old system, from which many of them were eventually rewarded for performance by being shifted over to the new rank system. (This has a lot of connection to the famous "Black Corps".) Suv cites official Soviet reports in detail, as well as memoirs of commanders for a ground-level view of what happened. Regarding the training, and being adroit at strategic usage, Suvorov cites many sources and memoirs (including Zhukov, also including assessments by Nazi generals) to demonstrate that the Soviet command structure in the early hours of June 22nd were at the top of their game, and their troops had been constantly and rigorously trained. That wasn't the problem -- the problem was, in a word, crippling over-specialization about what they were gearing up for, training constantly for, being equipped for, and strategically preparing for. The Nazis could make adjustments much better on the fly according to new situations -- and had also trained and geared much the same way as the Soviets to take advantage of the opening hours of their enemy being caught out of position. The example of Stalin's son being captured as a junior artillery officer comes to mind: he and his peers had been given excellent training, excellent equipment, and excellent maps, for supporting a blitz into Nazi territory. They had been given no training, no plans, and no maps, for defending Soviet Russia.

@TheBorakai 6 жыл бұрын

После 30 лет жизни в Британии такой ужасный английский? Да был ли Резун разведчиком?

@user-vk1tn4fm7o 2 жыл бұрын

Съ 1-го апрѣля по 1-го сентября 1939 г. въ Дaнцизгскомъ коpидорѣ пoляки yбили 58000 нѣмцeвъ. Германія много разъ обращалась въ Лигу Нaцій съ требованіями: Остановить пoльскій теpроръ, но отвѣтомъ было только молчаніе, поэтому, Германіи ничего не оставалось кромѣ, какъ силой Веpмахта остановить терроръ изъ Пoльши, а каpтaвые ни слова объ этомъ не говорятъ. Къ вoйнѣ привела бездарная и наглая политика oбpѣзаннаго _дe6ила_ сpалина. Лѣтомъ 1940 г. во время усмиренія Вермахтомъ Франціи, _Jеwгaшвили_ исподтишка напалъ на Румынію, нагло оторвавъ отъ нее Бессарабію и Буковину и, опасно приблизившись на 140 км къ нефтянымъ вышкамъ въ г. Плоешти, угрожая разбомбить ихъ, это была единственная нефть доступная тогда Райху. Вотъ, поэтому Фюреръ, защищаясь, и не будучи готовъ къ такой войнѣ, напалъ первымъ на aнглiйскую шeстёрку сдaлина. Ну, а совки умылись кровью за такую бездарную политику _Jеwгaшвили._ kzfaq.info/get/bejne/bN17aKV23tLcg4E.html histoire-image.org/sites/default/complot-juif.jpg aif.ru/society/history/osnovnye_zavody_byli_kupleny_za_granicey_kto_koval_industrializaciyu_sssr

@mrd7067 Жыл бұрын

@@user-vk1tn4fm7o Not to forget things like: California Digital newspaper collection Madera Tribune, Volume LXXIV, Number 98, 24 August 1939 POLE GUNS FIRE ON DANZIG PLANE German Planes Detour to Avoid Attack DANZIG, Aug. 24. -Early morning bathers reported today that Polish guns fired 10 shots at a Danzig sports airplane and that shell fragments fell in the streets of Zoppot, in free city territory. The German Lufthansa company abandoned direct airplane service, across the Pomorze area of Poland, separating Germany proper from East Prussia and Danzig. Planes were detourned over the Baltic as the result of today’s and yesterday’s alleged Polish firing on German planes.

@barbrokjelkerud 10 ай бұрын

Skitsnack!!!

@mirkovic 2 жыл бұрын

Mmm so Anna Frank was a agoraphobic after all! Any more re-writing mate? How about the American Civil war being about Northern aggression and it had nothing to do with slavery??

@dominiks9961 2 жыл бұрын

Exactly, just like Jesus being black and Africa having the first civilization.

@jasonpratt5126 2 жыл бұрын

Absolutely nothing in Suvorov's Icebreaker theory involves Holocaust denial. On the contrary, he acknowledges it while comparing and contrasting with Stalin's gulag strategies. This is why he declares, in the two lectures I stitched together above, that Hitler and Stalin are both cannibals. Nor have I ever once denied the Holocaust anywhere, ever, including here. (But perhaps you were replying to someone else in another thread.)

@mrd7067 Жыл бұрын

@@typopit6117 Anne Frank’s Diary Now Has a Co-Author and Extended Copyright. If i remember right her father had to pay someone else for copyright back in the day. Hearing of Anne Frank i have always to thing of Ellie Wiesel book night and there especially the differences in the translatons of his french and english to his german version.

@brianr3720 Жыл бұрын

@@mrd7067 Anne Franks diary is not authentic: kzfaq.info/get/bejne/a6yHfbmL38nHcqs.html

@brianr3720 Жыл бұрын

@@jasonpratt5126 Just because Suvarov is telling us something amazing here, that doesn't mean he is telling us the Truth in all aspects about WW2. If tells the Truth about the Holahoax, it's possible they will allow his book "Icebreakers" (and all succeeding books) to be published. If you think about it, he didn't mention the Central banks either (one of the main reasons that led to the war for Germany), but that doesn't mean they didn't play a major role, right? Sometimes, you can only share one piece of the puzzle at a time...