It's getting pathic how little work these types of channels put into their efforts but still have decent sub and view numbers. Can I recommend a newish channel with the content creature not only make an effort but is more than willing to accept critism and use it to improve his work? www.youtube.com/@Aircraft_Files/videos Check out his video on the Bristol Beaufighter and look over the comments, then check out his video on the Bristol Blenhiem. He took the critism from viewer and applied it to his last video, massive improvement. He's a newish channel and deserves more sub then he has.

It was a night fighter.

@@williamacree1558 only later in the war......they are using total loss figures to make up their ratio's......subtract the bomber losses from the total the ratio would improve greatly as the biggest threat to them at night was Mosquito night intruders or their own flak as the defensive armament of the British heavies was rather lacking. Yes a few were lost to the gunners on those heavies, but more were lost to Mossie's.

Hayabusa was Obsolete by 1943, thus, it was equally matched against P40/F4Ffighters, which also became obsolete by 1943.

Fairly Battle? It may have been crap, but it’s a [light] bomber not a fighter.

Leave her alone she's the tigger girl

You forced my to change my post.....Damn your eyes.......

Yes, it was. A Heavy Fighter like the ME 110.

@@patrickmccrann991 You mean the Do-17? No she was a bomber that was pressed into service as a night fighter much like the Bristol Blenhiem was due to lack of adequate oppotions. The ME-110 was designed from the get-go to be a heavy bomber escort fighter, but was soon pushed out of that role after it became apparent she, 2nd only to the Stuka, was little more than easy meat for Hurricanes and Spitfires to gnaw on during the Battle of Britian. Instead of defending bomber formations over England, they had to form up in flying defensive circle and try to get the hell out of Dodge. She did make a fairly decent night fighter and a fast ground attack ight bomber on the eastern front.

@@gumpyoldbugger6944 No, Potez 63. She was very similar to the ME 110.

@@patrickmccrann991 ah okay....when talking about a number of models, its best to say which one you are talking about. The Potez 63 was bit of a Frankenstein monster in her design specs. She was suppose to be a figher leader, directing more agile single engine fighters while staying out the furball herself, a recce machine, a light bomber and nighter fighter....a true jack of all trades and an absolute master of none. Apart from the light attack and recce roles, she was pretty much hopeless.

by the logic of this video the B17 and B24 were terrible due to their losses to fighters...LOL

Because it shot down a lot of aircraft.

the aircraft is obsolete and there were only 12 peashooters operated there

The Type97 of Japan beat the P51 flown by the Thailand Airforce. Surprise !!

@@hose6282 Weren't they also used at Midway Island and suffered heavy loses during the initial Japanese attack causing the Japanese to assume there were no USN carriers in the area which lead them to be caught swapping out torpedo's for bomb on their aircraft while on their decks when the USN caught them with their knickers down around their ankles.....

​@gumpyoldbugger6944 No, those were Brewster Buffalos not P-26s. There were no Army fighters at Midway, only Marine F4F Wildcats and Brewster Buffalos.

@@patrickmccrann991 Ah right, you are correct.......didn't the Buffalo replace the Peashooter? Even though the Buffalo was long out out of date, obsolete and out-classed, the Finns made good use of them against the Soviets.

Similar things could be said of the Polish PLZ fighters. The stats seem to suggest that they downed slightly more Luftwaffe planes than their overall losses in September 1939, but once you subtract the planes destroyed on the ground, you get something more like an 8-10 kills to singular losses, which is very impressive.

what almost all of these show is that the training of the Luftwaffe was generally better than the French and Russians at the start of the war. It also shows that if you want to compare kill ratios for bombers against fighters, the bomber will always lose. Another important note is that French and German tactical concepts were vastly different. The French in particular had massive problems with their entire aviation industry which could not provide aircraft in the numbers a modern air force required. That was compounded with an incomprehensible air doctrine that could never work and a command structure for their air force that was both inflexible and subordinate to the army. For the British, although the Fairey was obsolete and useless by 1940, it was obvious the British knew that and had already moved on from the single engine bomber concept. Their decision to keep Spitfires and more modern bombers in GB and not deploy them to France is part of the reason it appears to be so poor, but it seems that the British knew it was inferior and accepted that until more modern designs could be produced, they would get what they could out of it. As for the Japanese, they went into the war with great Naval Aviation machines, men, doctrine and tactics. However, their industry and training pipeline could not cope with attrition and rapid US production. During the war, the Japanese Army's aviation was far less effective and far less useful outside China/Far East areas where they flew against truly ancient machines for the era.

Late Russian designs were more than a match for ME's or FW's......on the western front, most battles were fought at high attitudes, on the eastern front they were fought at low attitudes.....which is one of the reasons the Soviets were not very impressed with the Spitfires when they got them as they were more geared to the med to high combat areana and not the low one they were fighting in.

@@CB-vt3mx Deutscher, 60. Es gibt vielerlei Gründe für die überraschenden Anfangserfolge der Wehrmacht zu Beginn des Krieges. Ich denke, dass die Alliierten zwar einen neuerlichen Krieg haben herauf ziehen sehen, aber ihn zu diesem frühen Zeitpunkt für völlig unwahrscheinlich hielten. Noch im Frühjahr 1938 etwa wäre jeder britische Marineoffizier, der zum damaligen Zeitpunkt in der "Kriegsmarine" einen ernstzunehmenden Gegner gesehen hätte, wohl seines Postens wegen Inkompetenz enthoben worden und auch die französischen Landstreitkräfte brauchten ihren potenziellen Gegner nicht wirklich zu fürchten. Die mangelnde wirtschaftliche Leistungsfähigkeit des 3. Reiches versprach einfach keinen schnellen Aufbau einer deutschen Marine oder eines größeren deutschen Heeres in den nächsten Jahren. Eine wirkliche Bedrohung und damit ein Krieg in den nächsten Jahren war allein aus praktischer Sicht unwahrscheinlich. In der Folge des Münchener Abkommen, dass die schrittweise Besetzung Tschechiens möglich machte, änderte sich dies dramatisch, da sich die gesamte Ausrüstung des tschechischen Heeres und auch die dortige Rüstungsindustrie angeeignet werden konnte, was die Kampfstärke deutsche Armee innerhalb weniger Monate um ca. 30 % vergrößerte. Weiter wurde zwar der Aufbau einer modernen, deutschen Luftwaffe registriert, aber über dessen Ausmaß und deren generellen Bedeutung in einem zukünftigen Krieg waren sich die damaligen Militärs auf allen Seiten uneinig, denn eigentlich nirgendwo war der Ausbau einer Luftwaffe personell und materiell als wirklich gleichberechtigte Teilstreitkraft vorangetrieben worden. Außer unter Hermann Göring, dem es als zweite Spitze im national-sozialistischen Staat eben möglich war, einen gewaltigen Teil des 1934 einsetzenden, gewaltigen Aufrüstungsprogramms in die Luftwaffe fließen zu lassen, mit dem klaren Ziel, mit dieser neuen Waffe wirklich Krieg zu führen. Die deutsche Luftwaffe war deshalb zu Beginn des Krieges an den entscheidenden Fronten als einzige Teilstreitkraft denen ihrer Gegner technisch und oft auch zahlenmäßig deutlich überlegen. Vor allem hatten Heer und Luftwaffe im spanischen Bürgerkrieg ihre Zusammenarbeit unter Kampfbedingungen erproben können und konnten dieses Wissen 1939/40 gleich anwenden, wohingegen die alliierten Luftwaffen ca. zwei Jahre dieser Entwicklung hinterherhinkten. Bis weit in das Jahr 1942 sollte die gesamte deutsche Kriegsführung von dieser Überlegenheit in der Luft profitieren.