thank you for this video! I'm a first year uni student studying philosophy and this was a really helpful video!

Would be cool if you besides hard determinism also cover the position that holds both determinism and indeterminism as incompatible with free will (Hard Incompatibilism (coined by Derk Pereboom).

I struggle to get behind Wolf's ideas. With a theory revolving around morality it will forever struggle in becoming widely adopted and accepted; (look, here I am disagreeing for example) what does she mean when insisting our moral nature has to be the 'correct' moral nature in order to be free? In layman's terms, what is the correct moral nature? Why is it correct? Who/what is the moral authority?

Even if we accept hard determinism, we're probably going to have to come up with new term that means free (in the compatibilist sense). So we might as well cut out the middle man and just start using "free" that way.

P1) The observable universe has been accurately modeled by deterministic and probabilistic processes, in which emergent properties have resulted in dissipative structures capable of interacting with the environment in new ways. P2) Such dissipative structures include vortexes, single and multicellular life, and the neurological dual-process structure necessary to observe and hypothesize P1. P3) Free will begins when intrinsic motivations (to give and receive reasons with intellectual honesty) align with extrinsic motivations (to do as little as needed to survive and as much as you can to grow); it grows as a person refines the accuracy of their conceptual models and ultimately results in the improvization and discovery of metacognitive strategies which are strictly dominant for the individual (P2), resulting in the emergence of higher (cognitive) structures (P1).

Did Carneades ever cover 'chemical determinism' about human and considerably all animal actions? And btw I'm a sort of compatibilist (as intuitively I believe there's some control and sometimes not) I'm just looking for ways to argue what I mean by it. - Your Quality Apologist

Yup 😁

So can you clarify: on Wolf's view, is it not sufficient that you merely *think* that you have good reasons to do something, and that you are able to actually act according to what you think are the best reasons (rather than say, doing something you think you oughtn't do because you feel compelled or such)? Do the reasons you think are good ones have to *actually be* good ones? I've always thought of Frankfurt and Wolf's views as in the same general ballpark, and in my own philosophy I actually identify a second-order volition (which I term an "intention", as opposed to a "desire") as the very same thing as a "moral belief": belief more generally being self-judgement of one's first-order perceptions, which always might be wrong, so a belief is a judgement that such a perception is or isn't the right or wrong thing to perceive (e.g. you perceive a puddle of water in the desert, but because you know about mirages, you don't *believe* that there is really a puddle of water there). And a desire on my account is basically a "perception that something is good", which always might be wrong, so a "moral belief"/intention is a self-judgement of one's first-order desires, concluding that what you desire is or isn't the right thing to desire. Since those self-judgements all involve both a second-order cognition (self-awareness) and second-order volition (self-control), that makes action driven by moral belief identical to action driven by second-order volition, at least on my account of moral belief. I always thought that my view was compatible with both Frankfurt's and Wolf's, but if Wolf insists that your moral beliefs have to be *correct* in order to be free, then I guess not. And I'm not sure how we could ever know whether or not anyone ever had free will on Wolf's account in that case, since there's (on any reasonable epistemology) always some question as to whether the things we currently believe are true or not.

What are good reasons to be skeptical of compatibilism?

I object to claiming that incompatibilism is "more intuitive" or that compatibilism "redefines" free will. We had some notion of freedom of will already way back when Aristotle first posted the Problem of Future Contingents; in order to even ask "would a fixed future undermine our freedom?" we needed to already have some folk concept of freedom. Even today, in my experience with freshmen philosophy students who haven't studied any of this yet, there's a split between compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions. Furthermore, compatibilism was the dominant, default position of most philosophers since... at least some time in the Modern Era, until Van Inwagen gave some life back to incompatibilism. Bottom line, before we can ask whether determinism would undermine free will, we have to have some notion of what we mean by free will. If you just define free will as freedom from determinism, then sure, we can only have free will if we are not determined... but then also, electrons get free will under quantum physics. Is that really an intuitive concept of "free will" if it's something that applies to fundamental particles that don't even have brains?

Compatibilsts redefine the concept of "free will" so it can exist within a Deterministic world. 1.Classical Compatibilism - One is free if he can do what he wants, if he can achieve his goals without impediment. 2.Hierarchical Comppatobilism - Fallacy. 3.Reason Compatibilism - "In order to be free, you must be acting in accordance to what is actually true and morally good." Umm, so if I cheat to win money, I am suddenly less free than the person who got cheated? This whole definition is bad and wrong throughout, not only at the point of morality.

free = nothing left to lose

My brother in Christ, that free will diverging path diagram made of words looks like a womans holy of holies.

I feel like there is an element of truth in all three of these types of compatiblism. Why can’t we have meta-compatiblism that justifies the three types together?

The Frankfurt examples are obviously wrong. No idea why philosphers have fallen for this. Jones could have done otherwise in the relevant sense. He could have gone through a process in which Black intervened. If so he would not have been morally responsible for Taylor's death.

Compatibilism doesn't make any sense no matter how much I hear about it. They want to deny the second premise while agreeing to the first premise which I feel has a lot of problems off hand there. For one, the reason compatibilism wants to talk about people's desire lining up, as if a desire is still not a pre-determined factor of the laws of the universe. If hard determinism is true, our actions and thoughts are pre-determined, so we don't have "true" and "free" desires as well. They just want to blame people for actions they take because......reasons.

All miss the actual point. Where is the chain of strict causality broken in which can be inserted some unfettered, uncaused cause that whatever "I" am has free control over? Even if I can do what I want, preceding causes over which I had no control determine what I want. Where is the "free will" in that chain?

bring on the trolls. KEvron

your very first remarks show a belittling biased view of compatibilism ( certainly not steel manning it)

Compatibilism is a lot more incoherent than i remember it to be. These three verities are excellent examples of self-delusion and conceit.