Thanks! And thanks for watching!

Hello dear body ,I also lean towards causal determinism matched with a little human's free willed choices. The life is blend of causally determined happenings and states and our own behaviour towards them which is stemming from our free will ,but many a times swayed by all these causally determined happenings and states near us.

Since no explanation has been forthcoming, I guess I'll just retype the comment again, from memory: it is not the case that particles-as-waves have a uncertain position while particles-as-particles have uncertain momentum, as you claim. Waves of any form, even macroscopic ocean surface waves, have position-momentum uncertainty; this is not a specifically quantum phenomenon, other than saying "all particles are waves". (I linked to another video about this in my first post; maybe that's why it got deleted? Search for "sixty symbols uncertainty principle"). You need to sample many wave crests to accurately determine wavelength (which is what momentum is in quantum physics), so the more accurately you measure wavelength, the more spread-out a position you have to be accounting for, and so the less well-measured the position. Conversely, the more accurately you measure the position, the fewer crests you can sample, and the less accurately you can measure wavelength. This is even true of e.g. a guitar note, the example used in the aforementioned video: a short chug on a guitar has a broader frequency spectrum but a more specific time it happens at, while a long note has a more specific frequency but is spread out over time. Where the "quantum" part and wave-particle duality comes in is that macroscopic waves are continuous, and can come in any frequency, while quantum waves can only exist as integer numbers of wave crests that are themselves integer multiples of the shortest possible wavelength. It's that discreteness that makes them particle-like.

Hmm. There's a distinction to be made between the arguments of Pyrrhonian skepticism and the position of Pyrrhonian skepticism. The arguments can be used to attack any specific epistemic claim, but the overall position would be skeptical of the justification for epistemic relativism, i.e. how do you justify the claim that specific claims are relatively true. The IEP has a great comparison of skepticism and epistemic relativism. iep.utm.edu/skepanci/#SSH3civ

Well but that doesn't actually speak in favor of Libertarianism at all. If some microparticles behave randomly, that doesn't give you any more agency in the decisions you're making. The world might not be 100% deterministic but you still don't have any more agency, since physics behaving in a random way is no more under you agency than if physics behaves randomly.

@Eleftherios Epikuridis Hi again. I've got another counter to your argument. This one comes from philosopher John Searle, and you can see him explain it yourself in a video called "Philosophy of Free Will" or something like that. Just search John Searle and the title here on KZfaq and it should come up. Anyways, I'll summarize it for you: He basically states that this kind of argument (the one you just made) is commiting the fallacy of composition. There are many instances in which something that is made out of basic elements inherit properties from said elements without inheriting all properties from the same elements or sometimes give rise to new properties. As an example: atoms are not individually wet, water is made of nothing but atoms so water cannot be wet. Is something like the argument you made. In the case of consciousness, it would have to be the case that the mind inherits the parts of quantum physics that give rise to indeterminacy without inheriting the parts that give rise to randomness, thereby laying the groundwork for a conceivable framework for free will. Again, I will say that my only goal is to try to show that a libertarian perspective of the will is worth consideration and that it shouldn't be dismissed entirely as people tend to do.

@@hessylaguna5415 That's actually a pretty interesting Argument, and I'd say the argument of composition is true, in so far that single atoms are not concious, a mind is though. But it makes no sense that a brain should suddenly not be subject to causual chains, just because Atoms on a micro level behave probabilistically. No matter whether physical processes are deterministic or probabilistic, in both cases you have no agency over what is happening.

@Eleftherios Epikuridis I'm going to respond line by line. First, you recognized where the fallacy was, you even gave a good example with the conscious atoms which is awesome. Next you say that just because atoms behave indeterminately does not mean that the brain can, even though the brain is made of these atoms. I ask then, why not? What doesn't make sense? Why could the brain not inherit the indeterminacy of these atoms? Then you basically just re-stated the same argument again with the same fallacy as before even though you recognized it earlier. Given my previous example here's how it reads as: "No matter whether the molecule is made from oxygen or hydrogen, with both atoms you still don't get a liquid" So it feels like you both understand and misunderstand what I was trying to say and I don't know whats confusing you.

@@eleftheriosepikuridis9110 Well, the quantum argument is not meant to prove free will itself, but disprove determinism. If the universe is not deterministic, it opens the possibility of free will.

Yes, i think a good analogy is a "class" in computer software development languages. A decision may be called 'free' when the outcome is dependent on the properties of a specific instance of a class, rather than solely dependent on properties of the class itself.

Thanks, but I think you are incorrect. Heisenberg assumed (unjustifiably) that measurement = meaning, in other words if you cannot measure some X, then that X is meaningless. Here's the SEP: "he adopted an operational assumption: terms like “the position of a particle” have meaning only if one specifies a suitable experiment by which “the position of a particle” can be measured. We will call this assumption the “measurement=meaning principle”." It is the act of measuring that causes us to not be able to determine the momentum and position, not an actual fact that it lacks both properties. In fact Heisenberg himself admits as much saying that the position and velocity can be calculated in the past. Here's the SEP quoting Heisenberg: "A solution to this problem can again be found in the Chicago Lectures. Heisenberg admits that position and momentum can be known exactly. He writes: 'If the velocity of the electron is at first known, and the position then exactly measured, the position of the electron for times previous to the position measurement may be calculated. For these past times, δpδq is smaller than the usual bound.' " Furthermore, clearly the measurement=meaning assumption appears false. We cannot measure the number of organisms that were alive exactly 1,000 years ago, but that does not mean that the concept is nonsense. Just because you cannot measure something does not mean it does not exist.

@@CarneadesOfCyrene Yes, I've noticed that the Copenhagen interpretation has gone out of vogue. And I see where you're coming from. But I think that that's not the correct interpretation of the theory, because it seems to imply almost a Kantian "noumenal vs phenomenal" (or however it's spelled) view of physics. Bohr and his followers held that when we say "position and momentum" we're projecting a priori assumptions upon physical reality, and quanta don't adhere to those. Oh! And I should mention that yes, the position and momentum of a particle IN THE PAST can be known, yes. But not "now".

I really hope I'm not being "that guy" here, but I should clarify what I'm saying. Okay. Yes. You can say what the position and momentum of a particle was in the past, but that cannot be used to PREDICT where it's at and how it's moving right now. And that's not because of measurement. It's due to the wave/particle problem. That's how electrons and protons and such "tunnel". There's a measurable probability they could be either here, on the Moon, or across a solid wall, right after you figured out they were right in front of you a minute ago. THAT'S what I'm saying. Quantum theory is indeterminate in that elementary particles aren't billiard balls, nor are they ocean waves either. And no amount of precise or even superhuman measurements can change that

Fate can only be recognized after it's done. Some people pretend to be able to see the accurate future, but really we can't. Determinism is directly connected to the chain of causality.

Well I mean really a toaster as an individual thing does not exist, and neither do you. This is a perfectly reasonable position to hold, why try to someohow insert the idea of individual toasters and free wills into that? Sure it might not be as handy of a worldview as believing in toasters and free will but really that's not the goal of metaphysics...

Yes but quantum particles behaving in a probabilistic instead of a determinstic fashion doesn't give you any more agency over your free will. It might attack the claim that the universe is determinist but that doesn't mean free will suddenly exists because microparticles behave randomly. Also: You have no agency in randomness, so this isn't introducing any more free will. The point of free will determinism still stands. Microparticles are unimportant to the fact that your will is conditioned by your other forces which you cannot control, whether those be random or deterministic doesn't matter.

@@eleftheriosepikuridis9110 Probability is not randomness. plato.stanford.edu/entries/chance-randomness/ Are there more than two possibilities, ie, determinism or free agency? Can a conscious being affect the probabilities of the processes happening in their brain and thereby affect consciousness itself? Can you accept determinism and not reductionism?

@@PhokenKuul Well even with Probability, you don't have Agency over the outcome. You're wholly subject to whatever the particles wanna do any way, whether they are acting deterministically or probabilistically, you do not control either.

@@eleftheriosepikuridis9110 Are there more than two possibilities other than determinism or free agency? Can you accept determinism and not reductionism? How do particles "wanna do"? Who is this "you" that is controlling or failing to control and where does it come from?

Interesting claim. Are you saying that the reason we can't know that determinism is true is because it is possible that we are not determined before birth or after death? If so, it is a view with a high metaphysical burden to bear. It might address some of determinism's concerns about physicalism, but it will still have to address the issues of the principle of sufficient reason etc. that plague libertarianism, not to mention proving life before and after death. All of that said, from the epistemic standpoint this weakens the case for determinism, which would bear the burden of showing that all life is like the one we live now or weaken the claim to be that only during our life is everything determined.

​@@CarneadesOfCyrene My angle would be not exactly that one, though it would be an interesting one. I try to be more precise. Sorry I didn't make myself understood well enough before. The first issue I have with Determinism is that it basically deny itsself. Basically it might be possible to measure every matter in every energystate. Therefore it is possible that we can know every state before and afterwards (if we have a complet set of rules that this matter follows, hece the laws of nature applying) just by detuction/applying the rules to the current known state. But if I know the state right now (and therefor every state afterwards) I know what follows. As soon as I know what follows I must be able to change those future states by acting differently until then. Now me acting differently is is either included in my pediction for the future state - but then - since I know this now - I must be able to act differently again. Which then again be included in my deterministic prediction, which should also be known and so on. This basically goes to infinity - the deterministic laws get into an loop of infinity. Or there immediately is a second future state. But the deterministic law can't accept 2 determined futures at the same time. Still determinism MUST hold true to a certain point for the laws of nature working. This is where my first post about perception comes into play. And I'd be more than happy to make this more clear as well... but I am not a native speaker so I am not sure if I can translate everything as well as I would like to. Therefor I would love to ask if I have been able to detail my first issue in an understandable matter.

This series is going to cover all the major positions. It depends on what exactly you mean by indeterminism, If you mean the denial of determinism as defined here (encompassing both hard and soft determinism), then check out the previous video on Libertarianism (kzfaq.info/get/bejne/h6l4edOU0c6rmYU.html), if you mean denial of hard determinism, check out the upcoming video on "Freedomism".

Ok thanks But do you have video about moral epistemology?

Hmm. I would refer you to the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle. As for my source, here's the Oxford Companion to Philosophy: "...these put a fundamental limit on the accuracy with which one can simultaneously predict the values of certain pairs of physical magnitudes (termed 'incompatible'), such as the position and momentum of a particle...Bohr argued that the limitation is also ontic, rendering inapplicable the classical concepts of 'position' and 'momentum' to a particle." That is not to say that issues like electrons existing in clouds of probability are not also used by libertarians to poke at determinism (as I note in the video, the example I use is just one of the libertarian's arguments, I mention the probability issue in the previous video). However, the same objections around interpretation of results and underdetermination work for either argument.

@@CarneadesOfCyrene Ah, that explains it. Popular science sources and philosophical encyclopedias tend to really suck at explaining quantum mechanics. Do you mind if I share some of my perspective? I've actually studied this stuff at the graduate level and published papers on it. It's the sort of thing I'd even like to make a video about someday. First, it is entirely false to say that we are unable to simultaneously measure position/momentum. There is nothing to stop me from constructing a machine that performs whatever measurements I like, so that claim is trivially debunked. Under the Copenhagen interpretation, the wavefunction can only tell us the *probability* of where the particle will be and what momentum it will have. That interpretation is also treated as a fundamental property of the particles themselves. The outcome of any specific measurement on position/momentum cannot ever be repeated with perfectly determined accuracy. It is a fundamentally random experiment that violates determinism in every philosophical respect. This is the part that makes free will enthusiasts happy, but it also kind of begs the question as to how utter randomness is supposed to change anything (which is why I personally think libertarian free will is incoherent). The thing about position/momentum is that they are expressed as a Fourier transform relationship. If you've ever studied Fourier transforms, then it should intuitive how squishing the function down in one domain necessarily blows it up in the other. In QM, this means anything that squishes the variance on position will necessarily increase the variance on momentum (physicists often use the word "uncertainty" here, but that's a misnomer. The statistical term is standard deviation; or you can square that to get variance). This is what Heisenburg's uncertainty relationship tells us. Any attempt to reduce the variance on one parameter will necessarily increase the variance on the other. That means I can rig an experiment where position behaves very determined (i.e., low variance), but then the momentum will blow up in randomness (high variance). It's not a problem in the measurement, though. Again, it is an intrinsic property of the particles themselves. The particles simply won't have the same momentum, no matter how much you try to perfectly replicate the initial conditions of the experiment (or vice/versa on position). Incidentally, this all kind of changes depending on what interpretation you give to QM. Copenhagen is the de-facto "standard," but it has numerous philosophical issues as well. I personally think Many-Worlds solves them, but that's another story.

The parts do not control the whole. The whole decides what will happen with the parts.

@@caricue Do you mean the whole individual, the whole group, or the whole species? Or maybe all life in general?

@@joehobo8868 In this case, I mean that a whole organism makes choices and decisions and the atoms and molecules just react to whatever situation they find themselves in according to their nature. Atoms don't determine anything since they are passive objects. In terms of groups, there is group behavior and individual behavior which feed into each other. For species, evolution is manifested at the species level even though this is an artificial human made category and is the sum total of all the members. I don't think "all life in general" is a useful grouping to explain very much, but I'm sure others do.

@@caricue Atoms and molecules are nothing but building blocks. We will never know where they came from or why any of it works. The more we learn the less we know, exponentially. We do know that life cannot out last the sun nor can we travel to another one. Tau Ceti is a little out of reach and we will never have enough tv tech to travel there. Even if we could it would literally be nothing more than a shot in the dark. This means that as we know all life is temporary, so is life itself. Life is one large organism that feeds upon itself while morphing from one form to another in multiple lineal branches. All of this is done through DNA coding which must be writing its self or growing with contaminants. Contaminants seem to be the better choice as some form of consciousness would be needed to write its own coding or thus a magical god that had to overcome this dilemma itself. No one knows what consciousness is nor how. when or why it came about. Maybe the real question is, does consciousness really exist or is it just some kind of by product that only thinks it exist? Well, according to the laws of determinism consciousness can not think because it has no brain. The body has the brain. The brain is the actor and the consciousness thinks, without a brain, that it is the audience. So if the consciousness thinks it exists it is because the brain is instructing it to think so. Why? If the consciousness is a by product that serves no purpose then, why would the brain expend valuable energy on a useless function when evolution is about, use it or lose it? Nature has always worked on a basis of elimination unwanted genes from the gene pool. Why is something without conscious thought conversing with others about something that does not exist, Freewill, which it should not be even able to comprehend since it never existed?

@@joehobo8868 I like the way you think and I wouldn't necessarily disagree with any of your ideas. Naturally, I have come to some different conclusions on certain matters, but you can't learn anything if you only talk to people who agree with you. I love your answer to the question of "all of life." You captured the banal horror of life in one sentence. I approach the DNA question by acknowledging, as you did, that information is the product of mind. With this premise, the only conclusion is that DNA doesn't actually contain any information. DNA is used by ribosomes in the cell as a physical template to order amino acids into proteins. No information necessary, and besides, what good would information be to a ribosome. It is a molecular machine and has no mind. The scientist who looks at the DNA is the one who finds information in this physical structure, but that doesn't mean that it was already there, if you see what I mean? I see consciousness as just another brain function. Even the simplest life form must have a basic, unconscious level of awareness. A cell must "know" what is self and non-self, what is inside and outside, what is food and what is dangerous. Evolution builds on this basic awareness as the creatures become more complex, eventually reaching the rich consciousness that we experience without ever losing the original basis. I conclude that the living matter of the brain is what is experiencing being alive, and in the end, this is consciousness, with the layers of perception and cognition contributing to the experience. This is why I don't see AI going very far in terms of being conscious. Consciousness is a feature of life, so with dead silicone, there will never be anyone home, even if it acts like there is. These are interesting and crazy topics and it's nice to hear others well thought out points of view. Thanks for the respectful dialogue.

All these questions can be answered with yes as it doesn't highlight any contradictory beliefs that determinists hold. Right and wrong are subjective, not objective. We exist.

Put playback speed at 0.75 and you will get a slower talking speed.

You will never get a sound like the original one, I know this, but boring