@@GMGMGMGMGMGMGMGMGMGM They were very much invented. Sorry.

@@childintime6453 I wish philosophy was that simple. The main problem is that they only pretend to teach out how to evaluate arguments. The unfortunate reality is that they absolutely suck at it. That’s why philosophy is riddled with so much disagreement and fraud. They want you to think you’re thinking without actually teaching you how to think.

@@kermit_boi2169 So you didn’t watch the video, I see.

​​@@AntiCitizenXFirst of all thank you so much for replying :D anyway, I did but why did you never use this definition and instead imposed contradictory definitions of omnipotence? So sorry for the late response btw

@@kermit_boi2169 the dictionary is not the end-all-be-all authority on how a word is used. Christian philosophers use very specific definitions whenever they describe the supposed power of God. And even if we use the dictionary definition you provided, it still has the potential to run into the same ambiguities and paradoxes. So it doesn’t really change anything anyway.

​@@AntiCitizenXanyone who says omnipotence is "the ability do to anything" doesnt really know what theyre talking about it is logically impossible to do anything, could u please provide a paradox with the definition I provided?

@@kermit_boi2169 I already did exactly that in the video. Did you watch it?

@@uglyfense7754 I think you are misunderstanding the meaning of the symbols. An event may or may not leave evidence. But the probability of X given some sort of evidence to support is more likely than X in the absence of evidence. Like, this is intrinsic to the very meaning of evidence itself. It’s the stuff that justifies belief in some event.

@@AntiCitizenX I'm at 2:03 in your video right now, and it says, "6) Let P(X | E) denote the conditional property of X given E" With that being said, your expression of "the probability of X given some sort of evidence to support it" would be that, (X | E), and your expression of "X in the absence of evidence" would be X given !E, (X | !E), henceforth, your full claim: "the probability of X given some sort of evidence to support is more likely than X in the absence of evidence" would thus be written as P(X | E) > P(X | !E). However, assumption 1 reads P(E | X) > P(!E | X). As said, this is probably a typo, but it's what I was confused by when watching.

@@AntiCitizenX Just want to clarify, I'm indeed atheistic, and I agree with your overall claim. I'm just a bit confused by Assumption 1.

@@uglyfense7754 Oh I see now what you mean. Thanks for clarifying.

@@uglyfense7754 In this case, you’re right. I’m not necessarily saying this is a universal principle that applies to all events. I am stressing that for an event like God existing, then it is reasonable to expect there to be evidence of that fact. And if there is not, then you’re basically claiming that God literally “hides” by covering up His existence. Plus, if there is no evidence for His existence, then on what basis are we to believe He even exists at all?

@@patnewbie2177 thanks. :)

@@macknovo99 What exactly is a “metaphysical” being? And if you cannot empirically detect such a thing, then how exactly is that qualitatively different from no being at all?

@@AntiCitizenX what we think of as metaphysical, is likely a being that is outside of our current scope of measurement due to the limitations of our technological capabilities. It could be a being that is of the fourth or fifth dimensions. (I’m meaning the different dimensions of theoretical physics, not the way it is misused by woo woo crystal idiots) while it may be a being that can influence events on our dimension, we would likely not perceive it. Kind of like if we were to interact with a being of the second dimension that only understood length and width. It would consider depth to be utterly absurd. This of course wouldn’t mean that this higher dimensional “god” would be the creator or whatnot but maybe there is a reason that mathematics and patterns are present in our observable universe. But this could also be the ramblings of a human who seeks meaning out of nothing.

@@macknovo99 If it is outside our scope of measurement, then by definition you cannot know anything about it. You literally cannot know if such a thing even exists. Any claims made about it, including any claims to its very existence, are no better than wild speculation. I am therefore very confused as to why anyone would want to dignify such claims with any serious consideration.

@@AntiCitizenX at the end of the day, it would be down to faith but in all honesty we don’t need to go down that road tbh. I think eventually we’ll be able to perceive higher dimensions but until then, it’s all up to speculation for everyone and everything. Keep doing what you’re doing man. Different perspectives is what I like to see, especially in this space because I can listen to this while I work

@@craaazer8869 at no point did I ever say or imply that evolution determines “what we ought to do.” It only explains the existence of cooperative pro social behavior. These “objective moral oughts,” as they are often called, are a complete fiction that never existed. In fact, it is kind of a textbook example of how inept modern philosophers are, in that this exact brand of moral realism should never have been taken seriously. There are countless arguments that clearly demonstrate the total incoherence of the concept, yet it still persists somehow.

@@AntiCitizenX You said "many of the traditionally deep philosophical questions have already been LONG solved by professionals in other fields. Take, for example, the NATURE of morality." So, you did not say it "only explains the existence of cooperative pro social behavior." You said, again, "the nature of morality." Maybe you ought to adhere to the clarity you proposed in this video. Moreover, there are also countless arguments demonstrating the incoherence of moral anti-realism. You actually need to give the argument to prove a point, rather than just saying there are arguments. An intro to philosophy class would have taught you this, sadly. Also, I never even mentioned moral realism. Odd that you were to even bring that up. You can still be a moral anti-realist and think that there are moral facts. For instance, even if morality is just dependent on the evolutionary functions of a given subject, given those evolutionary functions, there can still be a fact of the matter of what one ought to do. Again, you should adhere to conceptual clarity, my friend. And, on top of this, you said in another comment "Human beings do in fact share certain fundamental goals and values..." So, this would imply that there is a universal (sure, maybe a loose one) morality for human beings, meaning that there are objective facts of what one ought to do, given they are a human being.

@@ljuhan2 I like how I can make a presentation with over 50 citations about how philosophy does not instill critical thinking skills, only for arrogant philosophy snobs to leave mindless comments that prove my point perfectly.

@@AntiCitizenX Ok, that's a fair criticism. I didn't go in detail, because I don't have the time. And I don't have it now either, but I will state the gist of my view. Your claim here is at least twofold (I admit I dind't watch the video to the end): there are no criteria that can differentiate between good and bad philosophy, and there are no widely accepted proper goals or even methods of philosophy (you mentioned this particularly in relation to philsophy of science). The justification for both of these claims is persistent disagreement among philosophers. Your claims are false. First, one needs to bear in mind the distinction between analytic (or Anglosaxon more generally) philosophy and Continental philosophy. In a lot of ways, those two are different academic disciplines. So what I will say refers only to situation in analytic philosophy. It is false that there are no widely accepted criteria of distinction between good and bad philosophy. One clue to the fact that this is false should already be the relaization that philosphers, by and large, agree who the greatest philosophers in Western tradition were. Sur,e they might differ when it comes to precise ranking, but everyone agrees that Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Leibniz, Russell...are among the best, and almost no one thinks that Franciscus Patricius is better than any of the aforementioned. That woiuld be inexeplicable if there were no accetped criteria of good philosphy. When it comes to contemporary philosphers, there also, there is wide agreement on who the good or bets philopshers are (Lewis, Kripke, Jackson, Williamson, Sider, Maudlin, Stalnaker, Perry, Putnam, Block, Pritchard, Goldman, Dennet...). There is also agreement on what makes a good philosophical paper: clear analysis, careful argumentation, sensitivity to distinctions and semantic subtleties, the ability to explain contrary intuitions... On that regard, you are just wrong. What there is disagreement about is what is the correct philosophy. Or, what philsophical claims are true and what are false. But that is a different matter than the issue of good philsophy. Just as science can be good even if it's false, but was reasonable to believe at the time of production, so too can false philosophy can be good, if it's argued for well. It is similar with your claim thazt philosphers dont agree on the goal or methds of philsoophy They largely do, and how much agreement there is depends in large part on how precisely you want to describe the questions on which they differ. They almost all agree that experiments can rarely, if ever, decide a philosophical issue. And they almost all agree that rational intuition play a much bigger role in philosophy than in science. And they almost all agree that a large part of philosophy is done by careful analysis of language, and so on... SO, your claims are rather extreme. You start with something that is an undeniable fact (disagreement), but then you infer false claims from it, because you mistakenly assume certain things (like, good philosophy=true philosophy). Not to mention that your claim is self-defeating. The only way to argue that disagreement is an epistemological problem for philsophy is to assume certain episptemological, that is, philosophical claims. But, if philosophy is rationally inadequate, then your assumption is also rationally inadequate. I would love to have more time to go into more detail on in what specific places you claim false things, but alas, I have a lot of obligations and cannot spare any more time to this discussion.

@@ljuhan2 Thank you for elaborating. As the man said, "I cannot refute an incredulous stare." So let's take a look at your major criticisms one by one: *Your claim here is at least twofold ... there are no criteria that can differentiate between good and bad philosophy, and there are no widely accepted proper goals or even methods of philosophy (you mentioned this particularly in relation to philsophy of science). The justification for both of these claims is persistent disagreement among philosophers.* That is only ONE justification. I gave several more. You are also really downplaying the argument to an almost blatantly dishonest level. It's not just about "persistent disagreement." It's about the total inability of the profession to come to a consensus on the most basic questions of their field, including the question of what exactly the field is supposed to be in the first place. That is not some trivial thing you can ignore. You also seem to be strongly implying that this is some argument unique to myself. Um... hardly. This is a widely discussed topic within the philosophical journals. *It is false that there are no widely accepted criteria of distinction between good and bad philosophy. One clue to the fact that this is false should already be the relaization that philosphers, by and large, agree who the greatest philosophers in Western tradition were.* This is objectively incorrect for multiple reasons. First, if philosophers have such well-accepted criteria, then you should be able to list what those criteria are, and they should naturally compel agreement among expert practitioners within the field. Neither is demonstrable. Second, philosophers absolutely do NOT agree on who the "greatest" philosophers were. They only agree on who the most "influential" philosophers were. That's what they mean when anyone speaks of greatness in this context. Take your own example of Aristotle. Have you even bothered to read any of his writings? Because I have. The overwhelming majority is nothing but a bunch of demented, incoherent fever dreams. I'll even challenge you to demonstrate 3 significant findings of profoundly insightful fact that we can directly attribute to Aristotle. You can't do it. *There is also agreement on what makes a good philosophical paper: clear analysis, careful argumentation, sensitivity to distinctions and semantic subtleties, the ability to explain contrary intuitions...* So let me get this straight. The best example you have of agreement in philosophy is what, exactly? That philosophers have to follow rules when writing papers? Do you have any idea how absolutely pathetic this argument is? Because I've read what passes for "serious" academic literature in the philosophical world. They absolutely do NOT follow these rules. I even gave you a classic example with modern philosophers like Alvin Plantinga who are complete buffoons. I'm sorry, my friend, but this is hardly a compelling counter-point. You're just making blanket assertions that neither support your argument, nor have any significant foundation in reality.

@@AntiCitizenX ''t's about the total inability of the profession to come to a consensus on the most basic questions of their field, including the question of what exactly the field is supposed to be in the first place. That is not some trivial thing you can ignore. '' False again. I agree it is not a trivial thing you can ignore, but you are making an extreme claim in the first part of the quotation. Most philosphers agree on 'what exactly the field is supposed to be in the first place'. Saying otherwise is either ignorance or lying. ''You also seem to be strongly implying that this is some argument unique to myself.'' I did not do that. ''First, if philosophers have such well-accepted criteria, then you should be able to list what those criteria are, and they should naturally compel agreement among expert practitioners within the field. Neither is demonstrable.'' False. First, I don't have the time to write long comments now. Secondly, I already hinted at the criteria: creative arguments related to important philosphical themes, intutivie support for the premises, explanation of contrary intutitons...all these criteria are satisfed by the great philosphers. ''Second, philosophers absolutely do NOT agree on who the "greatest" philosophers were. They only agree on who the most "influential" philosophers were. That's what they mean when anyone speaks of greatness in this context.'' False. They largely agree (to the degree to which scientist would garee on who are the greatest scientists). And ''great'' means, in part, but not solely, ''influential''. ''Take your own example of Aristotle. Have you even bothered to read any of his writings? Because I have. The overwhelming majority is nothing but a bunch of demented, incoherent fever dreams.'' You need to read it again, more carefully this time. ''I'll even challenge you to demonstrate 3 significant findings of profoundly insightful fact that we can directly attribute to Aristotle. You can't do it.'' I sure can. First, the analysis of scientific explantion in POsterior Analytics, in which he even grapples with the problem of intensionality; secondly, the distinction between actuality and potentiality, and the arguments to the effect that actuality is both ontologicllay and conceptually basic; thirdly, the comsological argument for the existence of God. I could write many more, but I don't have the time. ''The best example you have of agreement in philosophy is what, exactly? That philosophers have to follow rules when writing papers? Do you have any idea how absolutely pathetic this argument is?'' I was not talking about substantial agrrement there, I was talking about agreement on criteria of good philosophy. And that is much more than ''following rules when writing papers'', as you disparagingly put it. Try writing a philoosphical paper of yur own, and see how hard it is to clearly express the vague intuition you have in favor of some claim, and to explain away the rival intuition. Then get back to me. ''They absolutely do NOT follow these rules. I even gave you a classic example with modern philosophers like Alvin Plantinga who are complete buffoons.'' Read them again. More slowly and carefully this time. And this language you use to talk about famous philosophers, people much smarter than you, is completely unbecoming. ''You're just making blanket assertions that neither support your argument, nor have any significant foundation in reality'' It is you who is incorrect. You put forward extreme claims about the field you seem to have no patience with and insufficient understanding of. And you haven't replied to my criticism that you argument is self-defeating.

@@georgemacintyre2858 It is not “thin ice” to simply explain the modern philosophical and logical consensus on what a word means.

@@Hauserxx-u2f simple. If you are defining truth in terms of anything other than a pragmatic capacity to predict and shape the future, then I literally don’t care. You’re using the word in a way that is meaningless, irrelevant, and incoherent to me. If you want to twist facts to manipulate people, that’s your business. Just don’t call it truth.

@@AntiCitizenX Why do you think this way of using the word is meaningless? Since I'm supposedly expressing a kind of postmodern definition of truth, would you say that's your stance when It comes to postmodern arguments?

@@Hauserxx-u2f Remember the thought experiment I present in the middle of this video. Imagine a possible world where everything I believe about the world is technically "wrong." If, however, I am able to navigate the world, explain all of my experiences, predict the future, and even SHAPE the future, when what possible reason do I have to care about being "right?" What does it even mean to say my beliefs are "false" in such a context? Why would I even care about such a concept at this point? In contrast, you can imagine the opposite scenario. Everything I believe is "true," yet none of it allows me predict/shape the future in any capacity whatsoever. What possible reason would I have to even care about "THE CAPITAL-T TRUTH" in such a world? What purpose would there be in believing such things? The information is literally useless to me. This clearly demonstrates the meaninglessness of trying to avoid the pragmatic maxim. The moment you define truth in any other capacity, I literally stop caring. Any such epistemology is irrelevant to me and fundamentally worthless. I therefore have no use for it, and I'm not interested in it. *it is also intertwined with the discursive frameworks through which knowledge is produced and legitimized.* Except it's not. It doesn't matter who rules over you or how much privilege your neighbors have. The world is objectively built a certain way, and your actions will have consequences as a result of those conditions and interplays. You're welcome to lie to yourself or manipulate others, but this foundation will always cut through the bullshit and reveal the world as it really is. *Truth claims are socially constructed and maintained within specific power dynamics.* Says who? That sounds like abject speculation based on nothing. Power dynamics will not change the physical behavior of the moon and tides. *But consider, for example, how, in the history of medicine, certain truths about health and disease were established based on empirical observations/clinical trials. The problem is that these truths were often framed in a way that priviliged certain demographics over others, leading to disparities in healthcare outcomes.* You will have to explain to me how this has any bearing on the philosophy of pragmatism. Like, I'm genuinely struggling to understand what exactly the claim is supposed to be, here. It sounds like you're saying that people did science poorly, and somehow that is science's fault.

@@AntiCitizenX Alright man, got It. But let me try another example: What about the idea that sexuality, as a category, was socially constructed as a way of establishing power over other people? (I guess I'm oversimplifying here) The greeks, for instance, had no concept of homossexuality. Homossexuality would be nothing more than a modern invention designed to opress people who engaged in homoerotic acts, classifying them as "incorrect" or "vile". Same as Heterossexuality (understood as a good thing rather than a bad thing), or any other sexuality. How does that fit in the pragmatist framework?

@@Hauserxx-u2f you seem to be confusing the idea of a empirically predictive model with … well… whatever random manipulative bullshit that people make up to control each other. I fail to see how this is a challenge to pragmatism. If homosexuality is a thing that exists, then fine. It exists. If people want to make up blatant nonsense and value judgments about homosexuality causing the downfall of civilization, then that’s just called “lying.”

@@RonaldoGasparzinni You can judge morality however the hell you feel like. It’s just a word. But other people also get to judge, and they universally judge actions according to certain standards. Those standards didn’t just appear by accident, nor did we just make them up out of nothing. It is a natural evolutionary response to enforce prosocial behavior onto others. It makes group cohesion stronger and thus promotes survival and reproductive fitness. So that’s your objective morality at the end of the day

​@@AntiCitizenX So the objectivity of morality is purely evolutionary, correct? In the sense that whether the consequences of an action are "good" or "bad" is dependent on the desires, and that the desires themselves are shaped through natural selection. Therefore, we fall into a sort of "limit", whereby there a things we cannot not desire simply because not desiring them would decrease our reproductive fitness and, overall, are not beneficial to the maintenance of group cohesion, which we naturally need. I mean, we can not desire them, but on evolutionary terms that would be objectively detrimental. Is this what you mean? Or, other than that, is there any other criteria?

What do you think about the comments?

@@AntiCitizenXwell…they’re certainly strident defenders of philosophy’s honour. I’m not sure she needs defending though… I admit I have a love/hate relationship with philosophy. I sometimes really enjoy thinking about abstract problems where empirical data doesn’t come into it. But then I get frustrated that what I’ve been thinking about for the past 2 hours (or days) is utterly useless. Modern philosophy at this point is basically a meta science- it exists outside of empirical evidence but may possibly, one day, sometimes be useful for science. But philosophy used to have another part- how should I live my life? I don’t think that exists anymore, but I think we need it.

How is it “useful fiction” to observe that actions have consequences, that those consequences are NOT determined by your whims, and that you are not immediately aware of the causal interactions that lead to them? That’s what we are talking about when we refer to the “external world.” It’s all the stuff beyond your immediate perception that appears to translate your actions into future consequences.

Does it help me predict and explain events in your experience? If yes, it’s pragmatism. If no, it’s worthless and irrelevant and I’m not interested.

​@@AntiCitizenX Well, I think my doubt involves determining if It is pragmatism or if It is irrelevant. Because I wanted to be able to communicate to my teacher which one It is, with the aim of making him understand. From what I've gathered, epistemological historicism affirms that whether a proposition is true or false is determined by It's historical context. For example, my teacher argues that the concept we have of "mental illness" today didn't exist back then. Therefore, in the past, saying "you're mentally ill' would be automatically false. Saying that today, however, could be true. At first glance I would conclude that epistemological historicism is irrelevant, but I also thought that It could predict certain consequences on a given time period or society(?) (making It pragmatism). Don't know. I considered you'd probably have a simple solution to this I haven't thought of

@@lucashendler8688 truth values are not these objective things determined by the universe. You have to assign them however you want. Under pragmatism, a true synthetic proposition is one such that it facilitates my desires to make testable, reliable, empirical predictions. That is literally all I care about at the end of the day, and so does everyone else. Therefore, by definition and admission, that is the ultimate standard. If you want to go around utilizing some other standard, the go ahead. I won’t stop you. I also won’t care, and neither will anyone else. I don’t say this to be crass, but to express a point. That’s the fundamental argument behind pragmatism. If you’re not facilitating that goal, then by definition, I’m not interested and you’re not helping me navigate the world. So the basic choice is either pragmatism or irrelevance

@@AntiCitizenX Uhhh, alright, so you mean that epistemological historicism can't make any empirical predictions, which in turn makes It irrelevant? Or do you think It can make some predictions (turning It into a sort of "pragmatism in disguise")? Because I think I understand your points, since I've watched your videos, but I'm not sure if you answered my question. Sorry in case I'm just being obtuse

@@lucashendler8688 Reading again, the only thing you’ve basically said is that the meaning of language changes over time. That’s not really an “epistemology.” It’s just a fact about human language. So it’s not really in conflict with pragmatism.

What in God’s name are you babbling about? And what point of fact are you even disputing? I swear, you people seem to be going out of your way to prove the central thesis of this video.

@@AntiCitizenX Firstly you don't need to bring god into this or get so defensive of the video nor do you have to attack philosophy by painting it with my comment. Secondly, to reiterate, the notion of progress is a modern notion which by it's own logic is now not as progressive as contemporary philosophy which is more skeptical of the notion of progress, thus ironic. Not that philosophy should completely dispense with the notion of progress but perhaps it shouldn't be the measure of philosophy as a discipline. Lack of consensus is precisely what vitalises philosophy and consensus as progress seems to be a central argument made in this video.. totally up for debate if you are but not if you keep "babbling on" like that

@@capliced You argue like someone who didn’t actually pay attention to the video. You make vague references to things that were discussed, but you ignored all supporting data, you ignored the arguments, and you didn’t specify any particular point of fact that you’re disputing. The best I can figure out is that you think philosophy shouldn’t make “progress,” which is so baffling to me that I can’t even begin to explain how insane you sound. You’re ignoring the fact that philosophers themselves openly promote the field as a place to find “truth” about the world. You’re ignoring the fact that philosophy has no standards and no definition, and you’re ignoring the obvious prevalence of self serving propaganda that permeates the field. Maybe try watching the video again and try paying attention to the facts, evidence, and arguments. You know, put that philosophy skill to use that you people seem to love so much

Sir, this is a physics video…

This video has nothing whatsoever to do with omnipotence, which tells me everything I know about your philosophical honesty and competence.

​@@AntiCitizenX The Ontological Argument is about Omnipotence. Ad hominem attacks also won't help your red herring.

@@ichthyostegaxd3727 It’s really not. Not sure where you got such a bizarre notion in your head. Please go back and study the issue properly before pretending to have a discussion about it.

@@AntiCitizenX You yourself defined God as a "divine agent" and noted that omnipotence would be one of his aspects. Substitute "God" with "an omnipotent agent" in the modal ontological argument. How would the argument be any different?

@@ichthyostegaxd3727 The MOA isn’t about omnipotence. It’s about necessary existence. If I honestly have to explain that distinction to you, then you are in no position to offer serious criticism of this video. By all means, ask questions and discuss, but don’t pretend to know enough to tell others how they’re wrong.

Just because math is really special, that does not negate the fact that we define our mathematical language through axioms and rules of inference. Math is therefore an invention, whether you like it or not. The proof is right there in the very fundamentals of math itself, and the debate is effectively settled.

@@AntiCitizenX Thanks for the response. Even if the axioms and rules of inference in math are human-defined, the applicability and effectiveness of math in describing the real world go beyond these definitions. If you say that we can tweak math to match reality (i.e. take an arbitrary theory of math and keep adjusting it), then you're already agreeing that there is a reality to be matched by our descriptions of it, and that that given tweaked math somehow resembles that reality. I.e. math is not just in our head, because a part of reality looks just like its description (e.g. a formula describes how a process works to some level of accuracy). Also, math statements are not just evaluated for internal consistency. If that were the case, why wouldn't every mathematician work on his own pet theory of math? If the invention of axioms and rules of inference were completely arbitrary, all internally consistent mathematical systems would be equally valid, and equally worth studying. However, this is not the case - or perhaps the majority of mathematicians are wrong, and everyone should just study their own invention of math rules? To look at an extreme thought experiment: even if you could take an infinite amount of mathematicians, isolate them from the world (as in a brain-in-a-vat scenario), and they would come up with an infinite number of different kinds of math, one of those would have to be a perfect description of reality. So, the origins of all of those maths would be arbitrary. But, that doesn't mean THAT reality doesn't fit any one of those possible mathematical theories. In fact, logic (another "arbitrary" human invention) even gives at least one reason WHY at least one of them must fit reality: because if reality has mathematically describable regularities, then by definition there must be some math that describes those. And this can only be true if reality also follows the rules of logic. The only way reality wouldn't fit any math would be if there were no regularities in the world, but all of our experiences tells us that there are. And math describes those regularities. It's a system of describing something, just like other languages, but just like in other languages it can describe something other than itself. When I say "There's a tiger", there really is a tiger that I'm describing, and when I say "2+2=4", I'm also talking about something external to the statement. Thanks for reading another long comment. What do you think?

@@alittax No one is disputing the existence of a mind independent reality. You can have a real world all you want, and that changes nothing about the fact that math is a human invention. You asked why mathematicians aren’t dabbling with let theories. Bro, they do it all the time. I’ve done it myself.

@@AntiCitizenX Thanks again for the response. So then you agree that there is some part of reality that resembles our mathematical models of it (or more precisely, that some of our mathematical models resemble it)? Some part of our descriptions of it (like the mathematical notation we use) is a human invention (e.g. we could write the number 1 as a random squiggly line, or we could write out equations in words, making them incredibly cumbersome to manipulate, etc.). But, what the human part of the description refers to is not our invention, because it exists independently of us. And it is that part which is the subject of math, and the human parts serve the purpose of finding new things out about it. Also, the fact that of an infinite number of mathematical theories, at least one must be correct, necessarily proves that the object of math exists (since reality also follows the rules of logic). This idea by itself seems to prove that math must necessarily be about something external to the human mind. What do you think? I'd be happy to read another response.

@@alittax *So then you agree that there is some part of reality that resembles our mathematical models of it (or more precisely, that some of our mathematical models resemble it)?* You're using very vague, loaded language. We invent models to help us describe our experiences and make quantifiable empirical predictions. If that's what you mean by "resemble," then sure, but it's nothing profound. "I think it will rain tomorrow because the fairies in my head told me so" is a perfectly valid English sentence that expresses a model without math. Why does this suddenly become all magical and supernatural, just because a formal language is involved? *But, what the human part of the description refers to is not our invention, because it exists independently of us. * So? There's an objective mind-independent reality. Why is this so profound to you? We still need a language to describe it with, and the mere existence of a pretty language says nothing about the existence of a magical bearded sky fairy. *Also, the fact that of an infinite number of mathematical theories, at least one must be correct,* There is no such thing as a "correct" mathematical theory. That's meaningless gibberish. There are only axioms, rules of inference, and the theorems that follow. Some of those systems are useful in some situations. Others are not.

I like how you just blindly repeated a claim that was specifically addressed and debunked in this very video. Why are so many Christians such bad listeners?

​@@AntiCitizenX​ sorry, didn't have time for the whole 30 min video. I watched up until you made that point about its logically possible to lie so omnipotent beings should be able to lie. I'll watch the rest later today and make another comment. Why are so many non-Christians such bad assumers?

@@AntiCitizenX nice video! The current definition does indeed not work. I think people use the current definition because it makes it easy to understand the idea. Perhaps we should have a dictionary for normal people, and then a much larger dictionary with overly complicated, ever-changing definitions for philosophers? Two points of concern though: 1. Since you can lift small weight, but cannot lift a 1,000 pound car over your head, that is a physical limitation. It is against your nature to lift a 1,000 pound car over your head, but it is not against your nature to lift 1 pound over your head. Lifting is not against your nature, yet you are limited. God however cannot tell a lie. A big lie, a small lie, doesn't matter. He is not limited by anything in his nature. If Mr. Mick Ear can only scratch his ear, what about the speed that he scratches his ear? If Mr. Mick Ear can't scratch his own ear at an infinite speed, that would be a physical limitation and thus, he wouldn't be omnipotent. If he could however scratch his ear at an infinite speed, then he would be omnipotent, assuming he has no other limitations such as how far he can see, hear, how big he is, etc. This would technically be infinite power. 2. If God created the Universe and the laws that the Universe follows, wouldn't He be able to just rewrite laws so He can complete any task you could possibly think of? Even the logically impossible? Regardless, true omnipotence is not possible. I agree that the current definition does not fit. Seems like the main problem you have is how most Christians defend God's power.

@@RaidenDEVOUR You can’t think in terms of “true” omnipotence. That’s not a thing. There is just “omnipotence,” the word, plus a handful of definitions we may try to give it. Some definitions may work, others may not. Some definitions are rigorous and meaningful, others are incoherent and sloppy. The goal of the philosopher is to pick apart the “bad” definitions and try to think of something better. We also need to fix your concept of logic. It is not an ethereal energy field that interweaves itself throughout space and time. It is a system of rules built into language. Anyone can “violate” logic all they want. The result is just meaningless gibberish. It is not up to God to create illogical entities like married bachelors. It is up to YOU to follow the rules of logic when you describe such things. That’s why it is meaningless to think of God as being “above” logic in some sense. It’s not up to Him. It’s up to YOU. It doesn’t matter what God does. You’re the one who has to use language to describe it.

@@AntiCitizenX I like your funny words, magic man. On a serious note, is that really what logic is? Say you could lift a 1,000 pound car over your head. That would be illogical, but we would be able to use language to describe it perfectly fine.

I’m afraid I have no idea what claim in this video you are trying to dispute.

@@AntiCitizenX My point is that our current metaphilosophical understanding, expressed in the definition of the word philosophy, cannot constraint the future development of philosophy forever. Our current definition will reflect our current standards, methods etc. All future definitions should be roughly coextensive with it - and therefore valid, broadly speaking. But if we treat such definitions as saying what the essence of some discipline is, then I think we risk getting stuck in a failed paradigm. The logical empiricists defined philosophy as 'logical analysis of language', then Michael Dummett, along similar lines, advanced the view of philosophy as being concerned primarily with solving metaphysical questions through semantic (metamathematical) analysis. We see how these definitions reflect their understanding of how philosophy should be done. And, indeed, a lot of contemporary work can be paraphrased to satisfy these definitions, probably, but most philosophers nowadays don't see themselves as pursuing primarily, e.g. semantic analysis. Just like most physicists don't see themselves as pursuing the empirical study of natures of things (which is what Aristotle thought physics was), although perhaps there is a sense in which there is a continuity between Aristotle's efforts and the work of, e.g. Richard Feynman. In other words, I think that your point that philosophers cannot define philosophy is wrong. They can and sometimes do, but the normative power of their definitions lasts only as long as the paradigm they work in is successful. Nevertheless, various definitions now seen as outdated (missing the 'essence' of a given field) are still (almost) nominally equivalent, since they never exclude major figures, like Kant in philosophy or Galileo in physics. And since the definition we can give at the moment reflects our current methodological predispositions and knowledge (Bourbaki defines mathematics as study of abstract mathematical structures... I don't think Euclid or Gauss could've come up with such a definition, even though they were definitely studying these structures), it won't help to fix a field in crisis. A successful redefinition, I believe, can only reflect a paradigm shift (for example from Aristotle's physics to Cartesian physics as study of spatial stuff), not be a cause of it.

You’re still not pointing out any particular claim that was made in this video. If you watch it again, I very clearly discuss what philosophy is. Are you agreeing? Disagreeing? I can’t tell. Remember. The complaint is that the traditional definitions for philosophy are directly contradicted by the actual content of philosophical textbooks/classes. On top of that, I demonstrate that philosophers are essentially lying to you when they try to promote philosophy as a reliable avenue to truth. Philosophy has no standards for truth or progress, and so no progress is ever made. Debates are never settled, and the field inevitably ends up sheltering frauds and incompetents. Most of this stuff is admitted to openly by mainstream philosophers themselves, so I’m honestly still not sure why people take so much offense at it.