UPDATE: The National Transportation Safety Board has released its preliminary report (WPR22FA068) regarding the investigation into the El Cajon, CA Learjet 35A (N880Z) accident. data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/104445/pdf

We were doing our UPRT recurrent training in the Falcon 7X simulator a few days after this accident. After fulfilling the required training, the instructor asked if there was anything else we wanted to do. Though the simulator database does not have KSEE in it, we were able to try this maneuver, using the exact same weather conditions, speeds, and altitudes, configured for a circling approach. I can tell you that in these conditions, keeping the airport in sight was near impossible. When I demonstrated over banking (45 degrees), the nose dropped and there was no way to recover. With the critical wing of the Lear 35A, this was a death sentence. So sad that this occurred.

FWIW, I am a CFII and Gillespie Field is my home base. The airport's METAR (reported weather) 20 minutes before the accident was a 2000' (Above Ground Level) Ceiling of broken clouds with only 3 miles visibility which should have given them plenty of room to enter a normal left traffic pattern at 1000' AGL and maneuver to land on Runway 27 Right. it's important to remember that that is what the pilots were expecting. At Gillespie Field in the early night hours with unsettled weather as it had been all day, a 20 minute METAR is already quite stale. It is VERY likely that an unreported, scattered layer of clouds were forming below the ceiling. The METAR after the crash confirms such a layer had formed. This new layer would have forced the now-VFR flight to fly the pattern very close to the ground, which they in fact did. Remember, the field elevation is almost 400 feet above sea level. They crossed the airport less than 400 feet above the runways! As you said, there is much we don't know, but I will tell you from my own experience his turn to downwind is way too close for a 130 knot airplane. Why did he do this? Poor visibility makes everything seem farther away than they are. It also gives the illusion that one is higher than is the case. My guess is that, because of the unreported (at that time) clouds he flew unusually low to avoid them and due to the poor visibility it didn't feel that low to him. He turned a close downwind, but again, because of the poor visibility and the low altitude, it didn't seem all that close either. He then turned what he thought was a normal base leg and found that he was low, close, fast and pointed at Rattlesnake Mountain, the terrain that sits just north of final approach to 27R. With a windshield full of mountain (the first expletive) he steepened the bank, he saw the houses were very close below him (the second expletive), he pulls hard and he gets an abrupt stall (the final expletive). The saddest part is, had he stayed IFR he could have legally flown a circle-to-land approach to the same strip of pavement, but in the opposite direction. Runway 9 Left is available to land from a circling approach at night, unlike 27 Right and the winds were light and mostly from the south so wouldn't have been a problem. If he had done this and he lost orientation to the runway, he would have been able to execute an IFR missed approach procedure and climbed away from danger.

Excellent overview. Having flown this approach many times, my hunch is, in part, that they rolled out onto Base/Final and saw the mountain and cranked in an unintentional impulse hard over. You raised a few very key points that aren't available elsewhere, 1) Vref speeds in line for a stabilized 17 approach and landing and 2) airspeed/configuration questions related to stall speed (as well as the lack of horns). Outstanding report. RIP to all involved.

Thanks for this fantastic analysis. It's extremely important that us pilot make notes of others' mistakes, factors and debriefs so we avoid future accidents.

These case studies are a must-watch for any pilot.

The picture of your father on the shelf brings back some great memories for me. That airplane was beautiful in person. He sure was living his best life in his hanger/man cave. I remember visiting him many times as I took flying lessons at that airport. He was such a genuine man and I’m sure would be proud of everything you are doing for the aviation community.

The words of one of my CFIs comes to mind: "The need to circle to land at anything close to minimums is just as much a need to divert."

I remember one of my first night landings in primary I was circling to land and searching for the runway lights. I was young and kind of cocky and felt I had everything under control. Suddenly I heard the instructor pilot calmly say one word over the com: airspeed. Thinking he was just being "an old lady" and saying "airspeed" because he didn't have anything else to do during such a flawlessly executed landing, I took a quick glance at the A/S. To my horror I was ~10 kts slower than I'd ever thought I could be. I took a wave off and instantly earned respect for cockpit focus, night disorientation, and instructor pilots. RIP to the crew.

One thing not mentioned in most of the videos I've watched about this accident is that both RWY 17 and 27R have significant displaced thresholds, which reduce the landing distance available. RWY 17 is 4145' long, minus 450' DT = 3695' available. RWY 27R is 5342' long, minus 706' DT = 4636' available. The difference between them is 941' of landing distance available. I believe that it would've been better to divert, either to SD - Lindbergh, or to SD - Brown, given the weather conditions AND to not cancel IFR, to allow for a legal missed approach. I think that this was a case of "last leg, get-home-itis", something that is very hard to combat when you're heading back to base.

Excellent analysis as always. Since this was their home base, I wouldn’t be surprised if they have done this same maneuver before in marginal conditions. If so, that familiarity could have led to overconfidence that got them in a fatal situation. Sad that a crew dedicated to saving lives would lose their own.

I live on the ridge west of the airport and trained there. This crew had a history of making this pass switching from a 17 approach to a circling maneuver to 27 at very low altitudes and often very fast. The clouds were very low, unbroken, with drizzle. The bottom line is this was scud running and hot dogging it. I mourn those on board but this is a lesson in avoidable accidents by pilots who should know better, especially with their experience with this field. In a bind? Get some altitude and time to reassess your options. There is no sin in finding an alternate field like Brown and waiting out the weather. The consequences of rushing it based on old habits are deadly.

This is so much better than the long-winded "probable cause" guy. Thank you for the facts without opinions.

Of the multiple personalities who’ve chosen to offer an analysis of this incident, I do certainly appreciate your professionalism and respectful approach the most 😏. We all know what happened here. We don’t need to sensationalize the events in some self serving way. Please keep doing what you do.

I think it’s important to note that they were not 100% backed into a corner by going VFR. If you’re ever in their situation (past declaring VFR), you can absolutely do a go around; climb into the clouds, declare an emergency and get pop up IFR. They knew climbing and continuing a standard bank towards the West would avoid terrain. Better to have to talk to the FAA the next day then not have a next day. Obviously the better choice was to just divert, but they still had options even as they kept descending to maintain VFR.

Absolute gem of a channel and a necessary and vital part of the industry. Salute!

There's a factual error at 4:16. The narrator states that the request for runway lights to be turned up comes as the plane enters left downwind for 27R. In fact, a comparison between the ATC tape and ADS-B data shows that this request came when they were a couple of miles north of the airport, and still on the RNAV 17 approach. Not sure what this changes, but for one thing it means that the request was *not* made because they lost sight of the runway after turning to the east, as some have claimed.

Its great to see AOPA/ASF issuing these rational, factual, non- hysterical & non judgemental videos so soon after the accident, when the topic is still 'hot.' Well done; hopefully this will help pilots learn about some of the potential traps out there.

Night flying is a whole different ball of wax, as any pilot knows. Sounds like get home itis , and being comfortable with your home field might have made these pilots complacent. I know from experience that at night your home field can look like anything but home. A part of us all die in the pilot community anytime we lose a fellow pilot. We have to learn from others mistakes, and as long as we are human, we will make them. Condolences to all involved.

As mentioned, the aircraft/air medical transport company was based there at Gillespy, I'd be amazed this practice hadn't been established/used by other of their pilots. This pilot knew back at John Wayne he needed the longer runway. Easy enough to find out if others have done the same.

Well presented, Richard. Looking forward to seeing the facts uncovered during the investigation. My condolences go to the family and friends of those who were onboard.

As usual another EXCELLENT analysis. Air Safety Institute is a valuable entity making significant contributions to global aviation safety and education-THANK YOU. Having served as an airline simulator instructor I realized something I had not realized as a line pilot flying turbojet aircraft. It does not happen often in training but what I discovered was how unbelievably rapidly the cockpit environment can change from "routine" to "utter confusion and chaos" with predictably "ugly" results.

I'm not a pilot, but as part of my job, I analyze paddling accidents in search of causality and also to extract lessons learned. I watch ASI videos because they give me a greater appreciation for common factors that many accidents share. You've highlighted the trap that complacency lays for anyone who doesn't appreciate it, and certainly complacency was a major factor in setting the stage for this tragedy. It also appears that the PIC's decision resulted in a relatively demanding approach that left no margin for error - another common cause of accidents. What troubles me the most about this particular accident is that apparently, their decision to fly a prohibited approach was SOP for this outfit, and the tower granted them permission to do so. I find that astonishing. Blowing off safety protocols is something that one can sometimes do without consequence. Doing so without encountering any problems reinforces the mistaken notion that the protocol was unnecessary or overblown, and increases that sense of complacency. Then, one day, some factor or otherwise minor error intrudes and results in a fatal outcome. I apologize if I'm just restating what is already obvious to you safety-conscious professional pilots. I was just stunned by this tragedy and the preventable loss of life.

I was a flight nurse with these pilots in this plane as of early 2021. Great guys. I never felt unsafe with them. So sad.

As always we appreciate you Richard and AOPA. I do appreciate these quick AOPA videos being put out while the longer lead time videos from Air Safety are AMAZING these quick reviews are great to jog all our minds on what we can learn regardless of the root cause.

Thanks so much for these new format videos. I am a lower hour PPL and am trying to take in advice and tips wherever I can. ASI and AOPA is a fantastic resource for this, keep up the good work!

I watched about three other you tube aviation experts analyze this accident and was not impressed with there objectivity, depth of investigation, and rush to judgement! This presentation by AOPA is how an analysis should be done, thank you AOPA!

Richard, good analysis and presentation (although watching the video footage of the actual crash is difficult and sad) -- one small item that you omitted and that would be helpful in conveying a better understanding of the accident is that there is no available instrument approach to runway 27 at KSEE (due to terrain), thus the crew's decision to fly the RNAV 17 approach then cancel IFR and visually circle to land on 27. Sadly, they don't get another chance to reconsider that decision but hopefully we all can learn from the outcome. My heartfelt condolences to the families and friends of those that were lost.

Thank you for this early breakdown. I’ve listened to a couple other analyses and some have wondered if he wasn’t looking at the lights of the runway, rather, the street lights, at the time he asked for the runway lights to be turned up. If so it’s likely he did lose spatial orientation at some point during his circle to land.

Stall speed for Leerjet is 110. At 45° bank, it would be VS+20%, or in this case 132. When looking left and trying to get the airfield in sight, it would be easy to dip just a little too far with airspeed just a little too low. Very sad day for all involved.

Possibly mistook Christmas lights on Pepper Dr for dim runway lights from a distance through fog. When the tower told him the lights were already up he realized he wasn't where he thought he was and adjusted too much.

Keep the new episodes coming. Thanks for your efforts.

The audio was chilling to say the least. Very sad .

There is a reason some airlines no not authorize even published circle-to-land approaches.

Excellent work! ASI NEEDS to post more videos more often. These are invaluable to a learning pilot. So glad my AOPA dollars are at work.

Make more accident case studies I’m not even a pilot or associated with aviation but these videos are amazing to watch ! Great job!

Circling configuration for the Lear 35 is gear down, flaps 20, and VRef+20 while maneuvering…up to 30 degrees of bank. Once you’re in a position to leave MDA and make a landing using normal maneuvers, the pilot flying should call leaving minimums flaps full. The speed now is V ref +10 requiring about 65-68% N1. The Lear 35 doesn’t have an aural stall warning but it does have a shaker and a pusher as well as stall warning lights. The ADS-b speed data doesn’t strike me as being too slow; however, if you over bank a Learjet and unload the wings it will drop like a rock even if it’s not stalled. I’m guessing this is what might have happened during tight maneuvering in this situation. In any case it’s very sad and my deepest sympathy for their family and friends. We are all human and we make mistakes. What is for certain is that we all will die and we will all be judged by God. We can’t save ourselves, only by Christ can we be saved.

I worked at a company for a few years not two blocks from that airport. If he was only at 500 feet on that turn, he would have been extremely close to the mountain at the east side of that valley. Then they would have to drop very fast to the runway, and at the speed he was supposedly going, he would be dropping out of the sky like a rock because in that tight of a turn he would have lost far too much lift from his wings and with not enough speed for the horizontal stabilizer to keep the nose up thus he stalled falling out of the sky like a rock.

He may have spotted the approaching rising terrain on his base to final turn and tried to tighten the turn putting the aircraft into an accelerated stall without enough altitude to recover.

A stall can occur at any airspeed. The fact that he remained at 130 kts during the circle maneuver is not relevant. What most likely occurred they kept the pattern too tight and to prevent the overshoot he banked and pulled. The Lear 35 has very short wings,

RNAV 17 Circle 9L is totally legal. No need to cancel IFR. Circle to L downwind or direct L base near Tomty. NOTE: He can't go below MDA of 1360 LP or Circle 1440msl without field in site. The ceilings must have been at least above that. Why did he descend to 725msl 400 agl? He did a low pass over home base hangar and proceeded to a very unstable approach, with varying speeds, alts, and a pinched base overshoot which led to aggressive bank and accelerated stall. Perfect example of getting behind and an unstable approach leading to accident.

You’re doing important work, Richard. Please keep these early analysis videos coming - they save lives.

Where the head goes the hands/body follow. The PIC was head out looking for lights, caught sight and chased them. He gave both a slight overbank and some pull with the end result of stalling out the left wing. ALWAYS add a few knots for the family at night on a circling approach in weather just for this reason...

Well, I retired last April first after almost 45 years of professional flying all of it in GA Part 91 135 and 133 in helicopters. When I was flying canceled checks.I learned real quick about circling approaches. Yeah, you have to do them from time to time because well weather is well the weather, but only went circling approaches are authorized on the plate. Short cuts will end you, there are reasons why the approaches to a given airport are charted and limits published. These two should have gone missed and to their alternate. I wonder what the culture in that company is like and why they had to cheat so to land at an airport I would not fly into at night with all the sprawl and obstructions around, and short for a jet to boot. I would have gone missed and most likely gotten fired before the cool-down checklists were completed. EMS flying is the pits.

so they circumvented the prohibited circle -to-land by going vfr, in other words, they cheesed it in order to overcome what they saw as an annoying technicality. At barely more than 1.3x their stall speed.

I'm really loving these early analysis videos, but I mean I love all content from this channel. I could watch multiple new videos a day on here.

This happened not even a mile away. All i heard was bang then a massive boom. Gillespie field has amazing ATC staff and they’re very dedicated. It is quite strange that 2 crashes happened so close in time in the same area

To those saying it was not a stall, look at the impact point debris. That thing stalled, rolled, and landed as flat as a pancake.

The real problem here is this Lear Jet should not be operated out of this airport. Any risk analysis of this situation would have to see what a bad choice the “hot” Lear with no night approaches to the long runway because of the terrain. The pilot’s and crew were put in a bad situation.

Just listened to the full recording of this mishap. Probably one of the most horrific things I’ve heard. Thank you guys for the early breakdown. Hopefully the NTSB ends up shedding even more light on this.

I'm not a pilot (bar a handful of hours on small light aircraft) but I can see how videos like these will save countless lives. Great work

Thank you. Very interesting from a non aeronautic person. This was a very sad mishap. California seems to be a place where it can be challenging to fly, due to the quick change in visibility, the mountains, the fog and weather and valleys creating disorientation.

Great analysis. One factor I suspect may play a significant part in this accident is the crews experience. Given a single type rating with a possible SOE limitation, suggests they may not have had significant hours in the plane.

Very thorough discussion. Glad to be a Life Member of a fine organization that contributes so much to aviation safety.

Thank you for the great job in this analysis. As a newer IR pilot, I learn a lot from these analyses.

Great explanation @ 6:00. I wondered why they made their circling turn so tight. Since they were VFR, the need to keep the airfield in sight did not give them enough room to execute the approach.

Excellent analysis, sir. I am not in aviation, but I find it fascinating. This incident was a terrible tragedy and you bring up many excellent points and questions.

Excellent commentary. A little creeped out by your studio 54 old man bracelets.

I wasn’t a stall spin (watch the security video) it was just a stall during a hard turn . He would had to have another 40 knots of air speed attempting that final turn and full thrust during the turn. It was almost identical to the New Jersey accident. The Lear jet was based on the design of the P-16 military aircraft witch does not have a very good agility low speed turns , hence then elongated fuselage and narrow wings. Fatigue, overconfidence and bad weather are a bad mix. He should have just started over with a new approach or to another airport if he didn’t feel comfortable with the landing. I remember my instructor telling me (Ex Vietnam fight pilot)it isn’t the students who crash , it’s the pilots with thousands of hours of flight time. There always should be a high margin of safety in any flight maneuvers.

Always sad to lose people in air accidents, but especially sad when they're performing a great service to society, as air ambulances or firefighting aircraft do.

Again, thank you for an unbiased, calm and "undramatic" presentation...unlike other opinionated "analysts" appearing on this channel.

Isn't this the flight where you hear the pilot yelling oh expletive then screaming as they crash ? That was hard to listen to hearing his last seconds alive. It honestly sounded like the workload was on the pic.

I’m on the commercial jet flight path to SRQ. They always come in at the same angle, which directly lines up with a runway. The other night a jet came into view but then veered East - not at all normal. I’ve watched so many of these videos that I’m like “missed approach” or some problem with the plane. Then I heard sirens (probably completely unrelated). On FlightAware I could see that it did a big Figure 8 and then got back on the same route and landed. But wow I had all kinds of scenarios going through my head, all from these crash videos!

Old or bold. Make your choice.

Low and slow is dangerous in a Learjet and being this close to vref while dipping his wing (turning) gave this crew no safety margin imo.

Interesting comment about not hearing the stall warning on the pilot's last audio. How is the stall warning on a Learjet 35A initiated ? How responsive is it? Are their different warnings for stalls? Can the pilot turn down or mute the different audio warnings? Is that part of the flight check before take-off to verify it's working?

On your next ASI video update on this accident, please discuss the stall speed differences at the steep bank angles that appear to have been needed to bring the aircraft beyond the point of the lost radar track (end of the green line), thru the base to final, to have it ending up crashing down the street on a somewhat westerly (runway) heading

Pilots, especially private jet pilots, need to learn from these tragic deaths. I'll just say avoid get thereitis, stay ahead of your aircraft, and don't fly in a situation that will potentially present multiple problems. Weather, weather, weather. Hang out on the ground and have a good dinner and enjoy life. Then fly when it's clear.

I fly jets personally, professionally, and teach in various types and live in San Diego. The crew were professionals, however I understand how professional aviators, including myself, can make errors. I teach my clients extensively in circle-to-land (CTL) instrument approaches, both since they are required and in the unlikely event they need to use them - IFR or VFR. They carry a high risk, especially at night - as evidenced by accident statistics and I have flown a number of them on IFR approaches. A number of CTL procedures place you at MDAs lower than you would use in a VFR pattern. When combined with night, precipitation, low ceilings, and terrain - even with 100% lights- it can be difficult to see the runway lights and the runway itself due to line-of-sight and angle issues. Rattlesnake Mountain - the hill just to the north of the 27R centerline is an issue and occasionally you will receive a TAWS - Terrain warning on final. As aviators know, when you turn to final and realize sometimes that you may be flying past the centerline there is a tendency to turn steeper, or use more inside rudder, both situations can increase the chance of stalling the aircraft by changing the lift vector on the wings or increase in load factor that increases the stall speed. I'm not stating that this happened with the Lear Jet, since we don't know all the facts, just reminding pilots to beware of that risk - IFR or VFR. I was up today teaching our son for his Instrument Rating and we were flying circle-to-land approaches in San Diego and reviewing the same risk factors associated with these approaches. They can be safe, if the risk can be mitigated. Regretfully in this case the risks appeared to have been too high, even for a very experienced crew. A crew that has previously provided such wonderful service as air ambulance staff on a number of successful flights. This video is a great resource to pilots, and hopefully might help aviators in their future risk management decisions - Rich Pickett

The Widow maker turn. Thanks AOPA for the video an unfortunately some of the best teachers to learn from are the ones that are no longer with us to share the story from the pilots perspective and we have to remember not to fall in the same spider web traps. Go around!!. RIP

Why the ear pods?

Good on you Air Safety Institute, glad to see you're back to regular posting. Keep it up

Sorry. No offense. At 4:15 How do you know he was on downwind when he called for lights to be turned up? The LiveATC transcripts are edited for silence, so times can be compressed. IMO, I think he called for lights before Tomty.

Thank you Richard, well done. QUESTION: did you do analysis like this for N605TR, the Truckee crash on July 26th of 2021? I did not see one in your videos. They seem similar in nature.

Such a helpful analysis. Thank you.

These videos are valuable, as we can read from many comments here, also to people not directly involved with piloting high performance aircraft. Personally, I also take away learnings with respect to crew coordination, as very often businesses leaders will take decisions without properly consulting with the staff they actually pay to help them. Lessons learned from crew coordination shortcomings are valuable for society beyond aviation.

The blending of lights with the horizon; especially if you want/need it to be a certain parameter. But no stall alarm? Damned strange.

Thank you, Richard, for your analysis that may be contemplated along with the others about this incident. My question is this: Why would not the pilots opt for 09L (RNAV, GPS) approach and landing given that winds were so slight and variable.

this happened about 15 minutes from my house, another plane crashed near the airport in october

Actually, didn’t the crew have a third option? In addition to landing straight in on 17 or canceling IFR and doing an unauthorized VFR circle to 27, they must have had numerous other airports at which to land and live for another day. Great report!

I'd have to believe the low altitude to start was the result of just inattention by both pilots, rather than an attempt to scud run below a cloud layer. I mean, you're not even VFR if you're not 500ft below the clouds, and if you're choosing to fly a jet at 500ft AGL intentionally to stay below clouds, you're just insane and have incredibly bad judgement. I have to believe the more likely explanation isn't purposeful flying low, but accidentally getting low

Amazing the details and analysis of what is starting to become almost a weekly thing around the country. More and more flights=more and more crashes. I was going over the flight in MSFS 2020, and as I made that sharp left turn for my landing, changing my mind too late or too early depending on who you ask, on which runway. And mindful of the low hills I was approaching, my speed, visibility

A fantastic, broad overview of this unfortunate accident..WAY TOO many, too often. Prayers for surviving family members. Thanks..

Echos of the crash of N535PC in KASE almost 30 years ago. (night, low vis, steep turn, aircraft returning to home base and possibility of an accelerated stall) We need to realize, the LR35 is not a forgiving wing. It will load quickly and stall when provoked.

That is one crazy place for a runway. Absolutely ludicrous

I do not see the NTSB being able to figure this out as much as here even if the spend a year or two trying. It is a hard problem. RIP.

Take a look at Probable Cause, that channel says he wasn't going fast enough for that 30 degree bank. Also he didn't need to make it so hard. He could have went around here n a big circle band essentially landed a straight in approach. It would have only taken a few more minutes. The FAA and NTSB need to require more training on circling approaches...

Seems like a lot of accidents happen in bad weather/poor visibility. Just last week a Pilatus PC-12 crashed with 8 souls on board, probably spatial disorientation in IFR conditions. So I think if I only fly when the weather is good, I will increase my chances of survival dramatically.

Excellent video ASI, I love your investigations a lot and makes me a more confident pilot. Cheers.

There’s an interesting fact to this crash I haven’t heard many people talk about: if you listen to the audio, just before the pilot begins screaming, you can hear a very distinct “thud” or “bang”. I listened to it a few times thinking it was possible it could be the sound of the landing gear extending but I don’t think it was. I do however believe it was a contributing factor to the accident. I’m curious to see if this is mentioned in the accident report.

These early analysis videos are truly excellent

From the surveillance video and description of events it looks like he was in a tight turn and shedding altitude and didn't realize how much altitude he was losing. He lost too much altitude too quickly and didn't have enough altitude to pull up before hitting the ground.

I started my flight training at Golden State Flying Club at SEE in 2012. The entire surrounding area is very challenging between GA traffic at SEE and MYF, military traffic out of Miramar and North Island, commercial traffic, the terrain, and the winds off the smaller peaks and the weather. I never flew IFR there, but night VFR was a wild time. It's very easy to get disoriented. While I understand why the PIC wanted the longer runway, they definitely should've went with an extended downwind for 27 instead of cutting it super close in. Very unfortunate accident and a serious case of get-there-itis.

I thank you for these updates and believe helps with keeping everyone safe through the knowledge you share and learn from these all too often tragic events.

Very similar to the Challenger crash at Truckee last summer. Circling approach leading to a VMC stall.

You couldn’t cancel IFR and proceed VFR in New Zealand under those conditions because night VFR minimum for uncontrolled aerodromes in NZ is ceiling 1500 ft and 8km flight visibility and controlled aerodromes is ceiling 1500 ft and 5km flight visibility.

Great video. Try not wearing your white ear buds - look like earrings, a bit distracting.

I'm not a pilot, I just like this channel. It looked to me like the plane was on fire. It was at night, but you can see the plane going down, why would that be?

This is better than probable cause and blancolirio channel’s review of this accident

"A crew on their planned final flight of the day... face a dilemma. Land on a runway that doesn't give them the landing distance... or circle to land at a longer runway at night..." Or, uh, maybe divert to another airport. Not to be captain obvious, but they hadn't declared a fuel emergency, so diversion should not have been ruled out of consideration.