Another reason why the V-1 and V-2 rocket launch sites were also in the sector of the British army. And the V-1 and V-2 were causing a panic in UK by killing the civilians in London.

It's obvious Monty was talking about the long term objective. Capture the port, get resupplies/additional reinforcements and push behind the enemy.

@@manticore4952 That's why Monty ignored the waterway to Antwerp until he lost Market-Garden and then sent the Canadian's to do the hard work! The German 15th Army had time to organize it's defense.

What is err?

@@bayuadhi3671 It means 'to make a mistake'.

@@renard801 i see

I really want to say something intelligent, NATO ally, but I can't get past what "Afsluitdijk" looks like in (American) English. Any funny ones the other way around?

@@johnd2058 think the pikes along the Mississippi river, but it is also a bridge

Doesn't matter what Churchill was "pushing". Eisenhower was ready to give Stalin all he wanted - the Western Allies DID, in fact, meet the Soviets further East than the borders of East Germany. They then retreated to hand over all that German land and people into Soviet hands - the US troops met the Soviets at Torgau; Leipzig was well behind the American lines; yet all those people were then given to Stalin's cruel hands. You can see the front here at the end of the war: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Line_of_contact#/media/File:Final_Operations_-_19_April-7_May_1945.jpg

@@KnightofAges All that had been agreed to, and not an inch or a soul more. That map you posted shows Torgau as an insecurable salient, and Leipzig within artillery range of the front. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/210_mm_gun_M1939_(Br-17) | The Western advance past that occupation line occured in the context of terrain decidedly favorable to the offense, as good as it gets in Germany. This does not make for a stable border, historically. The only rational outcome of breaking the deal at this point would have been to fulfill the Valkyrie Conspirators' delusional fantasy that Hitler's death would make the Western Allies switch sides and join the Third Reich's war against Slavic Bolshevism. I don't know if Churchill could have speechified the British into it, but I'm certain the American people would have revolted. www.google.com/maps/@51.0855258,11.71812,113365a,35y,1.77h,5.55t/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en&authuser=0 upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a9/Germany_occupation_zones_with_border.jpg | Merry Christmas to all. ^_^

@@johnd2058 As the British voted in a Democratic Socialist government, before VJ day, Churchill's _Operation Unthinkable_ would have been rejected. VE day had Britain spattered with union jacks, US and Soviet flags.

Spot on, yet any time anybody brinks up this argument. These defenders of Monty's legacy WILL NOT HEAR IT. Monty himself stayed the goals. It was his operation. Just every aspect of thid operation screams incompetent leadership. Yet esp. British people will till their deaths defend legacy of their hero from El Alamein. Which objectively clearly had little chance to fail regardless of current C.O. Change my mind.

Exactly they had to file in a single file line on a road that was bordered on both sides by impossible terrain.Like in Gallipoli when they landed on the beach overlooked by cliffs which was never figured into the battle plan.Half asked plans make for losing battles.

@@GFStodtmeister you could wait until Biden has been in office for a year before you decide he is no good, 100 days in doesn't give him much time to do much. Except get 100 million people vaccinated,

@@grogery1570 And this is the opposite side of the "blame coin". The obverse is "blame others for your failure" the reverse is "take credit for another's success".

@@GFStodtmeister you are sort of right - i don't personnaly know anyone who rates Biden high

I wish more people would put aside national boundaries and realise there's more important ideas to stand up for

UniworldCityGGaon You are absolutely correct. This is something I've learned only recently which is surprising because I've been studying WW2 as a hobby for years and never came across the amount of Indian Nationals who served under the British army. In terms of percentages, Indian troops actually made up the plurality of the British Army troops in North Africa. This only reinforces my respect for everyone who fought to preserve the the ideals of republicanism and democracy, of course including my Indian brethren as well.

My Grandpa fought with the Suffolk Regiment which was part of an Indian Division in Burma. He had high praise for them. They won many VC's during the war.

Yea and with a name like MrStoneycool, I am not sure how we could take any of your comments seriously, we are a shithole but you are using You Tube to so freely express your spew, so we are such a shithole that we allow you to use our medium to speak your opinion....you sound like a spoiled ungrateful winer, thats Y-NER..GET IT SLOW-POKE...

MrStoneycool69 Wow! Do you think Jews and those favouring the economic system of Karl Marx eat babies as well?

Stewart Nicol as BILLY CONNOLLY. The failure was Montgomerys supreme arrogance in ignoring the fact that there were two full strength Waffen SS panzer divisions, the 9th. SS Hohenstauffen and the 10th. SS Fruendsberg in the woods and fields outside of Arnhem. The man was an asshole.

@@johnmcdonald9304 Both Divs in the II SS Pz Korps were refitting after being decimated at Falaise...and the chase up the coast ... On the day of operations, only the 9 SS Recce Btn was in fighting order. The strategic operational directive was F.M Montgomery's. The Air element...Market.. of the operation, was planned by Generals Brereton and Williams, USAAF.....and Browning. The ground..Garden.. operation was planned by XXX Corps'.

Very interesting to hear your father's experiences and call on the battle...Bless them. I will never understand why they didn't use a series of coy sized coup de main ''Pegasus'' attacks with Horsa gliders at Arnhem...and with the Yanks father south. With both, Main and RR Bridges on the Nederrijn was already secured by coup de' main....I would have dropped the the Bdes south of the river and then ''do the scoot'' over from a strategic southern base right on Horrock's line of advance Sla'inte from New Scotland.🍻

BRAVO, BRAVO!! TRUTH INDEED!!

@Stewart Nicol as BILLY CONNOLLY The Black Watch were not at Market Garden. The failure was the US 82nd not seizing Nijmegen bridge immediately. Browning was still in the air when the 82nd men should have been moving towards Nijmegen bridge. They were drinking coffee and having donuts.

Another miscalculation by the British

@@ramal5708 Two thirds of the drops were American and it was largely planned by the Americans Brereton and Williams of the USAAF. And if course let down by the US 82nd Airborne.

@@johnpeate4544 Not Browning?

@@ramal5708 Monty _did not plan_ Market Garden, coming up with the idea and broad outline only. Montgomery’s relations with the commander of Second TAF, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, were poor, and he was largely excluded from the planning process. It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF and Hollinghurst of the RAF. It was Bereton and Williams who: ♦ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset. ♦ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet. ♦ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges. ♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity. ♦Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“ From Robin Neilland’s The Battle for the Rhine 1944: _”In early September **Montgomery had a plan ready for employing airborne forces-Operation Comet-and some details of Comet should be noted here. Comet called for the 1st Airborne Division and Sosabowski’s 1st Polish Parachute Brigade to seize the Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges, using gliders for coup de main attacks, landing close to the bridges, rather as Pegasus Bridge at Benouville had been taken by the 6th Airborne Division on D-Day. Once the bridges had been taken the parachute brigades would land on nearby DZs (drop-zones) and join up with the glider parties to hold the bridges until the ground forces arrived. In the Comet plan, Brigadier ‘Shan’ Hackett’s 4th Parachute Brigade was tasked to take the road bridge over the Maas at Grave, landing on a DZ just 1,000 yards from the north end of the bridge-which, hopefully, had just been taken by a force from the 1st Air Landing Brigade in four gliders landing at the south end of the bridge. Operation Comet was planned for 10 September; then it was called off and replaced one week later by Market Garden._ *_The Comet plan stuck to the basic airborne rule-land as close to the objective as possible-and to the basic rule for capturing any bridge-take both ends at once. In view of the subsequent arguments over the deployment of 1st Airborne at Arnhem, one cannot but wonder why the Comet plans for taking the bridges with one reinforced British division, using glider coup de main tactics, were regarded as far too risky for an airborne assault by three Allied airborne divisions just one week later?_* _It has to be clearly understood that taking the bridges on the road to Arnhem was only a means to an end. The final aim was to establish Second Army just west of the Rhine, north of Arnhem, and just south of the Ijsselmeer (or Zuider Zee). Once there, having outflanked the West Wall, which petered out some distance to the south, Second Army could either turn south-east to outflank the Ruhr, or head due east towards Berlin. Any decision on its final destination would rest with General Eisenhower._ _Having elected to use the Airborne Army, Montgomery had first to decide where to cross the Rhine. His own preference was for a crossing east of Arnhem, close to the town of Wesel, and Wesel was also the choice of Dempsey in Second Army. Wesel lay just south “of the Ruhr and was the better option for Garden, with fewer canals and an easier approach to the river. However, Wesel lay within the Ruhr anti-aircraft gun flak belt and the airborne planners stated that low-flying and slow-moving glider-tugs and parachute aircraft would suffer severe losses if Wesel were chosen (readers should note that Wesel was chosen for the last airborne operation of the war, the Rhine crossing in March 1945, when the US 17th and British 6th Airborne Divisions were dropped around the town)._ *_Therefore, since the air planners-specifically Brereton and Major-General Paul L. Williams of the IX US Troop Carrier Command-had the casting vote over the air element in Market, the decision was made for Arnhem, the target town for a thrust north from the narrow bridgehead over the Meuse-Escaut canal east of Antwerp, a route that would require the crossing of some wide rivers or canals: the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon, the Willems canal at Veghel, the River Maas at Grave, the Maas-Waal canal, the River Waal at Nijmegen and the Lower Rhine (Neder Rijn) at Arnhem (the Waal is the southern arm of the Rhine, which divides in two to form the Waal and Neder Rijn, some distance upstream of Arnhem). There were, in addition, any number of minor streams and canals restricting movement off the main north-south axis. “The point to note here is the destruction of the first Arnhem myth. *The choice of drop zones was in the gift of the US Air Force commanders, not the airborne commanders - and the factor that governed the Air Force commanders’ choice of parachute drop zones ( DZs) or glider landing zones (LZs) was the presence, actual or feared, of anti-aircraft batteries around the bridges._* _*Since the US Air Force commanders considered that these bridges would be surrounded by flak guns, they selected landing zones that were, in the main, well away from the bridges._* *_This decision had some dire effects. The obvious one is that it gave some airborne units-most notably 1st Airborne-a long way to go through enemy territory before they even got to their prime objective. If that were all it would have been bad enough, but there was more. It also deprived the airborne soldiers of that other airborne asset, surprise. Once on the ground, airborne units lack mobility: instead of swooping from the sky onto their objectives in a matter of minutes, the men of 1st Airborne had to march there from distant DZs, and this took hours. Long before they reached the bridges over the Neder Rijn the enemy were fully alert._* *_In addition, one of the other prime assets of an airborne division is that it can leap over obstacles that would hinder a ground force by landing on both sides of “a river bridge at once, which the 82nd Airborne did at the Grave bridge, but not at the Nijmegen bridge. At Arnhem both these assets were lost by the Air Force commanders choice of DZs, but the choice of the Arnhem drop and landing zones was not made by Major-General Roy Urquhart, commander of the British 1st Airborne Division._* *_Nor was this the only error committed by the air planners. Another was their decision that ground-attack fighters were not to be sent over the battlefield while escort fighters were in the air protecting supply drops. This decision denied the airborne units the vital assistance that these ground-attack aircraft had been giving to the troops in Normandy just a month before, and a lack of air support exacerbated the problems of the airborne units. Among other tasks, these ground-attack aircraft could have taken on the flak positions around the bridges, those anti-aircraft guns the air planners were so wary of. But the truly dire effect was, as Julian Thompson relates:*that the 1st Airborne Division was denied the use of a weapon the Germans, after their Normandy experience, dreaded. The enemy was able to bring reinforcements into Arnhem in broad daylight, with impunity, a move which would have been fraught with risk in Normandy a few weeks earlier.’_* *_....Ideally, an airborne force, be it battalion, brigade, division or corps, should be landed in one lift. For Market it was judged impossible to fly in all the Allied airborne units in one lift as there were not enough aircraft available. In fact, it was judged impossible to land any of the Allied Airborne divisions intact on the first day._* _This difficulty was put down to a shortage of transport aircraft and glider tugs, but the problem actually went further than that. _*_The British transport commander, Air Vice Marshal Leslie Hollinghurst of No. 38 Group, RAF Transport Command, wanted to solve the aircraft shortage by flying-in two lifts on D-Day. His colleague of the US IX Troop Carrier Command, Major-General Paul L. Williams, did not agree, believing that time was needed to service the aircraft and rest the crews-and this view prevailed at Allied Airborne HQ where Brereton supported it. Since the principal asset of an airborne operation is surprise, the two-to three-day deployment-an attack by instalments-was throwing this vital asset away. This decision would have some profound effects on the ground, most notably on Urquhart’s 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem.”_* - The Battle for the Rhine 1944: Arnhem and the Ardennes, the Campaign in Europe by Robin Neillands

@@ramal5708 From THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE 1944-1945. Rick Atkinson. _”General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in Dragoon the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision.”_ On the failure of the US 101st Airborne to capture the Som bridge intact: _”Montgomery’s proposal was for the US 101st Airborne to be strung out like a kite string over a 30 mile stretch. Major General Maxwell Taylor, the commander of US 101st Airborne, protested against such an extreme dispersion of his division. Brereton took the matter up with Montgomery,who agreed to let the matter be settled by direct discussion Taylor and General Miles Dempsey, the commander of British Second Army. They met at Montgomery’s headquarters on September 12th.”_ -Market Garden Then and Now by Karel Margry These kind of decisions ended up being crucial flaws and it was Brereton who enforced them, not Montgomery. The air commanders made the wrong choices throughout the planning. They took and kept 100km of ground up that road i.e. 90% of it. They NEARLY did it. They were not stooped where they set off, or even halfway up it. They got 90% of the way, within touching distance. Had the operation been planned a bit better by the air commanders and with more resources it would have worked. Monty’s idea was actually a good one, as nearly all the relevant personnel involved agreed. Including the Americans. They (Eisenhower and Brereton) were the ones who had to agree with it and give it the go ahead. They very much liked the idea. Eisenhower insisted it go ahead while under resourcing it. Montgomery wanted to use Hodges 1st US Army (and had in fact been promised) as a follow up flanking advance. Eisenhower: _”I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations”._ There were supporting units on either flank who set off to the left and right of Hells Highway shortly after and in fact one of these supporting flanks advances pushed the Germans away from cutting the highway near Eindhoven on the 20th after XXX corps had gone through ahead. They even widened the axis of advance with their follow on actions. It should also be borne in mind that promised supplies from SHAEF failed to arrive, leaving VIII Corps, supposed to attack alongside, mostly stranded in place. “Garden” launched with only half the troops it should have had. If only certain things were executed a bit better, such as *the 82nd capturing the Nijmegen bridge early when only around 20 German troops were guarding it.* Beyond the initial broad outline, Monty didn’t plan the operation and nor did he have any jurisdiction over the air forces. He can consult and discuss but he cannot give them orders. Monty’s aides tried to persuade Brereton to double missions on the 17th but Brereton refused and as I just pointed out, Monty even went back on his idea for the 101st to be strung out over a long distance when a Taylor argued against it. Monty did not wish to step on the toes of the airborne commanders. He respected their views and he let them plan it. Also neither Montgomery nor Browning could dissuade the RAF from deciding to drop 1st Airborne so far way from the Arnhem bridge, which led to the vast majority of 1st Airborne not even reaching it. The orders of advice Marshall Hollinghurst could not be changed. Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst are the ones who should be vilified, not Montgomery. It was their decisions that screwed the operation and prevented it from being a 100% success.

Truth will emerge?

May I give one a try? The Allies should have pushed through Italy to Germany and Not through France?

@@rampancyproductions pushing through Alps would be very casualty heavy. Mountains offer great defensive positions

@@michals5873 Yeah Italy was a horrid slog. There’s a reason Italy didn’t completely capitulate until the very end of the war despite being invaded 2 years before Normandy.. The terrain almost totally negated allied mechanical advantage with British and American soldiers having to trade their half tracks for donkeys to trek up and down those mountains!

My knowledge of that operation is that they wanted the Germans to win the battle.Theres a lot of covert operations that I can't really go into.But the Dutch Prince Bernhard who was Co owner of Royal Dutch Shell oil was a Nazi defector and joined Montgomary and the British in the planning.He was working with Dutch resistance who were double agents.The end game was to extend the war as it would have ended by Demember.The reason for WW2 was to create the EU They had the first Bilderburg meeting at the same place ten years later in 1954. You need to look for the Traitors of Market Garden by Tony Gosling.

@joanne chon Tea bags - I thought so!

The Scheldt estuary was taken, but at a high cost, and still after 2 months, while the western Allies were needing Antwerps port useable asap. Like, today. Fuel among others was taken in by Mulberry and the small part of French Normandy and Brittany ports that were usable, then driven by trucks all the way through northern France and Belgium. There was only supply enough for a single army to do a decent offensive operation. So market garden is considered a loss because it didn’t deliver, whatever the reasoning afterwards. Market Garden even DELAYED the clearing of the Scheldt estuary, because it got prioritized over the Scheldt, while little to show for. Don’t get me wrong, operational successes were sometimes spectacular, and certainly heroic, but Arnhem was just heroic, it was ultimately not taken. So there was no bridge over the Rhine, and no push to either the IJsselmeer (it was no longer the Zuiderzee at that time) to cut off supplies to the 15th Army defending western Holland, to facilitate an easier attack on the Zeeland Isles and peninsulas, gaining the use of the bulk port of Antwerp, or even Rotterdam. In every which way you look at it, Market Garden took the supplies bulk at the time, delaying everything else. It then did not deliver on anything called decisive. It did not outflank the Siegfried line, it gave no easier route than the Hurtgen Forest or the Siegfried line into Germany. It did not even free Holland apart from the provinces below the Rhine. The river delta of this area is low lying, wet ground, often sodden. Even if you get across the Rhine, it is not ideal ground to conduct a major offensive from using armored units, or even motorized, making having to cross the Rhine in the Netherlands the least desirable option. Apart from that, in the area east of Nijmegen! Next to the Groesbeek Heights lies the Reichswald and even more Rhine river. Not ideal. It makes no sense to prioritize an operation that does not deliver either an easier or swifter move into Germany itself (if not the Ruhr or Berlin, hell, even Hamburg would be nice), does not really speed up the use of Antwerp (surely it will have had an effect on 15 th army effectiveness, but it delayed the Battle of the Scheldt, and according to some, maybe many historians, made the battle considerably costlier and longer). Market Garden took place roughly 3 months after the initial landing in Normandy. After the Falaise pocket (21th aug) Germans were in full retreat. Market Garden gave the Germans a few extra weeks to prepare the defense of the Scheldt estuary. Imagine what an airborne division may have accomplished if it was used there. No more insane than dropping them at Oosterbeek. Freeing Holland was not a real goal, but if it was it was limited to the lower provinces. Tik mentions here that if 15 th Army was cut of, north eastern netherlands was still occupied. BUT, as with the southern provinces, the northeast is largely agricultural and less populated than the west. So the Hongerwinter would have had a far smaller impact, if western holland (actually the provinces of North and South Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht) had been freed. I think the real sting in this story is the question as follows: why do commanders at that level disagree, or even be ambiguous about what the aim of this operation was? Following Falaise things were fluid, not solidified as much as a few weeks later when the Germans were better dug in and ready. So making a gamble was reasonable, logical, worth a shot. A gamble was made, and it failed. Yes it took ground (thankfully. My parents were born in 1944 and 1945, in the Netherlands, below the Rhine. So already free, no Hongerwinter for them), but did not deliver a decisive push for considerable losses and delays in vital alternatives.

Market Garden _was_ part of the broad front. The idea was multi-fold. It its northern extreme over the Rhine it was to consolidate for an attack on the Ruhr.

those are some mighty big IFS. The HURTGEN forest was a death trap and much has been said and written about turning the corner at ARNHEM.

It's worse than you know. Aachen was going to surrender as an open city. Read up on the details, a TV video has been made. This surrender was reversed when the Americans didn't show up on time. Why? Ike had stopped their advance BY ORDER, per his deal with Monty. Ironic, no? The American Army was just about to roll right across all of the bridges near Aachen -- and Monty's plan stopped it. The German general involved survived, though many thought he should've been shot. He was the same guy that fought to hold Aachen -- the battle went on for ever.

David Himmelsbach More drivel by the resident halfwit.

@John Burns Can't you get ANYTHING right? The Aachen story has been documented in both book and made for TV video broadcast. The Germans were totally befuddled as to why the Americans didn't show up 'on time.' They'd been rolling right along. The fact that 1st Army was stopped by Ike, at this time, in favor of Monty was something that you have to piece together, as neither the US Army nor the British Army want that connection made, then or now. It's evaporated from the narrative. But the German general's plan would've put US 1st Army CLEAN over the Rhine within HOURS -- a full week before the Garden drop. He, literally, expected to surrender Aachen to a jeep -- the traditional lead element of an American Armored Corps. By this time, Germans were accustomed to surrendering to jeeps. [ It was common for the jeeps to announce themselves by way of 50 caliber machine gun bursts. This always terrified Germans, as the M2 machine gun usually required a closed coffin for the dead. Jeeps, of course, never travelled alone. They'd pack a tank brigade over their shoulder. ] (Two jeeps took the surrender of Prague in 1945 -- an event that the Czech Republic honors to this very day. It refuses to acknowledge the Red Army is its liberators. Those monuments have all been torn down. A plaque thanking the US (3rd) Army was erected in their place.) The jeeps were driven by Jewish Americans on a hunt for their cousins, BTW, and totally against orders. When they returned, their colonel told them, "Don't do that again." And that was the extent of their punishment for disobeying orders. Now contrast that with any other WWII army. Heh. When Gavin rolled north to the Baltic, (April 1945) he just used two jeeps, with his mounting an American flag. That ended all resistance. The arrival of the US Army was a fantasy come true for northern Germans. They feared the British or Russians.

I might add, the key German panzer unit involved, 116th Panzer Division, was loaded to the gills with anti-Nazi officers. Guderian deliberately staffed it so. It was held out of the fighting in Normandy until this it not be avoided. The intention was to use the 116th to put down the 1st SS Panzer Corp should the Heer move against Hitler. Yup.

I can certainly agree with Nicholas Conder that Montgomery had serious psychological issues without detracting from the successes attributed to him. I base my comment on the fact that as a sixteen year old student engineering apprentice at Rolls-Royce company in Derby in 1954, along with 8 other students, we were undergoing instruction in engineering drawings and I was standing at my drawing board when the door opened, and there stood Lord Hives, the Chairman of Rolls-Royce at that time. Behind him stood Viscount Lord Montgomery. Both men entered the room and of all the students he chose to speak to. Montgomery chose me. He stood in front of me and curtly said 'Good Morning". to which I replied, 'Good Morning Sir'. Montgomery then said, 'How long have you been here?' and I replied, Almost one year Sir'. The next words he spoke tells you all you need to know about Montgomery because he said, 'Can you read and write?' Need I really say any more? When I returned home that evening, I related the incident to my Father who was in the Royal Marines. I am not able to relate his response but let your imagination loose. That is MY impression of Montgomery and I am now aged 81 years of age and I have never forgotten.

@@rickreeve525 Ironically enough, this stands in stark contrast to how he addressed troops. My mother, who was serving with the British Army in the ETO in 1944-45, remembered when Montgomery gave a speech to the assembled British Forces just after the war ended, congratulating them on a job well done. I don't know if the intervening 9 years serving as Chief of Imperial General Staff, then head of NATO, went to his head. More likely, retirement in 1954 finally loosened the restraints that had long held his ego and lack of tact in check. One wonders if he would have had a more tactful personality had his wife not died in 1936.

Any re-writing of history by Montgomery, if it happened, pales when compared with the re-writing of history by Americans, as Nigel Hamilton drew attention to.

@@thevillaaston7811 I know. The number of Europeans who have to put with Americans saying, "We won the war" is too numerous to count.

little villa - rewriting the history of a super power that came 3,500 miles to a so called empire's shores to help them go 30? Tell it to the French/Poles/Dutch/Czechs - go ahead wave your little Union jack in their face - then duck. Your favorite poofs plans got over 20,000 Dutch citizens killed in the Honger Winter - wag. Mr Conder what was Mr Churchill doing in Washington. this whole board is English revisionism. The fact is at the end of the war the USA had 61 divisions the British had 13 and they were driving American tanks/trucks/jeeps and being fueled by the USA stings doesn't it. We even fed you after the war,don't mind helping allies but monty was ASS and in fact prolonged the war. For 250 yrs your crown shoved everbody else's shit in but couldn't bring your self to admit America kept that from happening to England

Totally correct, except that 15.Armee would technically be cut off from Germany by MARKET GARDEN if not from the WBN (German armed forces Netherlands) on the Dutch coast in 'Fortress Holland' and 1.Fallschirm-Armee west of the corridor, which would also be cut off by the operation. It was typical of Montgomery to go for a wider envelopment if a smaller one (aimed at just 15.Armee at Antwerp) was not possible or too costly. Montgomery made the point to Eisenhower in their 10 September meeting that a northwards advance to Arnhem would ease the opening of Antwerp, but that Eisenhower did not accept the analysis. Eisenhower did agree that successful operations to the north would open up wide possibilities for future action.

The Hongerwinter happened simply because the was a food shortage in Germany, thus food was siphoned off and sent back to the Vaterland. Market Garden had nothing to do with the Dutch famine.

The 8th Air Force and the British Bomber Command were never happy to forego Strategic Bombing for tactical ground support which they felt the Allies had plenty of medium and fighter bombers available and designed for that roll. Further bombing an area while trying to target tanks or troops was a not a target rich environment! Then there's the anti aircraft fire from the German 88's! So it was like a "game" of blind man's bluff, with death for the aircrew if hit by German ground fire! Many Allied aces were shot down while "going to the deck" looking for "targets of opportunity". The planners of Market Garden would have gotten their money's worth if instead of dropping the British so far from Arnhem, the medium and fighter bombers had flown flack suppression mission right before the airborne attack, and, having working radios would have been nice also!

@@mgt2010fla yes the radios were the biggest mistake Whoever was responsible for that error should of been taking out and shot. There is no reason what so ever that the 1st AB should not of had the right crystals in their sets. As for the 82nd not taking their assigned objective that was just plain poor setting of priorities by the planners. The orders should of been make very clear that the bridge was #1 all else means nothing without that bridge being taken. And yes the AAC commanders were pussies when it came to taking out the flak at Arnhem. Take that flak out and the 1st AB takes the bridge with ease and holds it for the 4 day it would taken 30 corp get there if 82nd had taken their bridge on first day But in the end it all comes down to those crystals

@@frederickbays405 Still, there were German SS Panzer divisions in the area and Allied airborne and German armor was never a fair fight! Ask the Airborne!

@@mgt2010fla I did met a man while working landscaping He got added my 2nd and last summer of doing that in RI to our rout. He was with the 101st. 596th D Co Ya they did not like tanks but they knew what to do with them and so as he said they were not really any big deal U see tanks dont fight tanks Tanks are good to take out Arty but other tanks are taken on by infantry in coordination with anti tank guns The 101st was hit three times by tanks during MG and did them in all three times Look at the Arnhem bridge The only reason the Germans got over it was b/c to few of the 1sr AB made it there and then those that did ran out of ammo MG could of made it if the Brits who had planned it had done the job right 1st crystals 2nd orders not to damage private property 3rd not making orders clear that bridges top priority over any other concerns the commanders on the ground might have 4th not have bridging equipment nor boat very close to front of column 5th AAC and RAF not giving enough air support That one fail on Ick he being #1 over it all Should of had them do it whether they wanted to or not You see Kid I am 73 been at this since I was 8 Did my time with the 8th Div HQ (69) as head S-3 clerk then with 101st B Co 101st Aviation Bn as two S-3 clerk, S-2 clerk, radio op and door gunner all at same time Put in 20 to 24 hr days for 309 days but 10- says ay China Beach 95th Evac when I got my left ear drum busted and then got pneumonia Did get to spend my 22nd birthday surfing at China Beach though So i do know just a little about the operations of a AB Div

@@frederickbays405 Who is speaking here, you or the veteran? Tanks don't fight tanks? El Alamein? Normandy? Kursk? Bulge? What drove the AB out of the Holland villages? Panzers! If the Germans had taken Bastogne the AB would have been routed! Arty vs tanks is a tankers worst nightmare! I am not a kid, Vietnam war era veteran, USAF medic, spent my 21st BD at a SAC base in the UP of Michigan! You had a better deal! My BA is in US History, Military History! Every operation has its failures, AB has the most! Crete, Sicily, Normandy, and Market Garden, the worse, and unnecessary, the jump of the Rhine for the British, aka Monty! You are right, "(you) KNOW A LITTLE (ADDED) about the operation of a AB division." There were no AB division operations in SE Asia!

Antwerp was the largest "Deep"water port in Europe I believe. The question that I always had is about Comet 3 and those operation. I haven't come across reference then in"Bridge To Far"

@@johnelliot3246 I was able to find some information on Operation Comet doing a google search. Based on what happened during Market Garden, it would have been a catastrophe (rather like the abort airborne landing at Rome, which was mentioned in Gavin's "On to Berlin").

Oh, don't even get me started. Biggest joke in the Pacific was the commander of the south pacific, who was always a better politician than he was a general, and he was a terrible politician.His claim to fame was his CMH, which was won by the soldiers who die under his command in 1917, not his skill as a general. His incompetence is a subject that I could rail on for hours.

@@donupton5246 Please do! Bug Out, Dug Out Doug was not a real hero in anybody's boook, except his own!

@@donupton5246 Who's that? MacArthur or Halsey? Halsey was an Admiral

so you felt what it was like in 1944 ?

*From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415* After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. *After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem*

@@bigwoody4704 Rambo, a quiz. Name the bridge the US 82nd *failed* to seize in Market Garden? 20 points form the correct answer.

David Irving Burns you've fooled no one but at least you are getting better at disguising your sickness .You haven't forgot to sign out of one of your accounts before posting in another.Perhaps if they rescind that restraining order and your ankle monitor is removed the management at the home there will take you to the library.I hope those voices leave you alone I have things to do so take your meds like the nice men with the nets there have directed

@@bigwoody4704 *BZZZZT!* Wrong answer. Rambo, the name the bridge the US 82nd failed to seize in Market Garden, was... 🍾🎊🎈 *the Nijmegen Bridge* 🍾🎊🎈 Zero points Rambo. Zero. Better luck next time.

Burns you're getting dizzy from inflating your date repeatedly. Take a deep breath.......for 20 minutes So let's review shall we, ♦️did you visit those fine Czech folks like I told you to? ♦️Did you explain why your crown sold them out to the NAZI's in 1938 with no representation ? ♦️Did you explain to the French why you left them covering your retreat in 1940 while Monty was boarding the boats and they were taking bullets? Kind of explains why they came back with the GIs and took Southern France while Winnie and Brooke wanted to keep faffing around in Italy. ♦️How about the Dutch did you tell them why Monty left them on the horn of the Hun and the Honger Winter that followed after Monty didn't have the nerve to show up for an operation that he bragged would take him to Berlin that took him backwords to Antwerp? ♦️How come Field Marshall Walter Model and General Kurt Student were able to ferry tanks and troops across rivers/canals under the ever watchfull RAF,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September,not in October and not in November!!! ♦️ Did you visit Monty's statue in Arnhem ? - oh that's right there isn't one ♦️And pick up your plastic army soldiers also mum may may slip when at home. And help with the groceries this time you lazy lump

V2 rockets... yes, you've got it. MG stopped V2 attacks against London. They then shifted to Antwerp.

David Olie Arnhem by-passed the Seigfreid line. Monty wanted a multiple crossing of the Rhine - Operation Comet. Objections mainly by Sosabowski scuppered it. Bradley and Patton were diverting supplies (disobeying orders) away from Hodges, who was on Monty's right flank, so Hodges could not assist Monty going north. Monty wanted a few divisions of Hodges' First Army on his right flank in Market Garden. Bradley and Patton should have been fired. US Corps commanders like Truscott and Collins were better than those two turkeys; they should have been put in those positions. _"The prospective benefits, if this operation was successful, were great. By establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine at Arnhem, the Allies would unhinge the northern flank of the Siegfried Line and gain access to the German Northern Plain. This in turn would set the conditions for a quicker defeat of Germany, either by directly attacking_ *_Berlin_* _or by enveloping the Ruhr Valley and then attacking_ *_Berlin_* _from the Arnhem bridgehead. It would seal off western Holland from Germany, which would in turn speed the clearing of the approaches to the much needed deep water port at Antwerp. Isolating western Holland also offered the prospect of gaining a second deep water port at Rotterdam, and of ending German V-2 rocket attacks against England."_ - SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA JUNE 1996 _"upon approval of MARKET-GARDEN at Brussels on I0 September had been short-lived. Five days later, on_ *_I5 September,_* _General Eisenhower himself reopened the wound, perhaps with a view to healing it once and for all through a process of bloodletting. Looking beyond both Arnhem and Antwerp, he named_ *_Berlin_* _as the ultimate Allied goal"_ - US Official History - THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN, Page 210. Eisenhower had no proper strategy and kept changing whatever he had. Very amateurish.

@John Burns The US armies NEVER had to divert supplies in the manner described. General LEE and IKE were totally in charge of such matters, NOT Bradley, not Patton. That's why they had to sit on their azzes and watch MG while doing nothing. If they'd had any say at all, they'd have kept on going. Ike TOTALLY SHUT THEM OFF with a phone call to Lee. He issued orders to General Lee, who ran the supply echelon. The American system was unlike that of any other army's. All supplies were brought up by non-combat troops that the generals at the front had no control over. They were delivered to the various army-level supply depots, whence 1st, 3rd and 9th picked them up to haul them the last miles to the front. That's how the system really worked. When Bradley was desperate for soldiers, he requested that Lee's boys be diverted to combat. He was shot down in flames. He didn't get ANYBODY. General Lee, of course, had a FIT. Ike was trying to mollify Monty, nothing more. Official histories are nothing more than azz wiping for the record. When you've read enough of them, it becomes baffling why anyone in any army ever put a footstep wrong. ( In this regard, Halder's revisionism is epic by any standard. ) NO WAY is the American official history -- or any other official document -- going to put the blame on Monty -- or the British, more generally. Grow up. As for 'Maxwell' (Taylor) -- you're looking at parachute DOGMA. No way is the school for parachutists going to opine that the biggest drop of the war was all goofed up because Browning -- its godfather -- phu cked up. Instead, the official line had to be: it could've worked, yes it could. Well, who can argue against could'ves?

David Himmelsbach More disjointed babble.

@John Burns Can't you get anything right? Petulance is not an argument. 1) You keep opining on an American Army that you know not of. 2) You are wholly ignorant of the Dutch bridge defense scheme, that's for sure. 3) You STILL can't accept that Frost's interdiction of the northern approach to Arnhem bridge did not constitute capture of that bridge -- not even remotely. 4) What was transparent to Gavin and Urquhart -- at the time -- eludes you. Both wanted to land near their bridges -- and on the island. Crazy enough, they were both turned down FLAT. That error destroyed MG before Garden even got rolling. It permitted Grabner access to the island. Neither Browning nor Gavin imagined that motorized panzer troops would be shooting down the highway before 1st Airborne even got to the bridge... which was a major error on Browning's part. (Gavin was kept in the dark WRT II SS Panzer Corps sightings. Imagine his shock when his boys tell him there's a major German formation occupying the Nijmegen bridge. It must have been a real WTF moment.) ( With only light weapons, they couldn't make any headway.) ( Keep in mind that the Americans suffered more fatalities during MG than the British did. !!! That's how intense the fighting was. 1st Airborne was ruined as a fighting formation, and it still took less fatalities than the Americans. Its figures for wounded and captured were sky high, of course.) While 1st Airborne is having fun and games north of the Rhine, the 101st is holding off a stream of infantry from 15th Army. No author wants to dwell on that, though. As bloody as it was, it was a side-show.

Yes, probably the same guy! I've moved on from gaming (although will be dripping in and out of it again soon). If you liked my Market Garden video, you'll probably enjoy my other Battlestorm videos too (later ones are the best) kzfaq.info/sun/PLNSNgGzaledgHIszXQVDreX-ZC1Xejf9Y Currently working on the next one's, Operation Crusader (coming soon), and an epic one of the Battle of Stalingrad which I've been working on for over a year now and I'm nowhere near done.

Ever since I saw the film A Bridge Too Far I have been captivated by Operation Market Garden. I thought it was interesting that you proposed that Gavin was to blame and I think I now agree that if he'd got his men moving to capture the Bridge. And the British had landed far closer to their target, the whole operation may have went a lot better.

I never expect another Planetmans here (let alone a Vanu)

@@CallsignYukiMizuki I never expected anyone to recognise my self made profile pic! Wow!

Once the 15th is taken care of the forces in the Arnhem area would go on to attack towards the Ruhr. The question is would it be a diversionary or a main assault? Because if MG had gone well then those forces could not have been ignored. They weren't that far from the point where the Ruhr meets the Rhine. Cutting that would be disasterous for German industry. So the plan was to a) cut off the 15th, b) destroy the 15th then c) decide where to attack now they're across the Rhine and have so many options.

Patton had nothing to with this. He was only any army commander not an army group commander.

Patton did have an alternate plan if you read his memoirs

One does not issue ironclad orders to allies. Or even general officers in your own military. This allows for blame to be diffused in case of failure. For example, Adm. Halsey's decision to abandon the landings at Leyete Gulf. Vague orders and priorities. Or Gen. Clark's vague orders to Gen. Lucas at Anzio.

So you mean, there is no document available except memoirs?

_"The whole operation as I have said already was given the code name of MARKET GARDEN. It was certainly a bold plan. Indeed, General Bradley has described it as_ *_“one of the most imaginative of the war.”_* _But the moment he heard about it_ *_he tried to get it cancelled,_* _lest it should open up possibilities on the northern flank and I might then ask for American troops to be placed under my command to exploit them. "_ - Montgomery of Alamein. _Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery_ The amateurism and jealousy of US generals did not help. There is s enough evidence to suggest the Americans did all they could to scupper the operation.

Montgomery's letters to Eisenhower in early September proposing Market Garden spell this out in detail, so it cannot be an after the fact invention for his memoirs.

+ODDBALL SOK see this as more of a theory for discussion :)

@John Cornell How can he be the best when he was not following Allied plans, but forged ahead with his own egotistical goal? He lied about his understanding of Market Garden and got thousands of Canadians and other allies killed. He was wishy washy with his duties, because he wanted to be first into Germany, surpassing Patton's accomplishments. His Market Garden failure was as obvious, as his North Africa campaign had been a success. Yet, he blamed everything wrong on America and Canada, or the weather, when necessary!

@John Cornell And between Antwerp, Belgium and Holland, he screwed up terribly!

@John Cornell Read something besides Montgomery's book of fairy tales. Then , you will be allowed to play with your crayons.

Monty debacles at Caen,Falaise and Market Garden had forced the GIs to go straight thru the Sigfired Line.Something Monty couldn't do

'There's no way the Brits could hold that corridor and place a new corp across the Rhine without significant risk of distruction.' But they did.

Um no,not in September,not in October,not in November.Try April with the US 1st Army and 17th AB I believe.And after Bradley,Hodges,Patton and the 291st Enginners crossed

@@bigwoody4704 What about the crossing of Operation Plunder? 23-27 March 1945

it was a disaster worse than monty garden and IMO was covered up by high command. Who was responsible for letting the least effective allied officer have yet another chance at getting good troops slaughtered

No, Norway had 2500 plus calories per day and denmark had something like 3000. If my memories serve me right.

Jim Jones Market Garden came out of British Government pressure on Montgomery to find a way of finishing the war in 1944. Eisenhower dithered for a crucial week before giving it the plan the go ahead.

Bradley and Patton were disobeying orders and depriving Hodges of supplies, in order to restrict Market Garden. Monty wanted divisions of Hodges First army on his right flank. They should have been sacked. The operation was three corps to Eindhoven and only one corps running up to Arnhem. A disgrace when seeing the level of men in Europe at the time. Eisenhower had prioritised the northern thrust as well.

Neither Bradley nor Patton had control of supplies, stop pretending you have any clue how supplies are controlled. Monty was a fool, who blamed everyone but his own ignorance.

Montgomery was in charge of *all* ground forces in Normandy. It came in ahead of schedule with less casualties than expected. Eisenhower, supreme commander, a political job with enough to do in that position, then also took on the ground forces job. He had to much on his plate. He was inexperienced for the role. All went pear shaped with his broad front, which stretched from Switzerland to the North Sea. There was not enough punch anywhere all along the line to force through. Eisenhower was out of his depth. _"Returning to his theme in a letter to Eisenhower, written on 18 September, Montgomery stated - yet again - that time was of the essence, that there was not enough logistical support to sustain such a big effort [broad front], that one route, preferably the northern one, must have priority"_ - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 Monty wanted divisions of the US First Army on his right flank at Market Garden. This was rejected. It amounted to three corps with only one above Eindhoven. An absolute disgrace. _"By the evening of 14 September, the day V and VII Corps of the US First Army opened their attacks, Patton had established half a dozen crossing points over the Moselle, and was heading east, consuming great quantities of fuel and ammunition. The outcome was that Patton did not stop until brought to a halt by the German army in front of Metz. It should be noted that this move, designed by Bradley and Patton_ *_to check Montgomery,_* _actually had a dire effect on Bradley’s other contingent, the US First Army, which was starved of fuel and artillery ammunition at Aachen."_ - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 Bradley and Patton were conspiring, in disobeying orders, to scupper a fellow allied commander. Unbelievable. _"On 16 September, when Eisenhower told Bradley that logistical priority must go to First Army and Patton must stop, Patton again told Bradley that the Third Army must get involved ‘at once’ and asked Bradley to ignore this order and ‘not to call me until after dark on the nineteenth."_ _"On 17 September,_ *_again defying his Supreme Commander_* _and with the backing of his Army Group commander, Patton launched an all-out attack on his two prime objectives, sending XX Corps against Metz and XII Corps in a drive for the Rhine. Success can justify such actions, but_ *_neither attack succeeded."_* _"Bradley now faced a considerable dilemma. By favouring Patton at the expense of Hodges he had ensured that_ *_neither Army could actually achieve anything_* _- and he had undermined Eisenhower’s current strategy at the same time. By 20 September, the Allied armies had to face the unpalatable fact that the days of rapid advances against a retreating foe were over."_ -Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 Eisenhower should have fired Bradley and Patton. The US had excellent corps commanders like Collins and Truscot who would have done better jobs.

Whyever would Montgomery need to show the world he's bold when he had already commanded all ground forces in D-day and planned the Normandy breakout? He never seems to get credit for that. He surely was an overly proud prick, but he wasn't a bad commander all in all. I get the feeling that a lot of people take offence to Montgomery's personal attitude (horrible, admittedly) and go the extra mile to insult his achievements. Why do people always scrutinise his mistakes in great detail, yet never seems to commend his better work? Meanwhile a subpar general like Patton is praised into the heavens...

Richard Binkhuyse Those 86,000 were actually the sieged Channel port troops sneaked out from Calais Dunkirk etc.

711 I.D. Cabourg (north east of Cean) remnants were send to the north of Antwerp and later moved more eastwards.Only 744 G.R. remained at St.Mariaburg (N-E. of Wilmarsdonk). 346 I.D. (north of Le Havre) was send to Brasschaat . 857 G.R. to south of Stabroek. Later towards St.Job in 't Goor. Remnants of both Division escaped via Falaise.

Richard Binkhuysen _"It was already decided to prepair for 'Market-Garden "_ Nope. Market Garden was given the go-ahead on 10 September by Eisenhower. The German 15 Army sneaked from the Channel coast and went north into Holland. They were benign from then onwards.

@John Burns Can't you get ANYTHING right? The 15th Army kept trickling onto the field of battle to harass the 101sth Airborne from the second day of MG onwards. These piecemeal attacks were relentless. However, they were a sideshow, so most MG histories skip past them. Eventually, the 15th Army was slotted in just north of the 6th Panzer Army when the Ardennes offensive kicked off. By that time, it was a shell of its former size.

Over 84.000 Germans troops, about 5000 vehicles, 540 artillery pieces and 4500 horses a sideshow ?

@John Cornell Agreed. And I think that Monty is hard done by, by most historians. It's seems to Patton good. Monty bad. Where as it is the reverse in my view.

Hollywood didn't faff up market garden quoting the Cornhole Chronicles again

*From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este* After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after AlameinI do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily, said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt

​@@bigwoody4704 Patton was well overrated and would have been convicted of war crimes if he hadn't conveniently been killed. Also, the ex Nazi Generals were always praising the Americans after the war, it paid off well.

@@johnbrereton5229 war crimes . Monty was the best general the Gerries had. You could have won in the Desert - the Failed Marshall didn't build the massive advantages the RAF,RN,ULTRA and US men and materiel coming in did that

The priority for the allies was to take pressure off Antwerp. The biggest problem the allies faced was supply. Even the massive American industrial machine could not cope with the amount of supplies and the distances those supplies had to travel to get to the soldiers on the front lines. Antwerp was the key. Operation Market Garden would forces the Germans to withdraw from the coast, freeing the river route to Antwerp and allowing supplies to be shipped from there opposed to the arduous route from France. Yes, crossing the Rhine may have been important, but it was never the focus of the operation as HOLLYWOOD suggests.

@John Cornell Please get help soon.

Yes, ofc any advance allows for one to stage attacks on neighbouring areas. Ultimately all operations are aimed to eventually move to Berlin, however in this case it is clear that the primarly objective was in the north not the south, you can not just push in all directions after a attack is undertaken as you need to regroup and reorganize.

Sandy Addison Canadian Army. You mean British Army with a Canadian name. The Canadian Army was fully fifty percent British and more. Go look up the order of battle for the so called Canadian Army which included Crocker's 1st British Corp. for Operation veritable it was three quarters British. The truth is there would have been no Canadian Army without British soldiers and equipment.

No he didn't,not with supplies landing for 3 straight days.Is it in British DNA to lie thru your crooked teeth?How was he even handed a command he hadn't done shit since 1918

Montgomery didn't want to be Supreme Allied Commander because he thought that was a mainly political role - he wanted to be Ground Forces Commander, as he had been during OVERLORD. Montgomery thought that the Allies needed a Ground Forces Commander to focus their effort in hastening the war to it's end, and that Eisenhower being both Supreme Commander and Ground Forces Commander meant he could not focus the Ground Forces job because the Supreme Commander role required greater attention due to it's need to coordinate both military and political factions. There is no doubt whatsoever that Montgomery coveted that Ground Forces Commander roles and wanted it for himself, but he was committed to the principle of it above his own self-promotion - he legitimately suggested that Omar Bradley be appointed to the role if it was politically impossible for a British Officer to be Ground Forces Commander when America provided the bulk of the manpower.

Had nothing to do with politics IKE gave monty preferential treatment @ Caen/Falaise/OMG. It was obvious he was no Field Marshal.Brooke should have called up Slim or reinstated The Auk or O'Connor.Britain had good officers that knob wasn't one of them

@@bigwoody4704 Auchinleck had failed to achieve victory in North Africa and lost the support of Churchill, so even if Brooke wanted to bring him back - which he didn't - that could never have happened. Slim did not have a high enough profile to even be considered a potential replacement for Monty, and if he had been brought in it would have dramatically weakened the situation Burma by removing from it the most competent and capable British field commander in the theater. O'Connor had been in a prisoner of war camp for two-and-a-half years and was never going to get near army command so soon after his liberation - not even Montgomery himself suggesting O'Connor be given command of the 8th Army changed the mind of the British High Command I know you hate Montgomery and think little of him but give the devil his due. He was a very successful field commander, and was promoted to high command, and retained in that position, despite his numerous personal flaws because he was a proven winner who got results at a tolerable cost in casualties. This doesn't mean he was a great general or that he's above criticism for things he got wrong, or for the issues he caused with his difficult personality, but if you cannot even recognize the basic inarguable fact that he was a General who got results and won the majority of his campaign then you have no credibility when you criticise him or compare him unfavourably to other people.

@@11nytram11 he won in 1st Alamein and laid the Mine fields on the Alam halfa ridge and called over 2 fresh divisions from The Nile Delta.Monty used both his plans and that mine field.The Auk and Dorman-Smith after that battle had to refit,resupply and reinforce.Churchill had too many brandies and sacked him because he wanted him to go on the offensive. Then Monty took10 weeks to launch an offensive.Which was the same amount of time he wanted in the 1st place.Monty was a WW1 sargent and a lying knob. Watch the Desert Generals Part two and go to the 26:19 time mark.3 straight Historians call the berk out

@@bigwoody4704 Yes, Montgomery inherited the position at Alam el Halfa. No, he did not use Auchinleck's plans. Auchinleck's plan was for a reactionary mobile defence using the Alam el Halfa ridge as a central pivot around which his army would move to strike at the Germans wherever they tried to attack, defeat them and drive them back. Montgomery's plan was a for a battle at a single defensive position dug in on the Alam el Halfa ridge which he would goad Rommel into attacking by leaking false information to him, and the Germans would be broken by the British artillery and armour as they advanced through a minefield. Auchinleck's plan was to fight in the open field between two mobile mechanized armies, Montgomery's plan was a static defensive battle - they were vastly different plans, only similar in the fact that shared the same location. As such, Auchinleck deserved no credit whatsoever for Montgomery's victory at Alam el Halfa. The best that can be said of the Auk is that he set the scene for it, but he did not plan the battle. Churchill sacked Auchinleck because the Auk had been driven back to the gate of Cairo and lost the confidence of the 8th Army. After some success in 1941 with Operation Crusader and driving the Germans back to El Agheila, Auchinleck had his ass kicked all over the Western Desert, lost Tobruk and almost got kicked out of Egypt. By any reasonable definition Claude Auchinleck's time in command in the North Africa was a failure. He had some successes, but he left the theater in a far more precarious position than when he took over, and he fully deserved to be fired.

Do you blame Browning for directing Gavin's attention to the Groesbeek Heights in the first place and prioritising them to Gavin?7

Owen Jones General Gavin *assigned a battalion* to seize the bridge _"without delay"._ They never moved on the bridge. There is the problem - not Browning.

4 years,FOUR FULL YEARS, the polluted rube wouldn't cross his own channel until the Big Boys showed him how.Class dismissed

@@bigwoody4704 Rambo, a quiz. Name the British general who had to take command of two shambolic US armies in the German Bulge attack? 20 points for the correct answer.

♦️You never answered my question - UK & Monty had 4 yrs,FOUR FULL YEARS to have a go across the channel.What was stopping them? 20-30 miles right off your shore couldn't be that daunting could it? With 45 million men in your Empire should have been a smashing success . 20-30 miles,WTF happened? How come Monty didn't cross the Rhine until April '45 and needed the US 9th Army to do it? ♦️Imagine what this yapping jackel Boy Burns would say about IKE if he lost say 200,000 @ Dunkirk or 81,000 @ Singapore or 25-30,000 @ Tobruk but who the hell has losses like that? 🚑🚑🚑

@UKExpat Monty was talking in code. He meant that the V2 and V1 threat to London had just been eliminated. That's what the 90% meant. It would've been nice for a grand tactical victory, but at a strategic level, he'd saved his nation's capital. Churchill was mightily pleased. He, not Monty, was the REAL author of MG. He didn't not dare let Ike know that MG was his inspiration. Ike would have shot it down just based on KARMA. Churchill's karma dictated that EVERY military gambit he EVER touched would go to chit. Every gambit he loathed would be a blow out success. (Dragoon immediately comes to mind. ) In North Africa he screwed the pooch for EVERY British commander: Wavel on over. No-one could talk him out of stupidity.

UKExpat Market Garden was a success: ♦ It created a 60 mile buffer between Antwerp and German forces. Antwerp was the only port taken intact. This buffer proved itself in the German Bulge attack right through US lines. ♦ It created a staging point to move into Germany at Nijmegen, which happened. ♦ It eliminated V rocket launching sites aimed at London. ♦ It isolate the German 15th army in Holland. ♦ They reached the Rhine. ♦ The salient was fleshed out. ♦ The Germans never retook one mm of ground taken. All this while Patton was stalled at Metz moving 10 miles in three months against a 2nd rate German army. And US forced were stopped before Aachen and eventually defeated at Hurtgen Forest - you know that engagement the US historians and History channels ignore.

Isn't that what happened in October/November 1944 with operation INFATUATE? I'm not that knowledgeable on the operation, but you seem to have described it to the best of my knowledge.

'It seems that GB might have been able to muster some battleship or heavy cruiser surface ships' They did. My Uncle was a gunner in one of those ships.

The really big error was to adopt a broad front strategy.

Idiot Monty already displayed the single thrust brilliance when market garden blew up in face and circled around and bit them in the ass

Browning dropped the 101st in the wrong place. It needed to be between the two key bridges. AMAZING that no-one was dropped there. Ike DID give his approval. MONTY dragged things out. Ike told Monty to speed things up. (!)

bill ballbuster To drive to Berlin was Eisenhower's plan. He changed it a day or so before Market Garden.

@bill Your analysis is fact-free, I'll give you that. 1) Grabner was ACROSS the Arnhem bridge BEFORE Frost arrived. That meant that MG was DEAD, DEAD, DEAD. Arnhem bridge was ALREADY lost before Frost showed up. Interdicting the northern approach is ALWAYS conflated by British eyes with taking the Arnhem bridge. Such is not so. 2) Once Grabner was on the island, he proved to be too much for both the 82nd and the 1st Airborne. He'd brought FLAK with him. Yeah, he had both 88mm & 20mm FLAK. XXX Corps accounts tell of 4 88mm guns. Which would ring true, as that was the standard deployment for such guns. ( They were simply not deployed singly or in duos. Back in 1940, a quad-set destroyed the British counter-attack at Arras. a quat-set destroyed the British ( Indian ) attack at Hell Fire Pass. ( North Africa, see TIK's video on that campaign.) Once Grabner was across, Frost, Urquhart, and Gavin -- and BROWNING -- were all screwed. 2) Even without Grabner, the SS had continuous access to the island and to the southern end of Arnhem bridge. Consequently there was ABSOLUTELY NO WAY to stop the SS from dropping the Arnhem bridge into the lower Rhine -- it didn't mater what Horrocks// XXX Corps did. THIS ^^^ is the REAL reason why the Irish Guards didn't charge off into the night after rolling across the Nijmegen bridge. All other tales are BS. Not only would the Irish Guards have to blindly roll up a solitary causeway at NIGHT but they could absolutely COUNT ON SS Panthers showing up before they reached the approaches to Arnhem bridge. Regardless of the opinions of this or that para, the Irish Guards knew from bitter experience that the SS was sure to pull a rabbit of their helmet and slot four more 88s some place further down the causeway. They were the #1 killer of Allied tanks. Nothing else comes close. The Irish Guards had just destroyed four of them around the southern approach to Nijmegen bridge, and that took ALL DAY with both their grenadiers and the 82nd paras. [ A single 88 could wipe out a platoon of Shermans faster than you can drop your underwear. This was a known fact. ] The Germans had routine access to the island by way of a ferry that the RAF never put out of business. For some reason, the RAF is given a pass on this matter -- while TIK and jingoist John Burns tees off on Gavin. If Gavin were such a boob, why did he get a prompt promotion? If Browning were such a whiz why did he disappear from WWII history? It takes a LOT to disappear a national hero with three-stars -- an army commander. Browning attained this distinction; yeah he was sent off to INDIA. ( Good grief, what a demotion! ) "In December 1944 he became Chief of Staff of Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten's South East Asia Command. " Considering the travel time, Monty had him hustled out of England ASAP. ( Americans would call that the MG Lloyd Fredendall 'solution.' If you'll recall Lloyd was even 'promoted.' Well, that's what the paperwork said. Heh. ) His trip to India kept Browning away from Fleet Street, that's to be sure. &&& You Brits, knock it off with the Gavin thesis. Browning blew it with the drop zones. Monty, Ike, Urquhart, Gavin, Horrocks ALL saw that to be true -- after the battle was decided. The after-action report must have been BRUTAL. ( Frost didn't comment: he was in enemy hands, wounded. )

@John Burns EVERYONE used such terminology. Gavin's war bio was titled "On to Berlin." The expression didn't mean what you impute here. Ike was PROHIBITED by George Marshall from getting down into tactical details. This is something that went WAY over Monty's head -- and yours, too. Monty went round and round during the war -- never comprehending that Ike CAN'T jump into tactical details. George Marshall realized that there was NO WAY that Ike wouldn't end up being the Fall Guy for a troubled operation if he even stuck his toe in the water. If that were to happen, then Marshall might be compelled to relieve Ike. But Marshall had no-one queued up to take Ike's place. Mr. Charm was THE pick of Winston Churchill. No other American even came close to him. Ike's PRIMARY mission was "Winston Control." This was a reality that could never be uttered. Both Brooke and Ike CONSTANTLY had to shield the Western Allies from Winnie. You would NOT BELIEVE the crazy stuff Winnie kept throwing at Brooke. The man had the patience of a saint. All of Winnie's crazy ideas were at least as bad as anything cocked up by Stalin or Hitler. The BIG difference, Brooke was no carpet. He fought to save the Tommies from Winnies crazies... and within the Service was beloved for his role. None of this could be admitted to wartime Britain. FDR exhibited superior military leadership: he dumped everything onto Marshall, Arnold and King. He dumped war production onto Stimpson, Wilson, et. al. He had enough smarts to realize that he didn't know diddly. The few times he did intervene -- due to high politics -- ie diplomatic matters -- the result was a disaster -- almost without exception. ( B-29s to the CBI theatre comes immediately to mind. They actually had massive bases in Scotland all set and read to receive squadrons of them. These bases were so far north that they were out of range for all other aircraft. The original plan was to bomb Ploiesti from Scotland -- and much else. (!!!!! ) When the atomic bomb showed up, down it would go, upon Berlin.)

David Himmelsbach This one is a complete idiot. "later, on I5 September, General Eisenhower himself reopened the wound, perhaps with a view to healing it once and for all through a process of bloodletting. Looking beyond both Arnhem and Antwerp, he named *Berlin* as the ultimate Allied goal" - US Official History, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN (Page 210).

Had Nijmegen Bridge had been taken of Day 1, it's most probable Patton would have gotten to Arnhem quicker than Horrocks and XXX Corps. Horrocks was a good general. But Patton was known for his speed so it's reasonable to assume he would have gotten at least to the Waal bridge quicker than Horrocks. But once again, it comes back to the fact that the tanks they had couldn't swim across a river. They needed the Nijmegen bridge, and they didn't have the Nijmegen bridge.

+Sneaky Scaper Personally I doubt if the results would have been different. The landscape was not in favour of tanks between Einhoven & Arnhem. It was not like the rolling hills of northern France or the steppes of Russia. That and the very narrow spearhead of hell's highway would make it impossible to gain any real momentum. Had the spearhead been wider and more crossing available than it might have worked.

+TIK Patton had a full compliment (however big that is I have no idea) of bridging equipment that he dragged everywhere with him.

+Sneaky Scaper patton is quicker but tends to take more causalities as a counter cost to his speed. plus unless pattons tank swim they still needed the bridge Nijmegen secure. patton really would not be a major factor on the bridge securing.

+Sneaky Scaper General Bradley's subordinate, Patton, took 3 months to move 10 miles at Metz. The advance on Metz by Patton had stopped before Market Garden was even devised. Patton was an unremarkable general. Famous for beating up a sick man in a hospital bed, wearing a shiny tin hat and cowboy guns. The US never had an outstanding general, so their media made one up. It was one with cowboy guns as it made good newsreel material. Papers recently revealed showed that most German generals had never heard of Patton. Do not get your history from Hollywood. Look at the 1st 4 minutes: kzfaq.info/get/bejne/mLSao8Jlz7-coI0.html

He was very understated and did not seak the lime light, I think you are getting confused with Patton

@@andrewlancefield3730 "UNDERSTATED" my ASS! Montgomery was a pompous FULL OF HIMSELF and OVERRATED general who cared more about "losing a battle than he did winning one."

@@agentmulder1019 really... so is Patton not to mention Bradley who also fucked up in Ardennes

@Benedict... Adolf phucked up in the Ardennes. Other than the trite influence of the British 43rd division, and the preening of Monty, the Ardennes was a purely American show. In the eyes of Germany -- and history -- the Americans crushed the offensive -- throwing it totally off the rails within 72 hours -- the single fastest reversal of a Nazi offensive during that war. Famous for a time, but now lost to the kids, American engineers totally derailed 6SS Panzer Army -- its spearhead in particular. These were not front line assault engineers. They were trained in bridge building. Which also meant they knew where all of the bridges were and how to blow them up. Strategy & Tactics magazine cranked out a Wacht on Rhein simulation that used the US Geological Survey of that battle zone. If you should ever obtain a copy -- it's an eye-opener. With it you can follow company level movements during every account -- both sides. ( Wacht on Rhein is the tune being sung by Germans in Casablanca, for you film buffs. It was written in the 19th century as an honor to the Germans that fought against Napoleon. Hence, the Casablanca scene is irony compounded many times over. The French anthem is the aggressive one. By the time of Hitler, what had been a totally defensive ode had been transformed into an opus of offense.) It is Bradley that smeared Patton as Blood & Guts. Under Bradley's leadership, 1st US Army suffered crazy high casualties -- especially to include the Hurtgen Forest. He OWNED it. In contrast, Patton was parsimonious with blood. He correctly understood that you can't allow the Germans to get their bearings back. You must keep driving them like a broken herd of sheep. The second the Germans recover their wits, they become Hell to shift. THAT was Monty's epic mistake. When his own subordinate commanders brought this fact up -- he had them canned. ( retired, sent to India -- something that happened to Browning. ) The fact that Browning was CANNED by Monty is not something that Burns & Coy can bear to face. In contrast: Monty and Gavin had a (military reputation) love affair to the ends of their careers. Monty 'forgave' Gavin -- yet NEVER forgave Browning. ( Gavin was absorbing the blame truly belonging to Browning and Monty knew absolutely everything about the events. ) The 1,000 panzers came from BROWNING and Bletchley intercepts. No British general would put ANY faith in brigadier general Gavins strategic insights. No-one tossed off Bletchley's transmissions. Bletchley was not wrong. They got the timing off. The panzers were for the BULGE. Adolf really expected Speer to crank out that many panzers in time for his dream counter-offensive.

@@davidhimmelsbach557 What confusion exists in your mind. Montgomery was given command of the US First and Ninth armies in the Ardennes. Monty put British troops in the depleted US armies who again were under British control. The rest of your post is not worth it.

UK and Canada were mainly using American Lend lease tanks

B Mc No they were not. The British had a whole range of tanks better than the Sherman.

UK and commonwealth forces in Normandy were mainly fielded with Shermans

B Mc Nope.

Over 17000 Sherman's were given to the UK alone

The Allies ALL started coming down with Victory Disease. They ALL thought that the war was effectively over, and that all that was left to do was march to Berlin. Bradley even halted the shipment of artillery ammo! This turned into a first class crisis that the US Army did it's best to hide. Victory Disease had every Tommy reluctant to be aggressive. Who would want to die right before the victory parade? The Western Allies were furious with German officers for extending the war, which every professional knew was lost by Germany. This anger is now down-played by histories.

Monty made Ike hate him after his many screw - ups.

Spud westhaver dont forget Monty made a play top become supreme allied commander.he wanted to rep[lace Eike.eike threastned top resign over tgis.Churchill realizing that the majority of allied troops.were american not british.Made Monty back down.and apologize to Eike.

@thunderbolt Don't invent history, please. It was Freddie de Goungand, Monty's chief of staff, that brought Monty around. Churchill was not even in the picture. He returned to 21st Army Group HQ -- having just left Ike -- who had ALREADY drafted the magic letter addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Freddie flipped out, BEGGED Ike to not send it on until he'd had a chance to 'smooth things over with Monty.' When he revealed to Monty just how perilous his position was -- Monty countered with the astonishing question: "Who can (possibly) replace me?" Freddie had to tell his own boss that Monty's old boss FM Alexander was the American favorite to succeed Monty. [ The Americans had wanted Alexander ALL ALONG. ] And that their thinking was that Monty would be 'promoted' to some command back in England, and Alexander would be brought up from the Med, where he was already operating as a theatre supreme commander. (SHAEF actually didn't cover the Med. You can see the politics of it: Britain had its Supreme Commander; America had its Supreme Commander. Their joint status was fuzzed by the press during wartime. BTW, Churchill bitterly railed against 'Dragoon' precisely because it would take two armies away from Alexander. Churchill had all kinds of crazy ideas about using them in the eastern Med: Rhodes being at the top of the list. Ike had a major row with Winnie over the matter. ) "[Alexander] Commander-in-Chief Middle East and commanding the 18th Army Group in Tunisia. He then commanded the 15th Army Group for the capture of Sicily and again in Italy before receiving his field marshal's baton and being made Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean." The fact that Alexander was independent of SHAEF is only apparent when you pull the organizational chart for SHAEF. His entire command is missing, of course. The Med was considered a theatre in its own right. But, with D-Day the BIG action had shifted to Northwest Europe. This latter term was ginned up to make explicit the split between Ike's command and Alexander's command. Both reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As you can imagine, Alexander would cough up anything that Ike needed -- namely the newly constituted 6th Army Group. ( French 1st Army; American 7th Army ) &&& AFTER Monty realized that Churchill would accept Alexander with no qualms at all... he drafted a contrite 'apology' to Ike about how he LOVED working as a team-member, etc. etc. Obviously, Freddie drafted this letter. He'd been crafting it while on the plane flying to 21st Army Group HQ. ( Monty never went to Ike's HQ if it could possibly be avoided -- and it usually was. )

david himmelsbach mier point.Then point was that Montys eego demanded that he command all alied troops in europe.Well that didnt happen.he got humiliated as a result.

Brian Knutson Monty was professional, the egos were with the Yanks who were colonels only a few years previously.

@@johnburns4017 The Americans did not hold a monopoly on ego. There were enough to go around.

@@oldesertguy9616 No. The Americans cornered the ego market.

The USA cornered the ego market.

@Brian Knutson You must stop making things up. Monty cared about the troops under him, British, Canadian, US, etc. Look at just these three with USA: Hurtgen Forest (34.000), Lorraine (55,000), Bulge (100,000). Total around 200,000. There is no way Monty would have subjected his men to such slaughter. A lot of American mother saw their sons again because of Monty.

Callum1 Scott. Failure to take it? As if Gavin was ordered to and didn't. No, he was ordered to NOT take the bridge and secure a HQ for his commanding officer, Browning.

The 101st was dropped in the WRONG place. It was useless near the Son. It need to be between the two critical bridges. Then everything clicks.

I'm rather sure Patton in particular had plenty of bold plans, just his bold plans were actually feasible.

@Shandwen Patton was relegated by the Grand Plan to the TRADITIONAL invasion route into Germany. The further south you go, the smaller the Rhine gets. By the time you're in Holland, the Rhine is an absolute monster. It's as big as the Volga, Mississippi, Columbia, etc. MOST of that water landed north of the southern Rhine. In the actual event, 3rd Army found that it was a cakewalk to set pontoon bridges across the Rhine. Patton didn't use ANY of the exotic preparation that Monty required -- and he was across BEFORE Monty was. The Germans were so concerned about 1st Army ( Remagen ) and 21st Army Group ( Monty ) that the door was wide open. Shortly thereafter 3rd Army made a MASSIVE penetration that was so DEEP that Bradley told Patton to knock it off, to stop, damn it!!! You'll never find any battle maps showing this -- no matter how far you look. You'll have to craft one yourself from 3rd Army records. What happened is that 3rd Army was forced to stay in place, killing time, while 1st Army caught up. Only then Bradley permitted position maps to be published for general release. The big hang-up with 1st Army was that Hitler had thrown EVERYTHING in front of it at Remagen. So it took 9th Armored and friends a lot of fighting to eliminate this blocking force. Once this was done, one arm swung north to meet 21st Army Group and the Ruhr was pocketed. The rest of 1st Army ( it was a monster ) then pushed forward at the same time -- ultimately to the Elbe. It was at this time that 15th Army was established. It was a huge army. You'll have to look long and hard to find 15th Army in any history map. Why? It was an administrative and occupation army. It took over the vast bulk of 1st Army -- so that the fighting troops could spend the final weeks of the war taking it easy. 1st Army was, day by day, re-blooded with brand new infantry divisions. There were some exceptions: the 2nd Armored was loaded with Pershing tanks, so it was sent forward so that the Soviets would be impressed. ( It's sole reason for staying in the front line. ) It didn't take part in any substantial fighting. Bradley absolutely did not want it crossing the Elbe.

It had only one road!

Yes, exactly. What I don't understand is why Montgomery is insisting that this operation was an attack on the Ruhr. It's obvious he's trying to lay blame on Supreme Headquarters. And it's clear that he's trying to damage control to boost his integrity. But why say this attack was aimed at the Ruhr, when it wasn't? I think it's because it was a disaster. They couldn't justify the loss of so many troops at Arnhem this late in the war just to potentially outflank the Fifteenth Army. The loss of so many men could only be justified if they sold it as an operation that may have ended the war by Christmas. That's the only reason that makes sense.

+TIK I think you've hit the nail on the head. He can't very well say "I got 15,000+ men killed attempting to alleviate our supply problems" but he can say "they died trying to shorten the war by half a year and save millions of lives".

+gmsimpson05 Market Garden had many positives. It protected the only port taken intact, Antwerp. It prevented the Germans operating V rockets from that part of Holland. It isolated a whole German army. Troops from Nijmegen did turn east and move into Germany.

Um no - Monty owns it

TheFreshman321 Big Woody also uses the name Para Dave - who he claims is an ex British Army soldier who went to Sandhurst. Actually Big Woody / Para Dave is from Cleveland, Ohio, USA. The only Sandhurst he has been to is Sandhurst Drive, Cleveland.

TheVilla Aston 😂😂😂

Viilage Ass cheer on fire bombing the Irish anymore or piss on the Honor of dead GI's?You get worked by real students of history then run to another thread.Again Prat look him up but he might give you the same treatment he gave Cornhole

@@TheFreshman321 See what I mean?.. Anyone, anyone please let me know where this Para Dave stuff can be found on KZfaq. Name of item, lead comment ot whatever and how old the comments are. I will go straight there.

how patton can't make his army fly or go over rivers.

Howard Chambers you obviously aren't a history buff or a tactician. Even the British army still studies patents tactics because they are so effective they don't study Monty's. Between the two Monty gave Les s**** about his soldiers but Patton was the superior tactician and his men loved to hate him but they would have followed him to hell and back because they respected him as a soldier you get that if you weren't a soldier you don't get it.

Desmond O'Brien "British Generals were too cautious" British Generals WERE cautious! WHY? Because the amount of British Forces available was limited after the mass slaughter of WWI. The Yanks didn't have this problem as they only entered the front line in force during the last year 1918! The Yanks generals could afford to squander their soldiers lives to achieve some limited aim.

Stewart Nicol as BILLY CONNOLLY doesn't doesn't really have anything to do with that even to this day British leadership is still the same way they like to over-analyze things and make sure that they have a massive tactical Advantage they don't learn from Lessons Learned the way that the American Military can and does. They're not as adaptive as their American counterparts when it comes to tactics and operations. I also think it has a lot to do with the way their society is if you compare an American to a Brit the Brit will be much more reserved and standoffish whereas the American will be much more Brash and in your face and that reflects in the military.

RED S7VN OK, my friend, you say that the British tend to over-analyse things and be a bit cautious. Montgomery has stated that of all the formations that he commanded in his life there was none better than the Highland Division. My late Father and his brother were both sergeants in the Black Watch (RHR) 51st (Highland) Division. Now, here is my response to your accusation of over-analysis....ready? FUCK OFF! FUCK RIGHT OFF AS FAR AS YOU CAN GO, OK? Then, when you get there, FUCK OFF AGAIN! If you have a problem with that you can Fuck Off. Love and Peace.

Not really... The V2 campaign alone justified Market Garden, quite apart from the allied perception that the Germans were close to defeat. Market Garden gave the allies the opportunity to encircle the Ruhr. Market Gaeden got the go-ahead because it did NOT take fuel away from US 1st and 3rd armies. Btw. By 1944, the Zuider Zee had been renamed the IJsselmeer, and it is north of Arnhem.

even the comment sections need buckets when reading your posts You keep refuting yourself with the stupidity of your own statements.None of the objectives were met -Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare -The V-2s were still being launched -The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies -Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost. -The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease. -Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich -Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged -Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army -Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success *From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 370* German Generals thought Montgomery was wrong to to demand the main concentration of forces under his command in the north .Like Patton the reasoned the series of canals and great rivers the Maas,The Waal,the Neder Rijn - made it the easiest region for them to defend."With obstacles in the form of water traversing it from east to west" wrote General von Zagen,"the terrain offers good possibilities to hold on to positions".General Eberbach whom the British had captured,was recorded telling other generals in captivity:"the whole of their main effort is wrong.The traditional gateway is through the Saar" The Saar is where Montgomery had demanded that Patton's 3rd Army be halted

Bil Slocum What sort of idiot would post this: -Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare -The V-2s were still being launched -The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies -Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost. -The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease. -Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich -Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged -Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army -Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success' Probably a teenager from Cleveland, Ohio, USA. Field Marshall Model was there because his headquarters was in Oosterbeek. He soon fucked off when the fighting started, As I would have done. Student was there to command his forces. Army Group Commander Montgomery was at Eindhoven before the end of the battle. Eisenhower was in Ranville in Normandy, Brereton was England. V2 attacks on Britain were hindered by the increasing pressure that the allies were able to put on German communications after Market Garden. As Antwerp was never a Market Garden objective, and as Eisenhower approved the deferment of the campaign to clear the Scheldt to allow Market Garden to go ahead, any attempt to put the inability to use Antwerp as the fault of Market Garden is absurd. The 17,000 losses were not entirely made up of Paratroops, and those losses compare with allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000), Metz (45,000) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000). The Dutch Honger Winter was not caused by Market Garden. It was caused by the Germans, and the German treatment of the Dutch at that time was entirely consistent with German treat of other occupied areas at that time. Market Garden displaced no plan to liberate the bulk of the Netherlands at that time. Further, Market Garden liberated far more people than died in that winter. Deportation of Dutchmen to Germany as forced labour started long before Market Garden. Market Garden was not designed to take the allies to Berlin, as one of Montgomery's harshest critics has confirmed: 'Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.' Arthur Tedder, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue. None of the allies would cross the Rhine for another six months. US 9th Army was assigned to 21st Army Group because they were where the Germans were providing the stiffest opposition. The SS Man Prince Bernhard was distrusted by both British and US intelligence, both of whom, rightly showed him the door. Only his Royal status kept him out of prison in the 1970s.

That''s a fact how about Alan Brooke and Admiral Ramsay you twisted tosser.What kind of idiot would disagree with these men.Monty even admitted he faffed it up,shit on any dead GIs lately Vile? From a PHD at King's College who lectured @ Sandhurst *From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415* After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which *Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely* *Brooke was moved to write I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem* From a Pulitzer Prize Winner *From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303* Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. *Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding *"a bad mistake on my part"*

@John CornellSimple questions: Did the plans for D-Day spell out Monty taking Caen on D-Day? Plus the airfield to the west of Caen? Did Monty not capture the Scheldt waterway to open the port of Antwerp in early September 1944, to ease the supply problems for the Allies? How far did Monty have to go to get to Belgium and how many miles did Patton have to go to get to Metz? Why didn't Monty close the Falaise Gap, bagging all of the Germans instead a less than half? Ask Major Frost and the men of the 1st British Airborne what they thought of Monty's plan to make Monty a hero! Why was Monty's best friend a 10 year old boy? Here ends the lesson!

@John CornellWait a minute, who took most of that "...100 km of German held ground" that was "taken in just 3 days"? The British XXX Corps moved on roads and bridges captured by the US 82nd and 101st Divisions! And, I don't remember it being all within 3 days! Your Patton comment lacks that he had to pivot 90 degrees and fight through bad winter weather, in bad terrain, against heavy German resistance to get to Bastogne! The 101st claims that Patton didn't "relieve" them, Patton's tanks "reinforced" the 101st! I concur with the 101st! Finally, Monty was given extra supplies for his sally toward the Rhine while the US Armies had to wait. This gave the Germans time to reinforce in front of a idled 3rd Army, because Monty hadn't opened the port of Antwerp until late November 1944! Then after the Battle of the Bulge Monty ran his mouth about helping the Americans, which he didn't, and he almost got canned for it! You can be a Monty lover all you want, but you aren't entitled to your own facts!

@John CornellI didn't say anything about Bradley and Patton wasn't on the Continent until way after D-Day! Bradley didn't let Patton go any further because he was afraid of "Friendly Fire" episodes! Monty was the ground commander and he picked the meeting place, and didn't close the Gap! Bradley took one for the team on that one! Patton would have taken Metz BEFORE getting reinforced IF Monty didn't take Patton's supplies! You totally missed the huge mistake of Monty's about opening the port of Antwerp! Nice blaming the Division Commander for the Field Marshall's planning! Turns out the British Intel Officer was correct about the forces near Arnhem, SS Armor Divisions! I noted you didn't argue with how US Airborne Divisions opened much of your 100 km for XXX Corps! You also ignore how Monty put his foot in it about his Bulge input! It must be Cherry season where you live, you sure Cherry Picked my comments! Monty and a young boy? Guess that's not important to you either! The good news I don't have a love affair with any of those leaders, unlike you and your dear Monty! Research? I'm doing this from memory! Enjoy your Cherry Pie!

@John CornellI know what he said, and how he said it! His own aide, Freddie De Guingand, told Monty that his giving an order for Ike to sign making the Commander of the 21 Army Group the Ground Commander, meaning Monty, caused Ike to write to the Marshall saying it's either him or Monty! Freddie asked for a 24 hour delay, and told Monty what Ike was doing! Monty backed down and finally stopped asking to be Ground Commander! Ike didn't send his letter! De Guingard saved Monty's career because there was no doubt which Country was carrying the heaviest part of the log, the US! Even Churchill knew Eisenhower was in charge! The British didn't have any more men, so Ike gave Monty US troops but I have no idea what you are talking about the "Rhine Pocket!" The 9th reverted to Bradley after Monty crossed the Rhine, which was after every other American Army had already jumped the Rhine! Monty was assigned to defend Bradley, and advance on Hamburg and further east to keep the Russians out of Denmark! Ike's exact words were, "US Ninth Army will revert to Bradley...Bradley will be responsible for occupying the Ruhr and will deliver his main thrust on the axis Erfurt-Leipzig-Dresden to join up with Russians. The mission of your army will be to protect Bradley's northern flank." Eisenhower finally crossed the line vs Monty! Bradley's feelings were just fine after that!

@John CornellYes, many of the jumps in the Pacific were equal or more than that, on a regular basis! You forget that the US was fighting on a two front war, the war Hitler promised not to do and then did just it! The British lost Singapore even though they had more troops! Plus, Monty was supplied with tank and planes and trucks(Lorries) from the United States, that helped both him and Stalin to mobilize their ground troops movements! Monty might have move 1000 KM but he did it with American mobility! You seem to not want to answer any of my questions! Scared? Look at the questions, and then answer. Antwerp? Distance Patton went and Monty went? Monty's aide keeping Monty from being fired? The Rhine Pocket? Even with US troops Monty didn't jump the Rhine before every other US Army? This is a bit one sided, you never answer shit! I can't lose, I'm arguing with myself! Getting in a battle of wits with you is like fighting an unarmed man! GFY!