Astounded Market Garden wasn't even addressed until halfway through the documentary. Who made this? Montgomery?

But it almost did completely succeed.

It could have succeeded if the air planners did things differently. On the other hand, a bridgehead across the Rhine could not have then moved onto the Ruhr unless the Americans to the south had moved up towards the Rhine as well, and we know they didn't get much further than Aachen and got stopped in the Hurtgen Forest. So ultimately even if Market Garden was successful, the Americans would still have failed.

The Brits must be ignoring this story. Usually they so worship and adore Monty that they blame Market Garden's failure on the US. Probably the same people who voted for Brexit, such geniuses they are.

One thing did go wrong . Gavin prioritised the Groesbeek Heights and not the Bridge at Nijmegen and decided to shell a forest with no Germans in it after calling in artillery to do so . 30 Corps had seen how Rommel had traveled over 60 miles in one day amongst British tank regiments in 1941 in Operation Crusader and had made up the time lost at Eindhoven the following day after installing the Bailey Bridge . Gavin's action gave the 2 depleted SS divisions ( of around 30-40% strength ) time to respond and one division take Nijmegen Bridge and town , by the time Gavin ordered a unit to take the Bridge . Market Gardens priorities were for the Airborne to lay a carpet to Arnhem for 30 Corps which Gavin failed to do , holding up 30 Corps progress . He should have been removed from command . Gavin eventually learned a lesson and under Montgomery's command reprieved himself in actions against Panzergruppe Pieper in the Ardennes offensive a few months later .

Nope the British sitting in their tanks at the Belgian Border until 2:30 pm the 1st day completely losing the initiative.Horrocks,Vandeleur and Dempsey watching supply transports go over - did they think they somehow would catch up? Had they left at 1st light they would have made the bridge at Son before Jerry blew it up. But at least they showed up unlike Monty

Whatt?!?

@@jbloun911 wanted to ask the same

@@Swormy097 he couldn't hear the narration as well as he liked to because of the background music

I don’t disagree. If your tv or device is capable, try adjusting the audio settings. It helps.

Pmsl

It's shown as a visual reference to the geographic locations being explained

Captain Obvious

1. No closer areas were suitable, and yet Frost still got his men to Arnhem bridge and held it for four days. 2. Despite landing 30 mins before Frost at Arnhem and having 3km less to march to the objective. 3. Decision by the commander of IX Troop Carrier Command. 4. Incorrect crystals supplied with the VHF radio sets used by the US forward air control teams at Arnhem.

LZ Z was 4 miles/6k from the rail bridge yet it was six hours before 1st AB got close enough to watch it being blown up. There was np surprise because AA and other known positions were attacked by air hours before the landings. Even if two lifts had been planned it would not have gone off because the fog did not lift in England until 0930. If it had been planned and possible there would no resupply by air on day two because the pilots would have been toast from flying over 14 hours the day before.

@@davemac1197 Frost had jeeps. Some British radio sets had the wrong crystals or weak batteries and would have been operating at the extreme limit of their range even under ideal conditions.

@@nickdanger3802 - not quite. British Parachute Battalions had precisely 1 Jeep on establishment for the HQ (plus other vehicles in the 'seaborne tail' - 1 x 15 cwt GS, 1 x 15 cwt Water, 8 x 3-ton GS) and for Arnhem they had airlifted 2 Universal Carriers per Battalion for ammunition. I think the wrong crystals were the problem specifically with the USAAF Fighter Control Teams VHF radios, while the British sets worked but at greatly reduced ranges because of the terrain. This most affected No.22 Set used by Battalion nets, but the more powerful No.18 Sets used by the artillery were working.

Map Nijmegen day one i.pinimg.com/originals/d1/fa/bb/d1fabb09d7b032564d98331e871cf633.jpg

No. Montgomery had no final say on the MARKET air plan.

@@thevillaaston7811 shhhh read. It was his plan

@@michaelhenry7638 Nope. The MARKET air plan was down to the the US General Brereton, head of the FAAA (First Allied Airborne Army, to save you looking it up). Montgomery had no final say on MARKET. On his, he evidence is clear: CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY P 588 The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave. THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945 Rick Atkinson LITTLE BROWN 2013. This paperback edition published in 2013. P 265 ‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’ UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN By Charles B. MacDonald CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993 P132 ‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’

Michael Henry What makes you think British 21st Army Group commander could tell The First Allied Airborne Army, the USAAF and the RAF what to do? Montgomery had to accept the planning and decisions made by Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst etc.

@@michaelhenry7638 His idea. Approved by Eisenhower and his Chief of Staff in preference to one proposed by the US. Others planned the detail and executed it. 7 miles and 12 hours made the difference between success and failure. The Guards tanks stopped 7 miles short waiting for Infantry support to catch-up. After which for 12 hours the Germans had virtually nothing between them and Arnhem. No one knew that at the time.

Kevin Kinsella. You were very concise in your comment.

@@aesop8694 And also wrong.

@@thevillaaston7811 Absolutely not! Montgomery was a mediocre general, a self promoting prat who did nothing of value in the war. Eisenhower loathed the man and told Churchill to keep him well out of his way. General Hastings Ismay Churchills Chief Military Assistant said Montgomery suffered from "an overbearing conceit and an uncontrollable urge for self-promotion."

@@aesop8694 As an army and army group commander, Montgomery won in North Africa, Sicily, Normandy, The Scheldt, the Northern half of the Bulge and the Rhine. As a single division commander, Montgomery had performed with distinction in trying circumstances in France in 1940. Montgomery served in the front line in France in the First World War, being wounded twice, and being awarded the DSO. Eisenhower had zero personal combat experience, he had not even seen a dead body until April 1943. He made a mess of US operations in Tunisia, having to seek help from Alexander, he made a mess of the invasion of Italy. He kept out of the way in Normandy and the Germans suffered a defeat as big as Stalingrad. Eisenhower took over the land battle in September 1944 and the allies went nowhere.

Aesop, Montgomery was actually the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander of WW2. Even Market Garden was the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period. The Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine were TRUE failures, in comparison.

Yes. On the other hand 1st Airborne already failed in Arnhem though.

@@lyndoncmp5751 Not really, they deprived the Germans the use of Arnhem Bridge until late on the 20th. If 30 Corps had been able to move straight across the Nijmegen bridge on 19th they may have got to Arnhem to reprieve them.

US marines. Army, navy, air force all in one

NOPE. What helped the allies was the cracking of the Janapese and Germen codes.

@@Sekonism lol. Another British guy desperately trying to prove the British actually had a role in winning wwii. Just say thank you.

I’ve read in one of General MacArthur’s top aides memoirs that Big Mac’s enemies were 1) The US NAVY. 2) Japan, in that order. I believe inter-service rivalry existed to some extent in every Country’s Armed Forces.

MacArthur vs everyone ineffective and counter productive.Succeeded only because he was on the right side his smug self importance probably eclipsed that of even Montgomery.Much better generals and Commanders available and practical. He couldn't stand Marshall a much better soldier and was jealous of Nimitz and his success and insight ,not fond of IKE either.All infinitely better informed,educated and capable than him

Rubbish.

little villa monty even fessed up to it after the war. Winston covered for the dithering dolt until it was obvious after Sicily,Caen,Goodwood,Falaise he was nothing more than a propped up fraud. Bernard was worse at commanding than you are commenting - if one can imagine

Nick Danger Big Woody / Para Dave Rubbish.

On what do you base this article of faith?

@@johnburns4017 On Hollywood films, badly researched chauvinistic US documentaries, and novels written by US hack historians.

the British sitting in their tanks at the Belgian Border until 2:30 pm the 1st day completely losing the initiative.Horrocks,Vandeleur and Dempsey watching supply transports go over - did they think they somehow would catch up? Had they left at 1st light they would have made the bridge at Son before Jerry blew it up. But at least they showed up unlike Monty

@@bigwoody4704 Rambo a quiz. Name bridge the US 101st *failed* to seize in Operation Market garden? 20 points for the correct answer.

Sorry johnny Bernard like you or your family was no where around a his masterpiece came apart immediately.Shameful really Churchill had to come groveling to Big Brother because Brooke and Monty got driven into the channel.Then took another 4 yrs to cross with Uncle Sam holding his hand of course

Did paratroopers were infomed the present of 2 ss divisions?

@@KotobKotob Well the allies were aware of the resistance intell coming out of the Arnhem area,there were different Dutch resistance factions so i don't think the British high command trusted some of them,maybe they thought they could have been infiltrated by German counter intelligence,or it could have been British arrogance,i believe they also had aerial recon photos that showed those two SS divisions were in the area.

@@Coolerman565 so mean the paratroopers who drop there dont know the 2 ss panzer divisions was station at arnhem...that why they were badly defeated

@@KotobKotob The individual soldiers would not have know,i knew a man who was with the Airborne recon squadron at Arnhem knew i was interested so invited me to his home to hear his story,he landed by Glider and his unit who were in Jeeps were ambushed in Osterbeek, he survived the battle and managed to escape over the river,very interesting man.

Thanks for the explanation ,you're the second Brit I know that didn't blame the Americans .. lol

Eh ... Market Garden was a less than fully successful attack - they took a lot of ground and while they failed in their final objectives ... you could say - if you wanted to (and they did) that it wasn't a ... loss ... it's just that with the destruction of most of 1st Airborne ... it wasn't much of a win either ... The real thing about that quote is the first part ... If you look at the early war ... they got kicked off the continent at Dunkirk, kicked out of Greece, kicked out of Crete and kicked right back to El Alamein ... After Alamein ... they never again got kicked out of anywhere. They may or may not have achieved victory the way they wanted - but - none of that was as disastrous as their early war defeats. So - viewed in that context - in the context in which it was said - this is pretty much true. .

Dubya CWH Nope The quote was:P 'It may almost be said, 'Before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein we never had a defeat.'

How is it a loss if you advance 100km and the enemy retreat 100km and lose vital areas?

Monty said it was 90% successful.

@@BobSmith-dk8nw You would do good in politics.

thank you

It’s just absolutely goofy

Its called real history.

@@thevillaaston7811 If you ever want to learn real history, start with books on the subject. Primary sources (do you know what that term means?) all say the same thing.

@@Heathcoatman Primary sources (do I know what that term means?) Who can say?. WINSTON S CHURCHILL. THE SECOND WORLD WAR. CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950. VOLUME Vl TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY P174/5 ‘Heavy risks were taken in in the Battle of Arnhem, but they were justified by the great prize so nearly in our grasp. Had we been more fortunate in the weather, which turned against us at critical moments and restricted our mastery of the air, it is probable that we should have succeeded.’ CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948 P340 'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.' UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN By Charles B. MacDonald CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993 P199 Field Marshal Montgomery has written: "We had undertaken a difficult operation, attended by considerable risks. It was justified because, had good weather obtained, there was no doubt that we should have attained full success." CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P 586 In Gavin's opinion, the performance of Frost's force was " the outstanding independent parachute battalion action of the war." Frost's " tactical handling " was, says Gavin, " a model for parachute unit commanders." P 120. Montgomery says that " Had good weather obtained, there was no doubt that we should have attained full success." (Op. cit., p. 186.) Student, when interrogated by Liddell Hart, did not go quite so far as this, but gave the weather as the main cause of the failure. A DROP TOO MANY MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC PEN & SWORD BOOKS. 1994 P xiii ‘However, by far the worst mistake was the lack of priority given to the capture of Nijmegen Bridge. The whole essence of the plan was to lay an airborne carpet across the obstacles in southern Holland so that the Army could get motor through, yet the capture of this, perhaps the biggest and most vital bridge in that its destruction would have sounded the death-knell of the troops committed at Arnhem, was not accorded priority. The capture of this bridge would have been a walk-over on D-day, yet the American 82nd Airborne Division could spare only one battalion as they must at all costs secure a feature called the Groesbeek Heights, where, incidentally, the H.Q. of Airborne Corps was to be sited. It was thought that the retention of this feature would prevent the debouchment of German armour from the Reichwald in Germany. This armour was there courtesy of a rumour only and its presence was not confirmed by the underground. In fact, as a feature it is by no means dominating and its retention or otherwise had absolutely no bearing on what happened at Nijmegen Bridge.

@@thevillaaston7811 3 weeks and no reply to you, think we can safely say you owned him :)

little villa Real history? you and history have but a fleeting acquaintance why were the British forces were being "evacuated" from -Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940 -Greece, Crete,Hong Kong and Libya in 1941 -Tobruk and Dieppe,Singapore in 1942 Oh because you lampshades fought to the last colonials - ask India,Canadians,ANZACs and IRISH or the Big Boys who had to come 3500 miles so the BEF or Back Every Friday as history would have them couldn't go the last 30. Ya you tell 'im Mate Monty even admitted he faffed up Market Garden worse than he did Caen

Why should Eisenhower have fired Montgomery? Eisenhower approved MARKET GARDEN, which freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. MARKET GARDEN’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties). In any case, Montgomery's appointment came from the Imperial General Staff in london, not Eisenhower. As for Patton, what did he ever do?

Publically,not privately KE gave Bernard the rope and he hung him self with Monty Garden

He said it was "90 per cent successful" and it would have been a complete success if he had been given aircraft that did not exist. His autobiography is on line.

It's also a stroll thru fantasy Island

@@nickdanger3802 I do not think that your comments are 'a stroll thru fantasy Island'

In, as far as Market Garden failed to take Arnhem. Montgomery's seem to be in line with Churchill, Eisenhower, the official US Army history of the European campaign, and the German General Student: WINSTON S CHURCHILL. THE SECOND WORLD WAR. CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950. VOLUME Vl TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY P174/5 ‘Heavy risks were taken in in the Battle of Arnhem, but they were justified by the great prize so nearly in our grasp. Had we been more fortunate in the weather, which turned against us at critical moments and restricted our mastery of the air, it is probable that we should have succeeded.’ CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948 P340 'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.' UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN By Charles B. MacDonald CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993 P199 Field Marshal Montgomery has written: "We had undertaken a difficult operation, attended by considerable risks. It was justified because, had good weather obtained, there was no doubt that we should have attained full success." CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P 586 ¹In Gavin's opinion, the performance of Frost's force was " the outstanding independent parachute battalion action of the war." Frost's " tactical handling " was, says Gavin, " a model for parachute unit commanders." Gavin, op. cit., p. 120. ¹Montgomery says that " Had good weather obtained, there was no doubt that we should have attained full success." (Op. cit., p. 186.) Student, when interrogated by Liddell Hart, did not go quite so far as this, but gave the weather as the main cause of the failure.

Monty's memoirs much like your novels about him. - fantasy..You understand correct lucian?

No.

What 500 tanks?

No, about 200 tanks were total losses in Goodwood and they were immediately replaced by new ones. Goodwood allowed Operation Cobra to suceeded. Normandy came in ahead of schedule and with fewer casualties than expected. The battles around Caen bled the German panzer divisions in France white. After Normandy, the Germans had few reserves to throw into France and instead had to retreat back to their own border area. Montgomery was already in Brussels Belgium at a time only Paris was intended to be reached. The only commander who kept struggling and failing in France after Normandy was Patton. Patton still hadn't gotten out of France even by the end of 1944. Montgomery had taken southern Netherlands and cleared the Scheldt by then, and elements of British 2nd Army had even crossed into Germany.

try 500 for Caen you carnival barker

You lying hounds *A General's Life,by Omar Bradley and Clay Blair,p.275* Monty launched Goodwood on July 18,It was preceded by a massive air attack.Some 1,700 heavy bombers and plus 400 medium bombers dropped nearly 8,000 tons of bombs on the German front. On the afternoon of July 20 when the rains turned the battleground into a sea of mud,Monty, declaring himself well pleased with the results of Goodwood,abruptly halted it. *It had gained six miles south of the city. The cost had been appalling:4,000 casualties and 500 tanks - over 1/3 of all the tanks in Monty's command*

CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948 P423 ‘Montgomery was always the master in the methodical preparation of forces for a formal, set piece attack. In this case he made the most meticulous preparations because we knew that along the front just north of the Ruhr the enemy had his best remaining troops including portions of the First Paratroop Army.’ P427 ‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.’ IKE & MONTY: GENERALS AT WAR NORMAN GELB CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LIMITED 1994 P406: ‘Montgomery wouldn’t hear of it. An early crossing did not fit the plan he had been devising with great thoroughness to meet all contingencies. The resourceful Germans had shown in the Ardennes that they were capable of the unexpected. Bradley, Patton and Hodges might have been willing to gamble and Montgomery was pleased that they had succeeded. But he was not interested in easy victories that might be of limited significance, and he did not believe they fully understood the risks they had taken or the extent of the far greater achievement he was aiming for. Risk-taking was for amateurs. The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right - six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties.’

Stop cherry picking your wall to wall nonsense *From Ike & Monty ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb,page 409* *There were many reasons why Montgomery was being effectively downgraded once more Eisenhower had no doubt any longer that his reputation as a battle-winning commander was greatly inflated* The experience at Caen,Antwerp,Arnhem and delays in following up the Ardennes assault and the excessively thorough build up for the Rhine crossing provided sufficient evidence for that.General Whitely .IKE's British deputy chief of operations,said the feeling at Allied HQs "was that if anything was to be done quickly,don't give it to Monty. Monty was the last person that would be chosen to drive on Berlin - he would have needed 6 months to prepare". *Air Marshall Tedder, With Prejudice, p.586* Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. *Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives* Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder: "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. *For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude* *From With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Cassel & Co., 1st edition, copyright 1966 .Page 599* "Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal.

Carl Stritzinger I quoted two views on Varsity. Any idea why would that be Cherry picking?..

Yes because you find one paragraph out of those books by men that resoundly pounded Monty - much like you get it in the comment sections

And why would your parents have 'despised "Monty".'?

No, I'm not going to fence with you. Do your research.@@thevillaaston7811

@@thevillaaston7811 Everyone's allowed an opinion "aston".... even those with utterly NO idea of what they're taling about. YT comments are jam PACKED with them.

it boggles the imagination at what the allied armies might have done to the Wehrmacht with out Montgomery working so effectively for them

Ah the air force. Completely failed to do more than merely dent the German positions preceding Operation Goodwood, despite throwing a thousand bombers against them.

Monty failed to move after one bombing, bernard didn't send armour ahead for 6 hrs. By that time the Gerrries came out from their redoubts and took up their old positions.Connigham and Tedder were both livid *Decision in Normandy,by Carlo D'este,p.210* at Montgomery's pre D-Day briefings it was recorded "Inaction and defensive mentality, are criminal in any officer - however Senior *With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.557* ​​ The situation was that Montgomery thought the air corp not vigorous in support of the immediate battle,while Air Marshall Conningham continued to be shaply critical of the Army's slow progress. I agreed with Conningham that the Army did not seem prepared to fight it's own battles.After I had talked these matters over with Eisenhower and Bedell-Smith on 6 July, *it was agreed that Eisenhower should draft a letter which would tell Montgomery tactfully to get moving.* *With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.559* The problem was Montgomery who could be neither removed or moved to action. Later that day, Generals Morgan and Gale,Deputy CoS and Senior Administrative officer respectively, spoke to me of their apprehensions *about the slow pace of the Army's advance* *With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.562-63* Our 3 Armored Divisions, the 11th,7th, and Guards , had been counter attacked from several directions and the advance came to a halt.On 20 July . *I spoke to Portal about the Army's failure. We were in agreement regarding Montgomery as the cause* Montgomery had in effect stopped his armour from going farther.Later I reported saying that *the British Chiefs of Staff would "support any recommendation that Ike might care to make in respect to Monty for not succeeding in going places with his big three-armoured division push"*

@@bigwoody4704 Rambo, a quiz. How many weeks late were the US in seizing St.Lo? 20 points for the correct answer.

Just 12 days to take it can you count that high with just 10 fingers you poultroon? You realize Monty was getting pounded in the press at the time?Much like you on these boards. The foot dragging fraud was finally figured out in Sicily - embarrassed,Italy - called home before embarrassing himself even further,Caen potsed and dithered even with the Air Corp and Naval Guns pounding the HEER. The Russians were even putting signs up on the Eastern front how far it was to CAEN,shameful I'm sure you'd agree

Exactly,this has been repeated ad nauseam evidently he thinks ignoring it and repeating drivel will win converts from the uninitiated.The Auk should never have been removed.IKE should have been reassigned also for allowing the putz to dictate

@@bigwoody4704 But then wasnt it the Auk who messed up at Gazala?

Not real familiar with that but Ritchie was still there and not up to snuff.from what little I've read about it.

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- From Big Woody (aka Para Dave): 'Not real familiar with that' He means history.

VILE is a sick juvenile who has made up other accounts to agree with himself Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013 Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013 John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013 John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013 John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013 TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013

Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan. Demands it,gets it - then dissappears as it comes apart immediatelty 3 miles from the start.Just like his CAEN debacle that he had 6 months to prepare for. Britan had good soldiers that pathetic troll wasn't one of them

@@bigwoody4704 Read Robin Neillands book The Battle for the Rhine 1944: Arnhem and the Ardennes, the Campaign in Europe. This history book is not a hollywood version or a make the'mericans feel good about themselves to gain usa market share like Antony Beevor's blowing smoke up 'merican rears. It will make you uncomfortable by the shear level of American corruption, different chains of command back to Washigton, lack of strategic vision by Eisenhower and duplicity of his subordinate commanders. Attacking me bigwoody, son, is your sport, have fun.

Your words, “it was not exactly a defeat”. The destruction of our airborne division. The thrust into to Germany to shorten the war. I call that a massive defeat. All because those in command would not , or ignored all the intelligence pouring in of strong German opposition in the Arnhem area.What is not mentioned is that also within striking distance was the nucleus of a parachute army being put together by Student.

@@iemjgf A prime strategic problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp and keeping it from German counter-attack - the logistics problem to supply all allied armies. It was: *1)* Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp, or; *2)* Take the Schedlt. Noord Branant had to be taken first, as it was *essential.* It was taken with limited forces also sent to take the Schedlt. Market Garden had to go ahead regardless of any threat, actually being a success. To use Antwerp and control the approaches, the Scheldt, everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen needed to be under allied control. The low-lying lands, boggy ground, rivers and canals between Arnhem and Nijmegen is perfect geography as a barrier against a German counter-attack towards Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp, and with a build up of forces directly back to Germany in perfect country for a counter-attack. Market Garden was the offensive SHEAF wanted to secure Antwerp, a prime port for logistics for *all* allied armies. It made sense as the Germans were in disarray, so should be easy enough to gain. Monty added Arnhem to form a bridgehead over the Rhine. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation. You needed Arnhem for a jump into Germany. *Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anything at all* - that is protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany. Gaining Noord Brabant, was vital, and was successfully seized. Fighting in the low lying mud and waterways of the Schedlt, which will take time, while the Germans are still holding Noord Brabant made no sense at all. SHEAF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view.

@@iemjgf Considering its scope and audacity it came pretty close to succeeding. No,it didn't succeed in total and it's currently a lesson in how not to do an operation. But things like the order of landings being discovered on the landing strips by the Germans made that victory, the lack of transport planes meaning getting boots on the ground was difficult. It came pretty close.

@@Trebor74 It was a disaster. In war, like in life, the grey areas are ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’. This plan was supposed to end the war before Christmas. The senior commanders swept too many negatives under the carpet. A 65 mile single road for 30th Corps forward movement meant that the slightest delay would hold up the vanguard from reaching Arnhem. Positive intelligence provided by Prince Bernard of SS units in the area was ignored. Another big error was underestimating the Germans ability to recover after the battering that they took in Normandy. Did they think of the German Commander, Field Marshall Walter Model. No, for this was the man known as Hitler’s fireman. On several occasions on the Eastern front he had blocked Red Army breakthroughs. His speed in organising a defence meant that only a fraction of the airborne division reached the bridge. In the latter stages of the battle he even brought in a Tiger Company, 506. The correct plan would have been to take the Scheldt and open up the port of Antwerp. The Navy thought this was the best idea, Major Brian Uruqhaurt gave them a report which said that the operation was perilous, because of increasing German strength including SS units with some armour. They sent him on sick leave. I believe that someone should have been held to account for the needless deaths of our fine young men.

@@johnburns4017 And ... what was your source for that? .

But it did.

Barely a mention in comments regarding the ATROCIOUS leadership of the US 82nd Airborne. Who instead of carrying out its orders of seizing the Grave and Nijmegen bridges, instead, and without informing 1st Allied Airborne Army HQ decided to sit in the southern districts of Nijmegen watching out for imaginary Germans in the Groesbeek Heights, and flagrantly allowed German forces north of Nijmegen to seize the bridge and set up a defensive perimeter that allowed the Germans to hold up 30th Corp's advance for THREE WHOLE DAYS !!! Instead the braindead parrots cry "Monty.... Monty.... Monty!!!" SQUAWK SQUAWK !!!! Pieces of eight!!! Pieces of eight !!!!

Via Betchworth?

@@thevillaaston7811 ?

@@westpointsnell4167 You remember, when you stated to John Cornell that yopu were in Betchworth.

@@thevillaaston7811 yep ..I sure did

@@thevillaaston7811 I m now in Pennsylvania

Yes and all the ground his British 2nd Army advanced over they kept and were not thrown back.

@@lyndoncmp5751 Bernard bloviated he'd be in Berlin of course like you he never showed up for the battle

and yet they very nearly did. The guards tanks after storming across the last bridge as the US airborne paddled across, stopped 7 miles short waiting for Infantry support to catch-up. Unknown to them there was nothing between them and Arnhem for 12 hours.

@@garymathison8361 Agreed to a fair extent, a good comment. I wasn't there so am hesitant to be an armchair General, different accounts abound of whether Guards Armored insisted on resting despite American pleas, or whether thr US paratroopers were exhausted and eager to rest. Others have questioned whether 4 to 8 Shermans could have achieved much against the gathering weight of German forces - the wheels were off with comms and vehicles gone within a few hours of the British Arnhem drop. I stand by my comments. Just like the blitzkrieg style armoured charge backed up with air power *Op Goodwood), it almost worked, but ultimately didn't, and nothing in the past performance of Allied ops told anyone that such an op was within the military culture of Western forces in WW2.

@@nspr9721 whilst not done previously there always has to be a first time. As you clearly know other factors played a part , the weather, proximity of the drop zones, delays with bridges etc.. you will know them all no doubt. But if just one of those had not been a negative whose to say what the end result could have been. It was close but not close enough. I'm no arm chair general either just an interested party over the years.

NS pr Only 5 tanks were able to get across the Nijmegen bridge that evening, and 2 were damaged so really only 3 tanks could have gone on to Arnhem. It was already too late. The Germans had anti tank guns en route, and had stronger forces in Arnhem itself including Tiger I tanks of Kompanie Hummel, which arrived the day before. The myth that the Germans had nothing in between Nijmegen and Arnhem on the 20th was started by Harmel of the SS. He was only going on his own SS order of battle but he didn't know that German army units (not SS) had arrived to plug some gaps after he moved down to Nijmegen. These army forces were not on Harmel order of battle. Harmel doesnt even seem aware of their presence decades later when he talked to Robert Kershaw for It Never Snows In September. Crucially as well, the wreckage of Grabners recon force was still strewn all over the Arnhem bridge, acting as a road block. 3 British tanks trying to get to Arnhem that evenung/night would have been toast.

Lyndon,you poor tampled cabbage leaf did it ever dawn on you that was because of Monty's clownish attempt at command - doesn't even show up - but that gets you the title of *Field Marshall* in Britain and Carrington came to a complete stop after crossing the Bridge and that gets you the title of *LORD* in Britain - what a bunch of royal rubbish

"Montgomery later admitted that he was wrong to assume the Canadians could open the approaches to Antwerp while his forces tried to reach Germany. But his timing was off. The Canadians began fighting around Antwerp in early October, after Market Garden had ended. So, our original question prompts another: Why did it take to the middle of October for Montgomery to support the embattled Canadians and make Antwerp a priority?" legionmagazine.com/en/2018/03/should-field-marshal-bernard-montgomery-have-tried-to-clear-the-scheldt-estuary-in-september-1944/

@@nickdanger3802 From the nephew of Brian Urquhart: _One last titbit of truth came from both Uncle Bill and Brian. _*_The mission had to go ahead regardless of the threat, and was a success._* _The number one problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp. The logistics issue._ *_To use Antwerp and control the approaches you needed to control everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen._*_ I remember Uncle Bill showing me on a map. He drove his bladed hand up the single road to Nijmegen, with the back of his hand against the German border and Siegfried line. He then spread his fingers along the various rivers into the the estuaries of Scheldt, Zeeland and South Holland, as if to grab the land between._ *_Those low-lying lands and boggy ground between Arnhem and Nijmegen make a perfect geographical feature to stop behind and prepare a defence of Antwerp.Without control of Noord Brabant, German forces would have been in artillery and strike range of the Allies primary logistics hub._* _Market Garden was the very next offensive to be launched and _*_had to solve the Antwerp problem._*_ Monty’s decision to push on to Arnhem may have been one last attempt at his single front argument._ _You only needed Arnhem if you wanted to springboard into Germany, _*_but you needed everything up to Nijmegen if you wanted to do anything at all._*_ That’s why Monty got all those resources for Market Garden, _*_it contained a vital mission for everyone._* *_Two majors on staff admitted as much to me._*_ The sacrifice of two light infantry brigades at Arnhem was probably not necessary - but a small price to pay for Noord Brabant, _*_which was *vital and accomplished._*_ Without the Arnhem operation all those tanks and mortars and infantry would have gone to Nijmegen, which was I believe the most important bridge - up or down._ David Rendahl's answer to What happened to the British intelligence officer who told his superiors about the presence of German panzer division in the area of Arnheim bridge? (www.quora.com/What-happened-to-the-British-intelligence-officer-who-told-his-superiors-about-the-presence-of-German-panzer-division-in-the-area-of-Arnheim-bridge/answer/David-Rendahl)

@@johnpeate4544 I wonder if this hearsay "witness" knew about this interview, at 3 minutes. Conversations with History: Brian Urquhart kzfaq.info/get/bejne/msylfZeIkt3VeWg.html

@@nickdanger3802 The reason why is... CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 1948 Page 336 _‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to_ *_defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches_* _in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted. To assist Montgomery I allocated to him the 1st Allied Airborne Army, which had been recently formed under Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton of the United States Air Forces.'_

Burns he didn't say that you are rearanging the content - AGAIN.He called Monty a "Psycho"

Which war was that?

@@thevillaaston7811 The Battle of France in the days between Arras and the evacuation at Dunkirk.

@@MaskofAgamemnon None of us know. We were not there. Based on hidsight, it was all over from the 15th May onwards.

@@thevillaaston7811 Exploring counter-factuals allows you to better understand the factual.

@@MaskofAgamemnon On the morning of the 15th May, Reynauld phoned Churchill and told him that the war was lost. The following day Churchill flew to Paris and met the French Government at the Quai d'Orsay. During their meeting they could see French civil servants burning secret documents in the garden. Where was the way back from there?

Supply was not an issue for US armies failing at Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine and Operation Queen. Committing to clear an estuary that will takes weeks, while the Germans are within artillery range of Antwerp is plain dumb.

@@johnburns4017 But it was the next logical step and Market Garden was an unfortunate distraction to opening the port of Antwerp and to the advances in the more southern areas of the front that gave the Germans more time to prepare the defense of the Rhine crossings. The advances were being limited by supply issues and Market Garden made them worse. Hurtgen Forest was an area that should have been bypassed as there was little value in controlling it and defending it was easy. Someone said 'there's Germans there to kill so let's go there! A lot of solders died to control what was nothing more than a dead end.

@@keithstudly6071 Securing Noord Brabant up to or near the Rhine was the next logical step in the broad-front. The logical thing was supply Monty and have a division or two on the right flank from the US First Army to power on from Antwerp taking a port within days on the sea - Rotterdam.

@@keithstudly6071 Clearing the Scheldt was month of work whenever it was undertaken in the Autumn of 1944. And whenever it was completed, there would still have been three weeks works to clear the estuary of mines. The Germans got the time and space they needed to rebuild their forces when Eisenhower opted for a broad front strategy.

Would it have been the same way if the Scheldt had not been made a secondary priority to Marketgarden? Everything on the front was made secondary to Marketgarden. It was the top priority. Where was the focus of the December German offensive? Antwerp. They understood it's importance. IF Marketgarden had succeeded It still would not have been as important to the swift end of the war as getting Antwerp port open a week earlier. @@thevillaaston7811

Rambo, a quiz. Name the US para unit that *failed* to seize the Nijmegen bridge? 20 points for the correct answer.

@@johnburns4017 The 82nd Division, like their counterparts 101st were excellent troops, but yes it was one man's indecision that led to the ignoring the bridge whilst other priorities were given more attention. Gavin was probably overtasked, but the roadbridge unquestionably should have been given higher priority on the 17th, and 18th too.

@@OldWolflad For 78 years the Americans have tried to cover it up. To the degree they farcically blame the British.

@@johnburns4017 Having studied MG for many years, I don't like to make it about fault, but I have looked at all the reasons and the key one for its failure was simply the delay in taking the Nijmegen bridge. The lies about British slowness do make me wonder if there has been some sort of deflection smear campaign. I am at a loss as to why Buckingham blames 30 Corps for what he called "wasted daylight hours starting at 1435 hours" on 17th September when in fact their zero hour was set for that time by Brereton so that the paratroopers could land first with some sort of element of surprise. There has been a great lie that it was 30 Corps who were late when in fact if you scrutinise their actions they were did ok, and were at Nijmegen by noon on 19th September.

@@johnburns4017 the only thing cover ed up is Bernard and you getting the FULL MONTY

They didn't ask the Canadian Army, obviously. They'd say the Battle of Ortona, won at great cost of life and then that flank was abandoned. All to make some Russian military observers think we were prosecuting the war as Stalin expected it. Some think he Italian Campaign was a waste of time, but the US ended up employing thousands of Italian troops in support roles for the rest of the war.

@@michaeldowson6988 Italy did tie down about 50 German and Italian divisions so i guess it wasn't a waste of time.

@@michaeldowson6988 So it was just the Americans fighting in Italy you dozy tool Michael.

@@timphillips9954 Reread my comment, and explain yourself.

Failure? A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2: ♦ Battle of Alam Halfa; ♦ Second Battle of El Alamein; ♦ Battle of El Agheila; ♦ Battle of Medenine; ♦ Battle of the Mareth Line; ♦ Battle of Wadi Akarit; ♦ Allied invasion of Sicily- the largest seaborne invasion in history before Normandy; ♦ Operation Overlord - the largest seaborne invasion in history; ♦ Battle of the Bulge; ♦ Operation Veritable; ♦ Operation Plunder - the greatest river assault crossing of all time. Not only did Monty replan and serve as Allied Ground Forces Commander for Overlord, the largest seaborne born invasion in history, he also replanned the Alllied invasion of Sicily, the largest seaborne invasion in history before that. _”Had the Sicily landings proved - as Salerno and Anzio would prove - near-disasters, then history might well have cast Eisenhower and Alexander in the same noble but failed mound as their predecessors in the Middle East, Auchinleck and Wavell. It is for this reason surely that General Dempsey, on his deathbed, referred to Sicily as Monty’s ‘finest hour’ - for Monty alone among the senior Allied military commanders had the courage to refuse to carry out an ill-conceived plan, and to insist that, if tackled, the invasion be mounted properly. Though he would be pilloried by the ignorant or envious, and his motives made out to be megalomaniacal rather than military, the accusations tell us more about his accusers than about Monty. As one British colonel - not friendly towards Monty - would later remark: I find those who criticise Monty loudest are so uniformly second-rate that I prefer not to make my own views known!….”_ -Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944 In Normandy Monty was in command of all ground forces and was the architect of the 5 beach invasion plan and the overall strategy of the campaign. The plan Overlord by Frederick Morgan was revised by Montgomery, like the original plan for the invasion of Sicily. Both would have led to complete disaster before Monty’s revision. This is something a lot of people don’t seem to be aware of. Monty was the one that made the Overlord plan what it was. The plan was originally just 3 divisions and army Corp landing on some beaches together. He changed the plan from 3 to 5 beaches and from 3 divisions to 8 correctly arguing that 3 beachheads would’ve been too narrow a front and such an attack could be easily rolled up on both flanks. And instead of some airborne brigades, it should be 3 airborne brigades to assist while each army Corp of the British and Americans should have their own beaches to ease organization. And he emphasized Cherbourg as the key. The Allies prevailed in Normandy using Monty’s invasion plan and his ground strategy. On Normandy: _”That the COSSAC plan for a 3-divisional assault in ‘Overlord’ was a recipe for disaster now seems undeniable. Had Alexander been appointed to command the land forces in the invasion, would Morgan’s COSSAC plan have been enacted? Monty was not alone in recognizing its flaws, as will be seen, but he was alone in having the courage and conviction to see that it was thrown out and a better plan adopted. He had done so at Alam Halfa, he had done so gain over ‘Husky’ and whatever mud was slung at him, he was determined that he would do so over ‘Overlord’. For Morgan’s ‘Overlord’ plan, the result of one and a half years of research and discussions, had no prospect of succeeding, as Morgan’s planners themselves confessed…_ _....and by presenting such a clearly defined strategic plan for the battle thereplan can be no doubt that Monty brought to his Allied land, sea and air forces a unity of purpose and conception that was remarkable - and often confused later with Eisenhower’s role as Supreme Commander.”_ -Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. Nigel Hamilton

If it had worked what was Monty going to use for logistics? The Scheldt Estuary was cleared a month later by the Canadians and the mines were not cleared until late November. legionmagazine.com/en/2018/03/should-field-marshal-bernard-montgomery-have-tried-to-clear-the-scheldt-estuary-in-september-1944/

@@nickdanger3802 Eisenhower deferred the clearing of the Scheldt in order for MG to protect their flank *and* obtain a bridgehead over the Rhine. _’At the ‪September 10‬ conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore _*_authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.‘_*
- CRUSADE IN EUROPE 
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 1948 
Page 336 Eisenhower: _”I not only approved Market-Garden, _*_I insisted upon it._*_ We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I _*_was quite willing to wait on all other operations”._*

​@@johnpeate4544What I still don't understand is that even if you succeed in forming a bridgehead across the Rhine at Arnhem, you still need to cross the IJssel river to get to the Ruhr. And the IJssel is not even a small river.

'At that time Patton was in a better position to make more progress' But that was first a decision for Patton's superior officer, Bradley. He allocated resources between his subordinate commanders, Hodges and Patton. But why would anyone have a priority to Patton? He was 100 miles from the Rhine, facing the least important part of the front and was furthest wasy from the Channel Ports.

@@thevillaaston7811 It would not matter how far away he was from the Channel ports if he been allocated the fuel available. He asked for 400,000 gallons. The reason I suggested Patton was because the opposition was light. The distance from the Rhine would not matter if your tanks are running against light opposition. Patton was a driver of men, and the 3rd army would have been kept on the move relentlessly. Say 10 miles every hour, therefore 10 hours to the Rhine. The Market Garden fiasco was around 5 days. Where would Patton have been in 5 days? With regard to the allocation of vital supplies I would have thought that Eisenhower called the shots?

IKE kept caving in to Monty until January

@@iemjgf SHAEF planners had laid out that the key to Germany was the Ruhr. That area, plus the parts of France and Belgium en route, produced 65% of German steel. The Saar, which Patton was pushing towards, produced around 5%. Capturing the Saar would hurt the German war economy: capturing the Ruhr would kill it. By splitting the Allies, Eisenhower ended with two attacks, neither of which was strong enough to break through the German lines. Montgomery was halted at Arnhem on the Rhine: Patton was halted at Metz and spent three months and thousands of men trying to capture that fortress. Ike allowed the Germans to decide where to fight and they chose to move troops to fight on the Eastern Front, and later to launch their attack through the Ardennes. If he had kept the Allied armies both British and American together he could have kept the initiative, captured the Ruhr, and ended the war. Montgomery thought so. And so did the Germans.

Patton had already been struggling to take Metz for two weeks before Market Garden even began. Nor was the Lorraine any great axis of advance. The Lorraine was too far from the Ruhr and the Ruhr was always considered the most logical area to strike for to bring the war to a quicker end. This could only be done by either 2nd British or 1st American Armies (or later 9th American Army).

Well Monty had just as success if we look at North Africa, Italy, Normandy, the Rhine etc

Much

You mean like his awful Lorraine campaign, or his antics in Sicily? Would you really claim that Montgomery had no 'success & results?'

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Caen??

@@lucaschoenmaker8046 What about it?

Get a life you chode sad really visiting every board to save the rep of a cad who liked little boys - is that your reason? Were you one?

How far is it from the Channel coast to Caen? How long did it take Monty to capture Caen?

"Montgomery later admitted that he was wrong to assume the Canadians could open the approaches to Antwerp while his forces tried to reach Germany. But his timing was off. The Canadians began fighting around Antwerp in early October, after Market Garden had ended. So, our original question prompts another: Why did it take to the middle of October for Montgomery to support the embattled Canadians and make Antwerp a priority?" Legion Magazine (on line) Should Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery have tried to clear the Scheldt Estuary in September 1944?

@@nickdanger3802 How many German armoured divsions were at Caen?

up to five what is your point besides the one on your head? They not Monty decided where they went,well that and the allied aircorp that pounded Rommel's forces all day long when weather permitted. Bernard had been tossed off the continent previously as I'm sure your middle school instructor told you last fall. Even with naval guns right off shore bernard took 43 days after stating he'd have it in a day

Yeah good show. It's on Amazon Prime and so is this show I think. You can also do online stream if your looking for all episodes like fmovies.to if they have it.

FDR already agreed at the Tehran Conference the Reds could have Berlin - there was nothing left of it anyway.Why lose allied soldiers when it would be handed over anyway

Montgomery was the only commander who had beaten Rommel and he had done so more than once. Montgomery won in Normandy.

I believe that, late in the war, Eisenhower asked Bradley what sort of casualty levels could be expected if Bradley's Army Group made an effort to get to Berlin, and Bradley gave an estimate of 100,000. Eisenhower already knew the agreed post war occupation zones. Do you seriously believe it would have been worth 100,000 dead Americans, simply to take territory which would later be handed over to Soviet troops?

Wishful thinking.

@@dovetonsturdee7033 for once I agree with you as I've previously stated this.Keegan,Hastings,Beevor,Barr,Bennet all mention the obvious in their books.These were terms hammered out at Yalta.The western allies simply wouldn't allow that kind of blood letting for an already defeated objective.We would have just surrounded it and starve them out - longer but much simpler

The small city of Caen was strategically unimportant, ports were important. At the 11th hour Montgomery switched a US 82nd parachute drop into Caen to the Cotentin peninsula to aid US forces in seizing the port of Cherbourg. Montgomery's plan was to draw in then destroy the German army, not gain territory. Caen had more German tanks per mile than Kursk. In just a dozen miles or so right Panzer divisions in a very small area of front. *Caen had the highest concentration density of German tanks ever seen in WW2, pitted against British armour.* At Kursk the panzer divisions were spread out over a much wider area and were not concentrated as densely as around Caen. Caen saw the densest concentration of German armour ever seen in WW2. At Kursk the Germans were attacking over a near 50 mile front. There were certainly not right panzer divisions within 12 miles. There were *EIGHT* Panzer Divisions in the Caen area by end of June 1944 and *FIVE* lines of anti-tank guns. The Germans kept sending more and more panzer divisions around the Caen area as June went on and into July. These were the panzer divisions deployed to the Caen area. ♦ 21st Panzer Division (117 Panzer IVs). ♦ Panzer Lehr Division ( 101 Panzer IVs, 89 Panthers). ♦ 2nd Panzer Division (89 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers). ♦ 116th Panzer Division (73 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers). In reserve just behind the front. ♦ 1st SS Panzer Division (98 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers). ♦ 9th SS Panzer Division (40 Stugs, 46 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers). ♦ 10th SS Panzer Division (38 Stugs, 39 Panzer IVs) ♦ 12th SS Panzer Division (98 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers). ♦ Tiger Battalion SS101 (45 Tigers). ♦ Tiger Battalion SS102 (45 Tigers). ♦ Tiger Battalion 503 (45 Tigers) Source: - Bernages Panzers and the Battle For Normandy. - Zetterling's Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness. On 12th June 1944 the British had no room to sidestep any German divisions before Caen because the Germans totally blocked them. This is why a wide right hook on Caen was attempted. To the south of Panzer Lehr's sector in the vicinity of Villers Bocage there was thought to be an area devoid of German forces, and so this wide right hook was attempted on the morning of 13th June (any wider and it would have overrun into the American lines). Unfortunately, unknown to the British, Schwere SS Panzer Abteilung 101 turned up into this area on the night of the 12/13th June and blocked this right hook with their Tigers and closed the door on Caen. There was no other room to manoeuvre onto Caen. All attempts had to go right through the German panzer divisions through the rest of June and early July, with the Germans having excellent defensive country (fields broken up by hedgerows everywhere) with which to utilise to their advantage. The Germans had over 1,500 tanks and assault guns in the British/Canadian sector, including Tiger and Panthers. Even the King Tiger and Jagdpanther made their WW2 combat débuts around Caen in July. The Americans who were not equipped, or experienced, to face massed German armour, were given primarily an infantry role by Montgomery - the Americans met very little armour in WW2. The US forces didn't face any German armour until June 13th, and that was only a mere battalion of assault guns. The British destroyed about 90% of German armour in the west.

@@johnburns4017 Thankyou for your very informative reply I was aware that Caen was the hinge and that it was contested ferociously i remember in the early 70s still seeing war damaged junk in Hedgerows and streets with half the houses destroyed or just not there!! Iwasnt aware of the numbers of tanks per square mile/km and had always thought that we had managed to hinder to such an extent the roads and bridges that the Germans couldn't get their Armour or supplies up to meet our Advance but i can very easily see why with the landscape over there how they could be so densely populated with tanks but so many Anti Tank belts sounds like a reversal of soviet doctrine learned from Kursk!!

That's a fair point...Monty's ego at that point outweighed his capability....and any advance into the Netherlands should have waited for Antwerp to be open to the Allies. MG was a rushed plan built on poor strategy, optimistism bias, and ignored real intelligence. It's sad that 8000 Paras paid for that mistake.

@@alanhutchins5916 General Horroks was Aghast apparently at the plan and knew from the start that his 30 Corps was Going to have one heck of a slog up that Highway and it was Doggedly defended by Meindls Falschrimjaegers The timetable was far too optimistic Hindsight i would expect would have Horroks start his push some days before the Airborne part ..Maybe..But even a modern Army of today would struggle under similar circumstances and I doubt that the risk would be taken

Alan Hutchings, If the advance across southern Netherlands had waited until after Antwerp was cleared then in all probability it would have been tougher longer and with more casualties. The Germans would have defended in greater strength, the weather would have been far worse with the ground half underwater and the skies too cloud for allied air support. As it was nearly 100km of German held ground was taken in just 3 days. Casualties were around 15,000. Now compare that to the 3 month long failures in the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine which suffered 35,000 and 52,000 casualties respectively, and did no better than Market Garden. Its quite feasible that the British 21st Army Group would have suffered 20, 000 plus casualties advancing across southern Netherlands in October or November 1944. And they would have been killed and wounded. Half of the Market Garden casualties were POWs, not killed and wounded.

The strength of the Third Army as of 19 December, the date the bridgehead occupation was completed, was 9,638 officers and 221,070 enlisted men. Wikipedia. The number varied by time and the campaign. Patton's third army that is.

@@brianw612 Thats a lot of men. Holy moly all geared up and in fighting form no doubt. Thanks Brian.

@@kenc9236 I read somewhere where nine of ten in any US army are support of some kind.

Err...With Dunkirk surrounded, 338,000 troops were rescued. How is that a defeat.

Dunkirk was a British/Allied success and a German failure.

I get sick when the British call Dunkirk a win. They lost France and they lost a lot of men captured wounded or killed in France. The Germans once again are made to be bungling idiots for stopping before Dunkirk when they won a great victory. look at the German losses in France and compare to the Allies. The German total losses were 156000 including 27000 dead. The French lost 90k killed, 200k wounded and 1.8 M captured. British losses were 68000 and they were the first to retreat to Dunkirk.

@@ronaldsmith4153 British won the battle of Dunkirk.

@@ronaldsmith4153 Wall to wall rubbish. If anyone lost France, it was the French. Britain supplied about 10% of he allied land forces campaign. As too who were the first to retreat: 15th May 1940. Reynaud telephoned Churchill and said that it was all over and that the Battle was lost. 16th May. Churchill flew to Paris. He met French leaders at the Quai d’Orsay. As the meeting went on, they ccould see French officials burning archives in the garden. 16th May 1940, Dowding wrote to Churchill. His letter ended: ‘I believe that, if an adequate fighter force is kept in this country, if the fleet remains in being, and if Home Forces are suitably organised to resist invasion, we should be able to carry on the war single handed for some time, if not indefinitely. But, if the Home Defence Force is drained away in desperate attempts to remedy the situation in France, defeat in France will involve the final, complete and irremediable defeat of this country. I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant, Air Chief Marshal, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command, Royal Air Force.’ 21st May 1940. British forces attacked German formations at Arras and then on the 22nd, Gort was ordered to attack German forces as per the Weygand Plan. 25th May 1940. British troops fell back, with the French towards the coast. On the 25th May in response to the failure of a French attack from the Somme, Gort informed Blanchard of his intention to withdraw to the coast. On the 26th may Gort and Blanchard drew up plans for the withdrawal to the coast. 26th May 1940. (6.57pm), an Admiralty signal put Operation Dynamo in hand. Later on the 26th, the decision to evacuate the BEF was taken and this decision was passed onto the French Government on that same day. At 1pm on the 27th, a War Office telegram to Gort instructed him that henceforth his task is to evacuate the maximum force possible. 28th May 1940. Belgium capitulated at 1 hours’ notice leaving the BEF to cover the undefended left of the Allied flank. 29th May 1940. Before any complaint or request was received from the French, Churchill ordered that the French should have a full share in evacuation and that they should have full access to British shipping during the evacuation. 31st May 1940. Churchill flew to Paris for a meeting with the French Government at the French War Office at the Rue Saint-Dominique. At that meeting, attended by amongst others, Reynaud, Petain, Churchill and Attlee, Churchill pointed out that at up to that point, French forces had been given no orders to evacuate. 4th June1940. Operation Dynamo ended with approximately 220,000 British troops and approximately 110,000 French troops evacuated. A total of 861 allied have taken part in the operation of which 693 are British. Over 100,000 French troops have evacuated by British ships. All clear now?

Nice one Lyndon.

You pathetic lumps were pulled out of the channel then allowed to tag along with the big boys - you're welcome

Hey mate, how are you doing?

@@lyndoncmp5751 OK, I think. How are you? We need your contribution on some other threads.

The Villa Aston For some reason, I don't get reply notifications so I have to search myself. If there are any other videos, let me know mate. I'll look through the threads here.

Was El Alamein underperforming? How about Medinine? Alam Halfa? Mareth line? Overlord? Sicily? Varsity? Plunder? The Scheldt? I don't think you know what underperforming means.

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Did someone insult your boyfriend?

@@SamBrickell Yawnn...attack the argument not the person...

A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2: ♦ Battle of Alam Halfa; ♦ Second Battle of El Alamein; ♦ Battle of El Agheila; ♦ Battle of Medenine; ♦ Battle of the Mareth Line; ♦ Battle of Wadi Akarit; ♦ Allied invasion of Sicily- the largest seaborne invasion in history before Normandy; ♦ Operation Overlord - the largest seaborne invasion in history; ♦ Battle of the Bulge; ♦ Operation Veritable; ♦ Operation Plunder - the greatest river assault crossing of all time. Not only did Monty replan and serve as Allied Ground Forces Commander for Overlord, the largest seaborne born invasion in history, he also replanned the Alllied invasion of Sicily, the largest seaborne invasion in history before that. _”Had the Sicily landings proved - as Salerno and Anzio would prove - near-disasters, then history might well have cast Eisenhower and Alexander in the same noble but failed mound as their predecessors in the Middle East, Auchinleck and Wavell. It is for this reason surely that General Dempsey, on his deathbed, referred to Sicily as Monty’s ‘finest hour’ - for Monty alone among the senior Allied military commanders had the courage to refuse to carry out an ill-conceived plan, and to insist that, if tackled, the invasion be mounted properly. Though he would be pilloried by the ignorant or envious, and his motives made out to be megalomaniacal rather than military, the accusations tell us more about his accusers than about Monty. As one British colonel - not friendly towards Monty - would later remark: I find those who criticise Monty loudest are so uniformly second-rate that I prefer not to make my own views known!….”_ -Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944 In Normandy Monty was in command of all ground forces and was the architect of the 5 beach invasion plan and the overall strategy of the campaign. The plan Overlord by Frederick Morgan was revised by Montgomery, like the original plan for the invasion of Sicily. Both would have led to complete disaster before Monty’s revision. This is something a lot of people don’t seem to be aware of. Monty was the one that made the Overlord plan what it was. The plan was originally just 3 divisions and army Corp landing on some beaches together. He changed the plan from 3 to 5 beaches and from 3 divisions to 8 correctly arguing that 3 beachheads would’ve been too narrow a front and such an attack could be easily rolled up on both flanks. And instead of some airborne brigades, it should be 3 airborne brigades to assist while each army Corp of the British and Americans should have their own beaches to ease organization. And he emphasized Cherbourg as the key. The Allies prevailed in Normandy using Monty’s invasion plan and his ground strategy. On Normandy: _”That the COSSAC plan for a 3-divisional assault in ‘Overlord’ was a recipe for disaster now seems undeniable. Had Alexander been appointed to command the land forces in the invasion, would Morgan’s COSSAC plan have been enacted? Monty was not alone in recognizing its flaws, as will be seen, but he was alone in having the courage and conviction to see that it was thrown out and a better plan adopted. He had done so at Alam Halfa, he had done so gain over ‘Husky’ and whatever mud was slung at him, he was determined that he would do so over ‘Overlord’. For Morgan’s ‘Overlord’ plan, the result of one and a half years of research and discussions, had no prospect of succeeding, as Morgan’s planners themselves confessed…_ _....and by presenting such a clearly defined strategic plan for the battle thereplan can be no doubt that Monty brought to his Allied land, sea and air forces a unity of purpose and conception that was remarkable - and often confused later with Eisenhower’s role as Supreme Commander.”_ -Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. Nigel Hamilton

N Africa was won because the Allies achieved overwhelming numbers and supply as well as superior air and sea power. Montgomery was egotistical and arrogant and on many occasions he disregarded the chain of command. He tried to steal credit for Battle of the Bulge and never took responsibility for the failure of his plan…. Market Garden. Was so slow in Sicily Patton had to take over, so ineffective in Normandy and taking Caen he should have been fired. Monty reportedly had a history of undermining his superiors and criticizing his peers. He never got over the fact the Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Allied Commander. I also have read that Montgomery, Alabama stripped him of his honorary citizenship and that he did not attend the funeral of his mother claiming he was "too busy". And then theres the whole thing (alledgedly) with 12 year old boys…… Yea keep believing he was a great guy.

Agreed.

Eisenhower had to be diplomatic about this, and he did. Remember that Montgomery was Churchill’s favourite general and could do no wrong. Also, and most important was the American army’s way of giving responsibility to the army group commanders. Montgomery’s attitude towards Eisenhower to a degree was one of contempt, because of his arrogance. Not many Americans liked him, and our Air Force commanders detested him. To sum him up, he was a good general , but he was not in the same category as Slim, Alexander or Auchinleck

@@iemjgf Alexander or Auchinleck? Please.

If Eisenhower was at fault then why does Montgomery write in his Memoirs and I quote, "Arnhem was my biggest mistake of the war".

@@iemjgf Read what I wrote.

That's a new one for me. 👍

Eisenhower, Montgomery, Dempsey and Brereton.

No Bernard pushed for and got it,IKE never trusted him again

Mark McCormack What sort of idiot would state this?: 'IKE never trusted him again' Perhaps a teenager from say, Cleveland, Ohio, USA? Eisenhower soon turned to Montgomery after Bradley and Hodges went to ground in the Adennes when the Germans attacked. Perhaps the sound of German gun fire was new to them. Who can say?

The Germans stopped twice for short periods.First the Commander, Von Runstedt , halted Guderian’s drive because the Germans were overtaken by their own success. He could not believe they could advance so rapidly. He was old school, First World War. Second stop was on Hitler’s direct order . Goring had persuaded him to let the Luftwaffe sort out the men on the beaches awaiting evacuation. Guderian , who was a pioneer of the new mobile warfare concept, wrote in Achtung Panzer, that he was frustrated by the delays, and that he could have been in Dunkirk well before the British advance guard.

@@iemjgf Quite simply to advance on Dunkirk would have cost the Germans plenty, many of their tanks needed maintenance which had to wait for support to catch up and they needed the tanks for the rest of France which did not surrender until later, also the terrain around Dunkirk was unsuitable for tanks. At best it is possible that Germany could have prevented the evacuation but at what cost?

Learn who Brian Urquart is. The failure lies in ignoring him. Stop being a Monty white knight.

@@esbam2002 Learn about Gavin and his failure to take the Nijmegen bridge. Suggested reading: _Lost At Nijmegen_ Stop being an ignorant Monty hater.

The Americans took the bridge at Nijmegen by making a costly crossing of the river. The guards armour was on the bridge and hesitated in the face of a German anti tank gun. It needed a sacrificial drive to go on and the 8 miles to the bridge at Arnhem was wide open. By the way John Peate, you don't have to hate a person to criticise their actions. I have no feelings regarding Field Marshal Montgomery. I believe that the man was over rated as a top general.

@@iemjgf That’s 3 big mistakes you made, on the 82nd capturing the Nijmegen Bridge, the presence of panzers in Arnhem and the road to Arnhem being wide open. Perhaps from watching a bridge too far?

@@iemjgf _The worst mistake of the Arnhem plan was the failure to give priority to capturing the Nijmegen bridge. The capture would have been a walkover on D-Day, yet the 82nd Division could spare only one battalion as they must at all costs secure the Groesbeek heights where the corps HQ was to be sited._ _These numerous attempts to divert attention from this failure, and pass the blame to a Captain in the Guards Armoured Division, have been shameful.........and highly successful. The myths surrounding the Nijmegen bridge have persisted and been engraved on the public mind by the media and the cinema._ _Given the US commander’s chronic tendency to pass the buck and blame their British allies at every opportunity, it certainly might have been better if some effort had been made to get elements of the Guards Division on the move to Arnhem that night._ *_That, however, is the romantic view, bolstered by hindsight. In practical terms it takes time to assemble an entire armoured division from a battlefield in the dark streets of a town, issue fresh orders and prepare it for another advance._* -The Battle for the Rhine 1944. Robin Neillands.

What did Churchill call a 'SUCKER PUNCH' ?

Just one example between two generals. Montgomery’s proposal of a single thrust into Germany was defeated and we lost the 1st Airborne Division. Patton was engaged with the Germans yet within 48 hours he turned 3 divisions 180degrees and attacked the Germans surrounding Bastogne which he relieved thus securing one flank of the German attack . From a logistical point of view that was first class leadership.That was the difference between them. One was cautious and the other was a “go for it”. Patton was an excellent general and Montgomery was a good general. The best general the UK ever had was Lord Wellington.

@@iemjgf Montgomery turned around his south facing infantry division near Arras in one single night at Dunkirk he moved his division 30 miles northwards across divisional lines to face north with his divisional flank placed securely on the Channel coast. In a matter of hours Montgomery had plugged the ten mile gap left by the duplicitous Belgian Army. The Belgians surrendered .. (as previously arranged with the Germans beforehand ) without informing us . There were no Americans present to witness this superbly executed manoevre on this occasion at this time they were deciding whether to back the Nazis or the british!

@@iemjgf The best General England ever had was Montgomery the UK is an Island not a Country!

@@iemjgf You’re talking drivel. Patton was very slow and the troops under him suffered massive casualties. A mediocre Commander. Patton's Lorraine crawl of 10 miles in three months with over 50,000 casualties. In the Lorraine Patton fought a 3rd rate Amy full of deaf and dumb men- literally. *He moved 10 miles in 3 months, losing 55,000 men.* A 1985 US Army report castigated him. apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a211668.pdf (apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a211668.pdf) Even the German commander of Army Group G in the Lorraine, Herman Black, who took over in September 1944 said: _”I have never been in command of such irregularly assembled and ill-equipped troops. The fact that we have been able to straighten out the situation again..... _*_can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating command of the Americans._*_ Within my zone, the Americans never once exploited a success. Often Von Mellenthin, my chief of staff and I, would stand in front of the map and say _*_”Patton is helping us: he failed to exploit another success”._* From Nigel Hamilton’s 3 volume biography of Monty: _”If this sounds condescending the _*_fact remains that Eighth Army had fought its way almost two thousand miles across North Africa, often with a single supply road, in the time it had taken the 88,000 troops of 2 US Corps to establish its presence in the virtually undefended southern sector of the Eastern Dorsale and then be driven back to the Western Dorsale._*_ With Eight Army drawing upon itself all three Panzer Divisions at the battle of Medenine, and then forcing Messe to keep two of them behind the front at Mareth, Monty felt that a true fighting Corps could, by an energetic offensive, recapture Gaga’s and threaten at least the supply routes to Mareth from Tunisia._ _...Although Alexander later signalled that _*_’2 Corps was very slow_*_ seizing MAKNASSY defile’, he went to see Patton in 25 March and worked out a plan whereby Patton was to use the full strength of his three divisions as Monty wished, and by 27 March he hoped to ‘pass 1 US Armd Div through for a strong thrust to Djebel TBEGA’, in the rear of Gabes gap, or Chort, position._ *_This Patton failed to do, ‘making only negligible progress’_*_ in the attack beginning on 28 March, as his biographer Ladislas Farago chronicled, leading to ‘irritation and confusion’ - _*_week of fighting that resulted only in ‘stalemate’._* *_...Although Patton’s failure to break out of the Eastern Dorsale mountains_*_ had delayed the meeting between British and American forces, it could now only be a matter of days before the two Armies joined hands._ _...Here indeed were the seeds of future discord and misunderstanding, although Eisenhower was too shrewd to leave Marshal with the impression of sour grapes, after the American disaster at Kasserine Pass _*_and Patton’s failure, despite overwhelming superiority,_*_ in the Eastern Dorsale at Maknassy and El Guettar…_ *_...But not all Alexander’s and Montgomery’s urging could shift Patton’s paralysed divisions - and the Americans never did break through the Eastern Dorsale._* *_...and like Patton before him*, Alexander would *completely fail to break through the Eastern Dorsale_*_ to sever Messe’s vulnerable line of communication. Eighth Army, still being supplied along a single road from Tripoli, was thus left to fight its own way forward without material help from Alexander’s forces on the enemy’s rear flank. _*_’Contribution of 2 US Corps has been very poor so far,’_*_ Monty signaled on 1 April 1943 to Alexander. ‘If that corps could come forward e en a few miles it would make my task very simple.’ _*_But Patton was stuck…._* *_...Alexander tried, and in fact Patton was ordered to take the all important Hill 369 ‘regardless of losses’ but it was to no avail. Patton’s troops had taken considerable casualties - *over a thousand men in each infantry division_*_ - and only when the Germans retreated after Eighth Army’s tremendous victory at Wadi Akarit did Patton reach the plain._ _...Patton humiliated by the initial role of tying down enemy reserves, then humbled _*_by his own failure to break through into the enemy’s rear, had no idea what to make of the situation. Thus when con Arnim switched away the Afika Korps divisions from Patton’s front to try and contain Eighth Army’s successful break-in at Wadi Akarit, Patton was in no mood or position to exploit the sudden weakening on his front. Alexander urged again and again, but despite the 88,000 troops under his command, Patton would not take the risk of further infantry casualties._*_ ‘Had this Corps been able to get on, the whole of the AKARIT posn would have been taken in the rear,’ Lt-Colonel Oswald noted with feeling in his diary._ _Nevertheless a great British victory was won that day…._ _...Large numbers of prisoners were taken with their boots off,’ General Leese, commanding 30 Corps, later recalled. The best natural defensive position in North Africa was thus surrendered by the German-Italian Panzer Army in a matter of hours. Within three days Eighth Army was in Sfax - _*_though Patton’s 2 US Corps failed to cut into the Axis retreat, to Roosevelt’s chagrin.”_* -Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. Nigel Hamilton Continued

@@iemjgf Continued... Patton was not advancing or being heavily engaged at the time he turned north to Bastogne when the Germans pounded through US lines in the Ardennes. Bastogne was on the very southern German flank, their focus being west. The strategic significance of the stand at Bastogne, is over exaggerated. The 18,000 did not change the course of the battle. The German's bypassed Bastogne, placing a containment force around the town. Only when Patton neared Bastogne did he engage someGerman armour but not a great deal at all. Patton's ride to Bastogne was mainly through US held territory, with the road from Luxembourg to Bastogne having few German forces. The Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade was far from being one of the best German armoured units with about 80 tanks, 26th Volks-Grenadier having about 12 Hetzers, and the small element of Panzer Lehr (Kampfgruppe 901) left behind with a small number of operational tanks. Patton did not have to smash through full panzer divisions or Tiger battalions on his way to Bastogne. Patton's armoured forces outnumbered the Germans by at least 6 to 1. Patton faced very little German armour when he broke through to Bastogne because the vast majority of the German 5th Panzer Army had already left Bastogne in their rear moving westwards to the River Meuse. They were engaging forces under Montgomery's 21st Army Group near Dinant by the Meuse. Monty's armies halted the German advance pushing them back. On the night of the 22 December 1944, Patton ordered Combat Command B of 4th Armored Division to advance through the village of Chaumont in the night. A small number of German troops with anti tank weapons stopped the American attack who pulled back. The next day, fighter bombers strafed the village of Chaumont weakening the defenders enabling the attack to resume the next afternoon. However, a German counter attack north of Chaumont knocked out 12 Shermans with Combat Command B again retreating. It took Patton almost THREE DAYSjust to get through the village of Chaumont. They didn't get through Chaumont village until Christmas Day. Hardly racing at breakneck speed. Patton had less than 20 km of German held ground to cover during his actual ‘attack' towards Bastogne, with the vast majority of his move towards Bastogne through American held lines devoid of the enemy. His start line for the attack was at Vaux-les-Rosieres, 15km southwest of Bastogne and yet he still took him fivedays to get through to Bastogne. After the German attack in the Ardennes, US air force units were put under Coningham of the RAF, who gave Patton massive ground attack support and he still stalled. Patton's failure to concentrate his forces on a narrow front and his decision to commit two green divisions to battle without adequate reconnaissance resulted in his stall. Patton's Third Army was almost always where the weakest German divisions in the west where. In North Africa Monty's 8th Army advanced from El Alamein to El Agheila from the 4th to 23rd November 1942, 1,300 km in just 19 days. *The fastest advance for such such a distance in WW2.* And that was *after* fighting a major exhausting battle at El Alemein through half a million mines. No such quantity of mines was laid anywhere else in the Second World War. _”Even Rommel’s escape on this day was brought about only by a headlong retreat which Eighth Army forced him to execute prematurely and which therefore completed their triumph of the day before. In Rommel’s own words, he had hoped to hold Fuka ‘long enough for the Italian and German infantry to catch up’. When Eighth Army’s pressure “forced him out of Fuka late ‪on 5 November‬, his unmotorized units had no chance of doing anything other than surrender to XIII Corps. It is almost amusing to read the British accounts of Eighth Army’s slowness and caution, and then to find Paul Carell for instance, lamenting that:_ *_’Montgomery was pressing on with unusual speed,* chasing Rommel’s troops towards Fuka. His men were marching on a parallel course to the Germans, giving them no time to reorganize or dig in for a defence-not even in Fuka. The British High Command seemed to be fully aware of the disastrous position in which Rommel found himself… *In any case the boldness of the British pursuit was conspicuous.‘“* - Eighth Army's Greatest Victories: Alam Halfa to Tunis 1942-1943 by Adrian Turner From Nigel Hamilton’s 3 volume biography of Monty: _”and though later historians might mock it for its ‘onerous’ progress, all contemporary evidence shows that _*_Eisenhower’s headquarters were amazed at the rapidity with which Eighth Army overcame its supply problems and the vast distances of its lines of communication._*_ Not only did Eighth Army assume First Army’s responsibility - as dictated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive of 14 August 1942, and still envisaged in late December 1942 - for the capture of Tripoli, but it even removed the need for Eisenhower’s planned assault on Rommel’s supply line at Sfax - as Butcher noted on 18 January 1943:_ _’The essence of our meeting was that the plan to cut Rommel’s supply line, which had been ‘laid on’ for the II Corps under Major-General Fredendall, was called off because General Alexander’s Eighth Army *had made such rapid progress.’* ‪_On 20 January Butcher recorded: *’Rommel was being driven our way much faster than even the Combined Chiefs had expected.’”_* D-Day plus 90 was 4 September 1944. Monty said Paris would be liberated on D-day plus 90. It was liberated on D-Day plus 80. Dempsey took Brussels, 183 miles from Caen, on D-Day plus 89. Dempsey took Antwerp, 253 miles from Caen, on D-Day plus 90. That’s faster than the Germans in 1940.

as pointed out in A Bridge too Far, Monty thought Market-Garden was 90 percent successful.

@@jamesheald7971 In protecting Antwerp SHAEF thought it a 100% success. SHEAF thought strategically, thinking of logistics to supply all armies.

A success! The main aim of Market Garden was to drive into Germany with a powerful narrow thrust. This would have shortened the war. Because it did not achieve these objectives it was a failure.

@@iemjgf Market Garden did not have Germany as a target destination.

@@iemjgf A prime problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp - the logistics issue. It was: *1)* Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp, or; *2)* Take the Schedlt. Noord Branant had to be take first, as it was *essential.* It was with limited forces sent to take the Schedlt as well. Market Garden had to go ahead regardless of any threat, actually being a success. To use Antwerp and control the approaches, the Scheldt, you needed to control everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen. The low-lying lands and boggy ground between Arnhem and Nijmegen make a perfect geographical feature to stop behind and prepare a defence of Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp. The Germans _were_ actually directing artillery at Antwerp. Market Garden was the offensive launched to solve the Antwerp problem, in keeping the Germans away - it made sense as the Germans were is disarray. Monty’s decision to push on to Arnhem may have been one last attempt at his single front northern thrust argument, and making complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation. You only needed Arnhem if you wanted to springboard into Germany, but *you needed everything up to Nijmegen if you wanted to do anything at all.* Gaining Noord Brabant, was vital and accomplished. Fighting in the low lying mud and waterways of the Schedlt, which will take time, while the Germans are still holding Noord Brabant made no sense at all.

Who had Churchill's approval?

@@thevillaaston7811 Your boy Monty. Well we could call him what Patton called him, "the little twerp". I tend to agree with Patton.

@@akgeronimo501 R You met Montgomery when?..

VILE once again your reading comprehension rears it's ugly head. What part of *we could call him what Patton called him* sent you reeling?

@@bigwoody4704 Patton wasn't fond.

For what reason?

Incompetence,lying to both IKE and Brooke at Caen and Arnhem costing many more lives than necessary.He was worse at commanding than you are commenting.Try pulling your nose out of his backside and putting it in a book.

Richard Big Woody also uses the name Para Dave for KZfaq comments. Para Dave is teenager from Cleveland, Ohio, USA.

You are depriving some poor village of its idiot.

Patton could be very slow and the troops under him suffered massive casualties. A mediocre Commander. _”If this sounds condescending the _*_fact remains that Eighth Army had fought its way almost two thousand miles across North Africa, often with a single supply road, in the time it had taken the 88,000 troops of 2 US Corps to establish its presence in the virtually undefended southern sector of the Eastern Dorsale and then be driven back to the Western Dorsale._*_ With Eight Army drawing upon itself all three Panzer Divisions at the battle of Medenine, and then forcing Messe to keep two of them behind the front at Mareth, Monty felt that a true fighting Corps could, by an energetic offensive, recapture Gaga’s and threaten at least the supply routes to Mareth from Tunisia._ _...Although Alexander later signalled that _*_’2 Corps was very slow_*_ seizing MAKNASSY defile’, he went to see Patton in 25 March and worked out a plan whereby Patton was to use the full strength of his three divisions as Monty wished, and by 27 March he hoped to ‘pass 1 US Armd Div through for a strong thrust to Djebel TBEGA’, in the rear of Gabes gap, or Chort, position._ *_This Patton failed to do, ‘making only negligible progress’_*_ in the attack beginning on 28 March, as his biographer Ladislas Farago chronicled, leading to ‘irritation and confusion’ - _*_week of fighting that resulted only in ‘stalemate’._* *_...Although Patton’s failure to break out of the Eastern Dorsale mountains_*_ had delayed the meeting between British and American forces, it could now only be a matter of days before the two Armies joined hands._ _...Here indeed were the seeds of future discord and misunderstanding, although Eisenhower was too shrewd to leave Marshal with the impression of sour grapes, after the American disaster at Kasserine Pass _*_and Patton’s failure, despite overwhelming superiority,_*_ in the Eastern Dorsale at Maknassy and El Guettar…_ *_...But not all Alexander’s and Montgomery’s urging could shift Patton’s paralysed divisions - and the Americans never did break through the Eastern Dorsale._* *_...and like Patton before him*, Alexander would *completely fail to break through the Eastern Dorsale_*_ to sever Messe’s vulnerable line of communication. Eighth Army, still being supplied along a single road from Tripoli, was thus left to fight its own way forward without material help from Alexander’s forces on the enemy’s rear flank. _*_’Contribution of 2 US Corps has been very poor so far,’_*_ Monty signaled on 1 April 1943 to Alexander. ‘If that corps could come forward e en a few miles it would make my task very simple.’ _*_But Patton was stuck…._* *_...Alexander tried, and in fact Patton was ordered to take the all important Hill 369 ‘regardless of losses’ but it was to no avail. Patton’s troops had taken considerable casualties - *over a thousand men in each infantry division_*_ - and only when the Germans retreated after Eighth Army’s tremendous victory at Wadi Akarit did Patton reach the plain._ _...Patton humiliated by the initial role of tying down enemy reserves, then humbled _*_by his own failure to break through into the enemy’s rear, had no idea what to make of the situation. Thus when con Arnim switched away the Afika Korps divisions from Patton’s front to try and contain Eighth Army’s successful break-in at Wadi Akarit, Patton was in no mood or position to exploit the sudden weakening on his front. Alexander urged again and again, but despite the 88,000 troops under his command, Patton would not take the risk of further infantry casualties._*_ ‘Had this Corps been able to get on, the whole of the AKARIT posn would have been taken in the rear,’ Lt-Colonel Oswald noted with feeling in his diary._ _Nevertheless a great British victory was won that day…._ _...Large numbers of prisoners were taken with their boots off,’ General Leese, commanding 30 Corps, later recalled. The best natural defensive position in North Africa was thus surrendered by the German-Italian Panzer Army in a matter of hours. Within three days Eighth Army was in Sfax - _*_though Patton’s 2 US Corps failed to cut into the Axis retreat, to Roosevelt’s chagrin.”_* -Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. Nigel Hamilton Patton's Lorraine crawl of 10 miles in three months with over 50,000 casualties. In the Lorraine Patton fought a 3rd rate Amy full of deaf and dumb men- literally. *He moved 10 miles in 3 months, losing 55,000 men.* A 1985 US Army report castigated him. apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a211668.pdf (apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a211668.pdf) Even the German commander of Army Group G in the Lorraine, Herman Black, who took over in September 1944 said: _”I have never been in command of such irregularly assembled and ill-equipped troops. The fact that we have been able to straighten out the situation again..... _*_can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating command of the Americans._*_ Within my zone, the Americans never once exploited a success. Often Von Mellenthin, my chief of staff and I, would stand in front of the map and say _*_”Patton is helping us: he failed to exploit another success”._*

@@johnpeate4544 Subjective garbage. I will give you this...you are hilarious and have a lot of foolish time on your hands.

@@bbmtge All *fact.* Sorry if it contradicts the propaganda you’ve been fed for the last years.

@@bbmtge great post and gospel truth - Peate and history are but fleeting acquiantances

Little Blockhead. You really have no idea about history.

That's why the tool admitted "a bad mistake on my part" after the war

Operation Market Garden’s Failure and its Devastating Aftermath kzfaq.info/get/bejne/qruopcqWuJjSiqc.html

A good post.

@@nickdanger3802 'Why Operation Market Garden Failed and Its Devastating Consequences'...Is a presentation that has ben taken apart. As well you know.

yes the operation was taken apart all while Bernard was giving you the Full Monty. Any other rare gems you've mined for the congregation today?

@@bigwoody4704 You really need to grow up your snide remarks are getting old. I think your brain is addled through watching the Patton movie too many times.

Because there's no reason for Montgomery to carry the can for the failure of the 82nd Airborne to secure its primary objective - the Waalbrug at Nijmegen - almost completely undefended on the first day. Brereton and Gavin compromised the planning, and Lindquist compromised the execution of the operation at Nijmegen. Montgomery and all the other troops involved were badly let down by these officers.

Clearly a very brave man. Would it be impertinent to suggest that bravery is not necessarily the only qualification for assessing the capabilities of a senior commander?

Monty _did not plan_ Market Garden, coming up with the idea and broad outline only. Montgomery’s relations with the commander of Second TAF, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, were poor, and he was largely excluded from the planning process. It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF and Hollinghurst of the RAF. It was Bereton and Williams who: ♦ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset. ♦ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet. ♦ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges. ♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity. ♦Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“ From Robin Neilland’s The Battle for the Rhine 1944: _”In early September **Montgomery had a plan ready for employing airborne forces-Operation Comet-and some details of Comet should be noted here. Comet called for the 1st Airborne Division and Sosabowski’s 1st Polish Parachute Brigade to seize the Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges, using gliders for coup de main attacks, landing close to the bridges, rather as Pegasus Bridge at Benouville had been taken by the 6th Airborne Division on D-Day. Once the bridges had been taken the parachute brigades would land on nearby DZs (drop-zones) and join up with the glider parties to hold the bridges until the ground forces arrived. In the Comet plan, Brigadier ‘Shan’ Hackett’s 4th Parachute Brigade was tasked to take the road bridge over the Maas at Grave, landing on a DZ just 1,000 yards from the north end of the bridge-which, hopefully, had just been taken by a force from the 1st Air Landing Brigade in four gliders landing at the south end of the bridge. Operation Comet was planned for 10 September; then it was called off and replaced one week later by Market Garden._ *_The Comet plan stuck to the basic airborne rule-land as close to the objective as possible-and to the basic rule for capturing any bridge-take both ends at once. In view of the subsequent arguments over the deployment of 1st Airborne at Arnhem, one cannot but wonder why the Comet plans for taking the bridges with one reinforced British division, using glider coup de main tactics, were regarded as far too risky for an airborne assault by three Allied airborne divisions just one week later?_* _It has to be clearly understood that taking the bridges on the road to Arnhem was only a means to an end. The final aim was to establish Second Army just west of the Rhine, north of Arnhem, and just south of the Ijsselmeer (or Zuider Zee). Once there, having outflanked the West Wall, which petered out some distance to the south, Second Army could either turn south-east to outflank the Ruhr, or head due east towards Berlin. Any decision on its final destination would rest with General Eisenhower._ _Having elected to use the Airborne Army, Montgomery had first to decide where to cross the Rhine. His own preference was for a crossing east of Arnhem, close to the town of Wesel, and Wesel was also the choice of Dempsey in Second Army. Wesel lay just south “of the Ruhr and was the better option for Garden, with fewer canals and an easier approach to the river. However, Wesel lay within the Ruhr anti-aircraft gun flak belt and the airborne planners stated that low-flying and slow-moving glider-tugs and parachute aircraft would suffer severe losses if Wesel were chosen (readers should note that Wesel was chosen for the last airborne operation of the war, the Rhine crossing in March 1945, when the US 17th and British 6th Airborne Divisions were dropped around the town)._ *_Therefore, since the air planners-specifically Brereton and Major-General Paul L. Williams of the IX US Troop Carrier Command-had the casting vote over the air element in Market, the decision was made for Arnhem, the target town for a thrust north from the narrow bridgehead over the Meuse-Escaut canal east of Antwerp, a route that would require the crossing of some wide rivers or canals: the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon, the Willems canal at Veghel, the River Maas at Grave, the Maas-Waal canal, the River Waal at Nijmegen and the Lower Rhine (Neder Rijn) at Arnhem (the Waal is the southern arm of the Rhine, which divides in two to form the Waal and Neder Rijn, some distance upstream of Arnhem). There were, in addition, any number of minor streams and canals restricting movement off the main north-south axis. “The point to note here is the destruction of the first Arnhem myth. *The choice of drop zones was in the gift of the US Air Force commanders, not the airborne commanders - and the factor that governed the Air Force commanders’ choice of parachute drop zones ( DZs) or glider landing zones (LZs) was the presence, actual or feared, of anti-aircraft batteries around the bridges._* _*Since the US Air Force commanders considered that these bridges would be surrounded by flak guns, they selected landing zones that were, in the main, well away from the bridges._* *_This decision had some dire effects. The obvious one is that it gave some airborne units-most notably 1st Airborne-a long way to go through enemy territory before they even got to their prime objective. If that were all it would have been bad enough, but there was more. It also deprived the airborne soldiers of that other airborne asset, surprise. Once on the ground, airborne units lack mobility: instead of swooping from the sky onto their objectives in a matter of minutes, the men of 1st Airborne had to march there from distant DZs, and this took hours. Long before they reached the bridges over the Neder Rijn the enemy were fully alert._* *_In addition, one of the other prime assets of an airborne division is that it can leap over obstacles that would hinder a ground force by landing on both sides of “a river bridge at once, which the 82nd Airborne did at the Grave bridge, but not at the Nijmegen bridge. At Arnhem both these assets were lost by the Air Force commanders choice of DZs, but the choice of the Arnhem drop and landing zones was not made by Major-General Roy Urquhart, commander of the British 1st Airborne Division._* *_Nor was this the only error committed by the air planners. Another was their decision that ground-attack fighters were not to be sent over the battlefield while escort fighters were in the air protecting supply drops. This decision denied the airborne units the vital assistance that these ground-attack aircraft had been giving to the troops in Normandy just a month before, and a lack of air support exacerbated the problems of the airborne units. Among other tasks, these ground-attack aircraft could have taken on the flak positions around the bridges, those anti-aircraft guns the air planners were so wary of. But the truly dire effect was, as Julian Thompson relates:*that the 1st Airborne Division was denied the use of a weapon the Germans, after their Normandy experience, dreaded. The enemy was able to bring reinforcements into Arnhem in broad daylight, with impunity, a move which would have been fraught with risk in Normandy a few weeks earlier.’_* *_....Ideally, an airborne force, be it battalion, brigade, division or corps, should be landed in one lift. For Market it was judged impossible to fly in all the Allied airborne units in one lift as there were not enough aircraft available. In fact, it was judged impossible to land any of the Allied Airborne divisions intact on the first day._* _This difficulty was put down to a shortage of transport aircraft and glider tugs, but the problem actually went further than that. _*_The British transport commander, Air Vice Marshal Leslie Hollinghurst of No. 38 Group, RAF Transport Command, wanted to solve the aircraft shortage by flying-in two lifts on D-Day. His colleague of the US IX Troop Carrier Command, Major-General Paul L. Williams, did not agree, believing that time was needed to service the aircraft and rest the crews-and this view prevailed at Allied Airborne HQ where Brereton supported it. Since the principal asset of an airborne operation is surprise, the two-to three-day deployment-an attack by instalments-was throwing this vital asset away. This decision would have some profound effects on the ground, most notably on Urquhart’s 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem.”_* - The Battle for the Rhine 1944: Arnhem and the Ardennes, the Campaign in Europe by Robin Neillands

Monty was making Russian generals look like humanitarians. Attacking up a 64 mile lane with no room for maneuver and winter closing in is the idea of an idiot that had no business leading a boy scout troop.Your distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved .And if it wasn't for the sorry fact the British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have been.

@@bigwoody4704 _”Monty was making the Russian generals look like humanitarians”_ Sure he was. Normandy came in ahead of schedule and with 22% less casualties than predicted. When the US First and Ninth armies were given to Monty at the Bulge, Monty chose the right option. Instead of joining a grindmeat where the Americans lost almost 100,000 and the Germans around 75,000, Monty decided to choose his own ground, and not commit too many of his troops in the Ardennes. The result was almost 100,000 Germans were made casualties in Operation Veritable and Grenade, British (and American) casualties were 20.000. In Operation Plunder the British went further to make 30,000 German casualties, for an remarkable number of only 4,000 British casualties, less than 7,000 Allied casualties. Monty's operations were on the offensive, and yet the Germans suffered a gigantic number of casualties compared to the minimum of the British. Of the three main powers, the British managed the most cost effective advances in the war, while still keeping up the pace, and even facing the majority of the Germans in Normandy, while advancing faster than everyone else after the break out to Belgium. Patton was stuck in Metz for three months suffering 50.000 casualties failing to reach the Westwall. Bradley had 42.000 casualties in the Hurtgen Forest defeat. The Americans were having manpower troubles after the Bulge. - mostly because of their head on tactics and complete lack of interest in keeping their soldiers alive. They counterattacked in the Bulge not because it was the most sane thing to do, but just to try make Bradley and the Americans at large less humiliated.

@@johnpeate4544 You are trying to reason with this Woody person. Don't waste your time, as it isn't worth the effort.

No.

V2 Rocket attacks on London were not worth worrying about? CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P543 ‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’ THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945 Rick Atkinson LITTLE BROWN 2013. This paperback edition published in 2013. P245/246 ‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said.

The Germans concluded Market Garden failed because of dispersed drops over a number of days. That decision had nothing to do with Montgomery and everything to do with Brereton of the First Allied Airborne Army and Williams of the USAAF.

Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst then. They made the crucial plans and decisions.

MONTY The Field-Marshal 1944-1976 NIGEL HAMILTON HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1986 P64 'General Browning, Corps Commander of the three and a half divisions designated to participate in the carpet-drop on Zon, Vegel, Graves, Nijmegen and Arnhem, is supposed to have remarked to Monty that Arnhem might be a 'bridge too far'. This is inherently unlikely, since Browning saw Dempsey, not Monty, on the day the revised 'Comet' operation, re-named Operation 'Market Garden', was resurrected.'

Resurrected by Monty Garden IKE was whack for catering to a limited officer who never comprehended coordinating combined arms and mobile mechanical warfare

@@bigwoody4704 In your opinion do you think Richard O Connor would be better commanding an army group?

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Big Woody (aka Para Dave) hates Montgomery, and other Britons, including me.

But NOT better than the Americans, British AND the Russians together... :) Besides, as individual soldiers go the ,Japanese were far better.

@Germany East Well the Germans actually considered the British as their equals, the Waffen SS at Arnhem stated that the Red devils were the best troops they had fought during the war.

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Arnhem a victory for Germany.

@@OldEastGermany A bloody one at that, the Germans took 9 days to fight Paratroopers. Wasn't exactly easy.

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- That's right, but you can turn it around, German elite paratroopers in Italy 'Monte Cassino', stopped the entire allied force for 3 months. That was a world class achievement :-)

Sure they did. *_”That Montgomery was probably the best tactician if not the best strategist of the war is undoubted._*_ We knew his methods well, his ability to move a division across our front in 1940 fighting by day and moving through the night was because of his adherence to training his men. _*_His arrival in the desert changed the 8th Army, he was ruthless in his will to win and pressed this on others. He was a very good army trainer and he changed the battle into an infantry battle supported by artillery. The devastation of his attacks with artillery shocked us. When the American stalled in 1944 (Ardennes), we knew without being told that Montgomery was in the region, he was very good at realizing when a battlefield had become confused, we talked of his ‘tidying up the battlefield’ and reorganizing his lines communication. Montgomery was a master of logistics, in the desert we in the staff warned Rommel that our recess had seen fuel and ammo dumps forward of the battle. Rommel shrugged and said not important, we will deal with ‘another British general here’. That Montgomery did this meant that he believed where he would be in the weeks to come._* _During August we heard of important changes of command on the British side. General Alexander had replaced Auchinleck and General Montgomery had taken over command of Eighth Army. _*_There can be no question that the fighting efficiency of the British improved vastly under the new leadership, and for the first time Eighth Army had a commander who really made his will felt throughout the whole force._* *_Montgomery is undoubtably a great tactician- circumspect and thorough in making his plans, utterly ruthless in carrying them out. He brought a new spirit to Eighth Army, and illustrated once again the vital importance of personal leadership in war.”_* -German General Major Herman Von Mellenthin

Monty was in a different league to Patton. A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2: ♦ Battle of Alam Halfa; ♦ Second Battle of El Alamein; ♦ Battle of El Agheila; ♦ Battle of Medenine; ♦ Battle of the Mareth Line; ♦ Battle of Wadi Akarit; ♦ Allied invasion of Sicily- the largest seaborne invasion in history before Normandy; ♦ Operation Overlord - the largest seaborne invasion in history; ♦ Battle of the Bulge; ♦ Operation Veritable; ♦ Operation Plunder - the greatest river assault crossing of all time. Not only did Monty replan and serve as Allied Ground Forces Commander for Overlord, the largest seaborne born invasion in history, he also replanned the Alllied invasion of Sicily, the largest seaborne invasion in history before that. _”Had the Sicily landings proved - as Salerno and Anzio would prove - near-disasters, then history might well have cast Eisenhower and Alexander in the same noble but failed mound as their predecessors in the Middle East, Auchinleck and Wavell. It is for this reason surely that General Dempsey, on his deathbed, referred to Sicily as Monty’s ‘finest hour’ - for Monty alone among the senior Allied military commanders had the courage to refuse to carry out an ill-conceived plan, and to insist that, if tackled, the invasion be mounted properly. Though he would be pilloried by the ignorant or envious, and his motives made out to be megalomaniacal rather than military, the accusations tell us more about his accusers than about Monty. As one British colonel - not friendly towards Monty - would later remark: I find those who criticise Monty loudest are so uniformly second-rate that I prefer not to make my own views known!….”_ -Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944 In Normandy Monty was in command of all ground forces and was the architect of the 5 beach invasion plan and the overall strategy of the campaign. The plan Overlord by Frederick Morgan was revised by Montgomery, like the original plan for the invasion of Sicily. Both would have led to complete disaster before Monty’s revision. This is something a lot of people don’t seem to be aware of. Monty was the one that made the Overlord plan what it was. The plan was originally just 3 divisions and army Corp landing on some beaches together. He changed the plan from 3 to 5 beaches and from 3 divisions to 8 correctly arguing that 3 beachheads would’ve been too narrow a front and such an attack could be easily rolled up on both flanks. And instead of some airborne brigades, it should be 3 airborne brigades to assist while each army Corp of the British and Americans should have their own beaches to ease organization. And he emphasized Cherbourg as the key. The Allies prevailed in Normandy using Monty’s invasion plan and his ground strategy. On Normandy: _”That the COSSAC plan for a 3-divisional assault in ‘Overlord’ was a recipe for disaster now seems undeniable. Had Alexander been appointed to command the land forces in the invasion, would Morgan’s COSSAC plan have been enacted? Monty was not alone in recognizing its flaws, as will be seen, but he was alone in having the courage and conviction to see that it was thrown out and a better plan adopted. He had done so at Alam Halfa, he had done so gain over ‘Husky’ and whatever mud was slung at him, he was determined that he would do so over ‘Overlord’. For Morgan’s ‘Overlord’ plan, the result of one and a half years of research and discussions, had no prospect of succeeding, as Morgan’s planners themselves confessed…_ _....and by presenting such a clearly defined strategic plan for the battle thereplan can be no doubt that Monty brought to his Allied land, sea and air forces a unity of purpose and conception that was remarkable - and often confused later with Eisenhower’s role as Supreme Commander.”_ -Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. Nigel Hamilton

Another "Hollywood War Expert". I dont think Monty gave Patton a second thought. Not even in the same league

Monty couldn't come across his own 30 mile channel for 4 full years,of course after getting driven into it.Before that on Sicily even with Alexander giving Monty preference with the inside road - Highway 124, Patton still schooled the sap by taking Palermo in the west then going north and east and taking Messina.All while the old woman monty was faffing about

Probably because they use the same footage for different documentary subjects. I've watched a number of their documentaries, and I would almost guarantee you that they have a documentary on the actual Dunkirk Evacuation, which features the first part of this documentary.

_”Patton finally began receiving adequate supplies on September 4, after a week’s excruciating pause”_ - Harry Yeide _”It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is _*_not_*_ true.The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division. No road transport was diverted to aid Montgomery until September 16th On the other hand, three British transport companies, lent to the Americans on August 6th " for eight days," were not returned until September 4th.'”_ - CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE. 1954 P 58 Land supplies were not taken from Patton and given to Monty. It is a complete myth to claim otherwise. Monty didn't even have a full army for the attack at Market Garden, just a Corps and supporting elements, with much flown in from England. *Market Garden was under -resourced.* According to Bradley in his own book there was parity of supplies between the three allied armies, Second British, First and Third US by mid September 1944 and *according to the official US Army History* as cited in Hugh Cole's book, The Lorraine Campaign page 52..."*by 10th September the period of critical (gasoline) shortage had ended"*. This was a whole week before Market Garden took place. The gasoline drought was the end of August/beginning of September. It was over by the time of Market Garden. *Patton failed to take the Westwall.* On 5 Nov 1944 Patton stated to Bradley that he would take the Westwall in three days. He 100% *failed.*

Official UK PDF booklet on Market Garden assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/30056/ww2_market_garden.pdf

Patton couldn't even take Metz for three months. He had already been failing to take Metz for two weeks before Market Garden even started. He never did manage to get across and out of the Lorraine. His Lorraine campaign was the biggest allied failure of autumn 1944. 52,000 battle and 35,000 non battle casualties for his Third Army and it still failed its objectives, which were to get through the Siegfried Line and to the Saar.

A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2: ♦ Battle of Alam Halfa; ♦ Second Battle of El Alamein; ♦ Battle of El Agheila; ♦ Battle of Medenine; ♦ Battle of the Mareth Line; ♦ Battle of Wadi Akarit; ♦ Allied invasion of Sicily- the largest seaborne invasion in history before Normandy; ♦ Operation Overlord - the largest seaborne invasion in history; ♦ Battle of the Bulge; ♦ Operation Veritable; ♦ Operation Plunder - the greatest river assault crossing of all time. Not only did Monty replan and serve as Allied Ground Forces Commander for Overlord, the largest seaborne born invasion in history, he also replanned the Alllied invasion of Sicily, the largest seaborne invasion in history before that. _”Had the Sicily landings proved - as Salerno and Anzio would prove - near-disasters, then history might well have cast Eisenhower and Alexander in the same noble but failed mound as their predecessors in the Middle East, Auchinleck and Wavell. It is for this reason surely that General Dempsey, on his deathbed, referred to Sicily as Monty’s ‘finest hour’ - for Monty alone among the senior Allied military commanders had the courage to refuse to carry out an ill-conceived plan, and to insist that, if tackled, the invasion be mounted properly. Though he would be pilloried by the ignorant or envious, and his motives made out to be megalomaniacal rather than military, the accusations tell us more about his accusers than about Monty. As one British colonel - not friendly towards Monty - would later remark: I find those who criticise Monty loudest are so uniformly second-rate that I prefer not to make my own views known!….”_ -Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944 In Normandy Monty was in command of all ground forces and was the architect of the 5 beach invasion plan and the overall strategy of the campaign. The plan Overlord by Frederick Morgan was revised by Montgomery, like the original plan for the invasion of Sicily. Both would have led to complete disaster before Monty’s revision. This is something a lot of people don’t seem to be aware of. Monty was the one that made the Overlord plan what it was. The plan was originally just 3 divisions and army Corp landing on some beaches together. He changed the plan from 3 to 5 beaches and from 3 divisions to 8 correctly arguing that 3 beachheads would’ve been too narrow a front and such an attack could be easily rolled up on both flanks. And instead of some airborne brigades, it should be 3 airborne brigades to assist while each army Corp of the British and Americans should have their own beaches to ease organization. And he emphasized Cherbourg as the key. The Allies prevailed in Normandy using Monty’s invasion plan and his ground strategy. On Normandy: _”That the COSSAC plan for a 3-divisional assault in ‘Overlord’ was a recipe for disaster now seems undeniable. Had Alexander been appointed to command the land forces in the invasion, would Morgan’s COSSAC plan have been enacted? Monty was not alone in recognizing its flaws, as will be seen, but he was alone in having the courage and conviction to see that it was thrown out and a better plan adopted. He had done so at Alam Halfa, he had done so gain over ‘Husky’ and whatever mud was slung at him, he was determined that he would do so over ‘Overlord’. For Morgan’s ‘Overlord’ plan, the result of one and a half years of research and discussions, had no prospect of succeeding, as Morgan’s planners themselves confessed…_ _....and by presenting such a clearly defined strategic plan for the battle thereplan can be no doubt that Monty brought to his Allied land, sea and air forces a unity of purpose and conception that was remarkable - and often confused later with Eisenhower’s role as Supreme Commander.”_ -Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. Nigel Hamilton

If he had been an American we in England would have never heard the last of him who knows that he grew up in Tasmania Australia he was a disciple of Australia's best Gerneral who was General Monash ... you probably have never heard of him like so much else you Yanks are ignorant of!

Uh-oh, you didn't just say that... :-) Brace for the barrage :-)

@@HBMPaladin thanks for the warning. I'm sure it will happen eventually after all of Monty's devotees amass overwhelming amounts of artillery, ammunition, and personnel.

So was Bob Hope but he was OK he was English...