Afternoon Sal, Retired USCG Marine Engineer Investigator here. Having investigated a similar occurrence on board an LNG ship headed into port back several years ago, there are some similarities here. That ship, an all steam propulsion system, lost steam pressure which shut down all electrical and propulsion systems. During the crews attempt to restore power, the ships high voltage and low voltage buses kept tripping off after being reset. The ship was dead except for the emergency bus for 5 days offshore while being towed around in a circle. What we found after downloading the automation data, was that all the main breakers and bus ties are connected by a PLC (Computer) that tells it the position of all the other breakers and will prevent you from closing the wrong one. The engineers realized that each time the breaker tripped, the PLC had to be reset for every breaker every time it tripped. So if it trips 6 times, you had to press the reset 6 times to clear it on all the breakers. The engineers did not know this since they had never operated these manually before. Once that was found, the systems operated normally. A 100k ton ship dead due to something so small is what I'm expecting them to find.

Sal -- Ex Navy electrician mate and retired automation controls designer here. After reading many of the comments and rereading the report, I'd like to add my 2 cents. Why was the normal lineup to have 1 transformer in used and the other powered down? I would have expected that both transformers would have their high voltage breakers closed at all times and that there would be a schedule to switch the transformer in use on a regular basis. The way electrical system was actually being operated, one transformer was completely disconnected, often for extended periods of time. Leaving electrical equipment sitting unused and unpowered for long periods of time in a ship at sea is a recipe for disaster. Changing temperature and humidity levels on a ship plays h*ll with electrical connections and insulation. In addition equipment sitting idle will always manage to gather dust bunnies from somewhere. The end result is usually a short circuit or a ground when the equipment is turned back on, always occurring at the worst possible time. With this in mind, the following sequence of events may have occurred. 1. Until the day before, TR1 had not been used for months. Until the MV Dali pulled away from the pier, it had been lightly loaded as no large motors were in use. Once underway TR1 experienced normal at sea loads, the conditions in the transformer start to change. I suspect this caused a fault in the transformer. 2. The electrical control automation system detects the fault on TR1 and trips both HR1 AND LR1 breakers to isolate the fault. This is the 1st power failure. 3. The crew overrides the automation and closes TR1 and LR1 to restore power. 4. The fault in TR1 is still there, but the first level of automation trips for HR1 and LR1 have been overridden. The automation system most likely tries to alert the crew to the problem (by setting off more alarms), but they are too busy trying to get propulsion back. This is indicated by the heavy black smoke seen after the first power restoration. 5. After some programmed time delay (and not nearly long enough from the crews viewpoint), when no action has been taken, the automation safety program proceeds to it's next level of protective measures, and trips the DGR3 and DGR4 breakers, shutting down power to the High Voltage bus to protect the generators as well as tripping HR1 and LR1 for a second time to isolate the fault. 6. With the fault isolated, the automation now connects DG2 to the High Voltage bus by closing DGR2. 7. Now forced to deal with the problem, the crew leaves TR1 deenergized and manually close HR2 and LR2 to bring TR2 on line and power the low voltage bus. They have power back, but by now it's too late, and MV Dali hits the bridge. I understand that ship owners want to cut costs, and automation is cheaper than trained people. But I have never seen or designed a piece of automated equipment that was smarter than a well trained operator.

Fascinating report. As a retired USN officer, who served on the USS Lexington and was qualified as OOD-Underway, I listened to your descriptions attentively and stopped the video so that I could peruse the electrical diagram in detail. Same for the text excerpts from the NTSB report. What I was surprised by was the seemingly inherent fragility of that electrical system, and the fact that the emergency generator could only power some of the critical systems. Sure, a warship like mine is designed to take a lot of abuse and keep going - but any ship should have multiple ways of restoring engine propulsion, steering (the Lex had 5 ways to steer her), and full electrical supply from emergency generators to all critical systems. Sounds like the designers never anticipated that the high-volt bus would ever be unpowered. // Since this is not the first collision of a large vessel with a bridge and associated loss-of-life, I think that perhaps there should be the requirement for the tugs to stay close aboard until the ship is thru the bridge. Expensive and inconvenient - but that's exactly what we have now after this collision.

Electrician here. 110 and 220 volt residential power is always in the same panel. They’re also fed from the same transformer. The difference is phase to phase of phase to neutral

"ship hits the fan" is the pun that I needed to hear this morning. 👍

As a Captain of merchant vessels this is one of my biggest concerns. As technology progresses, more and more ship's systems that were previously of the electromechanical variety are switched to intergrated systems with chips and circuits running them. This is important for many reasons, including fuel economy, performance optimisation and longevity of components. However, more and more maintenance work is diverted from the crew to external contractors, with specialised knowledge and tools. Only problem - they are never there when you need them the most...

Former U.S. Navy Engineering Officer Of the Watch (EOOW) here. Sal, your explanation makes perfect sense they way you described it. You claim your no Engineer, I beg to differ. You did a masterful job of breaking this down. Perhaps the merchant fleet needs to adopt a "Sea & Anchor" detail similar to what the U.S. Navy does. Splitting the electrical bus during critical maneuvering operations may have saved the Dali and others from catastrophe.

As a former power plant EE and manager at several power plants (coal, NG, Oil, diesel), i am not a marine engineer but a couple of things stood out in your video. I agree with Sam this sounds like a protection scheme issue, the system if properly maintained was trying to protect TR1. Its normal in transformer protection relaying to open both the HV and LV breakers when a fault is detected on the related buswork, associated components (CTs/Pts), and of course the transformer itself. The ICMS should be key here as if it is similar to what we used in the utilities i worked for, the data should show which signal initiated the relays on the LR1 and HR1 breakers to open. Work upstream from there and you will find most root causes. My 2nd item is more operational in nature. When the crew attempted to restore power after the first power failure, why did they go back to the same TR1 and its breakers when the system was telling them 'Hey i am detecting a problem in this section of the buss"? I can only say in the utility world when we had dual transformers and associated breakers on standby, our procedure was always to use the standby (in this case TR2) and isolate the tripped portion of the buswork for later review before attempting to re-energize. Now if TR2 and that buswork had known maintenance issues well then that's another discussion. Great video!!

Electrical engineer specializing in a relevant field. Obviously there's a lot of detail missing from that electric plant one-line diagram, and I'm not familiar with CONOPS on container vessels, but it looks like Dali was running an unprotected vital bus lineup, where both port and starboard buses are powered by a single source. For the purposes of the lineup, DG3 and DG4 form a single logical source. This is a dangerous lineup in restricted waters. I suspect what's going on here is operators were trying to "wear level" their equipment by running one side of the plant (port or starboard) for X months at a time before switching to the other side. The problem is, you can't do that in restricted waters, because *by tying the port and starboard buses together, any single casualty will result in a complete loss of power.* You're always supposed to be operating in a split plant lineup, with 1 port and 1 starboard source energized (HVR and LVR breakers open) unless a casualty prevents you from doing that. This is where I might be wrong for container ships out at sea; when they're in deep water they have tons of time to recover propulsion in the event of a casualty. However, this should NEVER be the lineup in port. Changing subject slightly, it's clear that whoever was operating the electric plant didn't have a clue what they were doing. If HR2 and LR2 trip, it's not a problem with TR2--there's either an overload or fault on the LV bus. When they closed the EG output breaker into the LV bus and the EG stayed up, it indicates that an overload tripped HR2/LR2. The source of that overload should've been identified and isolated before closing the HR1/LR1 breakers. The fact that HR1/LR1 tripped after 30+ seconds indicates the trip was on long time delay protection. This means that somebody or something (like an automatic relay) turned on a huge load that the forward feeder cabling or transformer wasn't rated to handle. That's why I say they don't have a clue. Excessive/bad automation could also be a contributing factor like Sam Brown said.

I have a little experience with electrical distribution, 20 year substation electrician with a public utility and ex Coast Guard MK. We keep all our transformers energized whether they are loaded or not. This allows us notice if either one faults. It seems to me that that the Transformer that was not being used for months had an internal issue that took a while to manifest itself. If both transformers we're energized as a regular procedure a potential fault would have been detected. I'm just guessing that they do not run the whole bus energized at all times. Electrical equipment does not like to sit idle and deenergized for long periods of time. On land, moisture is a huge deal inside a Transformer, I would imagine at sea even more so. By running everything energized you will also keep heat in the equipment and moisture will be less of an issue. Just a guess.

Thank you for the education. Your point on the Pilot and pilot dispatcher is well taken on the lives saved. Very respectful to those who lost their lives and their families left behind.

Hey there Sal, great video! I was highly anticipating it! There is a CORRECTION to be made though. The second blackout was NOT caused by HR1 and LR1 breakers tripping again. According to the report it was actually caused by breakers DGR3 and DGR4 both tripping (the main breakers for Gen3 and Gen4). This is why DGR2 closed to provide power to the HV Bus which was lost this time. GEN2 was in standby mode so it had spun up. I’m a bit confused at this point because the report then states that the crew closes HR2 and LR2, but there’s no mention of HR1 and LR1 being opened or tripped. Not sure why they decided to energize the TR2 side if TR1 was already in operation. Regardless, the main correction I wanted to point out is that the Main Breakers for DG3 and DG4 did indeed trip, which is what caused the second outtage. According to the report at least 🤷‍♂️🤷‍♂️ Thank you again Sal!

I was an electrician for over 35 years and never saw separate panels in a house for different voltages. That's common in commercial and industrial applications, but never in a house.

It surprised me when the breakers either side of the TR1 tripped the breakers for TR2 did not close automatically, or as a variation the crew close those TR2 breakers. Closing breakers that have tripped because of a fault is asking the breakers to reconfirm that a fault exists - it did - so why not use TR2 and its breakers immediately? I'm sure the CG will be asking this.

As a former submarine crewmember and power plant operator ,you did a good job in explaining this report

As a power plant and electrical distribution tech for new ships I have a lot of experience in testing power plant blackout restoration. Sounds like 10hrs prior and the incident itself, they both had two blackouts in a row; which leads me to believe they forgot to restart fuel pumps or seawater cooling pumps and the generators shutdown on high temperatures most likely.

As an Industrial electrician I am very familiar with the switch panels in your diagram. I can tell you that in a land based factory, during normal operation, the Tie Breakers are left open. Normally, one even numbered generator and one odd number generator is used on both sides of the bus. Both transformers are used as well. This way, if there is a fault , only half of the loads lose power. It also makes it quicker to isolate the faulty circuit. The purpose of a Tie Breaker is to feed the entire bus if there is a problem with one of the transformers or the feeds. Your diagram may show the position of the breakers as they were found on the Dali , But I can tell you this is not the way these panels are designed to be operated under normal conditions. One more additional point. Usually an overload will trip the branch Breaker and the feed breakers will not trip, however if there is a low resistance short in a branch circuit then all of the breakers in series can trip.

I pay no attention to any other source(s) of information on the Dali episode -- yours is the one I trust to be accurate and comprehensive. Thank you.

As a layman I found your explanation concise and complete. Time will tell and get to the root cause so that this does not happen again. Thank you.

Thank you Sal. I’ll tell you how good your reporting/channel is… Look at the comment section! High level discussion from a wide selection of Knowledgeable people. Keep it up Sal, you’re doing great.

The 220 V and 110 V boards are combined in almost every installation. You have the house or office fed by a 220 V transformer with a neutral center tap, which gives you two hots that have 220 V between them, and 110 V each to neutral. The breaker board has two hot bus bars that alternate positions down the centre, so a single breaker gives you 110 V, and a double breaker gives you the full 220 V. Then there's also bus bars for neutral, and for earth, though in the main board those would typically be tied together.

Thanks Sal! As a retired engineer, I can tell you that you did a great job explaining. Keep up the good work!

As a marine engineer, I'm impressed with, and appreciate the accurate explanations. Well done!

Excellent detailed explanation. As a diesel mechanic it all makes sense. And to six people who lost their lives R I P and condolences to the families. Gerry

Wow, Sal. I'm impressed how clear and concisely you explain the electrical generation and mechanical systems of this ship. Understanding it is one thing, but communicating it to a layman so it's understandable is true mastery of knowledge. Kudos !!

One time a contractor hit the "emergency power off" for our facilities UPS. It took several minutes to get power back on. It took days to get all the systems working again. Many things are controlled by your basic PCs and they often don't like it when they loose power without a proper shutdown.

As an electrical protection senior adviser, I would have loved doing this electrical investigation. Well done on the electrical diagrams.

I'm NOT an engineer nor a seafarer but I'm grateful for this explanation. Although not yet comprehensive the NTSB report with your breakdown was most interesting. Thank you. (Tony from Melbourne Australia.)

Excellent description, no blaming, no guessing just facts

It does strike me that the emergency back up systems never envisaged a power failure whilst in a confined waters. I'm so impressed with the Pilot dispatcher and the Maryland Police in getting the bridge closed, incredibly impressive.

I am a retired senior engineering officer. ships i sailed on had a separate distribution board for all items to be fed from the emergency generator(emergengy lighting ,nav lights and 1 steering gear pump. This ships system where the emergency generator is just connected in to the low voltage bus is totally different . when the first blackout happened the emergency generator sharted and connected to the lv bus , crucially it didn't need to syncronise its ac waveform to the bus as there was no other ac wave present , but at the point that the main generator were reconnected it would be necessary to syncronise the ac wave form with the emergency generator this appears not to have been done (or it may not have been possible) connecting unsyncronised AC generator together is not allowed as a syncronising torque acts on the alternators which is powerful enough to shear drive shafts , and /or destroy alternators. i think that the emergency generator needed to be disconnected before the main generators were put back on line.

I have no doubt that most marine engineers don't know how to explain this stuff to the general public as well as you do. I'm glad you are doing it.

HR1 and LR 1 won't trip the HV bus, they are both downstream of that. The HV bus is protected by the breakers between the generators and the bus. I also don't think a lube oil pump will run on the HV bus, 6600 volts is way too much for the motor needed for a lube oil pump (and yes, I understand it's a big pump). Ergo, I think you will find it is only the LV bus that failed in the first blackout. The second blackout appears to have tripped breakers upstream of the HV bus so DGR3 and 4 must have tripped. I feel sorry for the poor trainee pilot, what a thing to have happen on a training trip.

Hey, engineer here! Of course we can talk to other people; they just don’t understand! Was happy to see the tugs have my name: McAllister.

Iron sharpens iron just as excellence begets excellence and now Sal’s high quality reports attracts the highest quality comments a community engagement. Such an amazing global resource, I wish there was medal or national honor we could bestow in recognition of all the hard work and dedication to the industry and lives it supports.

Hi Sal, I was enlisted in the Marine Corps and was press- ganged at the last minute as an air traffic controller on the U.S.S. Nassau, LHA-4 for an exercise in off the Coast of North Carolina. One minute I was planning my liberty with my buddies in Atlantic Beach, the next minute I was ordered to get aboard a CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter and get my hips up to Norfolk, VA. I was on that assault carrier for six days and six nights. As such, I am not a self proclaimed expert on all things nautical. Even though I did not get a sea service ribbon('Badges?! Who needs stinking badges!), it was an experience of a lifetime. But six days were more than enough sea duty for me. I was given carte blanche and the captain's tour and saw anything and everything on that ship. I thank you for your channel as it fills in some of the voids in my knowledge base of moving massive amount of materials and cargo across the waterways of the world.

I'm surprised that the shipping industry standard uses only electric driven pumps, in the electric generation industry, standard is shaft driven oil pumps with electric auxiliary pumps and additional battery driven emergency oil pumps as a fail safe. Your description of events is well done.

Main Power Breakers don't trip unless there is some electrical fault somewhere in the system causing them to trip. When a Breaker is reset and trips again that is a sure indication of an ongoing electrical fault. Those breakers are going to continue to trip until the electrical fault causing the breaker trip is cleared. "This is an electrical or control problem" Thanks for the clear and thorough explanation. Staying tuned in for further updates.

I think you did a great job of explaining it myself. I have a decent very fundamental understanding of electrical systems but not on ships, but I was perfectly able to follow along with your explanation. That's why I love your channel! You explain things in easy to understand ways but also manage to bring in so much more information than other sources provide.

Finally… someone who has knowledge on what they’re looking at, and not just spewing random articles and talking nonsense to fill a 15 min video… great explanation of the data for those of us with mariner experience as well as for those who don’t

Great report Sal, seen similar blackouts a few times in my seagoing career (fortunately not when manoeuvring!) - often caused by the Emergency Generator control system “sensing” there was a power failure and trying to put the Emergency.Generator on the board causing the main breakers to open when in fact there was no black out on the main power supply side.

Positive alcohol content 14 hours after the incident could be challenged in court. "I was so rattled AFTER the crash, I had a few swigs to calm my nerves!"....

Great synopsis. Thanks much. Ex-Marine Engineer that spent a career in Gas & Oil.

You make it understandable to non tech people! Thank you!

Being a retired engineering sailor with a LOT of experience in this area (NAVY ships operate on pretty much the same principles), the way they had the electric plant aligned was a recipe for disaster. No backup should any either HR1 or LR1 trip and the other generator running "unloaded" on the other side of HVR. Had they had HR2 and LR2 closed (which I would think to be typical in a "restricted maneuvering" situation) this more than likely never would have happened. The generators should have been split better as well. Assuming this is an accurate portrayal of the generators relative location to each other, DGR 1 or 2 and DGR 3 or 4 should have been used with one of the others running unloaded. Poor plant management, awful SOP's, Lack of foresight and bad planning were huge factors here.

I respect your dedication to your audience. Bet it means a lot to your fans out there as well. Thank you sir.

Great report! You made it all very easy to understand. Thank you.

Thanks for the update.

First time hearing about the one crew member running for his life and another one getting injured. Also bridge worker running for his life to safety. WOW!

As a nuclear engineer and expert in redundancy and safety systems, I can see two design flaws and administrative shortfalls in the Dali. The engineers designed everything to protect the main engine and the equipment assuming that protects the ship and crew. Not necessarily. Sometimes we may have to sacrifice in a grave emergency to save the ship and crew, which could have been the case with a design of "run to destruction" option. A safety interlock "lockout" feature may have been helpful to avoid the second trips and blackout that may have allowed saving the ship. If an electrical component starts overheat that is better than risking ship and crew. A fire watch in key places can be posted when used. Second the main engine design has apparently little in the design of self support. Why is the oil and cooling not pumped off the engine itself? "On" then means "on" and not "conditional on." "Well they don't come that way." Time to rethink main engine drive on large ships. Third exercising breakers and loads is a routine PM that should be performed in dock and at sea. Also a blackout test procedure should be performed before sailing.

You did a very good job of telling us what happened in real time. Thank you.

Great episode Sall!! Your awsome!! Thankyou!!😊

It's been many years since I've been a sailor, but as I recall, when we were at Sea and Anchor (maneuvering) detail, all systems were up and running. All the generators and as I recall, the Engineers (Snipes) would split the load so one branch would never have to shoulder the entire ships electrical load....from the simple diagram that I see here, it looks like that should have been done.

Fantastic, clear explanation. I've conducted many safety investigations and it's always difficult to present results in a way that folks (who are not familiar with the system) can understand. Well done!

That was the best and clearest explanation I have heard yet, I couldn't leave until I heard it all. Thank you for making these videos Sal.

You always do a great job with these videos, Sal! Thanks for making this understandable for the uninitiated

Now the question is, “Why did the breakers trip?”

Watched a similar video but it did not make sense because the presenter did not explain that the bow is filled with ballast to stop it shifting unexpectedly after the cutting detonation. Good job explaining this overlooked but critical detail.

Thank you! I read the report and had many questions. You answered nearly all of them. I'm grateful for your expertise.

WONKY! We LOVE IT! :) - Thanks Sal

On the nimitz we had rules against performing electrical maintenance during flight ops or restricted maneuvering. they wanted zero chance of operator error accidentally impacting the ships electrical distribution or propulsion during critical times. Do commercial vessels have prescribed configurations for their distributions systems during restricted maneuvering? is there extra manning in the propulsion spaces during these times?

Kind of surprised that after the breakers on both sides of transformer 1 tripped, they reset them instead of connecting the buses through the backup. I would have thought that after a trip, you’d treat that leg as suspect and avoid it in favour of the backup route until the reason for the trip was known. Hindsight and all that, but this is the sort of thing that I would have expected to be written down as standard procedure.

I always enjoy your content. Thanks!

Sal, you are the best! Thanks for all you do!

Excellent job going through the NTSB report.

All this makes a tug escort past navigation hazards like bridges look like a bargain, not an expense. In Japan LNG ships have attached tugs 15 miles or so from the berth when loaded, and escorted out into deep water, clear of hazards in ballast. Worth a thought.

Sal = always prepared! Glad you brought your camera gear!

Thanks again Sal. Yeh just as I figured this is not fully over, but a good update. Like the channel! I was at a sea when another crew member put me onto here

Sal, you are a treasure! Not only do you give us the clearest explanations, but you point us to the issues we should be focused on and not the diversive, paranoid drivel that so many try to feed us.

Great breakdown of the NTSB report. Thanks, Sal.

great videos sal, appreciate your time

Great video Sal. Most interesting. Thank you.

Thank you for this comprehensive and understandable interpretation of the preliminary report. With all the sensational/dramatic and speculative commentary flying around on social media plus the news coverage it's so refreshing to hear someone , from the industry, who actually knows what he's talking about. I have enjoyed your coverage since the event occurred.

I read the preliminary report last night. The only item which surprised me was when NTSB stated that M/V Dali was only required to shift to LSMGO at 12 nm. I never sailed on a ship with a scrubber and completed shifting over by 200 nm. That was required for the North America ECA.

Well made video. Explanation makes sense. Thanks.

Just watched your blog. Terrific explanation for us non-maritime folks. WOW, what a education we're getting from you. Thank you for the detail. Not boring at all. Very well presented. Keep up the good work.

With commercial building electrical panels, major breakers aren't really supposed to be tripping. Smaller breakers are supposed to be tripping when there is a problem. The only time a big breaker trips is when one of the big parts fails.

Re the comments about delayed alcohol & drug testing: Comments about alcohol are correct, but drug testing (for metabolites) comes back positive for weeks after consumption (for most common recreational drugs). So those 3rd party negative drug tests for the entire crew provide useful knowledge.

Glad I'm subscribed and this got recommended.

Fantastic update. Thanks.

Sal I can’t explain the fist blackout but the second I think I can. I’m assuming ships power works the same as land based generators and an engineer can explain this better but I will give it a try! There is a macro level of detail in the generators when you have multiple power sources connected they have to be synchronised ie the voltage and sine-wave from each generators have to be synchronised to be connected i imagine the normal startup processes applies electrical load in stages when you compress that timeframe the generators wander out of the voltage and frequency limits for synchronisation and cause a trip! If they did a rapid recovery and dumped a ships worth of load on generators that hard barely restarted I can easily see a trip

Dude brings a SM7B and associated kit on vacation. That's dedication.

You did a great job of explaining the report and the events.

Excellent commentary, thanks for your work.

Thank you. Together, two generators should deliver almost three million Watts of power. Those are not small circuit breakers, but highly specialized equipment capable of disconnecting serious power. The breakers probably have compressed air or some sort of ballistic system to extinguish arcs which would have tried to keep carrying current as the breakers opened. It seems like a dedicated electronic control unit would be required to properly sequence the breaker operation; no doubt that circuitry is going to get a very close examination to determine why it triggered a disconnect. A dead short would have caused some sort of explosion, given that three million Watts were in play. To me that suggests a control fault.

Something went wonky in the control voltage of those breakers which most likely had UVRs under voltage relays that require power to keep the the breakers closed. With breakers of that size there is usually a mechanical charging handle that enables closing of the breaker against a dead buss. These were likely used by crew to bring one of the generators back on line. Synching a second genset also takes time. Theres also load shedding to consider along with switching logic circuits. Reefer loads on board are huge consumers of electricity. As this was a leased vessel, i suspect lack of switchgear maintenance and cleaning, relay/breaker fatigue. As a retired journeyman marine electrician i can only speculate without looking at the prints, maintenance logs, and what was done at the last yard period?

Sal, thank you for explaining detailed systems and their use so clearly and in a way that us non-engineers can grasp. Keep up the excellent work. Thank you ,

I'm very impressed with the presentation you did. I thought it was easy to understand and an excellent summation/ evaluation of the report.

Fascinating! Amazing story about response speed. Thanks for sharing Your valuable time and insights.🎉😂❤

I probably need to dig into the NTSB report, but thank you so much for this summary. The Electrical system schematic is the key to this incident. However what is not shown on the schematic is where various loads are. The opening of HR1 and LR1 should not cause a total loss of power to both buses, but only a loss of power to the LV bus. The HR bus should still be powered, supplying power to steering pumps and lube oil pumps. It appear the LV bus had control circuits, cooling water pumps and lighting. So we saw a complete blackout of all the lighting, but as long as the DGs kept running, there would have been power on the HV bus. One thing I learned operating submarine electrical systems, is that automatic control is always better than manual control. Letting the system work automatically, is better than getting in there and shutting breaker manually. When you said the operators started manually shutting breakers, I thought, thats when the real problem started. If they had done nothing, and let the EG come up and supply the LV bus, while the DGs continued to supply the HV bus, they may have been able to recover without incident.

Great updates!!!❤️❤️❤️❤️❤️❤️

Thank you for your work this was much needed and appreciated

I sailed for years and was always interested those big ships. Sailing in Boston harbor before taking her out for the season buddie and I were close to the oil docking area skirting through (short cut) this tanker was being controlled by two tugs. Ever look how fast they move ? I tried to sail past as tugs pull in closer port side. 600 feet 500 ft. then one of the tug pilots open the window and Yell, "Can you put that little boat over there so we can put this Big! boat over there" Tacked got some wind and slowly moved.. I miss sailing..

Sal, is it possible that the breakers trip because of excessive power draw from the refrigeration containers. In other words to many refer containers. As always fascinating videos, thank you.

Excellent video with the right amount of detail presented in a manner that was easy to understand.

Many thanks for the information

Thanks for taking the time out on your busy life sal we really appreciate you. Thanks for keeping us in the loop. So what you're saying is something or somebody trip the breakers 🤔 sounds like really bad luck that all things go perfectly wrong or very good planning. I wonder which odds are higher ! It's because they speak Marine engineering they don't speak human lol

Excellent! I look forward to your reporting everyday. Humor included!!

Sal thank you for making this make sense. At the end of the day no matter how big or how small the problem was does not bring back the 6 lives lost or the key bridge. What a terrible peice of history to have to be apart of. Thank you for always make it easy for us to understand. Please as you always do in your videos keep these 6 family’s in your prayer may god give peace to the families and a very huge shout out to NTBS for putting the report out after the final victim was recovered. For the respect to those family’s as bad as we all wanted answers I am glad the last victim was out. Tufs.

Excellent overview, thank you!!