Britain had thwarted the threat of German invasion before even lend lease had been created, so no, the British would not be "speaking Kraut" if not for the Americans because they won the Battle of Britain on their own.

hahaha Leroy you are very very good at chocolate starfish speak

Coz they steal land

cautious probing advances..not according to this chap. As Generalfeldmarschall Kesserling noted ‘even a victorious army cannot keep up a pursuit of thousands of miles in one rush; the stronger the army the greater the difficulty of supply. Previous British pursuits had broken down for the same reason.’ and rather admiringly pointed out, ‘the British Eighth Army had marched halfway across North Africa - and over fifteen hundred miles - had spent the bad winter months on the move and in the desert, and had had to surmount difficulties of every kind.’

what losses? Falaise gap was Bradleys baby,

Bradley claimed responsibility for failing to close the Falaise Gap. He claimed he doubted the 3rd Army had the strenght to take Falaise and hold it against the Germans - famously saying "I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise" - and he did not consult Montgomery when he made the call to halt Patton, though he did consult Eisenhower who supported Bradley's decision out of concern that to cross Allied boundary lines would mean risking incidents of friendly fire.

MG not Monty. planned by Brereton and Williams and it looks like historian Nigel Hamilton disagrees with you. In truth, the real Battle of the Bulge was won in the bulge itself, north of Bastogne, D’Este conceded-especially at St. Vith, where valiant units of the U.S. 7th Armored Division held out against overwhelming odds for eight days, as the two main panzer armies-the Sixth and Seventh Panzer Armies under Generals Sepp Dietrich and Hasso von Manteuffel-stormed through the Ardennes and Montgomery reorganized the American front to thwart them. Patton’s major contribution to the Battle of the Bulge was therefore not so much tactical as moral. He personally briefed the commanders of seven of his U.S. divisions and, as D’Este wrote, “made it a point to be seen” traveling on the icy highways in “an open armored jeep. … Daily he prowled the roads of the [Southern] Ardennes, sitting ramrod stiff, often with his arms folded, his face unsmiling. **More than once his face froze.**” - Montgomery: D-Day Commander (Military Profiles) by Nigel Hamilton

codswallop.